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ABBREVIATIONS
COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with Community practice, the EU countries are listed using 
the alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
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DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
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IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia LVL (Latvian lats)
LT Lithuania LTL (Lithuanian litas)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
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BIS Bank for International Settlements
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BRICs Brazil, Russia, India and China
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CCR Central Credit Register
CDSs Credit default swaps
CEBS Committee of European Banking Supervisors
CEIPOS Committee of European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Supervisors
CESR Committee of European Securities Regulators
CEMLA Center for Latin American Monetary Studies
CEPR Centre for Economic Policy Research
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
CPI Consumer Price Index
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Defi cit Procedure
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EFSM European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Offi cial Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESA 79 European System of Integrated Economic Accounts
ESA 95 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Offi ce of the European Communities
FAFA Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FROB Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fi xed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
ICO Offi cial Credit Institute
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IGAE National Audit Offi ce
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
SPEE National Public Employment Service
LTROs Longer-term refi nancing operations
MFIs Monetary fi nancial institutions
MiFID Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
MMFs Money market funds
MROs Main refi nancing operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAIRU Non-accelerating-infl ation rate of unemployment
NCBs National central banks
NPISHs Non-profi t institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SCLV Securities Clearing and Settlement Service
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
TARGET Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement
Express Transfer system
TFP Total factor productivity
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
WTO World Trade Organisation
XBRL Extensible Business Reporting Language
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.
H1, H2 Calendar half-years.
bn Billions (109).
m Millions.
bp Basis points.
pp Percentage points.
... Not available.
— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignifi cance
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the fi nal digit shown in the series.
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OVERVIEW
In 2010, and although GDP fell by 0.1 % over the year on average as a result of the carry-
over effects of the previous year’s declines in output, the Spanish economy initiated a very 
sluggish and hesitant recovery amid the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The situation cre-
ated poses most considerable future challenges. These involve ensuring the success of 
the fiscal consolidation programme, the completion of the far-reaching restructuring and 
recapitalisation of the financial system, and the implementation of structural reforms ena-
bling imbalances to be fully corrected and that would set the economy once more on a 
path of sustained long-term growth.
The ongoing recovery in the economy continued last year and in 2011 to date, accompa-
nied by a progressive normalisation of the financial markets which, however, were not free 
from bouts of instability. Of particular note were the episodes on the euro area sovereign 
debt markets, which have posed the biggest challenge to the common European project 
since its creation. Inflation has been moving on a rising trend, despite starting from moder-
ate levels in the case of the advanced economies. The acceleration in prices has been 
largely linked to the cost of commodities and, in the case of the emerging economies, to 
greater demand-side pressures, too. This tendency has been more evident since Decem-
ber, due to the sharp rise in oil prices resulting from the political instability in the North 
African and Middle Eastern countries.
The 5 % increase in world output in 2010, following the 0.6 % decline in 2009, encom-
passes very different growth rates across the various geographical regions. The emerg-
ing economies, which had been less affected by the financial crisis, picked up more 
rapidly, with a 7.2 % increase in GDP. This headway was largely domestic demand-led 
and began to be manifest in certain signs of overheating and inflationary pressures. The 
advanced economies, meanwhile, posted growth rates of around 3 %, largely under-
pinned by inventories and public-sector support to demand. That said, fragility per-
sisted in certain sectors, such as the real estate and financial industries, and the labour 
market was lacklustre. Standard indicators continue to show a relatively wide output 
gap, which helps explain the contained course of core inflation. Yet within this group of 
economies there have also been significant differences. In particular, the recovery is 
moving at a slower pace in Europe, with GDP growth of 1.7 % in the euro area in 2010 
and of 1.4 % in the United Kingdom, in contrast to the greater dynamism of the United 
States and Japan (2.9 % and 4 %, respectively; see Chart 1.1). Even within the euro 
area there were significant differences in economic activity across the Member States, 
with vigorous GDP growth in Germany and Finland and significant declines in Greece 
and Ireland. 
Over the course of 2010 there was notable disparity in the economic policy stances ap-
plied, reflecting the differences in the cyclical position of the economies in question, the 
various constraints on their economic policies and the diversity in the assessment of the 
risks that expansionary measures entail. Regarding monetary policy, the United States 
adopted further unconventional stimulus measures based on enlarging the Federal Re-
serve’s balance sheet by means of the direct purchase of – essentially government – se-
curities. This quantitative easing strategy, set in train at the outset of the crisis, was added 
to with a further programme of staggered purchases for a value of $600 billion (QE II) to 
combat deflationary risks and the signs of weakness that emerged in mid-2010. In the euro 
1 Introduction
2  The sovereign debt 
crisis
The world economy continues 
on the path of recovery 
initiated in 2009, against a 
background of rising 
inflation...
… with a marked divergence 
between the advanced and 
emerging economies, and 
considerable heterogeneity 
across the former
The economic policies 
adopted also showed 
divergences, both regarding 
monetary policy...
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area, monetary policy remained accommodative, but no additional expansionary meas-
ures were implemented. Some of the exceptional measures adopted beforehand have 
gradually been withdrawn; however, given the major tensions on euro area sovereign debt 
markets, the Securities Market Programme was set up, centred on the purchase of the 
government bonds of the countries most affected by these tensions so as to preserve the 
efficiency of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Conversely, among the emerg-
ing economies, adopting a contractionary stance prevailed in response to growing infla-
tionary pressures, a stance which, in some cases, clashed with a reluctance to let the ex-
change rate float sufficiently freely.
The differences have proven particularly significant in the fiscal policy arena. In the Unit-
ed States and Japan, the continuing priority was to provide support mechanisms for the 
recovery, which took the form of new fiscal stimulus plans in both countries. The US 
budget deficit is thus expected to have stood at around 10 % of GDP at end-2010, with 
public debt close to 100 % of GDP. Conversely, both in the United Kingdom and in the 
euro area, vigorous fiscal consolidation processes were undertaken. In the case of the 
euro area, sovereign debt market tensions clearly put the focus on the risks inherent in a 
widespread situation of excessive deficits in the Member States, obliging members to 
take ambitious and swift corrective measures to quell investor doubts over the sustain-
ability of public finances. These doubts, however, did not spread to economies such as 
the United States or the United Kingdom, despite the large scale of the deficit and pub-
lic debt in both cases. 
… and, especially, fiscal policy
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The projections available suggest a central scenario for the world economy in which 
growth will continue to firm over the next two years, at a slightly lower rate than in 2010 but 
on sounder foundations. This would come about essentially from the application of eco-
nomic policies whose stance will, broadly, be more contractionary, though not so in the 
United States. The heterogeneity across geographical areas which characterised the be-
haviour of GDP last year would be maintained in this scenario.
It is also likely, according to these same projections, that inflationary pressures will in-
crease over the current and the two following years. As in the case of growth, there will be 
a continuing duality between the emerging economies, where the risk of overheating is 
higher, and the advanced economies, for which price growth rates are anticipated that, in 
the absence of second-round effects associated with the rise in commodities costs, would 
be more contained, in a setting of rather lacklustre employment growth.
Significant risks surround this central scenario and, though they have tended to diminish, 
they continue to point to lower growth rates. Such risks include, primarily, those arising from 
the increase in oil prices, whose ultimate effects on inflation and activity will depend on how 
long the oil price holds at high levels and how it passes through to the prices of other goods 
and services, i.e. on the materialisation or not of the so-called indirect and second-round 
effects. Doubts about the soundness of public finances, the slowness of the return of real 
estate markets to a normal footing and high private-sector debt in some advanced econo-
mies might also check the recovery more than expected. The catastrophes in Japan, too, 
might have an impact on the world economy which, at present, is still difficult to assess. The 
pace and pattern of correction of the so-called “global imbalances” remain a source of un-
certainty. Finally, as regards the necessary resizing of the financial sector and the restructur-
ing of its regulatory frameworks, there has been progress. Yet the risks that may still arise 
from the behaviour of the international financial markets should not be underestimated. 
Turning to financial regulation, where the need for far-reaching change became evident 
with the crisis, the global work led by the G20 has continued, with the Financial Stabil-
ity Board playing a leading role. Mention should also be made of the recent Basel III 
Accord, which introduces new capital and liquidity requirements for banking systems. 
Together, they provide a common reference framework for the deep-seated reforms to 
national regulatory systems that are needed to correct the weaknesses revealed by the 
global crisis. The elements of this common framework include most notably enhanced 
transparency, closer monitoring of developments in the non-regulated financial system 
and tighter control of the systemic risks generated by financial institutions. This would 
be done by imposing greater countercyclical capital requirements, limits on the level of 
leverage and closer surveillance of remuneration arrangements so as to prevent these 
encouraging excessive risk-taking. Discussions also encompass other aspects such as 
taxes on financial activity or the establishment of appropriate mechanisms to manage 
and resolve potential bank crisis episodes. On the whole, this process has evidenced 
notable international coordination, which must be maintained in the future to ensure the 
success of the reforms. 
Notwithstanding, the international financial markets remain subject to considerable ten-
sions. And these are particularly visible in the euro area sovereign debt markets. Any fur-
ther episodes of instability here might translate into a tightening of financial conditions that 
would have unfavourable consequences for corporate and household spending decisions 
in the economies affected. To properly gauge the scale of this risk, the fundamental rea-
sons behind these tensions should be analysed in detail.
The recovery is expected to 
continue at a moderate rate, 
against a background of 
greater inflationary pressures …
… not free from risks
There has been further 
headway in revising 
international financial 
regulation, so as to improve 
prevention and resilience in 
the face of potential future 
financial crises 
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Tensions in the euro area sovereign debt markets began to brew in late 2009 as a result of 
investors’ growing doubts about Greek public finances. The instability spread initially to 
the sovereign debt of those economies already perceived to be prone to greater vulnera-
bility. Such perceptions were based on their fiscal position (whether because of the high 
level of debt or deficit, or because of the pace at which either of these variables was dete-
riorating), the fragilities in their financial system and the presence of relatively weak foun-
dations for sustaining economic growth. But the problems also reached stock and foreign 
exchange markets and gave rise to a progressive loss of confidence by international inves-
tors which ultimately fed through to bank wholesale funding markets, causing serious li-
quidity problems to some institutions. As a result, the stability of the financial system of the 
area as a whole was affected, revealing the tight links between institutions and financial 
markets within the euro area. 
The reluctance of the Greek authorities to request financial support and the doubts 
expressed by European governments and authorities over the substance and form of 
any such support were a breeding ground for heightening tensions, which reached a 
critical point in May. That month saw the approval, finally, of a financial support pack-
age for Greece worth €110 billion, strictly conditional upon the Greek authorities 
adopting an ambitious economic adjustment programme. The funds were contributed 
by the euro area governments and by the International Monetary Fund. It befell the 
European Commission and the IMF, in collaboration with the ECB, to supervise com-
pliance with the terms of the agreement. To curb the growing contagion of the ten-
sions, the European Financial Stability Facility was instituted to run to 2013 and be 
capable of mobilising, along with the EC (through the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism) and the IMF, funds worth up to €750 billion to provide financial assistance 
in similar cases and under conditions that could also be equated to those of the Greek 
programme. 
These decisions contributed to easing tensions, as did too the publication in July of the 
results of the banking stress tests conducted under coordination across Europe, which 
offered a picture of banking system stability. However, over the summer and autumn a 
new source of tension arose, centred this time on the ongoing deterioration of the posi-
tion of Irish banks and on the consequences of the situation for Irish public finances. 
Once again, following an initial phase of some reluctance, the Irish authorities finally and 
formerly requested financial assistance. Their request was approved and took the form of 
a conditional programme, like that for Greece, worth €85 billion. In April 2011, Portugal 
joined the group of countries having to request financial assistance in light of its govern-
ment’s difficulty in carrying out the adjustment and reform plans needed and of the wors-
ening of financial market conditions. On 16 May Ecofin approved the related aid pro-
gramme. Weeks later, the continuing high sovereign spreads in Greece and the 
worse-than-expected behaviour of its main macroeconomic variables led to investor 
nervousness about Greece’s ability to return to the markets for funding in 2012, as envis-
aged in the financial assistance programme. Since the Greek authorities and govern-
ments of the rest of the euro area were unable to promptly define the strategy to pursue 
in light of this eventuality, tensions heightened, fuelled by untimely debates about how 
realistic certain traumatic scenarios were. 
In all three cases, the macroeconomic adjustment packages on which financial support 
was conditional envisaged ambitious fiscal consolidation programmes geared to restoring 
the soundness of public finances and thereby restoring investor confidence. In the rest of 
the area, the tensions experienced on the sovereign debt markets exerted the same effect. 
The sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe began in Greece and 
spread rapidly to the whole of 
the area
The Irish financial system 
crisis fanned tensions anew, 
as did the difficulties in 
adopting the necessary 
economic measures in 
Portugal and concerns over 
the Greek Treasury’s ability to 
return to the market in 2012 as 
planned... 
...and they made it necessary 
to change with relative 
urgency the fiscal policy 
stance across the entire area 
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Fiscal consolidation plans were brought forward and stepped up notably in Spain, with 
structural reforms being introduced at the same time. In Italy, Germany and other econo-
mies in the area, austerity programmes were likewise finalised with a view to their applica-
tion as from 2011. The sovereign debt crisis prompted not only a need to abandon the 
expansionary approach with which fiscal policy had responded in Europe to the initial 
wave of the international financial crisis, but also some urgency to reverse it. The tradi-
tional positive effects on growth of an expansionary fiscal policy (Keynesian effects) were 
exhausted and were rapidly replaced by others that operate to the detriment of activity. 
These are associated with the increases in long-term interest rates that occur when inves-
tors perceive a deterioration in the soundness of public finances and which ultimately 
prompt a fall-off in private spending (Ricardian effects). 
The euro area sovereign debt crisis is essentially the result of a series of imbalances and 
mismatches built up in the economies of certain Member States and their sudden emer-
gence and worsening as a result of the global economic and financial crisis. With differing 
degrees of influence in each case, these imbalances include most notably the continuous 
losses in the competitiveness of some economies; the excessive size of the financial sec-
tor and its excessive accumulation of risks, in other countries; and the high levels of pri-
vate debt prompted, in certain cases, by an expansionary single monetary policy stance 
insufficiently offset by the action of the other strands of economic policy in the hands of 
national authorities. Before the crisis, several Member States had high levels of public 
debt, accentuated on occasions by the existence of contingent public liabilities linked to 
the progressive ageing of the population or to the potential need to undertake banking 
system restructuring. The marked deterioration in budget deficits resulting from the opera-
tion of the automatic stabilisers and from the application of discretionary expansionary 
measures, the loss of extraordinary income linked to certain sectors such as the real estate 
and financial industries, and the influence of the support programs to financial institutions 
which it proved necessary to implement in some countries also contributed to undermin-
ing market confidence in the soundness of public finances. A further factor weakening 
confidence lay in growth prospects, weighed down by relatively unfavourable productivity 
and potential growth developments. As is known, the financial markets have a tendency to 
overreact to news, whereby it is likely that, in this episode too, investors’ response may 
have been excessive in some cases. But that should not mask the real scope of the prob-
lems that have emerged. 
The build-up of these imbalances without any mechanism in place to warn about their poten-
tial risks and their possible effects on the area also reveals the existence of weaknesses in the 
euro area’s non-monetary economic policy coordination and surveillance mechanisms, which 
have acted as amplifiers of the tensions. The sovereign debt crisis has highlighted not only 
the limitations of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and of national fiscal frameworks in 
promoting a sufficient degree of fiscal discipline, but also the inadequate attention to the ac-
cumulation of macroeconomic imbalances that are not necessarily fiscal in nature, as men-
tioned in the previous paragraph. Further, the scale of the tensions, their contagiousness and 
their interrelatedness with the thrust of the discussions on how to address economic govern-
ance in the area are by no means unrelated to the absence of powerful formal mechanisms to 
resolve situations such as those experienced by Greece, Ireland and Portugal, and to the 
difficulties involved in setting such mechanisms in place amid a crisis. 
The tensions on financial markets and, in particular, those created by the increase in sover-
eign risk, affected the monetary policy transmission mechanism and obliged the ECB to take 
measures supplementing those it had already adopted in response to the crisis. More spe-
The primary and principal 
source of the sovereign debt 
crisis lies in the major 
imbalances built up in certain 
Member States…
… whose effects were 
exacerbated as a result of a 
series of weaknesses in the 
structural design of economic 
governance in the area
The tensions on financial 
markets also influenced the 
decisions of the ECB…
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cifically, the absence of medium-term inflationary pressures meant that the ECB Governing 
Council was able in 2010 to retain its expansionary monetary policy stance in the euro area, 
holding official interest rates unchanged at the minimum level of 1 %. However, to ensure the 
effective transmission of its decisions, the Eurosystem continued to apply credit support 
measures, concentrated mainly in the ample provision of liquidity. In addition, the strong ten-
sions on some public debt markets led to the Securities Market Programme being imple-
mented. During the year, nonetheless, the covered bonds purchase programme expired, and 
repayment fell due of the special longer-term loan operations that had been introduced at 
the critical points of the international financial crisis. Accordingly, a sizeable portion of the 
excess liquidity was reabsorbed without giving rise to tensions on interbank markets, which 
shows how the progressive normalisation of these markets continued apace last year. 
In the immediate future, euro area monetary policy will be at a complex juncture that 
poses significant challenges. The gradual withdrawal of the exceptional measures in place 
should be carefully calibrated to avoid interfering in the normalisation of financial markets 
while preventing, too, the maintenance of the measures for too long from reducing the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy, detracting from the ECB’s credibility, distorting the relative 
prices of assets and delaying the reforms needed in certain segments of the European 
banking sector. At the same time, the rise in commodities prices and the difficulties of as-
sessing their medium-term trajectory are a further complication. This may hamper the 
adjustment of the monetary policy stance to a scenario in which the consequent risks of 
indirect and second-round effects that might endanger continuing price stability combine 
with a slow rate of recovery and, therefore, the slow closure of the output gap, and with a 
still-uncertain situation on financial markets. Against this background, the ECB Governing 
Council decided at its April 2011 meeting to raise official rates by 25 bp. 
The challenges for the other European institutions are likewise significant. First, they 
must successfully overhaul the euro area’s economic policy coordination and surveil-
lance mechanisms. As explained in greater detail in Chapter 4 of this Report, the reform 
targets greater and more effective coordination of national policies, which should move 
within agreed limits and which will be subject to mutual, rigorous and effective surveil-
lance. The recommendations of the so-called “Van Rompuy Working Group” were, along 
with the attendant EC proposals, the first steps of a process that should conclude this 
summer. The measures being considered may be classified under three major headings: 
those aimed at ensuring greater fiscal discipline, through the strengthening of the SGP; 
those geared to introducing a new mechanism for monitoring macroeconomic imbal-
ances and competitiveness; and the design of a permanent crisis-management mecha-
nism. Under no circumstances are changes that might require an amendment of funda-
mental aspects of the EU Treaty envisaged, thereby avoiding the risk of an unwanted 
stretching out of the reform.
As part of the reform programme, the EC published in early 2011 the first Annual Growth 
Report, thus inaugurating the “European Semester” of economic policy coordination. For 
the first time, the Member States and the Commission will jointly analyse the risks to mac-
roeconomic stability, headway in fiscal consolidation, and the structural reforms and other 
necessary measures for promoting growth. The European Council’s recommendations 
should be taken into account in preparing the national budgets for 2012 and in the imple-
mentation of other national economic policies. Along the same lines, the new “Europe 
2020” strategy, aimed at increasing European growth potential, has entailed introduction 
of a series of emblematic initiatives at the European level, geared to supporting member 
countries’ reform drives. 
… which faces the challenge 
of bringing financial conditions 
back onto a normal footing 
against a background of 
inflationary risks, slow 
recovery and tensions on debt 
markets
The European institutions 
likewise face the need to 
reform economic governance 
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The success of these reforms and their degree of ambition will determine whether the new 
governance framework is indeed able to withstand the challenges facing the EU. The 
sovereign debt crisis has highlighted the need to strengthen the European institutional 
framework and, particularly in the case of the euro area, to attune it to the high degree of 
integration and economic interdependence attained among its members. A sufficient de-
gree of automaticity and reasonably restrained implementation schedules both for proce-
dures and, where appropriate, for sanctions, will help ensure that the sound working of 
the mechanisms does not depend on national governments’ willingness to meet the com-
mitments entered into.
In this respect, the European Summit on 24-25 March 2011 gave fresh impetus to the 
legislative reform process that will underpin the new framework for the prevention and cor-
rection of fiscal (i.e. a strengthened SGP) and non-fiscal (the creation of the excessive 
imbalance procedure) imbalances. The Summit also laid down the core principles for a 
new, permanent crisis management and resolution mechanism that will come into force 
from 2013 (the European Stability Mechanism), and it approved the “Euro Plus Pact”, 
which enshrines the Member States’ political commitment to adopt measures aimed at 
improving competitiveness, increasing employment, ensuring the sustainability of public 
finances and reinforcing financial stability in the area. However, more immediately ahead, 
the situation in Ireland, Portugal and, especially, Greece poses a challenge whose scale 
should not be underestimated. The transition to this new, reinforced European governance 
framework is taking place amid the harshest crisis the euro has faced since its creation. If 
this complex situation is not tackled with the resolve required to overcome it conclusively, 
the common European project might undergo a setback whose consequences are difficult 
to foresee and which would jeopardise the success of the efforts made to date. 
Another of the structural shortcomings highlighted by the crisis is the absence of macro-
prudential and eminently pre-emptive economic policies aimed at ensuring the stability of 
the financial system as a whole and at minimising the effects of instability on the real 
economy. A consensus has been built around the need to develop a set of early-warning 
instruments to detect the potential build-up of macroeconomic and financial imbalances 
capable of leading to large-scale financial crises. The development of macroprudential 
policy is being addressed through a number of national and international initiatives. These 
include most notably, within the EU, the institution of the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) which, along with the three new European supervisory authorities with a micropru-
dential remit for the banking, securities and insurance sectors, comprise the new Euro-
pean supervisory architecture (the European Financial Supervision System). 
The success of the action undertaken at the European level will hinge crucially on whether 
it is complemented by the measures adopted at the level of the Member States. As re-
gards public finances, the euro area governments have formally undertaken to adopt all 
the measures needed to meet the fiscal targets envisaged under the excessive deficit 
procedures. Some countries have adopted additional commitments to speed through the 
fiscal consolidation foreseen under these procedures and to provide greater guarantees as 
to the sustainability of their public finances. Such progress towards laying the foundations 
for a prudent fiscal policy that ultimately provides for the return to a path of balanced and 
sustainable growth is crucial at the current juncture. 
Now the limits of expansionary demand policies have been reached, structural reforms 
aimed at increasing the responsiveness of economies to shocks, at making them more 
flexible and at raising, in the medium term, growth potential and the capacity to achieve 
The governance reforms must 
be commensurate with the 
challenges facing the EU, and 
due attention should be given 
to the problems the situation 
in Ireland, Portugal and 
Greece may pose in the
short term 
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operating in 2011 
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full employment of productive resources should be the chief priority of economic policy 
action. Along these lines, the Europe 2020 strategy offers a coherent framework to Mem-
ber States for implementing a co-ordinated and comprehensive programme of structural 
reforms, which are vital to boost European growth. Finally, it is important that the ongoing 
restructuring, resizing and recapitalisation of the crisis-hit European banking systems 
should be satisfactorily concluded. Along with the above-mentioned global regulatory re-
forms, these should serve to entrench a sound financial system capable of contributing 
effectively to economic growth through the efficient intermediation of financial flows.
The financial tensions that rocked European markets from May forcefully impacted the 
Spanish economy. The main channel of transmission was the diminished confidence of the 
markets, which was quite acute at certain points in the year, coinciding with the bouts of 
maximum tension in Greece and Ireland. In an economy like Spain’s that is strongly de-
pendent on external saving, these episodes translated into a tightening of lending stand-
ards, markedly so for the Treasury and credit institutions. Spain’s sovereign debt spread 
against the German benchmark was subjected to various bouts of pressure which saw it 
widen to close to 300 bp at the most critical points. Difficulties spread also to the banking 
sector, which for many months found access to the wholesale markets substantially 
blocked. And this, temporarily, significantly increased Spanish banks’ recourse to the 
Eurosystem. 
As in the case of the other euro area countries, the tensions involved an element of over-
reaction by investors. But it would be mistaken to dismiss the importance of the prob-
lems underlying these tensions. The aforementioned weaknesses of the European insti-
tutional framework and the doubts generated about the commitment of European 
governments in general, and of Spain in particular, to tackle structural problems and 
deteriorating public finances also played a key role in the initial stages of this latest 
round of financial instability. 
The vulnerabilities that had emerged further to the crisis seriously increased the Spanish 
economy’s exposure to this type of turbulence, at a particularly delicate juncture. The cri-
sis had given rise to a rapid deterioration in public finances, manifest not only in a very high 
budget deficit level, up to 11.1 % of GDP in 2009 from a surplus of 1.9 % two years earlier, 
but also in the swift rise in the public debt ratio, despite the fact that general government 
debt remained far lower than that of other European economies facing similar pressures. 
Moreover, the surge in the unemployment rate, as a consequence of the depth of the re-
cession in Spain but also of labour market dysfunctionalities, raised doubts about the 
possibility of reversing the course of public spending in the absence of reforms conducive 
to reducing unemployment and boosting growth. 
During the upturn prior to the crisis, Spain had become very dependent on external financ-
ing, a situation that persisted – albeit to a lesser extent in 2010 – and which increased the 
economy’s vulnerability to episodes involving a loss of confidence. These episodes ham-
pered access to the external financing that had been routed through credit institutions, 
whose role was seriously diminished by the doubts over specific segments of the banking 
industry, related to the scope of the impact of real estate asset impairment on the sound-
ness of their financial position. Lastly, high household and corporate debt and the cumula-
tive losses in competitiveness, the result of spending excesses during the upturn, were 
perceived by investors as a check on the recovery of expenditure, whereby the uncer-
tainty spread also to the economy’s growth capacity, once the real estate excesses had 
been corrected.
employment, along with the 
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As the fiscal crisis unfolded, some of these vulnerabilities elicited parallels – in many cases 
unfounded – with the experiences of the Greek and Irish economies, which had to resort to 
external financial support conditional upon harsh adjustment programmes overseen by the 
IMF and the European institutions. The labelling of certain countries on the basis solely of the 
nature of their difficulties, as opposed to the actual scale and potential scope of such difficul-
ties, has been a further factor amplifying the market tensions that have affected the Spanish 
economy. These financial strains hampered the ongoing adjustment and resizing of the finan-
cial system, eroded the confidence of households and firms, which had embarked on a 
process of slow deleveraging, and further checked the pick-up in private spending. 
Economic policy reacted with an abrupt shift in stance in the required direction, which had 
a key bearing on the course of spending and on macroeconomic developments in Spain 
during the period analysed in this report. Given the source of the tensions, it was vital to 
dispel doubts over the trajectory of public finances through a demanding fiscal adjustment 
plan that would ensure compliance with the goals of the Stability Programme for the 2010-
2013 period. In parallel, there was clearly a compelling need to tackle the labour market 
shortcomings that were hampering the absorption of unemployment and the adjustment 
to the economy, through the reform of some of the institutional determinants of the labour 
market. Lastly, in the financial arena, bank restructuring was speeded up, a far-reaching 
reform of the regulation of savings banks was set in train (providing, inter alia, for the trans-
fer of their financial activity to newly created institutions structured in the form of banks 
and encouraging the entry of private capital into the sector), unprecedented transparency 
measures were taken and capital requirements were increased so as to dispel doubts 
about their solvency, even in scenarios of exceptional tension. All these measures are ana-
lysed in greater detail at a later stage, when economic policy challenges are addressed.
In 2010 the Spanish economy slowly embarked on a course of recovery, posting positive 
GDP growth rates throughout the year, except in Q3. At the same time, progress was made 
on the adjustment of the imbalances that had built up during the upturn. The correction of 
the excess in real estate investment, the reduction in net borrowing abroad and the defla-
tionary path in labour costs and final prices all continued, and were joined by the start of a 
reduction in the budget deficit. The outstanding balance of private-sector credit stabilised, 
although the sector’s debt held at a high level which continued to influence spending deci-
sions. During the opening months of 2011 the pattern of sluggish recovery continued, and 
GDP posted a growth rate of 0.3 % in Q1, placing the related year-on-year rate at 0.8 %.
The recovery in 2010 began with some delay and less intensity than that of the euro area 
countries as a result of the greater scale of the crisis in Spain and of the impact that the 
necessary process of adjustment is exerting on short-term growth rates. The recovery in 
output was subject, however, to oscillations during the year as a result of certain tempo-
rary measures acting on the path of domestic spending. Specifically, the rise in VAT sched-
uled for 1 July and the foreseeable end of some of the expenditure-promoting public aid 
programmes (such as the State Fund for Local Investment and the car scrappage scheme) 
led some spending decisions to be brought forward to the first half of the year, while the 
effects of the austerity measures approved in May, chiefly affecting the public components 
of national demand, were felt in the second half of the year. 
Despite the gradually improving path referred to, GDP fell by 0.1 % for the year on average, 
the results of the carryover effect of the declines in output the previous year (3.7 %; see 
Table 1.1). Overall, domestic demand remained sluggish, influenced by the withdrawal of 
the public-sector expansionary impulse to aggregate demand, although the impact on 
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
DEMAND AND OUTPUT (b)
GDP 3.6 4.0 3.6 0.9 -3.7 -0.1
Private consumption 4.2 3.8 3.7 -0.6 -4.2 1.2
Government consumption 5.5 4.6 5.5 5.8 3.2 -0.7
Gross capital formation 6.5 8.3 4.2 -4.3 -15.8 -7.0
Equipment investment 9.2 9.9 10.4 -2.5 -24.8 1.8
Construction investment 6.1 6.0 3.2 -5.9 -11.9 -11.1
Housing 6.1 6.2 2.5 -10.7 -24.5 -16.8
Other construction 6.2 5.8 4.0 -0.8 -0.1 -7.2
Exports of goods and services 2.5 6.7 6.7 -1.1 -11.6 10.3
Imports of goods and services 7.7 10.2 8.0 -5.3 -17.8 5.4
EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, COST AND PRICES (c)
Total employment 3.2 3.3 2.8 -0.5 -6.6 -2.4
Employment rate (d) 64.3 65.7 66.6 65.3 60.6 59.4
Unemployment rate 9.2 8.5 8.3 11.3 18.0 20.1
Compensation per employee 3.7 4.0 4.8 6.4 4.1 0.7
Unit labour costs 3.3 3.3 4.0 4.9 1.0 -1.5
GDP dekator 4.3 4.1 3.3 2.4 0.6 1.0
Consumer price index (12-month % change) 3.7 2.7 4.2 1.4 0.8 3.0
Consumer price index (annual average) 3.4 3.5 2.8 4.1 -0.3 1.8
Consumer price differential with the euro area (HICP) 1.2 1.4 0.7 0.9 -0.5 0.4
SAVING, INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL BALANCE (e)
Resident sectors: saving (f) 22.9 22.6 21.5 19.9 19.3 19.1
General government (f) 4.5 5.7 6.0 -0.1 -6.6 -5.4
Resident sectors: investment 29.5 31.0 31.0 29.1 24.5 23.0
General government 3.6 3.6 4.1 4.0 4.5 3.8
Resident sectors: domestic net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) -6.5 -8.4 -9.6 -9.2 -5.1 -3.9
General government 1.0 2.0 1.9 -4.2 -11.1 -9.2
General government gross debt 43.0 39.6 36.1 39.8 53.3 60.1
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL INIDICATORS (i)
ECB minimum bid rate on MROs 2.0 2.8 3.9 3.9 1.2 1.0
Ten-year government bond yield 3.4 3.8 4.3 4.4 4.0 4.2
Synthetic bank lending rate 3.8 4.6 5.7 6.2 3.8 3.3
Madrid Stock Exchange General Index (DEC 1985 = 100) 1,060.2 1,324.0 1,631.8 1,278.3 1,042.4 1,076.5
Dollar/euro exchange rate 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3
Nominal effective exchange rate vis-à-vis developed countries (h) 100.5 100.7 101.7 103.3 103.5 101.9
Real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis developed countries (i) 108.8 111.6 115.4 119.2 116.1 113.0
Real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro area (i) 107.4 110.1 113.0 114.7 111.0 109.6
Cash and cash equivalents 14.4 11.3 -3.1 -3.3 8.6 -0.2
Liquid assets (l) 11.6 8.4 8.3 9.8 1.0 3.0
Households: total jnancing 20.9 19.6 12.5 4.4 -0.3 0.2
Non-jnancial corporations: total jnancing 21.4 27.9 17.7 7.9 -1.5 1.0
MAIN INDICATORS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a)  TABLE 1.1
SOURCES: INE, IGAE, AMECO and Banco de España.
a The National Accounts data are calculated on the basis of base year 2000.
b Volume indices. Rate of change.
c Rate of change, except the unemployment rate, which is a level.
d Employment rate (16-64). 
e Levels as a percentage of GDP.  
f Includes net capital transfers received.
g Annual average levels for interest rates and exchange rates and rate of change for jnancial assets and liabilities. 
h 1999 Q1 = 100.
i 1999 Q1 = 100. Measured with unit labour costs.
j Includes cash equivalents, other bank liabilities and money-market funds.
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activity was softened by the positive contribution of net external demand, an effect in 
which the thrust of exports was predominant. 
Household spending showed its first signs of growth following two years of strong de-
clines, although these were centred exclusively on the consumption component, since 
residential investment fell off once again. The pick-up in consumption was uneven over the 
course of the year since the rise in indirect taxation from July and the end of the car scrap-
page schemes prompted households to bring forward their spending decisions to the first 
half of the year, which lessened the volume of purchases in the final six months.
The recovery came about in a setting in which high debt continued to significantly restrain 
any greater buoyancy in spending and in which disposable income fell as a result of the 
decline in wage income and the lesser contribution of other sources of income that had 
underpinned it in the recession. There was a fall in the general government contribution 
which, although it remained expansionary in step with the situation of cyclical weakness 
still prevailing, accounted for a lesser amount owing to the withdrawal of the stimuli ap-
plied in prior years. Wealth also fell, albeit less sharply than in 2009, in both its financial 
and real estate components. Against this backdrop, the saving ratio fell sharply in 2010, 
breaking the upward course on which it had moved for three years, standing at 13.1 % of 
disposable income for the year on average. Set against the lacklustre spending described, 
the resort to borrowed funds was flat, although the low rates of credit received were ulti-
mately insufficient to significantly reduce the sector’s debt ratios (see Chart 1.2). 
Household spending began to 
rise, driven by the increase in 
consumption …
… despite the contraction in 
disposable income and the 
need to reduce debt
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Residential investment continued to contract, bringing its cumulative fall since the start of 
the downturn to almost 50 %, which placed the weight of residential investment at 4.7 % 
of GDP (4.5 pp down on the peak three years earlier), in line with the historical average. 
These figures suggest that the bulk of the correction of the real estate overhang in terms 
of activity has already been made. During the year, some housing demand indicators be-
gan to rise owing to the bringing forward of property purchases in the face of the tax 
changes that were introduced (the rise in VAT in July and the partial elimination of tax de-
ductions effective 2011), but also to the improvement in affordability. This meant that, on 
available estimates that are not free from uncertainty, the stock of unsold housing ceased 
to increase in 2010, marking the start of a period of absorption of excess stocks which 
may be prolonged. House prices declined once again in 2010, and this trend continued 
into the opening months of 2011, placing the fall from the peak at 15.4 % (19.3 % in real 
terms). The scale of this decline is still less than that observed in the real estate slump in 
the 1970s, whereby further declines in house prices should not be ruled out. 
Investment by non-financial corporations during 2010 was uneven by component in a set-
ting of tight lending conditions, excess accumulated capacity and limited headway in on-
going corporate deleveraging. Investment in capital goods picked up slightly following the 
collapse the previous year, influenced by the need to replace plant, the improvement in 
export markets and the impact of the plan to stimulate commercial vehicle purchases. By 
contrast, the component of investment in non-residential construction performed more 
negatively, as it was affected by the infrastructure investment cuts in the second half of the 
year.
Over the course of 2010 the improvement in the net lending capacity of non-financial cor-
porations continued. The increase in saving, far outweighing that in investment, meant that 
net lending was equivalent to 0.4 % of GDP for the year on average, an exceptional situa-
tion judging by its historical trajectory. This increase in corporate saving was largely based 
on ongoing staff cuts which allowed for a reduction in unit wage costs, although the sig-
nificant cut in the interest burden as the lagged result of lower interest rates also contrib-
uted. In the case of households, the fall-off in saving, which was sharper than that in in-
vestment, led to net lending that was lower than the previous year but positive for the third 
year running, for an amount equivalent to 4 % of GDP. 
The behaviour of the private sector, along with the cut in the budget deficit, which stood at 
9.2 % of GDP, prompted a fresh reduction in the nation’s net borrowing to 3.9 % of GDP 
(see Chart 1.3). This marks a considerable improvement from the levels of maximum ex-
ternal dependence attained in 2007 (close to 10 % of GDP), although behind this are cer-
tain risk factors that should be mentioned. From the standpoint of trade with the rest of the 
world, the headroom for improvement in the trade balance seems somewhat exhausted 
owing to the adverse impact exerted by the energy bill, amplified in recent months by the 
hike in oil prices, and a marked decline in the deficit arising on investment income pay-
ments. Indeed, the pattern seen in 2010 is illustrative of the challenges that must be ad-
dressed in order to further reduce reliance on external saving in the future. A priority will be 
that exports should be able to continue benefiting from the pick-up in world trade with 
further adjustments in competitiveness and with the design of ambitious diversification 
strategies for our markets. It is likewise vital that import dependence be reduced, most 
particularly in relation to the energy component. It should be borne in mind that the pos-
sibility of reducing the income balance deficit, which was cut significantly in 2010, is re-
stricted by the economy’s high net debit position vis-à-vis the rest of the world and the 
current low level of interest rates. 
The contractionary path of 
residential investment, by 
contrast, continued...
... whereas the course of the 
different components of 
business investment was 
uneven
The net lending capacity of 
the non-financial corporations 
sector continued to improve…
…as did the nation’s net 
borrowing, which once again 
declined
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The economy’s capacity to generate jobs was once again weighed down by the ongoing slide in 
construction activity. This was influenced in 2010 by the fact that civil engineering works ground 
to a halt, following the cut in public investment under the fiscal austerity plan (see Chart 1.4). 
Uncertainty over the strength of the recovery, doubts over the scale of the reforms under way 
and the sluggishness of domestic expenditure further weighed on hiring decisions both in indus-
try and in market services, which continued destroying employment, albeit to a lesser degree. 
The prolonged deterioration in the labour market altered the dynamics of labour supply, which 
expanded very moderately (0.2 %), far off the average rate of close to 3 % for the years 2005-
2008. Behind this weak increase lies the loss of momentum of the working-age population 
seen since the previous year, and influenced by the sharp decline in net immigration flows (in 
the two years spanning 2009 and 2010, these flows were somewhat less than 10 % of the aver-
age for the period 2005-2008). This prompted a decline in the foreign working-age population, 
for the first time since 1990, and a 0.7 % decline in the foreign labour force. Notwithstanding, 
the participation rate rose slightly owing to the increase in female participation, since the at-
tendant male rate and that of the younger cohorts reacted adversely to the cyclical situation. 
Despite the check on the increase in the labour force, unemployment continued to rise in 
2010, albeit at a more moderate rate than in previous years, and the unemployment rate 
climbed to 21.3 % in 2011 Q1. Unemployment affected youths, the less-skilled and for-
eigners more severely. Long-term unemployment rose sharply, accounting for 42.5 % of 
Job destruction continued for 
another year, eroding 
confidence and the capacity 
for recovery
Labour supply expanded 
moderately, influenced by the 
fall-off in the working-age 
population…
… but unemployment 
continued to rise, particularly 
sharply in the long-term 
component
-12 
-10 
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 
TRADE BALANCE ENERGY BALANCE (a) NON-ENERGY BALANCE (a) 
TOURISM BALANCE BALANCE OF INCOME AND TRANSFERS OTHER 
NET LENDING (+) / BORROWING (–) OF THE NATION 
% of GDP 
  
NET BORROWING OF THE ECONOMY CHART 1.3
-12 
-9 
-6 
-3 
0 
3 
6 
9 
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT
 
HOUSEHOLDS 
FIRMS
 
NET LENDING (+) / BORROWING ( –) OF THE NATION 
% of GDP 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 
NET LENDING (+) / BORROWING (–) OF THE NATION
 
INVESTMENT
 
SAVING
 
  
   
% of GDP 
SOURCES: INE, Customs and Banco de España.
a The energy and non-energy balance are an estimate of the Banco de España drawing on Customs data.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 ANNUAL REPORT, 2010 1. OVERVIEW
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
  99   00   01   02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
 LABOUR FORCE  EMPLOYMENT  UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGE  IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE  
Contributions of labour force and employment 
%    
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT (a)  CHART  1.4
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
  99   00   01   02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
 PERMANENT  TEMPORARY  TOTAL 
EMPLOYEES 
Year-on-year rate and contributions  
%   
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a The EPA (Spanish Labour Force Survey) series are linked on the basis of the 2005 Q1 control survey and the change in the dejnition of unemployment in 2001.
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 DIFFERENTIAL  SPAIN  EURO AREA 
SPANISH AND EURO AREA UNIT LABOUR COSTS 
Year-on-year rate 
%   
LABOUR COSTS CHART 1.5
SOURCES: Eurostat and Banco de España. 
 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
 COMPENSATION PER EMPLOYEE   PRODUCTIVITY (a) 
 UNIT LABOUR COSTS 
UNIT LABOUR COSTS 
Year-on-year rate 
% 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
 WHOLE ECONOMY  NON-MARKET SERVICES 
 MARKET ECONOMY 
  
   
% 
COMPENSATION PER EMPLOYEE 
Year-on-year rate 
a Year-on-year rates with sign changed.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 29 ANNUAL REPORT, 2010 1. OVERVIEW
the total for the year on average (46.6 % in Q1 this year). These figures are sufficiently il-
lustrative of the scale of the challenge that bringing back an increasingly larger group into 
the labour market poses, and it presages a substantial increase in the structural compo-
nent of unemployment, which demands an energetic economic policy response. 
Against the background of labour market weakness, labour costs eased substantially dur-
ing 2010. They did so more sharply in the second half of the year, owing to the direct and 
indirect influence of the cut in public-sector wages (see Chart 1.5). Compensation per 
employee increased by 0.7 %, in strong contrast to the 4 % increase recorded in labour 
costs in 2009. A significant portion of the slowdown was due to the change in trajectory of 
public-sector wages, which declined by 1.8 % (after having increased by 4 % in 2009 and 
by 7 % over the 2007-2008 period). The remainder was due to the slowdown in compensa-
tion per employee in the market economy, which increased at a rate of 1.4 % (compared 
with the rises of 3.7 % in 2009 and of 5.9 % in 2008, when the sharpest phase of the reces-
sion began). Behind this result lay the smaller increase in wage settlements, influenced by 
the recommendations of the Pact for Employment and Collective Bargaining entered into 
by the social partners in February 2010, and the absence of inflationary pressures, which 
in turn provided for a fall in market-economy unit labour costs, for the second year run-
ning. Collectively bargained wage settlements in the opening months of 2011 have evi-
denced a rise which, if it takes root, would jeopardise the improvements in competitive-
ness needed to reactivate output and employment.
CPI inflation rose in the second half of the year, posting a year-on-year growth rate of 3 % 
in December 2010 (see Chart 1.6). It has continued on this trajectory to date in 2011, plac-
ing the year-on-year rate of change of consumer prices at 3.8 % in April, having been 
strongly affected by the sharp growth in oil prices in recent months. Much of this increase 
is due to essentially temporary factors, such as tax changes and regulated prices, and the 
upward course of commodities prices. They all have a direct and significant effect on price 
levels and on the inflation rate but, if there are no indirect effects on business costs, their 
impact will ultimately be stripped out of the year-on-year CPI rate after a year. To ensure 
the rise in inflation is temporary, it is thus vital that these indirect effects should be limited 
and that there should be no generalised revision of inflation expectations that ultimately 
affects final prices in a permanent way, either through the prices producers set or through 
wage bargaining. Any reluctance to accept the temporary losses in real income that the 
rise in energy prices and in indirect taxation entails for workers and companies would 
translate into more persistent inflationary pressures and into diminished possibilities of 
recovery and job creation. 
The outlook for 2011 is one of slow recovery and will involve great dependence on the 
ability to harness the momentum of the rest of the world through substantial improvements 
in competitiveness, allowing external demands to provide the support needed for the take-
off in activity and employment. The pick-up in domestic demand is conditional upon the 
level of private-sector debt. This scenario is subject to great uncertainty and potential 
downside risks, associated with the tensions on financial markets that might continue to 
adversely affect financing conditions and economic agents’ confidence. An added risk is 
that arising from the hike in oil prices, which may alter the course of recovery in the ad-
vanced countries and affect economic and financial agents’ confidence. This shock may 
exacerbate the supply-side factors that have traditionally constrained flexibility and the 
potential for growth in the economy, and which stem from the interplay of high energy 
dependence with rigidity in cost and price formation in Spain. An easing in inflation and the 
adjustment of relative prices are essential prerequisites of recovery (see Box 1.1). 
In the setting of labour market 
weakness, labour costs eased 
significantly
And inflation rose forcefully 
owing to predominantly 
temporary factors
The outlook for 2011 is one of 
slow recovery that is not 
exempt from considerable 
uncertainty
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As highlighted in the previous sections, the tensions experienced by the Spanish economy 
were largely due to the vulnerabilities that emerged further to the financial crisis, vulnera-
bilities rooted in the macroeconomic imbalances that had built up during the long upturn. 
One year into this new phase of the crisis, linked to sovereign debt, the factors blocking a 
return to a path of sustained growth have not been fully eliminated and nor have the 
doubts over the economy’s medium and long-term growth capacity, despite the shift in the 
economic policy stance. That all makes for a difficult situation that poses significant chal-
lenges, which include bolstering the recovery while completing the adjustments under 
way, restructuring the economy and restoring confidence. 
In these circumstances, the economic policy response is pivotal and the role of the struc-
tural reforms central to seeing through the correction of the imbalances. The future trajec-
tory of the Spanish economy will hinge on how demanding the response proves; and most 
particularly, on the speed and scale of the recovery and its capacity to generate employ-
ment. In the past, the pursuit at critical moments of ambitious reforms was key to promot-
ing ongoing modernisation and real convergence. Within the euro area, the design and 
implementation of structural reforms is even more important because there is no exchange 
rate available to generate short-term gains in competitiveness and because the leeway for 
using expansionary demand-side policies has been exhausted. At the current juncture, 
there is a timely possibility that the adjustment effort may enable the full adaptation of the 
economy to the macroeconomic stability requirements that euro area membership entails. 
5  The scale of the 
challenges and the 
responsibility of 
economic policy 
The Spanish economy faces a 
difficult situation, and 
overcoming it will require 
ambitious economic policies
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BOX 1.1THE ROLE OF PRICE AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY WITHIN
THE EURO AREA 
An economy’s capacity for adjustment in the face of different 
shocks depends on a series of structural and institutional charac-
teristics, including most notably the adaptability of prices and 
wages to changes in their fundamentals. In the case of the Span-
ish economy, wage- and price-setting mechanisms have given rise 
to a pattern of adjustment that leads to significant fluctuations in 
employment and activity, with prices and wages showing more 
inertia, as demonstrated by various recent papers.1 In the latest 
crisis, for instance, the scale of job destruction was far greater 
than that in other euro area countries where the fall in GDP was of 
a similar magnitude; subsequently, the difficulties faced by the 
Spanish economy in generating net employment mean that emerg-
ing from the crisis is proving more belated and less intense. There-
fore, it is worth questioning to what extent the presence of price 
and wage rigidities has been a relevant factor in the recession and 
may hold back the current phase of recovery. 
To illustrate the scope of these questions, use is made below of a 
general equilibrium model (called BEMOD) estimated for the Span-
ish economy within the Economic and Monetary Union. It reflects 
the various degrees of nominal and real rigidity existing in Spain 
and the rest of the euro area, in the form of different values esti-
mated for wage indexation or for the frequency of revision of pric-
es and wages in the face of changes in their determinants, such as 
marginal cost and the reserve wage, respectively.2 It should be 
borne in mind that BEMOD explicitly models no financial aspects 
other than interest rate movements and, therefore, these results, 
like all those obtained from highly stylised models, should be 
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The sum of the contributions of all the shocks envisaged is not equal to the actual growth rate of GDP or of wages, but to the deviation of this rate from its average 
in the period 1997-2009.
1  For the case of wages, see, for example, P. Cuadrado, P. Hernández de 
Cos and M. Izquierdo (2011), “Wage adjustments to shocks in Spain”, 
Economic Bulletin, April, Banco de España. For price rigidities, a quan-
tification for Spain and other European countries can be found in Dhyne 
et al. (2006), “Price Changes in the Euro Area and the United States: 
Some Facts from Individual Consumer Price Data”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. 
2  See the article by Andrés, Hurtado, Ortega and Thomas (2010), “Spain 
in the Euro: a General Equilibrium Analysis”, published in SERIEs, vol. 1.
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BOX 1.1THE ROLE OF PRICE AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY WITHIN
THE EURO AREA (cont’d)
viewed with due caution.3 In line with recent papers, the model 
estimates an average duration of prices of less than one year both 
in Spain and in the rest of the euro area, and of slightly more than 
one year in wages, as well as a moderate effect of past inflation on 
prices, which is more significant in the non-tradable sectors than 
in those exposed to international competition, and similar in both 
economies. However, the estimated degree of wage indexation is 
high in Spain and scarcely significant on average in the other Eu-
ropean economies. 
The model enables the various factors behind the fall in activity 
in Spain and the euro area during the latest crisis to be identified. 
The top panels in the accompanying chart depict GDP growth in 
Spain and in the rest of the euro area along with the contributions 
of the main shocks that made these economies deviate from 
their historical average growth pattern.4 Of note at the start of the 
recession is the sizeable negative contribution of the “rest of the 
world” item, which captures, above all, the effect of the strong 
fall-off in world demand and which exerts a greater influence on 
the rest of the euro area than on Spain, which is less open to the 
rest of the world. It was also the pick-up in external demand that 
made a firmer contribution to the economic recovery in 2010 – 
once again to a greater extent in the rest of the euro area – along 
with the continuing expansionary stance of monetary policy, with 
lower interest rates than would be denoted by the estimated re-
sponse in the model of these rates to inflation and growth (the 
estimated Taylor rule suggests that, for the observed decline in 
GDP and inflation, the reduction in interest rates might have been 
sharper and swifter). The red bars show a broad set of shocks, 
mainly those related to public demand (which had a very marked 
positive effect during the public stimulus programmes of 2008 
and 2009, and a negative impact with the consolidation meas-
ures introduced in 2010) and national private demand (which 
posted very negative contributions in 2008 and 2009), but also 
those connected to productivity, and those from the rest of the 
euro area.5
Along with these contributions of various shocks to the crisis, a 
clearly negative effect on growth was identified in 2009-2010 
owing to the insufficient adjustment of prices and wages to the 
changes in their determinants, even in relation to the above-
mentioned gradual response estimated by the model, through a 
non-immediate resetting of prices and wages and of indexation 
to past price inflation, which was virtually non-existent in wages 
in the rest of the euro area, but close to 50 % in the case of 
wages in Spain. The contributions of the various shocks to 
wage developments represented in the lower panels of the ac-
companying chart show that wages grew in Spain above their 
determinants (the positive shocks are depicted by green bars) 
from 2008. In the absence of that rigidity, for example, wages 
would have declined by 1.4 % in 2009, compared with the 4 % 
growth observed. Given the delayed effect of wages on employ-
ment and activity, that would have prompted a positive impulse 
of 2.6 pp to GDP in 2010. In the rest of the euro area, although 
wages have outgrown their determinants since 2009, they have 
done so to a lesser extent than in Spain and their impact on 
activity is small. 
With a view to the recovery phase ahead for the Spanish economy, 
it is therefore necessary to insist on the advisability of pursuing the 
required reforms so as to have a greater degree of price and, 
especially, wage flexibility. In the context of the euro area, the 
3  Interest rates are modelled following an estimated Taylor rule where the 
short-term rates on which the ECB acts change in response to move-
ments in inflation and activity in the euro area as a whole. That said, they 
may undergo shocks that make them take values above or below these 
fundamentals.
4  That is to say, the sum of the contributions of all the shocks envisaged 
is not equal to the GDP or wage growth rate, but to the deviation of this 
rate from its average value in the model’s estimation period (1997-2008). 
%
Estimated rigidities
Flexible
economy
Estimated rigidities
Flexible
economy
GDP -1.59 -1.14 -1.11 -0.93
Employment -1.12 -0.62 -0.78 -0.57
Consumption dekator 1.74 1.34 1.18 1.01
Nominal wages 0.04 -0.82 -0.21 -0.76
Accumulated level differences in the second year compared with the baseline scenario
Spain Rest of the euro area
SIMULATION OF A 50% RISE IN OIL PRICES (a)  
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
5  Some of these contributions are very significant individually, but on be-
ing grouped together they tend to cancel one another out, hence the 
relatively small size of the contribution of this set of shocks. 
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impossibility of devaluing our currency should be made up for by 
a degree of price and wage flexibility that provides for the possibil-
ity of gains in price-competitiveness. Such flexibility is, moreover, 
vital in a setting in which further shocks will come about, such as 
the recent rise in oil prices. 
To illustrate how a reduction in these rigidities might help the 
recovery in the Spanish economy over the coming years, the 
accompanying table simulates with BEMOD the effects of a rise 
in oil prices under different scenarios. When the model is used 
with the degree of rigidity estimated with observed data, it can 
be seen that, given a persistent increase in oil prices of 50 %, 
GDP in Spain would decline by 1.6 pp relative to the baseline 
scenario after two years, and employment by 1.1 pp, also rela-
tive to the baseline scenario. In the rest of the euro area, how-
ever, the deviations in activity and employment would be only 
1.1 pp and 0.8 pp, respectively, due to both their greater ob-
served flexibility and to the lesser weight of energy in their pro-
ductive processes and in their consumption basket. A simula-
tion has also been performed of what would happen in a sce-
nario of total wage flexibility in which the second-round effects 
on prices of an inflationary shock are cancelled out, such that 
both in the Spanish economy and in the rest of the euro area 
wage indexation disappears and wages are revised each quar-
ter (this counterfactual scenario is rather extreme, therefore the 
quantifications obtained should be viewed with caution). In this 
case, the negative impact on GDP and employment in Spain 
would be smaller, because wages fall in the face of the decline 
in activity and employment, enabling the outcome of the shock 
to be a lesser adjustment in employment, and therefore also in 
GDP. As a result, faced with the same rise in oil prices simulated 
before, under this scenario of total flexibility 85,000 more jobs 
would be maintained, that is to say, approximately half the jobs 
would be destroyed in the second year as would be under the 
scenario with rigidities. In the case of the rest of the euro area, 
the differences between the two scenarios are smaller, since the 
degree of price and wage flexibility prevailing is closer to the 
counterfactual scenario of wage flexibility.
BOX 1.1THE ROLE OF PRICE AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY WITHIN
THE EURO AREA (cont’d)
1  There are more detailed analyses of the Spanish financial system and of its restructuring and recapitalisation in 
other specialist Banco de España publications such as the Financial Stability Report and the Report on Banking 
Supervision in Spain.
As indicated, over the past year reforms have been undertaken in three major areas: the 
restructuring and recapitalisation of the financial system1; fiscal consolidation; and struc-
tural reforms. The reform drive must persist and further progress must be made in these 
three closely interconnected areas. 
In the financial area, the imbalances accumulated in a part of the banking sector (es-
pecially in certain institutions in the savings banks sector) led as early as 2009 to the 
adoption of measures aimed at prompting substantial write-downs along with the re-
structuring and recapitalisation of the segment, which is where investors’ loss of con-
fidence tended to concentrate. At the core of these imbalances were problems of ex-
cessive size, excessive concentration of real estate exposures and high dependency 
on wholesale market funding. Further compounding these imbalances were the diffi-
culties arising from certain singular features of savings banks that have magnified the 
perception of these institutions’ vulnerability: their particular ownership structure, an 
insufficiently robust corporate governance model, difficulties in raising top-quality 
capital on the markets and the complexities which, compared with other credit institu-
tions, arise from a legal framework that sees measures taken at both State and re-
gional government levels.
In 2009 the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB) was created. 
Its dual aim was to resolve in an orderly fashion potential situations of bank non-viability, 
and to pave the way for integration processes between viable institutions. In this latter 
case, financial support from the FROB was conditional upon the submission of an integra-
tion plan, containing the business and restructuring plans, which had to be approved by 
In the past year there has 
been a shift in the economic 
policy stance in three major 
areas 
In the financial area, a far-
reaching process of write-
downs, restructuring and 
recapitalisation is taking place.
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the Banco de España (Box 1.2 offers greater details on the FROB and on the other meas-
ures discussed below). 
The first wave of the sovereign debt crisis in spring last year entailed a widespread loss of 
investor confidence which, owing to the reasons indicated, particularly affected a group of 
countries of which Spain was part. Ultimately, these circumstances highlighted the need 
to speed through integration processes, so as to achieve synergies allowing cost cuts, the 
idea being to create better managed and more efficient institutions with a greater volume 
of assets that would be better placed to raise funding on the markets. The reaction was 
swift and took the form of the approval of a significant number of integration operations, 
most with the financial support of the FROB, which affected a highly significant portion of 
the savings bank subsector. As a result, the number of savings banks or groups of savings 
banks in this subsector has, as at the end of May, fallen from 45 to 18, while the integration 
plans approved envisage significant reductions in both the number of branches and in 
staff levels at the institutions involved. 
In summer 2010 the highly detailed results of the stress tests conducted in coordination at 
the European level were published. In Spain’s case the tests covered listed banks and all 
savings banks. The results showed that the Spanish financial system as a whole could 
withstand relatively unlikely extreme shocks, and that only four groups of savings banks 
would not, in the event the assumptions materialised, manage to maintain the levels of 
capitalisation required in the tests. 
The restructuring and recapitalisation drive undertaken, along with the write-downs made 
by the institutions, were an appropriate response to savings banks’ problems of excessive 
size and accumulation of risks, as confirmed by the stress tests. At the same time, savings 
bank reform legislation was passed in summer 2010, the main aim of which was to im-
prove the governance of these institutions and their ability to raise own funds on capital 
markets. 
These measures were also boosted by others taken at around the same time at the Euro-
pean (the financial support mechanisms and the unconventional monetary policy meas-
ures) and Spanish (fiscal consolidation and labour market reform) levels. Tensions began 
to abate after the summer and investor confidence started to pick up. There was thus a 
reduction in the risk premia on assets issued by the public sector and by financial institu-
tions, and a gradual resumption of foreign capital flows.
However, this process was abruptly interrupted in the autumn as a result of the outbreak 
of the Irish banking crisis. Tellingly, as this episode was centred on the banking sector, it 
proved particularly harmful to the savings bank restructuring and recapitalisation process. 
The fact that the two Irish banks that had participated in and passed the aforementioned 
stress tests were an integral part of the problems substantially weakened investor confi-
dence in the results of the tests. Thereafter, bank funding costs once again began to rise 
and the difficulties in gaining access to the wholesale markets increased. Spanish credit 
institutions, and especially savings banks, thus saw how much of the headway made 
thanks to the previous reformist drive was lost. 
In November, the Banco de España imposed a particularly intense transparency exercise 
on savings banks to obtain a proper picture of their situation. Prior to end-January 2011, it 
published detailed data on their exposure to the real estate development and construction 
sector and on the volume of wholesale funding and their liquidity situation, the two factors 
The process is considered 
vital to tackle confidence 
problems that have been 
exacerbated by the sovereign 
debt crisis… 
… and later refuelled, again, 
by the tensions caused by the 
Irish banking crisis
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This box describes in some detail the main characteristics of the 
different measures adopted as part of the Spanish banking sys-
tem balance-sheet write-down, restructuring and recapitalisation 
process discussed in the main body of the text. The process be-
gan with the creation of the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of 
the Banking System (FROB), further to Royal Decree-Law (RDL) 
9/2009 of 26 June 2009, which had a dual aim: to provide a solu-
tion for institutions that ceased to be viable, and to pave the way 
for integration processes involving viable institutions by promot-
ing their restructuring. The former aim has only been used in one 
instance (Cajasur), although before the creation of the FROB con-
trol was taken over another institution (Caja Castilla-La Mancha) 
through the participation of the Deposit Guarantee Fund. The 
overall weight of these two savings banks scarcely exceeded 1 % 
of the system’s total assets. The second aim was instrumented 
through the subscription by the FROB of convertible preference 
shares, equity units or contributions to the capital of credit coop-
eratives, for a maximum term of five years, extendible by a further 
two years, and earning a minimum return of 7.75 %.1 The aid was 
conditional upon the submission of an integration plan approved 
by the Banco de España. This second arrangement was instru-
mental in supporting eight savings bank integration processes, in 
which the FROB committed itself to aid totalling €10.07 billion 
(around 1 % of GDP).2 Together with a further four processes 
which have not required FROB participation, the resulting restruc-
turing has proven far-reaching, as the accompanying table 
shows.3 Overall4, 39 out of a total of 45 savings banks are in-
volved, accounting for 88 % of the assets of this subsector and 
32 % of those of the national banking system. The result is a re-
duction in the number of savings banks or groups of savings 
banks to 18, with an average size in terms of total assets of €70 
billion, almost 2.5 times greater than was previously the case. 
The integration plans approved also envisage a cut of between 
20 % and 25 % in the number of offices and of between 12 % 
and 18 % in staff. These developments have been accompanied 
by a substantial balance-sheet write-down drive which, for 
Spanish deposit institutions as a whole, has amounted to €96 
billion (9.5 % of GDP) in the three years from 2008 to 2010, as 
the accompanying chart shows. 
In spring 2010, stress tests coordinated at the European level 
were conducted. It was considered that the target level of core 
(Tier 1) capital institutions had to reach following the exercise 
was 6 % of risk-weighted assets (higher than the figure of 4 % in 
the regulations then prevailing). In Spain, the exercise was con-
ducted covering 90 % of the system’s total assets. The results, 
which were disclosed in extensive detail in late July, highlighted 
the resilience of most Spanish institutions since only four groups 
of savings banks required additional capital, for a total of €1.84 
billion, under the adverse scenario. In spring 2011 a similar exer-
cise has been conducted, the results of which are expected to be 
published in June.
In July last year, the government approved the reform of the sav-
ings bank law by means of RDL 11/2010. The aim was to tackle the 
two structural weaknesses in the sector, linked to its singular legal 
structure, which have become clearly manifest during the crisis: 
BOX 1.2SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM BALANCE-SHEET WRITE-DOWNS, RESTRUCTURING AND RECAPITALISATION: 
THE MAIN STEPS TO DATE
SAVINGS BANK RESTRUCTURING PROCESSES
Participating 
institutions
Final 
institutions
Total assets 
(€ m) (a)
Assets as 
% of 
savings 
banks total
Assets as 
% of 
banking 
system 
total (b)
Integration processes 
with FROB aid
33 9 (4 SIP) 863,353 68.1 24.8
Integration processes 
without FROB aid
7 3 (1 SIP) 330,263 26.1 9.5
Total restructuring ( c) 40 12 (5 SIP) 1,193,616 94.2 34.3
Other 5 5 73,452 5.8 2.1
Total savings banks 45 17 1,267,068 100 36.4
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€ bn 
  
 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Consolidated balance sheet data as at 31.12.2010.
b Sum of national banking instituions' consolidated balance sheets.
c Including the restructuring of CCM, although in this case the traditional DGF framework was used.
1  The return shall be the higher of 7.75 % and the return on 5-year Spanish 
public debt plus 500 bp at the time of approval of the operation and shall 
increase by 15 bp each year up to the fifth year, and by 100 bp for each 
additional year if the operation is extended.
2  These figures do not include the initial Banco Base IPS (Institutional Pro-
tection Scheme) project, for which aid totalling €1.49 billion (making for 
a total of €11.56 billion) was envisaged, and which was finally not grant-
ed. The two institutions or groups resulting from this collapsed project 
have reconsidered their recapitalisation strategies in accordance with 
the new requirements laid down in RDL 2/2011.
3   Integration processes have also taken place between other institutions 
in the Spanish financial system (commercial banks and credit coopera-
tives) in the form of voluntary initiatives aimed at improving efficiency. 
4  Taking into account the collapse of the Banco Base IPS project.
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governance problems and a limited capacity to raise high-quality 
capital. As regards the former, more restrictive limits were placed 
on the presence of general government representatives on the gov-
erning bodies of savings banks, who were further required to dem-
onstrate their professional suitability. To redress the second short-
coming, a more attractive legal regime was introduced for equity 
units, and the legal structures through which savings banks may 
provide their financial services were broadened, allowing them to 
pursue their financial activity through public limited companies with 
the category of commercial banks, either through Institutional Pro-
tection Schemes (IPSs) or through the creation of a commercial 
bank to which their financial business would be transferred. 
Also in summer 2010, the Banco de España issued a circular 
(CBE 3/2010) amending the accounting rules for provisioning, with 
three aims in mind: to recognise the value of different real estate 
guarantees according to the type of asset involved, but applying 
substantial precautionary haircuts and shortening the period over 
which provisioning is made for the risk as a whole; to increase the 
minimum provisioning charges for foreclosed assets, which de-
pend both on appraisals and on the passage of time; and to en-
courage the setting of greater prudential margins for the granting 
of loans. Later (in November), the central bank required savings 
banks to publish detailed information on their exposures and pro-
visioning, especially exposures to the real estate sector, on the 
volume of wholesale funding and on their liquidity situation, which 
they duly did before the end of January 2011. That same month, all 
banks were formally required to incorporate this information into 
their 2010 financial statements. 
On 18 February 2011, the government approved RDL 2/2011. 
This legislation increased the minimum capital level required of 
banks, introducing a new solvency ratio that must be met main-
taining common equity Tier 1 capital5 of at least 8 % of risk-
weighted assets, and raising this ratio to 10 % for those institu-
tions in which the relative weight of funding from wholesale mar-
kets exceeds 20 % and which have not placed at least 20 % of 
their capital with third-party investors. The functioning of the 
FROB was also reformed so that it may be used to recapitalise 
those institutions that cannot meet these requirements by tap-
ping the markets. Specifically, the FROB is authorised to sub-
scribe ordinary shares under market conditions, which it must 
sell before five years have elapsed, provided that the institution 
submits a recapitalisation plan for approval by the Banco de Es-
paña. In these cases, the FROB shall take a seat on the board of 
directors of the institution affected. If a savings bank or savings 
bank integration process by means of an IPS is involved, all 
lending activity must be transferred to a bank by one of the 
means provided for in RDL 11/2010. The new requirements have 
to be met by September this year, although an extension of three 
months, extendible to six months in the case of market listing 
processes, may be requested. On 10 March 2011, the Banco de 
España made known the capital requirements arising from the 
new regulations, with the result that 12 institutions (two Spanish 
banks, two subsidiaries of foreign banks and eight savings 
banks) evidenced additional capital needs for a total amount of 
€15.15 billion (€14.08 billion of which relating to savings banks). 
On 14 April the Banco de España approved the strategies for 
complying with these new capital requirements. In the case of 
the institutions participating in the original Banco Base IPS, sep-
arate strategies have been submitted for the capital require-
ments of the two institutions or groups of institutions resulting 
from the collapsed project. On 28th April, within the legally stipu-
lated term, the institutions or groups of institutions that have re-
quested from the FROB, as the primary source, the funds they 
need to meet these capital requirements, submitted their recapi-
talisation plans. Thereafter, the measures envisaged in the new 
RDL 2/2011 have continued to be pursued both by the Banco de 
España and by the FROB so as to comply with the formalities 
and schedules laid down. 
SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM BALANCE-SHEET WRITE-DOWNS, RESTRUCTURING AND RECAPITALISATION: 
THE MAIN STEPS TO DATE (cont’d)
BOX 1.2
5  This definition is stricter than the above-mentioned core (Tier 1) capital 
and is based on the Basel III concept applicable in 2013, with some 
amendments.
perceived by markets as the main factors of risk of savings banks. In turn, in February 
2011 the government approved a Royal Decree-Law whereby the minimum levels of sol-
vency required of all banks were raised and the FROB was authorised to acquire, tempo-
rarily and subject to approval by the Banco de España of a recapitalisation plan, shares in 
the capital stock of those institutions that could not obtain the funds required on the mar-
ket within the period established. Capital requirements have been raised to a greater de-
gree for institutions in whose capital there is not sufficient participation by third-party in-
vestors and which are more reliant on wholesale markets, and it has also been stipulated 
that recourse to the FROB by a savings bank shall entail the transfer of its business to a 
bank, which would translate into a substantial change, inter alia, in its corporate govern-
ance regime and in its possibilities of gaining access to capital markets. 
The aim of this new set of measures, along with the forthcoming publication of the results 
of the new European stress tests, is to contribute decisively to restoring international 
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investor confidence in our financial system, reducing the risk of an extension of the ten-
sions that might undermine the recovery of the Spanish economy. 
In the budgetary domain, the government approved a package of deficit-cutting measures 
for 2010 and 2011 in May, supplementing the 2010 Budget (the withdrawal of some of the 
extraordinary expansionary measures, in force during the crisis, and a VAT rise from 1 July, 
among others). The May package involved an additional cut in spending of around 1.5 % 
of GDP for these two years, whereby the deficit-reduction path was set at 9.3 % of GDP, 
6 % of GDP and 4.4 % of GDP in 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively. 
The consolidation strategy defined by the government brought forward the bulk of the ad-
justment to the 2010-2011 period, underpinning it with spending cuts, many of which struc-
tural, including most notably the cut in public-sector employees’ compensation from June 
2010, the reduction in public investment, the freeze on public-sector wages and pensions in 
2011, and the 10% ceiling on the rate of replacement of public-sector employees. The State 
budget for 2011 validated these measures, introduced further cuts to other budgetary items 
and provided for specific tax rises (a tax rise in the State personal income tax tranche for 
incomes above €120,000 and the elimination of the tax deduction for purchase of the ha-
bitual dwelling for incomes above €24,170.2). The Updated Stability Plan for the period 
2010-2014, which the government approved on 29 April, confirmed the above-mentioned 
path of adjustment to 2013 and further set a deficit target for 2014 of 2.1% of GDP, which 
would be compatible with a public debt/GDP ratio of 68.9%. Accordingly, if the targets of the 
proposed consolidation plan are met, the deficit will embark on a declining course in 2014.
The public finances outcome at end-2010, entailing a general government deficit equiva-
lent to 9.2 % of GDP and a public debt ratio of 60.1 % of GDP, show that the measures 
adopted in 2010 have proven effective in reversing the upward trajectory of the budget 
deficit. They do, however, involve an uneven budgetary adjustment drive across the differ-
ent tiers of government: while the State cut its deficit by 4.3 pp (to 5 % of GDP), the re-
gional governments’ shortfall increased by 1.4 pp (to 3.4 %). The Social Security fiscal 
position also worsened by 1 pp, posting a deficit of 0.2 %. 
The fiscal projections for 2011 and 2012 by the Banco de España as part of the annual mac-
roeconomic projections exercise suggest some risks of deviations from the consolidation 
path. The projected reduction in the deficit is based on macroeconomic projections which, if 
they are not confirmed, might translate into a less favourable performance by revenue. Fur-
thermore, potential deviations at the territorial government level cannot be ruled out. 
The fiscal consolidation programme is a centrepiece of the overall economic policy strat-
egy, whose success hinges on a major budgetary effort that is unprecedented in terms of 
its size and extension to all levels of general government. In meeting these targets it will 
not be possible to count on the help of other potential sources of improvement that were 
present during the expansionary phase. On one hand, the extraordinary revenue linked to 
the real estate boom will not be resuming and, on the other, neither the business cycle, 
which is following a very gradual pattern of recovery, nor the interest burden, which has 
already moved onto a rising course, will help improve public finances. 
To prevent the risks of a deviation from the fiscal consolidation path materialising, it is 
necessary to set in place sound foundations for the reduction of the deficit and the control 
of medium- and long-term debt, in line with the proposals made in Chapter 2 of this report, 
which focuses on this matter. It is crucial to involve all levels of government in the fiscal 
Turning to fiscal policy, a 
demanding budgetary 
consolidation strategy was 
defined for 2010 and 2011,…
… bringing forward the 
adjustment drive envisaged for 
2013 to the 2010-2011 period. 
It was based predominantly on 
structural spending cuts
The fiscal projections for 2011 
and 2012 point to some risks 
of deviations …
… and averting this will require 
action by all levels of 
government and a strengthening 
of the budgetary stability rules
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 38 ANNUAL REPORT, 2010 1. OVERVIEW
consolidation process, to strengthen the institutional commitment to budgetary stability 
and the mechanisms for enforcing the rules, to increase the transparency of public fi-
nances and to reinforce budgetary planning in the medium term. 
The application of structural reforms providing for enhanced employment generation and 
growth capacity is crucial for embedding a durable recovery and facilitating fiscal adjust-
ment (see Box 1.3). Supply-side policies that improve the working of the markets for 
goods, services and factors are vital to pave the way for a durable expansion of activity 
and employment; and, therefore, to also increase government revenue and, through this 
means, to promote the medium-term sustainability of public finances. In turn, an appropri-
ate distribution of the adjustment drive between public spending and revenue would con-
tribute to boosting activity and would have positive effects on employment. 
The reform of the pensions system, the draft legislation for which was submitted to Parlia-
ment in March 2011, is an example of measures that harness the complementarity be-
tween the sustainability of public finances and the creation of favourable structural condi-
tions on the supply side. The reform approved in Spain amends certain parameters of the 
system, raising the legal retirement age and increasing the number of years taken into 
account to calculate pensions. The combination of both measures could, on one hand, 
increase participation by more elderly workers and thus raise growth potential; and, on the 
other, it could enhance the sustainability of the pensions system and contribute to the re-
structuring of public finances (see Box 2.3). 
The labour market reform approved last year (Law 35/2010 of 17 September 2010) took 
certain steps towards improving the functioning of the labour market in the medium term. 
In terms of internal flexibility, one aim of the reform was for companies to be able to 
change certain aspects of how work was organised (in particular regarding the conditions 
for setting wages) compared to what was stipulated in industry-, region- and nationwide 
collective bargaining agreements; that would bring about a more decentralised model, al-
lowing a closer relationship to be established between working conditions and the spe-
cific needs of companies. However, this would all be done without yet altering the collec-
tive bargaining system. In turn, in the case of hiring mechanisms, changes were made to 
the modalities already in place in order to boost permanent hiring (facilitating the possi-
bilities of terminating permanent contracts for objective causes and extending the possi-
bility of using employment-promoting contracts), while new limits were added in the case 
of temporary hires. On the whole, these are so far partial measures that do not alter the key 
features of the labour framework, such as hiring and collective bargaining arrangements, 
and they cannot therefore decisively change its present functioning. 
Any assessment of the impact of these measures would be premature. The as yet very 
partial information available points to an increase in employment-promoting contracts 
which, however, would appear to have crowded out other permanent contracts, while the 
impact on temporary employment is not yet discernible. Also evident is a greater use of 
objective dismissals, with lower severance costs, and a greater use by companies of the 
possibilities to reduce the working day, on a temporary basis. Some time will be needed to 
accurately ascertain the link between the changes being observed and the effectiveness 
of the steps taken. 
The behaviour of employment continues to be the source of most concern in the economy, 
and the wage rises observed in the opening months of the year indicate that the measures 
already taken must be complemented by far-reaching reforms to collective bargaining and 
Fiscal consolidation must be 
accompanied by an ambitious 
structural reform programme
The pensions reform approved 
in March this year has positive 
effects on the sustainability of 
public finances and growth 
potential 
Labour market reform remains 
one of the fundamental 
economic policy measures 
needed …
… and it should go ahead with 
substantial changes to the 
collective bargaining system …
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BOX 1.3
The substantial fiscal consolidation the Spanish economy needs 
to correct the budgetary imbalances arising from the crisis faces 
various problems; compounding the difficulties derived from the 
very scale of the imbalances are further complications due to 
growth expectations limited by the depth and extension of the 
crisis and by the impact of population ageing on spending on 
social policies. These are major obstacles standing in the way of 
public finances sustainability. In such a situation, a factor of great 
importance is the complementarity of fiscal consolidation policy 
and supply-side policies which, by improving the functioning of 
the markets for goods, services and factors, may lead to an ex-
pansion in potential growth, increasing public revenue and allow-
ing certain spending items to be reduced. 
To illustrate the effects that fiscal consolidation and structural 
reforms have on GDP and public debt in the short and medium 
term, this box presents simulations performed using a calibrated 
model for Spain that has two essential ingredients. First, in line 
with the standard approach in much of the recent economic lit-
erature1, the model incorporates distortions in the labour and 
product markets, in the form of monopolistic competition, which 
give rise to a gap between marginal costs and prices and to the 
inefficient allocation of productive factors. Second, so as to 
capture the impact on the economy of population ageing, the 
model’s demographic structure is highly detailed, in the form of 
overlapping generations of households.2
FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND STRUCTURAL REFORMS
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
BASELINE SCENARIO STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
SLOW CONSOLIDATION 
2 PUBLIC DEBT (% of GDP) (a) (2010-2020) 
  
  
1 
1.2 
1.4 
1.6 
1.8 
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060  
BASELINE SCENARIO STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
3 GDP PER CAPITA (a) (2010-2060) 
    
1 
1.05 
1.1 
1.15 
1.2 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
BASELINE SCENARIO STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
SLOW CONSOLIDATION 
1 GDP PER CAPITA (a) (2010-2020) 
    
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 
DEPENDENCY RATE 
4 DEPENDENCY RATE (b) (2010-2060) 
  
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The variables depicted have been normalised taking their 2010 value.
b The dependency rate is dejned as the ratio of the over-65 population to the working-age population (16-64).
1  See, for example, L. J. Christiano, M. Eichebaum and C. L. Evans (2005), 
“Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary 
Policy”, Journal of Political Economy, 113 (1), pp. 1-45.
2  For a detailed description of the model and its calibration, see A. Gavi-
lán, P. Hernández de Cos, J. F. Jimeno and J. A. Rojas (2011), “Fiscal 
Policy, Structural Reforms and External Imbalances: A Quantitative Eval-
uation for Spain”, Moneda y Crédito, forthcoming.
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BOX 1.3FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND STRUCTURAL REFORMS (cont’d)
Panels 1 and 2 show the response of GDP and of the public 
debt/GDP ratio from 2010 under different scenarios. The base-
line scenario incorporates a public spending trajectory for the 
period 2009-2013 in line with that established in the April 2011 
Stability Programme. It further entails the continuation of the fis-
cal consolidation process after 2014, whereby the public debt/
GDP ratio in 2020 settles at 60 %. This scenario does not, how-
ever, consider the introduction of structural reforms. Before ad-
dressing the potential impact of these reforms, and to assess 
the significance of the time path of the adjustment, this scenario 
is compared with the so-called “Slow Consolidation” scenario, 
in which the effects of cutting future budget deficits more mod-
erately, again in the absence of structural reforms, are simulat-
ed. As can be seen in Panels 1 and 2, a slower fiscal adjustment 
than that considered in the baseline scenario would entail a sig-
nificant delay in the stabilisation of the public debt/GDP ratio, 
without any benefits in terms of short-term growth. These re-
sults illustrate the advantages of the strategy of bringing the fis-
cal adjustment forward.
An assessment follows of the consequences of introducing 
structural reforms, for instance, those affecting the markets for 
goods and services. In the “Structural Reforms” scenario, it is 
assumed these reforms would narrow the prevailing margins be-
tween marginal costs and prices in the goods and services and 
labour markets by 2 pp3, and that they would increase the 
growth rate of productivity in the economy by 0.5 pp once the 
crisis were overcome.4 As can be seen in panels 1 and 2, the 
structural reforms considered, by reducing the distortions exist-
ing in the markets, would improve the allocation of resources, 
exert a significant positive impact on activity and make for a 
swifter improvement in public finances in the short and medium 
term, widening the fiscal policy room for manoeuvre. 
In the long run, the dynamics of activity and of public finances will 
be notably influenced by the population ageing currently charac-
terising Spain, and most other developed countries. With its high-
ly detailed demographic structure, the model used in this box can 
capture the impact of this ageing process on spending on pen-
sions and on labour supply, along with other general equilibrium 
effects on prices and wages. In this setting, the adoption of struc-
tural reforms would also have a considerable positive effect since, 
as shown in panel 3, it would significantly soften the effect of 
population ageing on growth (see panel 4). 
The results presented assume that the cost of financing for all do-
mestic agents (households, corporations and government) is inde-
pendent of the volume of debt in the economy. However, as was 
clear in the sovereign debt crisis episodes in 2010, the perception of 
international lenders may be that an economy’s risk of default rises 
with its volume of debt, and they may demand a growing premium in 
return. In this case, the advantages of undertaking structural reforms 
and accelerating fiscal consolidation would be even greater than 
those resulting from the simulations presented in this box. 
3  This reduction in margins is approximately equivalent to one-third of the 
competitive differences estimated in the literature across different coun-
tries. See, for example, J. Andres, E. Ortega and J. Vallés (2008), “Com-
petition and Inflation Differentials in EMU”, Journal of Economic Dynam-
ics and Control, 32 (3), pp. 848-874, and R. Christopoulou and P. 
Vermeulen (2008), “Markups in the Euro Area and the US over the Period 
1981-2004  −  A Comparison of 50 Sectors”, European Central Bank 
Working Paper Series, no. 856
4  The positive impact on productivity derived from regulatory improve-
ments in the goods and services and labour markets is empirically docu-
mented, for example, in G. Nicoletti and S. Scarpetta (2006), “Regulation 
and Economic Performance: Product Market Reforms and Productivity 
in the OECD”, in T. Eicher and C. García−Peñalosa (eds.), Institutions, 
Development and Growth, MIT Press, and A. Basanini, L. Nunziata and 
D. Venn (2009), “Job Protection Legislation and Productivity Growth in 
OECD Countries”, Economic Policy, 24 (58), pp. 349-402
active employment policies. The collective bargaining system in Spain concedes to infla-
tion a predominant role among wage-increase determinants. Also, bargaining is carried 
out at an intermediate level which foments highly uniform wage increases that are barely 
linked to the specific economic conditions of companies. This furthermore prevents rela-
tive wages from acting as a mechanism to allocate resources towards sectors with greater 
development potential. 
A more appropriate design of collective bargaining would help improve the capacity to 
redistribute employment across sectors, companies and regions, which would provide 
for a swifter exit from unemployment for the large number of jobless workers. An im-
provement here is vital, moreover, so as not to jeopardise the gains in competitiveness 
that have come about during the adjustment phase and so as to lay the foundations for 
a sound recovery in the economy. The increase in purchasing power that would ultimately 
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ensue as a result of this improvement in the competitive environment would also enable 
demand to be sustained. In sum, the appropriate functioning of the wage-setting mech-
anisms is a cornerstone of the capacity for macroeconomic adjustment within the euro 
area and of the structural change that the economy needs, following the serious shock 
it has undergone.
The changes should, moreover, be complemented by a far-reaching reform of active 
and passive unemployment policies, so as to help prevent the increase in unemploy-
ment from becoming structural. In this respect, the incentives of the benefits system 
should be reconsidered so as to make eligibility conditional upon active job search, 
complementing this with active policies aimed at enhancing training. The reforms ap-
proved in February 2011 are in this direction, although it is once again too soon to as-
sess their effects.
Some of the problems in our educational system, such as the high drop-out rates, can be 
found to be associated with the scant wage dispersion derived from our collective bar-
gaining system, which does not generate the right incentives for prolonging schooling.2 
However, improving human capital also requires significant steps to be taken in the edu-
cational system, including lifelong training.
The Spanish economy would be better placed to bring about a change in the productive 
model that has prevailed over the last business cycle if the design of the educational 
system and of labour institutions were to appropriately encourage companies’ and 
workers’ training decisions, to provide for job mobility across firms and industries, and 
to increase the capacity for adjustment in the face of the various shocks the economy 
may undergo, assigning less weight to employment fluctuations over the course of the 
business cycle. 
In recent years there has been a notable drive to liberalise and deregulate the market for 
goods and services, but there is room to take some of the measures already undertaken 
further and to launch new reforms.
In the housing market, house rentals as opposed to house purchases should continue 
to be encouraged. A more balanced market will pave the way for the provision of hous-
ing services under more favourable conditions, it will contribute to absorbing the ex-
cess capacity in the residential sector and it will provide for job mobility, which is es-
sential for infusing dynamism into the adjustment of the labour market across regions 
and industries. To this end, the latest initiatives adopted – such as greater legal effi-
ciency in tenancy-related proceedings and the elimination of the tax deduction for in-
comes above €24,000, equating it to the rental deduction – should be complemented 
by measures aimed at adding flexibility to the mandatory term of contracts and the 
control of rental incomes. 
The most substantial progress in structural reforms in recent years has been in connec-
tion with the liberalisation of the services sector, among others, and with the lessening 
of administrative burdens, further to the transposition of the Services Directive. How-
ever, obstacles remain in respect of the liberalisation of certain activities, such as retail-
ing, where the regional governments can continue to establish administrative authorisation 
… complemented by a far-
reaching reform of active and 
passive unemployment 
policies 
Increasing the quality of 
human capital requires 
substantial improvements on 
the educational front …
… and the drive to liberalise 
and deregulate the markets for 
goods and services must 
continue 
2  See A. de la Fuente and J. F. Jimeno (2009), «The Private and Fiscal Returns to Schooling in the European Un-
ion», Journal of the European Economic Association, December, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 1319-1360.
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“for reasons in the general interest”. Such reasons may ultimately interfere in the alloca-
tion of productive resources and price-setting. In addition, the reform of professional 
services should advance along the same liberalising path, given the significance of this 
sector in Spain and the numerous obstacles in place compared with those in other 
countries. 
Turning to the network industries, there remain segments in telecommunications in 
which certain rigidities and limited progress in the degree of competition are discerni-
ble, specifically in those most closely connected to the new communications technolo-
gies (broadband). In the energy industry, the degree of de facto competition is also 
scant and final prices should be more closely aligned to costs in order to bring about by 
means of incentives a reduction in our energy dependence. In the fuel distribution mar-
ket, further steps are needed to eliminate the barriers to entry and to the expansion of 
new operators, in line with the recommendations of the National Competition Board 
(CNC by its Spanish acronym). As to transport, there is scope for liberalising rail trans-
port, in particular freight.
Lastly, while the general government technology investment drive has increased con-
siderably, the carryover effect of public funding into private investment seems rather 
limited; accordingly, Spain’s relative lag in technological and scientific production has, 
overall, scarcely been corrected. In this respect, it would be advisable to improve gov-
ernance of the public research system and the mechanisms for managing incentives to 
R+D+i. 
2 THE FISCAL OUTLOOK FOR SPAIN AFTER THE CRISIS
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2 THE FISCAL OUTLOOK FOR SPAIN AFTER THE CRISIS
The euro area sovereign debt crisis, which was the main source of concern regarding mac-
roeconomic policy implementation in the area, was the outcome of a series of closely in-
terlinked factors. The financial crisis had seen uncertainty and nervousness surge, restrict-
ing the channels of funding for the countries that had recently increased their level of debt. 
Further, there was a generalised deterioration in fiscal positions in most countries, giving 
rise to an unprecedented increase in public-sector short-term net borrowing. Against a 
background of financial instability, this prompted greater investor sensitivity to the source 
of the fiscal imbalances that had built up. As a result, these imbalances began to be 
viewed as potentially unsustainable in some countries (see Chart 2.1).
These factors were shared by other economies, such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Japan, but the crisis became particularly virulent in the euro area. The short-
comings in euro area governance proved particularly problematic in light of the macroeco-
nomic and fiscal divergences that had arisen, which heightened uncertainty and the lack 
of confidence in the countries with the biggest imbalances. Moreover, the high financial 
integration among the euro area countries may have been conducive to the markets per-
ceiving cross-country contagion as a possibility.
The sovereign debt crisis began in Greece and subsequently spread to Ireland and Portu-
gal. Other countries were also affected by the contagion, as a result – to differing degrees 
in each case – of doubts over their growth prospects, uncertainty about the costs of re-
structuring their banking systems and the swift rise seen in their budget deficits and public 
debt, as described in Chapters 1 and 4 of this Report.
The first pre-requisite for overcoming the euro area sovereign crisis is the follow-through 
of a fiscal consolidation process, embarked upon already in some countries in 2010, that 
leads to firm foundations being set in place to reduce the deficit and control debt in the 
medium and long run, and to the entrenchment of the macroeconomic stability needed to 
promote economic growth. Equally important for dispelling market doubts is the applica-
tion of structural reforms that help provide for the recovery in potential growth and the 
conclusion of the restructuring of financial systems. But such action will not suffice if, as 
well, the euro area’s governance shortcomings that have emerged virulently as the sover-
eign debt crisis has unfolded are not redressed.
This chapter focuses singularly on analysing the fiscal consolidation challenges that the 
sovereign debt crisis has posed for Spanish economic policy.1 First, changes in the fiscal 
position during the crisis in Spain are described. These illustrate how, despite the sur-
pluses in the previous phase, the fiscal space available to pursue expansionary fiscal pol-
icies was limited, and they also reveal the essentially structural nature of the fiscal imbal-
ance built up. Next, debt dynamics are analysed, highlighting the role that economic 
growth potential and the cost of financing play in the sustainability of public finances. That 
primarily helps clarify why the swift increase in the fiscal deficit resulted in strong debt 
market tensions, and, secondly, it allows conclusions to be drawn on how the fiscal adjust-
1 Introduction
In 2010 the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis was the 
fundamental economic event, 
centred on some of the 
peripheral countries
The seriousness of the 
situation requires a resolute 
economic policy response on 
several fronts
1  With reference to Spain, the recovery in potential growth was the central theme of Chapter 2 in the 2009 Annual 
Report. Resolving the shortcomings of policy coordination in the euro area and the financial system restructuring 
process are addressed in other chapters in this report.
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BUDGET BALANCES AND PUBLIC DEBT COMPARED ACROSS DIFFERENT DEVELOPED COUNTRIES CHART 2.1 
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ment must be in terms of magnitude, timing and interaction with other policies. Finally, the 
changes that should be made to the institutional framework and to public spending and 
revenue policies to ensure that the fiscal adjustment is successful are detailed.
In late 2007 Spain had a fiscal surplus of close to 2% and a public debt/GDP ratio of 36%, 
compared with –0.7% and 66%, respectively, in the euro area as a whole (see Chart 2.1). 
However, beneath this healthy position lay some worrying public revenue and spending 
dynamics. Indeed, of the total reduction in the deficit recorded between 1995 and 2007 
(8.4 pp of GDP), almost 5 pp are attributable to the business cycle and to the decline in the 
interest burden, associated above all with the reduction in interest rates. The rest of the 
adjustment was due to an exceptional increase in tax revenue – with a significant tempo-
rary component – linked largely to the excessive real estate expansion, which more than 
offset the reduction in revenue of approximately 3 pp of GDP arising from discretionary 
changes in the tax system (see Chart 2.2).2
Primary public expenditure (excluding interest payments on public debt), net of unemploy-
ment benefits, grew at an annual rate of more than 7%, above trend economic growth. 
That confirms its procyclical behaviour, something common also to other developed coun-
tries.3 Of note was the growth of spending managed by regional and local government, 
which at no point in the expansionary phase attained a balanced budget, despite the high 
increases in tax revenue. Deficiencies in the budgetary framework contributed to this, a 
matter which is dealt with in greater detail in section 4.
2  The causes of the 
fiscal deterioration
At the start of the crisis the 
fiscal situation was favourable, 
albeit thanks to extraordinary 
revenue and worrying 
expenditure dynamics...
2  See F. de Castro, Á. Estrada, P. Hernández de Cos and F. Martí (2008), “Una aproximación al componente tran-
sitorio del saldo público en España”, Boletín Económico, June, Banco de España.
3  See P. R. Lane, (2003), “The cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy: evidence from the OECD”, Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 87, pp. 2661-2675, and A. Lamo, J. J. Pérez and L. Schuknecht (2007), The cyclicality of consumption, 
wages and employment of the public sector in the euro area, Working Paper No. 757, European Central Bank.
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The crisis revealed the latent risks in the public finances situation and highlighted the little 
leeway available to pursue countercyclical policies. During the economic crisis, the budg-
et deficit rose by more than 13 pp to a peak of 11.1% of GDP at end-2009 (see Chart 2.1). 
Contributing to the deterioration from 2007 to 2009 was the adverse trend of the business 
cycle by around 2.5 pp of GDP, whereas close to 4 pp of GDP were associated with the 
disappearance during the crisis of the extraordinary revenue previously raised (see Chart 2.2). 
in addition, the measures applied in an attempt to alleviate the effects of the crisis amount-
ed to 3.3 pp of GDP, although more than half of this effect was of a temporary nature. The 
rest of the increase in the deficit arises from trend growth in expenditure outpacing that of 
the economy. The rise in the deficit would, therefore, have an eminently structural compo-
nent, meaning that the cyclically adjusted deficit exceeded 10% of GDP in 2009 and stood 
at 8.3% of GDP in 2010.
Public debt amounted to 60.1% of GDP in 2010, almost 24 pp above its level in 2007, but 
still more than 20 pp below the average for the euro area. This increase in debt arose, 
above all, as a result of the rise in the budget deficit. The impact of the aid to the financial 
sector, which exceeded 5 pp of GDP in the euro area between 2008 and 2010, amounted 
to around only 2 pp of GDP in Spain’s case.
In addition to the contagion generated by the Greek and Irish crises and to the worsening 
fiscal situation in our country, other idiosyncratic factors played a crucial role in spreading 
the sovereign debt crisis to Spain. Specifically, along with the adverse effects of the eco-
nomic crisis on the Spanish economy’s level of potential output, according to various es-
timates the growth of this variable in the medium term is also expected to fall by somewhat 
more than 1 pp, dipping from 3% to a rate below 2%.4 On the evidence available, this 
factor is estimated to have played a relevant role in the widening of Spain’s spreads.5 Mar-
ket doubts also influenced the situation of the financial system, which in other countries 
had acted as an exacerbating factor of the fiscal situation, in such a way that the strong 
interrelatedness of macroeconomic, fiscal and financial problems has been particularly 
significant during the current crisis.
The macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy depend closely on expectations about the 
stability of the public debt/GDP ratio. The dynamics of this ratio hinge, in turn, on 
both the fiscal position, measured by the primary fiscal deficit as a percentage of 
GDP (the public deficit, excluding the interest on public debt), and on macroeco-
nomic developments, via the impact of the nominal interest rate and the nominal GDP 
growth rate. The level to which the debt ratio tends is given, in short, by the ratio of 
the primary deficit, in units of GDP, to the difference between the growth rate of 
nominal GDP and the nominal interest rate. By way of example, this means that, with 
a nominal growth rate of 4% and nominal interest rate of 3%, it would be necessary 
to permanently reduce the primary deficit to 0.6% of GDP to stabilise the debt ratio 
at 60%.
Chart 2.3 plots the course of the public debt/GDP ratio over the coming years under 
specific assumptions of budget deficit, interest rates and growth rate. Specifically, on 
the estimates available, the structural fiscal deficit stood at around 8% at end-2010. 
... whereupon the crisis 
prompted a rapid deterioration 
in the budget deficit and 
revealed the size of its 
structural component
Compounding the fiscal 
deterioration were doubts over 
the growth capacity of our 
economy and over the cost of 
restructuring the financial 
system
3  The scale of the fiscal 
adjustment
The fiscal adjustment needed 
is considerable...
4  See P. Hernández de Cos, M. Izquierdo and A. Urtasun (2011), Una estimación del crecimiento potencial de la 
economía española, mimeo.
5  See V. Echevarría, L. Fernández-Caballero and J. J. Pérez (2011), A note on the role of expectations on growth, 
public deficit and public debt in the determination of sovereign bond spreads: two case studies, mimeo, Banco 
de España.
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With this starting point and the growth scenario to 2012 included in the Banco de Es-
paña Projections Report6, if the output gap is assumed to close in 2015, the stabilising 
of public debt at around 70% of GDP that year would require an adjustment in the cycli-
cally adjusted primary balance of more than 8 pp of GDP between 2010 and 2015, 
which is what is simulated in Chart 2.3. That would require strict compliance with the 
commitments undertaken to reduce the budget deficit to 2013 and, subsequently, a 
further reduction, until attaining a balanced budget. Given the budget outturn figures 
for 2010, almost half of this adjustment would have to be made by regional and local 
government.
Compliance with European commitments will further require resuming at a later date a 
level of public debt below 60% of GDP. Under the assumption of a zero contribution to the 
change in debt of the differential between GDP growth and the implicit interest rate on 
debt7, attaining a public debt/GDP ratio of 60% in 2020 would mean that, after achieving 
a balanced budget, for example in 2015, it would be necessary to run a primary surplus of 
around 2.5% of GDP to 2020 (Chart 2.3).
If interest rates were higher or economic growth lower, the fiscal adjustment needed would 
be even greater. Specifically, if the growth rate were 1 pp lower throughout the period 
2011-2020 and there were no additional fiscal adjustment, the rate of public indebtedness 
in 2015 would be 10 pp higher and amount to 85% of GDP in 2020. In this scenario, the 
adjustment of the average structural balance between 2010 and 2020 to place public debt 
at 60% in 2020 would be 1.7 pp of GDP8, compared with around 0.8 pp in the scenario 
considered in Chart 2.3. and this without having regard to the effort needed to withstand 
the impact of population ageing on public finances.
... and would be even greater 
under harsher scenarios
6  Published in the Banco de España April 2011 Economic Bullletin.
7  By way of reference, the difference between GDP growth and the implied interest rate on debt in the period 2000-
2010 provided for an annual average reduction in the debt/GDP ratio of around 0.5 pp of GDP.
8  This is a mechanical calculation that does not take into account the potential interaction between those variables 
subject to the simulation that remain exogenous.
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It is also important to bear in mind that interest rates and the potential growth of the 
economy depend on debt dynamics. In particular, the higher the level of debt and its at-
tendant growth rate, the higher the interest rate at which such debt will have to be financed 
and the lower potential growth will be. The estimates available9 show that an increase of 
10 pp of GDP in the debt ratio gives rise to an increase of 50 bp in long-term interest rates 
and a reduction in real per capita GDP growth of 0.15 pp per year.10 These effects may, 
moreover, be greater if specific levels of debt are exceeded. A sharp reduction in the 
budget deficit and the stabilising of debt would therefore have a significant effect on the 
interest rates on debt and long-term growth, facilitating their sustainability.
In the short run, the impact of the budget deficit on the growth rate depends on a very 
broad set of conditions, such as its composition, the starting levels of debt, the behaviour 
of monetary policy and the exchange rate regime.11 A high budget deficit is not always a 
stimulus to economic activity; indeed, it may prove contractionary if it gives rise to an in-
crease in expectations about future interest rates, which is more likely the greater the debt 
ratio. And the habitually contractionary effects of a reduction in the deficit may be miti-
gated if the consolidation manages to improve confidence and, therefore, to boost private 
consumption and investment, which appears to be more likely in the case of fiscal con-
solidations undertaken at the end of a recession and by means of cuts in government 
consumption.12
Consequently, a timely and well-designed fiscal adjustment may improve growth expecta-
tions, contributing, given a specific primary deficit, to the swifter stabilisation of public 
debt at a less high level. For example, a primary deficit sustained over the long run at 1.2% 
of GDP would be compatible with a debt ratio of 60% if the difference between the growth 
rate and the interest rate were 2 pp.
Given the variables that influence public debt dynamics, the fiscal adjustment strategy 
should take into account not only the course of economic activity and the size of the fiscal 
multipliers, but also the costs of delaying consolidation in terms of risks to credibility and 
the impact on interest rates and agents’ confidence.
Indeed, although the sluggishness of the recovery may have worked in favour of a gradual 
consolidation strategy, the extreme tension conveyed to the debt markets (see Chart 2.4) 
made it vital to bring forward the fiscal adjustment by as much as possible, to gain credi-
bility and to reduce the financing costs of public and private debt alike, given the high 
correlation between the cost of both.
As regards its composition, the fiscal adjustment may be made through various combina-
tions of tax changes and public spending cuts, with different effects not only of a macro-
economic nature in the short run, but also in terms of likelihood of success. Further, the 
presence of factors that delay and hamper the recovery and long-term growth means that 
it is most important that the composition of the adjustment should be as conducive as 
possible to growth.
In certain circumstances, the 
contractionary effects that the 
fiscal adjustment may exert in 
the short run can be mitigated
For this to be so, it is crucial 
that most of the adjustment 
should be brought forward in 
time...
... and focus on public 
spending
  9  See International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Monitor, May 2010 and November 2009.
10  See C. Reinhart and K. Rogoff (2009), “The Aftermath of Financial Crises”, American Economic Review, 99 (2), 
pp. 466-472.
11  For an overview of these results, see Chapter 3 of the International Monetary Fund (2010), World Economic 
Outlook, October.
12  See P. Hernández de Cos and E. Moral Benito (2011), Endogenous Fiscal Consolidations, Working Paper no. 
1102, Banco de España.
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In this respect, the outcome of simulations of different fiscal adjustment strategies based 
on a calibrated macroeconomic model for the Spanish economy are illustrative (see Table 2.1)13. 
These should not, however, be interpreted as normative proposals, since the adjustment 
measures needed are contingent upon the nature of the problems of each conjunctural 
situation. The specific recommendations for the fiscal adjustment strategy in the current 
circumstances of the Spanish economy are addressed in subsequent sections of this 
chapter. According to the simulation exercises, a fiscal adjustment based on cuts in public 
investment would, in principle, exert negative effects on growth in the long run if the plans 
incorporated capital productivity similar to that observed in recent decades. In the present 
situation, however, it should be borne in mind that the return on public investments in in-
frastructure may have been drastically cut, following the period of sharp growth in recent 
years. In any event, it is the reduction in public-sector employees’ compensation (wages 
and public-sector employment) that has greater positive effects on GDP in the long term, 
which are also positive in the short term in the case of wages, provided that the public 
sector wage adjustment passes through to the private sector. On the revenue side, indirect 
tax, although it has very limited negative effects in the short term, positively affects both 
13  For a more detailed analysis of these results, see P. Hernández de Cos and C. Thomas (2011), Los efectos de 
la consolidación fiscal sobre el crecimiento a partir de un modelo macroeconométrico, mimeo.
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GDP and employment in the long run if the rise in such tax allows a reduction in other less 
efficient taxes.
The evidence suggests an association between the course of public revenue and public 
spending and that a larger public sector gives rise to a greater deficit bias14; accordingly, 
public spending cuts are more readily sustainable over time and allow the deficit to be 
reduced to a greater extent and more permanently than commensurate increases in reve-
nue. Taking a longer view, it is also desirable that the fiscal adjustment should be compat-
ible with a restructuring of public finances in which those items with positive effects on 
productivity and potential growth, such as spending on education and R+D+I, gain in 
weight as a proportion of total public spending. 
Membership of a monetary union attributes a more active stabilising role to fiscal policy, 
insofar as monetary policy is geared to price stability in the area as a whole. But, as 
clearly highlighted during the crisis, for it to play this role it is necessary to have an exten-
sive fiscal buffer, building up surpluses during cyclical upturns and reducing the public 
debt/GDP ratio significantly. From this perspective, fiscal consolidation is also very impor-
tant for gaining room for manoeuvre in the face of potential future shocks. The new frame-
work for the working of the European Monetary Union, in which the mechanisms for the 
surveillance and correction of fiscal imbalances will take on greater importance, makes the 
reinforcement of fiscal discipline necessary.
In accordance with the latest Stability Programme Update for Spain unveiled on 29 April 
2011, the consolidation strategy defined by the government means that more than 70% of 
the primary structural adjustment required to 2013 will be concentrated in 2010 and 2011. 
This consolidation strategy is 
particularly appropriate if the 
additional consequences of 
EMU membership are taken 
into account
The fiscal adjustment strategy 
defined by the government is, 
broadly, in line with these criteria
14  See F. de Castro, J.M. González-Páramo and P. Hernández de Cos (2004), “Fiscal consolidation in Spain: dy-
namic interdependence of public spending and revenues”, Investigaciones Económicas, vol. XXVIII.
Year 1 (b) Long term (b) (c)
Initial change 
in the 
instrument
GDP Employment GDP Employment GDP Employment
Taxes on 
wages pp.
REVENUE
Taxes on consumption 1.75 pp -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.7 0.8 -3.5
Taxes on wages 2.18 pp -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 0.1 0.1 -0.6
Corporate income tax 11.83 pp -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.3 -2.6 -0.4 -2.1
EXPENDITURE
Net purchases -13.2 -0.6 -0.9 -0.3 -0.3 0.2 0.5 -3.2
Public investment -28.2 -0.6 -0.9 -0.4 -0.4 -0.7 0.1 -2.5
Public wages -13.5 0.4 0.7 1.8 2.5 3.8 4.2 -7.2
Public employment -13.5 -0.4 -0.7 -0.3 -1.0 1.1 0.2 -4.0
Year 4 (b)
SIMULATIONS OF THE IMPACT OF PERMANENT ADJUSTMENTS IN REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE ON GDP 
AND EMPLOYMENT 
TABLE 2.1 
SOURCES: Banco de España, FiMod model simulation (Stähler, Nikolai and Thomas, Carlos,  2011, “FiMod – A DSGE Model for Fiscal Policy Simulations”, 
Banco de España Working Paper No. 1110). 
a Each change entails an initial improvement of 1 pp in the general government primary surplus. 
b All variables expressed as a percentage change relative to the base scenario, except where a different notation is indicated.
c In the long run, it is assumed the jscal authority uses the saving on interest payments on public debt brought about through the initial jscal consolidation to reduce 
taxes on wage income. 
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Further, in the two years spanning 2010-2011, 60% of the adjustment already made or 
approved resides on the control of public spending, meaning that government consump-
tion and public investment would decline by 1.5 pp of GDP (with a 0.7 pp contribution by 
employee compensation), and other spending and subsidies would decline by around 1 pp 
of GDP. The composition of the fiscal consolidation planned for 2012-2014 also resides, to 
the tune of almost 80%, on spending cuts, due above all to the adjustment of government 
consumption.
Any measure that increases the Spanish economy’s potential growth tends to be conducive 
to the fiscal adjustment. In particular, supply-side policies aimed at improving the workings 
of the markets for goods, services and factors may lead to an expansion in activity and in 
public revenue, and they may therefore help bring about public finances sustainability. 
Such complementarity comes about through several channels. The lowering of the obsta-
cles to competition and the improved efficiency in the workings of the markets for goods, 
services and labour have positive effects on productivity. For instance, it has been esti-
mated that an improvement in competition in the product market up to the level of the most 
competitive country might generate a 2.5% increase in productivity.15 In parallel are the 
spending cuts obtained as a result of greater economic activity. For example, the weight of 
unemployment benefits, which in Spain’s case amounted to 3% of GDP in 2010 compared 
with 1.9% on average for the euro area countries, would diminish. Finally, higher expected 
growth reduces public debt spreads. Thus, the short- and medium-term effects of a fiscal 
adjustment, when made separately and conducted along with structural reforms that 
heighten competition in the market for goods and services and increase labour market flex-
ibility, are very different (see Box 1.3 of Chapter 1 in this Report). Structural reforms, insofar 
as they lessen the distortions prevailing in labour and product markets, exert a significant 
positive effect on activity and public finances, mitigating the adverse effects of financial 
tensions and allowing greater room for manoeuvre for fiscal policy.
The economic literature shows that countries that have more demanding budgetary 
frameworks tend to evidence greater fiscal discipline. Further, the experiences of some of 
our neighbours showed that the most successful frameworks of fiscal rules are those that 
combine a budget deficit rule with explicit ceilings on public spending (see Box 2.1). In 
this respect, most EU countries have enhanced the quality of their fiscal frameworks, as 
a result above all of the application of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its exten-
sion to an additional set of national fiscal rules. Moreover, among the new features seek-
ing to reinforce fiscal discipline in the euro area, the reform of the SGP currently under 
discussion includes the need to properly develop these national fiscal frameworks and 
the application of a prudent public spending growth rule when assessing countries’ fiscal 
developments.
Spain has budgetary stability laws that set limits on the deficit that all levels of general govern-
ment, and public bodies, may incur. In particular, central, regional and local government and 
the Social Security system have to post a balanced budget or run a surplus over the course of 
the business cycle, in terms of financing capacity. However, only central government is sub-
ject to a ceiling on annual spending approved by Parliament before the budget is drawn up.
Parallel progress in structural 
reforms is crucial for the fiscal 
adjustment
4  The foundations of a 
fiscal stability 
programme for Spain
4.1  THE BUDGETARY 
FRAMEWORK AND FISCAL 
RULES
The institutional framework of 
budgetary policy in the European 
countries is being reconsidered, 
assigning greater importance to 
the rules that control the growth 
of public spending
In Spain, the budgetary stability 
legislation should be 
strengthened by extending a 
spending ceiling to all tiers of 
government. This ceiling should 
also be more accurately defined
15  On the effects of the regulation of goods and services markets and of labour market institutions on productivity, 
see, respectively, G. Nicoletti and S. Scarpetta (2006), “Regulation and Economic Performance: Product Market 
Reforms and Productivity in the OECD”, in T. Eicher and C. García-Peñalosa (eds.), Institutions, Development 
and Growth, MIT Press, and A. Basanini, L. Nunziata and D. Venn (2009), “Job protection legislation and pro-
ductivity growth in OECD countries”, Economic Policy, 24 (58), pp. 349-402.
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The experiences of some of our European peers (Denmark, Swe-
den, Finland and Switzerland) show that the most successful fiscal 
rule frameworks are those that combine a budget deficit rule with 
explicit public expenditure ceilings.1 Their usefulness lies in the 
fact that they are directed at the habitual source of budget deficits. 
Specifically, the ex-ante setting of a maximum amount of spend-
ing disciplines the drawing up of budgets for each unit of spend-
ing; these, therefore, have less room to exert upward pressure 
through individual demands. Further, the presence of a spending 
ceiling enables the rise in revenue in better-than-expected cyclical 
situations to be saved, ex post. Also, if the rule is well-defined and 
transparent, it provides for identification of the spending compo-
nents that generate the deviations. 
A spending rule is under discussion at the European level as part 
of the proposals to reform the SGP. According to the EC’s pro-
posal, its adoption would mean that, if a country failed to meet its 
medium-term fiscal target2, fiscal policy would only be qualified as 
prudent if the increase in spending were lower than the economy’s 
nominal potential growth, this being adjusted for discretionary 
measures on revenue.3
BOX 2.1PUBLIC SPENDING CEILINGS AS BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE MECHANISMS
1  See G. Ljungman (2008), Expenditure Ceilings – A Survey, IMF Working 
Paper no. 282.
2  The medium-term objective of the SGP is defined individually for each 
country; but generally, it requires that countries attain and maintain a 
structural public balance that is in equilibrium. 
3  This means that spending growth might exceed the economy’s poten-
tial growth if a fiscal reform that is to increase revenue is anticipated 
(and the opposite in the case of a tax cut). The extra permitted spend-
ing growth above potential will be equal to the amount of revenue 
raised by the tax increase.
Countries
Actual average 
growth in nominal 
primary spending 
(1998-2007)
Average growth
of potential
real GDP (c)
Average maximum 
growth in nominal 
primary spending 
compatible with
the spending rule
(1998-2007) (d)
Number of years
with actual spending 
growth above the 
spending rule (e)
Actual general 
government 
budget balance 
in 2007
General government balance 
that would have been posted 
in 2007 had spending been 
compatible with the 
spending rule (f)
Belgium 4.5 2.4 3.6 7.0 -0.4 3.4
Germany 1.5 1.7 2.4 3.0 0.3 -3.5
Estonia 12.5 6.1 11.7 7.0 2.5 4.9
Ireland 11.6 5.5 7.5 7.0 0.0 11.2
Greece 9.3 2.9 6.5 9.0 -6.7 3.0
Spain 7.8 3.0 5.9 8.0 1.9 8.2
France 3.9 2.2 3.0 7.0 -2.7 1.2
Italy 4.4 1.9 3.6 7.0 -1.5 1.8
Cyprus 9.4 4.3 7.6 7.0 3.4 9.3
Luxembourg 7.2 4.0 6.6 6.0 3.7 5.7
Malta 4.7 2.2 4.0 5.0 -2.3 -0.2
Netherlands 5.5 1.7 4.6 6.0 0.2 3.4
Austria 3.2 2.2 2.7 6.0 -0.6 1.3
Portugal 6.4 1.9 5.3 7.0 -2.8 1.1
Slovenia 9.5 3.7 9.1 7.0 0.0 1.8
Slovak Republic 6.9 4.6 8.6 6.0 -1.8 -8.3
Finland 4.0 2.7 3.1 7.0 5.2 9.1
EX POST SIMULATION FOR THE 1998-2007 PERIOD OF THE APPLICATION OF A SPENDING RULE SIMILAR TO THAT PROPOSED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (a) (b)  
SOURCES: European Commission and Banco de España.
a The simulation is performed year by year, although columns 1, 2 and 3 show average growth.
b According to the National Accounts information available in December 2010.
c Average potential growth for the period 2004-2010 according to the report "The impact of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the EU25 Member 
States", Report of the Economic Policy Committee and the European Commission (2006). 
d The simulated spending rule is dejned as a ceiling on annual nominal primary expenditure growth equivalent to the sum of potential real GDP growth and the 
actual growth of the GDP dekator, adjusted by the existence of discretionary tax measures. Moreover, if the country has not in the year under analysis attained 
the medium-term jscal objective, according to the EC's available estimates as at December 2010 of the cyclical adjusted balance corrected by the effect of the 
rule, the maximum ceiling on spending growth is reduced by 1%.    
e The column indicates the number of years in which actual spending was higher than the maximum ceiling in the period running from 1998 to 2007. 
f The budget balance that would have been obtained in 2007 if the estimated maximum spending ceiling had been observed in each year of the period.
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The accompanying table illustrates the workings of a rule of this 
type.4 Specifically, it shows the budget balance that the euro area 
countries would have obtained in 2007 had a similar rule to that 
proposed by the EC been applied each year over the 1997-2007 
period. To do this, the fiscal data for 1997 are taken as the starting 
point and, if a country has not reached the medium-term fiscal 
target set by the SGP, primary public spending growth is set at 1 
pp below the economy’s nominal potential growth.5 In this exer-
cise, once the country attains the medium-term target, the in-
crease in primary spending equals the economy’s nominal poten-
tial growth.6 it can be verified that strict compliance with this rule 
would have led to a much healthier situation in most of the coun-
tries during the decade prior to the economic crisis. Indeed, Ger-
many is the only country in which its application would not have 
led to an improved fiscal situation, given that in the period ana-
lysed, it posted average primary expenditure growth of 1.5%, al-
most 1 pp below that required by the rule (2.4%). In Spain, the 
application of such a rule would have provided for saving on the 
extraordinary revenue arising from the real estate expansion, and 
it would have allowed a fiscal surplus in 2007 almost 6 pp of GDP 
higher than actually observed. This is the outcome of the fact that 
average primary spending growth for the period was significantly 
higher in Spain than that deriving from the application of the rule 
(7.8%, compared with 5.9%, respectively).
Defining a spending rule is not, however, free from difficulties. 
Firstly, a variable allowing the permitted spending growth to be 
anchored must be chosen. If the starting point is a balanced budg-
et and, given that public revenue evidences approximately unit 
elasticity with respect to the economy’s nominal GDP, the spend-
ing ceiling should be set on the basis of the growth of this variable. 
Evidently, if the starting point is a budget deficit, the return to a 
balanced budget will require spending growth below nominal 
growth until such equilibrium is attained. To prevent the change in 
public spending from being pro-cyclical, nominal GDP should be 
replaced by the economy’s potential nominal GDP. In this way, in 
an economic upturn, characterised by GDP growth above poten-
tial, public spending should grow below actual GDP growth, while 
the opposite will occur in recessions. In any event, it should be 
stressed that the economy’s potential growth is not an observable 
variable and its estimation is controversial. As a result, with a view 
to its application in the spending rule, a prudent estimate of poten-
tial output must be recommended.
Potential GDP growth is normally estimated only in real terms; ac-
cordingly, the definition of the nominal component is additionally 
required. In this connection, resort can be had to using the annual 
growth of the GDP deflator. However, if spending growth is allowed 
to accommodate any increase in the deflator, this might enable 
very high increases in spending as a result of the existence of like-
wise very high inflation. To avoid this problem, one option is to set 
a ceiling on the increase in the deflator incorporated into the rule 
(e.g. that compatible with the ECB’s definition of price stability).
The rule should make explicit the spending components subject to 
it. On occasions, so as to prevent the ceiling from entailing a re-
duction in productive spending, the exclusion of investment 
spending has been proposed. Nonetheless, this rule is more diffi-
cult to oversee and easier to circumvent, since in practice the dis-
tinction between current and investment expenditure is not clear. 
In this respect, both the United Kingdom and Germany have re-
cently abandoned this type of golden rule. The national fiscal rules 
in place often exclude interest payments.7 Finally, it is occasion-
ally proposed that spending on unemployment benefits be exclud-
ed from the rule, so as to avoid, once again, a procyclical bias. 
However, it is argued that its exclusion adds complexity to the rule 
and may leave out increases in spending arising from a structural 
rise in unemployment, which will not be corrected by the cyclical 
trend.
The spending rules should also make explicit the correction mech-
anism for potential deviations that may arise, in which connection 
their fit in the multi-year budgeting horizon may prove particularly 
appropriate.
In sum, spending rules have proven to be a very useful instrument 
for ensuring fiscal discipline, but their definition can greatly condi-
tion their effectiveness. Broadly, to maximise their effectiveness, 
they should: cover all public spending, including fiscal expenses; 
be applicable to all tiers of government; be part of a medium-term 
budgetary framework; be subject to a deviation-correction mech-
anism; and be anchored in prudent estimates of the economy’s 
potential growth and inflation.
BOX 2.1PUBLIC SPENDING CEILINGS AS BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE MECHANISMS (cont’d)
4  See L. Fernández-Caballero, P. Hernández de Cos and J. Pérez García 
(2011), El marco de reglas fiscales en España, mimeo.
5  Each country’s potential growth is calculated as the sum of potential real 
GDP growth according to the European Union’s Economic Policy Com-
mittee’s 2006 estimates for the period 2004-2008 plus the GDP deflator 
observed for each year.
6  In keeping with footnote 3, the spending ceiling is raised/lowered by the 
estimated amount of the discretionary tax measures each year.
7  Set against growing public indebtedness as at present, this exclusion 
may give rise to a lower level of fiscal effort, or the opposite would occur 
in a situation of diminishing public debt/GDP ratios.
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Given the effectiveness of these limits on spending growth - which have enabled the 
State’s budgetary deviations to be reduced, setting aside the exceptional period of eco-
nomic crisis16 - and, above all, the decentralised nature of public spending in Spain, this 
type of rule should be extended to regional and local government, in particular to the for-
mer, where spending overruns compared with budget projections have been systematic 
and exceeded 3% per annum between 1984 and 2007. Further, even in the case of the 
ceiling on State spending, its definition may be better defined so that it is not only in terms 
of budgetary accounting, but also in National Accounts terms, and that it is anchored in a 
macroeconomic indicator, such as the trend growth of nominal GDP.
In this respect, Spain’s recently updated Stability Programme commits to including a 
spending rule in the Budgetary Stability Law, of similar characteristics to the European 
Commission’s recent proposal (see Box 2.1). Under this rule, budgeted and actual general 
government spending may not exceed the medium-term reference growth rate of the 
Spanish economy. Moreover, spending may only exceed that set under this rule if perma-
nent revenue-increasing measures are adopted; in turn, regulatory changes entailing per-
manent losses in revenue will automatically lead to a downward revision of the spending 
threshold. The spending rule will be directly applicable to central and local government, 
and the government will pursue its adoption by the regional governments.17
The fiscal rules should include appropriate mechanisms to enforce their application or, in 
the event of a breach, to correct this. In Spain’s case, the Stability Law allows deviations 
from the limits set whereby, if they arise, the level of government responsible is obliged to 
submit a plan for their correction, which in the case of the regional governments should be 
approved by the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council. It is further established that, if as a 
result of this breach Spain is sanctioned under the SGP, the level of government responsi-
ble will pay the commensurate portion of the sanction. In addition, the Stability Law allows 
central government to make authorisations for the issuance of regional government public 
debt conditional upon compliance with these objectives. Such conditionality is, in fact, 
that which has been applied over the past year, and its use should be viewed most favour-
ably, despite it not being automatically applicable. In this respect, it should be recalled that 
greater automaticity in the setting of specific sanctions is one of the aims of the reform of 
the Stability Pact. Under Spanish legislation there is, however, no possibility of establish-
ing sanctions, beyond those mentioned arising from non-compliance with the SGP. Look-
ing ahead, such a possibility might be considered as an additional disciplining mechanism, 
although the evidence shows that it is not easy to define these in a way that makes their 
application effective.
Another key element of fiscal rules is transparency, as acknowledged in the Budgetary 
Stability Law. Accordingly, although the dissemination of data on State activity is abun-
dant, detailed and with relatively short lags, this was not the case for most regional and 
local governments until recently. That limited the ability to exert timely control over their 
activity and accountability, and it is particularly dangerous at times such as the present, 
when a lack of information might result in a lack of market confidence.18
Moreover, the mechanisms for 
enforcing the rules should be 
strengthened...
... and the transparency of 
public finances should be 
increased, especially at the 
regional and local government 
level
16  See T. Leal and J. Pérez (2009), Análisis de las desviaciones presupuestarias aplicado al caso del presupuesto 
del Estado, Documentos de Trabajo, no. 0933, Banco de España.
17  Moreover, the Stability Programme, in line with the proposed reform of the Stability Pact (which seeks to set 
greater store by public debt in the European fiscal surveillance procedure), mentions that stricter rules will be 
set for indebtedness, extending the monitoring thereof. This will refer not only to compliance with the rules on 
debt as defined in the Excessive Deficit Protocol, but also to other financial liabilities.
18  See T. Leal, D. Pedregal and J.J. Pérez “Short-term monitoring of the Spanish government balance”, SERIEs-
Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 2, pp. 97-119.
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To redress these shortcomings, in late 2010 the government began to publish information 
on the regional governments’ budget outturn, individually and overall, on a quarterly basis 
(see Table 2.2). In any event, the regular publication of the budget outturn of regional gov-
ernments as a whole, and on an individual basis, with the same periodicity, degree of de-
tail, lag and accessibility as the State outturn, would be welcome. It would also be desir-
able to have some information, perhaps of a more aggregated nature, for the main cities, 
given their relative size compared with most of the regions. The latest Eurostat proposals 
to strengthen the Stability Pact statistically are, indeed, geared to increasing transparency.
Medium-term budgetary planning, necessitating the regular analysis of the structural dy-
namics of the various public revenue and spending captions and enabling those areas 
where room for rationalisation and adjustment is greater to be identified, may prove par-
ticularly appropriate when adjustment measures going beyond a temporary correction of 
imbalances are required. Indeed, the application of binding budgetary frameworks span-
ning several years is indicated in the literature as a positive factor in the application of 
fiscal adjustment plans, with the Netherlands a successful case in point in this connection.
In some cases, the full or partial delegation of fiscal policy decisions to an independent 
agency has also been discussed recently at the international level as a means of increas-
ing discipline, although the attendant design and effectiveness of such a mechanism is not 
free from controversy (see Box 2.2).
In a highly decentralised system such as Spain’s, achieving fiscal discipline comes up 
against the traditional problems of inter-government coordination. In this respect, in addi-
tion to extending fiscal rules to the lower tiers of government, the Stability Law includes a 
clause that establishes that the State shall not be responsible for financing the deficits or 
public debt of the lower levels of government.19 This clause seeks to prevent the cost of 
inappropriate fiscal behaviour in one region from passing through to the rest or to central 
government, and its presence enables the capital markets to continue to exert a significant 
disciplining effect on the basis of distinguishing between the risk premia on the debt of the 
different governments.
In addition, achieving fiscal discipline also depends on some correspondence between 
the level of accountability governing regions’ spending and their fiscal autonomy (fiscal 
co-responsibility), this being understood as the ability of the regions to generate reve-
nue to fund such spending. Without this autonomy, the regions depend excessively on 
inter-governmental transfers, distorting the relationship that should exist between taxa-
tion and public spending. That makes it more unlikely that citizens will penalise the 
undisciplined behaviour of the authorities, the appearance being that regional spending 
is funded, at least in part, by non-residents in the region. Indeed, the empirical literature 
finds a positive relationship between the level of transfers received by the regions and 
their levels of public spending and budget deficit.20 In Spain, although there has been a 
gradual increase in fiscal co-responsibility, this has only reached a scale and, above all, 
acquired significant characteristics in the latest financing arrangements: in these, the 
State guarantees on revenue growth were eliminated, the weight of tax receipts as a 
Greater importance should be 
given to medium-term 
budgetary planning 
For fiscal discipline, defining 
an appropriate framework for 
local and regional government 
is vital
19  Specifically, the Single Additional Provision of the Budgetary Stability Law states that “the State shall not as-
sume nor be accountable for the commitments of the regional governments, the local governments and the 
bodies linked or reporting to them,...”.
20  For the case of Spain, see I. Argimón and P. Hernández de Cos (2011), “Fiscal Rules and Federalism as Deter-
minants of Budget Performance: an Empirical Investigation for the Spanish Case”, Public Finance Review, 3 
February.
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Coverage Frequency Publication lag First year available
Accounting
framework
STATE
Revenue and
expenditure
Monthly (a)
Approximately  
one month
Cash basis: Jan 1988
Nat. Acc.: Jan 1995
Nat. Acc.,
Cash basis
SOCIAL SECURITY
Social Security System
Revenue and
expenditure
Monthly (a)
Approximately 
one month
Cash basis
National Public Employment Service
Revenue and
expenditure
Monthly (a)
Approximately 
one month
January 1984 (b) Cash basis
REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS
Revenue and
expenditure
Quarterly Two months 2010 Q4 Budget
Other regularly published data (c):
Andalusia
Revenue and
expenditure
Quarterly
Approximately  
one month
2008 Cash basis
Aragon —  —  —  —  —  
Asturias —  —  —  —  —  
Balearic Islands —  —  —  —  —  
Canary Islands
Revenue and
expenditure
Quarterly
Approximately 
one month
1990 Cash basis
Cantabria
Revenue and
expenditure
Monthly
Approximately  
one month
2006 (half-yearly from 
2001 to 2005)
Cash basis
Castile-La Mancha
Revenue and
expenditure
Quarterly 1999 Cash basis
Castile-León
Revenue and
expenditure
Monthly
Approximately  
one month
November 2009 
(quarterly from 1991)
Cash basis
Catalonia
Revenue and
expenditure
Monthly
Approximately  
twomonths
2007 Cash basis
Extremadura —  —  —  —  —  
Galicia
Revenue and
expenditure
Quarterly
Approximately 
four months
2002 Q1 Cash basis
La Rioja —  —  —  —  —  
Madrid Expenditure Monthly
Approximately 
two months
Cash basis
Murcia —  —  —  —  —  
Navarre —  —  —  —  —  
Basque Country
Revenue and
expenditure
Quarterly
Approximately 
two months
2004 Q2 (annual from 
2000)
Cash basis
Valencian Community
GENERAL GOVERNMENT
Revenue and
expenditure
Quarterly
Approximately 
three months
2000 Nat. Acc.
Since December 2010 the budget outturn jgures have been published uniformly on a quarterly basis 
for the regional governments, in aggregate form and individually.
AVAILABILITY ON THE INTERNET OF INFORMATION FOR THE YEAR AS AT DECEMBER 2010 ON THE BUDGET 
OUTTURN FOR GENERAL GOVERNMENT, THE STATE, THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND THE REGIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
TABLE 2.2
SOURCES: IGAE, Administración de la Seguridad Social, Economics and Statistics .Ejces and .Ejcial Gazettes of each of the regional governments. 
a The publication of the December jgure for the State, Social Security System and National Public Employment Service has a lag of over one month.  
b The Social Security System and National Public Employment Service jgures prior to this date were published quarterly. 
c Search made on public services as at 10 December 2010. The sources consulted were the websites of the  Economics and StatisticR.Ejces and .Ejcial Gazettes 
of each of the regional governments.  
d Initial publications on the Canary Islands budget outturn only included revenue. 
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In the ongoing reform of euro area economic governance rules and 
institutions, changes to the institutional framework for fiscal policy 
decisions are a priority. In this respect, two recommendations cur-
rently under consideration1 are to reinforce the independence of 
European fiscal policy supervision, through the creation of an in-
dependent European fiscal agency under the control of the Euro-
group, and to broaden national fiscal frameworks through the 
creation of independent budget offices or fiscal oversight agen-
cies in all the member countries.
The taxonomy of these independent fiscal agencies distinguishes 
two main types.2 First, there are fiscal councils with an analytical or 
forecasting role, which act as reference points, counterweights or 
guarantors of orthodox fiscal policy conduct and of compliance 
with the existing fiscal rules. Second, there are independent fiscal 
authorities which can influence budget balance directly by control-
ling some operational fiscal policy instrument.
The main theoretical reason for delegating a public decision to an 
independent authority is the existence of time inconsistency, i.e. a 
situation where short-term decisions are taken without consider-
ing their long-term consequences. In the case of monetary policy, 
inflation bias can be reduced by delegating control of operational 
monetary tools to an independent central bank with a clear price 
stability objective.
In the case of fiscal policy there may be a deficit bias, especially in 
the context of a monetary union3, but the delegation of fiscal instru-
ments is less common, given the limited consensus regarding the 
optimal levels of public spending and revenue. However, an exam-
ple of delegation of fiscal levers to non-government authorities oc-
curs in the management of sovereign wealth funds. In democratic 
countries, these funds are used to smooth public spending and 
taxes over time, and they are governed by a framework similar to 
the delegation of monetary policy, as summarised in the IMF’s 
“Santiago Principles”.4 Under these principles, sovereign funds 
should have a mandate that defines their objectives and confers 
them operational independence from the Finance Ministry, subject 
to rules of transparency in their conduct. Further, central banks 
usually act as guarantors of the independence of sovereign funds: 
for instance, a division of the Norgesbank manages the Norwegian 
funds, while the Central Bank of Chile appoints the management 
committees of the Chilean funds.
In the euro area, the role of the European Commission in the ap-
plication of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) can be seen as an 
example of delegation of fiscal responsibilities to a supranational 
agency. Nonetheless, the operation of the SGP has been compli-
cated by a lack of effective tools to ensure fiscal discipline ex ante, 
as opposed to sanctioning indiscipline ex post; moreover, the em-
pirical evidence suggests that an independent fiscal agency should 
be a national body, given the importance of specific knowledge of 
domestic fiscal conditions. Consistent with these arguments, many 
economists have proposed designs for possible independent fiscal 
authorities that would be mandated to ensure budget balance, and 
would be delegated effective operational control of some fiscal in-
struments to achieve this. Proposed instruments include changing 
VAT or income tax rates, without Parliamentary intervention, when 
budgetary or economic circumstances so require, or imposing 
across-the-board spending cuts if legislators approve a budget in-
consistent with the mandated deficit level.5
However, in practice most independent fiscal bodies today take 
the form of advisory councils. Their mandates range from the 
preparation of budgetary and macroeconomic forecasts to the 
evaluation of government policy proposals. Historical evidence 
suggests that these councils may reduce deficit bias if they inter-
vene directly in the budgetary process with their own normative 
recommendations, and that they can reinforce the impact of fiscal 
rules, laws or objectives.6 Examples come from the United States, 
where Congressional Budget Office forecasts were used to calcu-
late the fiscal adjustments needed to offset new spending pro-
grammes; from the Netherlands, where party platforms are based 
on the macroeconomic forecasts of the fiscal council, which also 
evaluates the fiscal agreements of coalition governments; and 
also from Chile, where two mutually independent panels monitor 
the maintenance of a structural surplus of 1% of GDP over the 
economic cycle. Another relevant role played by some independ-
ent fiscal agencies is to act as a neutral referee between central 
and regional governments, as stipulated, for example, by a recent 
reform in Australia.7
In Spain’s case, one new institutional feature this year is the estab-
lishment of the OPCG (Parliamentary Budgetary Office)8, which is 
intended as an advisory body for Parliament, designed to monitor 
and verify budget implementation. The specific role of the OPCG 
has still to be defined in detail.
BOX 2.2THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR FISCAL POLICY
5  See J. Von Hagen and I. Harden (1995), “Budget processes and commit-
ment to fiscal discipline”, European Economic Review, 39, pp. 771-779; 
S. Wren-Lewis (2002), Fiscal policy, inflation, and stabilisation in EMU, 
mimeo, University of Exeter; L. Calmfors (2003), “Fiscal policy to stabi-
lise the domestic economy in the EMU: what can we learn from mone-
tary policy?”, CESifo Economic Studies, 49 (3), pp. 319-353, and C. 
Wyplosz (2005), “Fiscal policy: institutions versus rules”, National Insti-
tute Economic Review, 191, pp. 70-84.
6  See Debrun et al. (2009), op. cit., and Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011), 
op. cit.
7  Council of Australian Governments (2010), Charter, “COAG Reform 
Council”, 30 June 2010.
8  Law 37/2010 of 15 November 2010 on the creation of the Parliamentary 
Budgetary Office.
1  ECB (2010), “Reinforcing Economic Governance in the Euro Area”, June.
2  See X. Debrun, D. Hauner and M. Kumar (2009), “Independent fiscal 
agencies”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 23 (1), pp. 48-81, and L. Calm-
fors and S. Wren-Lewis (2011), What should fiscal councils do?, CESifo 
WP3382.
3  See A. Velasco (1999), “A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and De-
layed Fiscal Reforms”, in J. Poterba and J. Von Hagen (eds.), Fiscal In-
stitutions and Fiscal Performance, University of Chicago Press, and R. 
Beetsma and R. Bovenberg (1999), “Does monetary unification lead to 
excessive debt accumulation?”, Journal of Public Economics ,74, pp. 
299-325.
4  International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (2008), Gener-
ally Accepted Principles and Practices, October.
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proportion of total regional government revenue increased, with the dependence on 
State transfers diminishing, and regulatory powers over taxation were increased (see 
Table 2.3).
However, some elements have still to be resolved. The first arises from the lack of stability 
of the system, which has given rise to high incentives for the regional governments to 
promote negotiation processes as a means of increasing the volume of financing acquired. 
Also contributing to this instability of the financing agreements is the complexity of the 
arrangements, which hampers anticipating how they may unfold over time and, indeed, 
setting a specific annual amount, which only depends on actual tax receipts with a time 
lag. The second element, associated with the first, arises from the way in which the re-
gional governments’ guaranteed spending is determined, since in negotiations it has al-
TAXES TRANSFERRED (percentages transferred under previous arrangements in brackets) % transferred
Normative 
capacity
DIRECT TAXES
    Personal income tax 50 (33) Yes
    Estate duties 100 (100) Yes
INDIRECT TAXES
    VAT 50 (35) No
    Manufacturing duties 58 (40) No
    Retail sales of hydrocarbons 100 (100) Yes
    Electricity 100 (100) No
    Transfer tax and stamp tax 100 (100) Yes
    Car registration 100 (100) Yes
    Gaming tax 100 (100) Yes
GUARANTEE FUND
SUFFICIENCY FUND
    In future years, the Fund changes according to the ITE (a).
REGIONAL CONVERGENCE FUNDS
    In future years both funds will change in step with the ITE (a).
    The Competitiveness Fund is annually distributed among the regional governments on the basis of adjusted per capita jnancing below  
    the average or below their jscal capacity, on the basis of their relative adjusted population.
    The Competitiveness Fund is annually distributed among the regional governments whose per capita GDP is below 90% of the average, 
    whose population density is less than 50% of average density or, given population growth that is lower than 90% of the average, whose 
    population density per square kilometre is lower than the jgure resulting from multiplying the average density of the ordinary-regime 
    regional governments by 1.25.
    Amount in base year: the regional governments contribute 75% of taxes transferred in normative terms and the State contributes an 
    amount of around 0.8% of GDP.
    The Fund is distributed by regional government on the basis of adjusted population (population 30%, equivalent protected population  
    38%, population over 65 8.5%, population 16 and under 20.5%, surface area 1.8%, dispersion 0.6%, island status 0.6%).
    In future years the regional government contribution changes in step with tax takings, the State contribution according to the ITE (a) and 
    the adjusted population is re-calculated year by year.
    Amount in base year: net borrowing of each regional government (including share in the additional State contribution to the system,  
    around 0.7% of GDP), less jnancing by taxes transferred in normative terms and less net share in the Guarantee Fund.
    Two new funds are created: the Competitiveness Fund (0.2% of GDP in the base year) and the Cooperation Fund (0.1% of GDP in 
    the base year).
MAIN FEATURES OF THE NEW FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ORDINARY-REGIME REGIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
TABLE 2.3
  
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The ITE comprises State takings for the year (excluding tax resources transferred to the regional governments), personal income tax, VAT and excise duties on 
beer, wine and fermented beverages, on intermediate products, on alcohol and derivative beverages, on hydrocarbons and on tobacco products. 
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ways been chosen to take the previous financing level as the base figure. That offers as-
surances to all the regional governments that, in the year taken as the base, they will see 
no decline in their resources. Looking ahead, it would be desirable, on one hand, to have 
a more stable financing system and, on the other, to use some objective method of calcu-
lating the regional governments’ actual spending needs. Such a method would assess 
current effective spending, it would add greater objectivity to the system and it would 
eliminate the incentives to periodically reconsider agreements that take the previously at-
tained level of financing as their basis. 
Taking the long view, the key factor for fiscal sustainability in Spain and in other developed 
countries is the impact on public finances of population ageing, which will push both pen-
sions spending and health care and dependency spending upwards. Accordingly, ensur-
ing the long-term sustainability of public finances involves, first, reforming the pensions 
system. This reform is particularly appropriate in the short term, since significant positive 
effects in terms of confidence may ensue from it, whereas its repercussions on demand 
are very limited. And regard should be had to its positive influence on the economy’s po-
tential growth, via the increase in participation rates, in particular those of the oldest co-
horts.
Since the increase in spending is due essentially to the rise in life expectancy and to the 
subsequent impact on the dependency ratio, the sustainability of the system necessarily 
entails raising the retirement age, restricting early retirement and encouraging a longer 
working life. The same considerations, along with reasons relating to fairness and encour-
aging participation in the labour market, also advise moving towards the proportionality of 
contributions paid in throughout working life to the pension received, in which connection 
the number of years of contributions for the calculation of the amount of the pension (the 
regulatory base) must be raised significantly, which would bring us closer into line with 
other European countries (see Table 2.4).
The draft legislation on the reform of the public pension system submitted by the govern-
ment to Parliament in March 2011 marks progress in both directions, and on the projec-
tions available, it will bring about a significant saving on the increased expenditure envis-
aged (see Box 2.3).
The reform also includes a factor of sustainability as from 2027, which should be instru-
mental in the revision every five years of the fundamental parameters of the system in 
terms of the differences between the trend of life expectancy for the population at the age 
of 67 from the year 2027 to the year in which the revision is made. The prompt definition 
of this factor of sustainability and the bringing forward of its application from the envis-
aged date (2027) are particularly important, and should avoid successive rounds of nego-
tiations on the adaptation of the parameters, which are so difficult to agree on.
Some European countries have already introduced similar measures (see Table 2.4). In 
some (Finland, Italy and Portugal), the factor of sustainability depends on changes in life 
expectancy, whereas in Germany the deciding factor is the ratio of pensioners to work-
ers paying contributions. In the cases of Finland and Italy, it only affects the calculation 
of new pensions; in Germany’s case, meanwhile, the factor of sustainability affects new 
pensions and the way in which previous pensions are updated. In most cases, the ad-
justment of the social security system parameters is automatic, except in Austria, where 
changes in life expectancy are only taken as an indicator of the need to activate the 
adjustment.
4.2  PUBLIC SPENDING
To ensure fiscal stability, 
pensions reform is pivotal...
... and must act on the actual 
retirement age and on the 
commensurateness of 
contributions to pensions, as 
the recent draft reform 
proposes
The introduction of a factor of 
sustainability is particularly 
important...
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In March 2011, the government submitted to Parliament the draft 
law on the reform of the public pensions system, containing pro-
posals to amend some of its main parameters. Firstly, the retire-
ment age is to be generally raised to 67 (compared with 65 at 
present). The extension will be progressively applied in the period 
from 2013 to 2027, at a rate of one month per year up to 2018 and 
two months a year from 2019. However, workers who have con-
tributed to the system for 38 years and six months may continue 
to retire at the age of 65.
The reform also states that, from the age of 63, there is a possibil-
ity of taking early retirement provided 33 years’ contributions have 
been made. In each case an annual reduction factor of 7.5% for 
each year ahead of the new ordinary retirement age shall be ap-
plied, although in these cases no top-up to the minimum pension 
will be applicable. The only exception to this rule has it that the 
minimum age (63) may be reduced to 61 in crisis situations.
The second notable feature of the reform is the lengthening of the 
period used to calculate the amount of the pension (the “regula-
tory base”) from 15 to 25 years (immediately prior to retirement). 
This will be progressively phased in at a rate of one year per an-
num from 2013 to 2022. 37 years’ contributions will be necessary 
to qualify for 100% of the regulatory base of the pension, whereby 
the first 15 years of contributions will entitle pensioners to 50%, 
while the remaining 50% will be obtained proportionately between 
15 and 37 years’ contributions, the calculation being made month-
ly. In this case a transitional period has also been set, commencing 
in 2013 and concluding in 2027. It is further established that, in the 
event of gaps in contributions, those relating to the first 24 months 
shall be topped up with the minimum contribution base, and those 
exceeding 24 months, with 50% of the base. That is in contrast to 
the current legislation, where all gaps are supplemented with the 
minimum base.
The reform introduces a sustainability factor as from 2027, with 
the aim of maintaining the proportionality of contributions to ex-
pected system benefits. In this connection, every five years the 
system’s fundamental parameters will be revised on the basis of 
the differences observed between the population’s life expectancy 
at the age of 67 as at the year in which the revision is made and life 
expectancy at 67 in 2027, using to this end the projections made 
by the competent government agencies. Finally, under certain 
conditions, the reform enables women who have interrupted their 
working life to have a baby or to adopt to bring forward their retire-
ment age ahead of 67, by a proportion of nine months per child, 
for a maximum of two years. New incentives are also provided to 
prolong working life,
together with greater safeguards for university and vocational 
training programmes, so that the entities and companies funding 
such programmes will have to contribute to the Social Security 
system for programme beneficiaries.
As regards the potential impact of this reform, information from the 
MCVL (Continuous Survey of Working Life) shows that a signifi-
cant proportion of individuals retire at present having contributed 
for more than 38 years and six months. Under the new regulations, 
these individuals may continue to retire at 65 and, therefore, they 
would not be affected by the higher retirement age. In particular, 
since 1998 the percentage of individuals who have retired at the 
age of 65 or less and with years of contribution more than or equal 
to 39 years has held relatively stable at a figure close to 50%.
In terms of the breakdown by sex, this percentage is higher in the 
case of men (around 61%) than in that of women (20% in 2009). 
The percentage in the case of women can be seen to be on a 
mildly growing trend, rising from 12% in 1998 to 20% in 2009; ac-
cordingly, in the future, the increase in female participation might 
exert slight upward pressure on this percentage, raising the num-
ber of people who might take retirement at 65.
With regard to skills, the group of highly skilled workers evidences 
a slightly lower percentage than the rest, due possibly to the fact 
that a higher level of educational attainment is associated with 
entering the labour market at a later age. Looking ahead, insofar 
as this high-skills group continues to increase, there might be a 
reduction in the percentage of people who can take retirement at 
65.
In sum, no clear trends are apparent in changes in the percentage 
of individuals who, aged 65 or less, and with 39 years’ contribu-
tions or more, have retired in recent years. With a view to the fu-
ture, if these percentages hold, the increase in the legal age of re-
tirement by two years, from 65 to 67, would give rise to an impact 
of around 1.1 years on average on top of the actual retirement age. 
In any event, the increase in the female participation rate might 
drive this percentage upwards, while the presumed increase in the 
population’s level of educational attainment would have the op-
posite effect.
As to how the average pension will be affected by the increase in 
the number of years’ contributions taken into account in calculat-
ing the regulatory base and the new treatment accorded to gaps in 
contributions, information drawn from the MCVL can be used to 
estimate the impact that would arise from these changes had the 
new regulations (those corresponding to the final year of the tran-
sitional period, 2022) been applied to actual retirements in 2008. 
To do this, the regulatory bases of the generation that was born in 
1943 and which retired in 2008 are estimated. For this group it is 
obtained that the application of the reform would have brought 
about an average reduction in pensions of 4.7%. This reduction 
cannot, however, be taken as an estimate of the impact of the re-
form on future pensions since, among other matters, individuals 
might change their behaviour, increasing for instance their partici-
pation in the labour market, as a result of the reform.
Calibrating the long-term effects of such a far-reaching reform of 
the parameters of the pensions system is a complex task and one 
subject to the uncertainty of the many assumptions that must be 
made. Possible exercises include estimates with a general equilib-
rium model, calibrated for the Spanish economy, with overlapping 
BOX 2.3THE REFORM OF THE PENSIONS SYSTEM
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generations of economic agents that take optimal consumption, 
saving, work and investment decisions. These estimates are com-
parable with those made by the European Commission’s Econom-
ic Policy Committee, which show an increase in contributory pen-
sion spending of 6.3 pp of GDP between 2009 and 2060, insofar 
as they are based on the same population projections to 2060 
(those made by Eurostat and which are known under the name of 
EUROPOP 2008) and the same projection on total factor produc-
tivity, which is a determinant of the future course of GDP and, 
therefore, of the sustainability of the Social Security system.
Specifically, a simulation has been made of the impact on future 
pensions spending of the estimated increase in the effective retire-
ment age, the extension of the calculation period determining the 
regulatory base and the modification of the scale of percentages 
according to the number of years’ contributions. The results of the 
simulations show that the effect of these changes might entail a 
saving of around 40% on the projected increase in pensions 
spending relative to GDP from 2009 to 2060 (see accompanying 
table). Consequently, the reform is a major step towards easing 
the effects of population ageing. The results are in line with those 
estimated in other papers, including the government’s official esti-
mate. Moreover, these effects of the reform might become wider 
following the activation of the sustainability factor, which would 
contribute to reducing pensions spending further if its application 
were to infer new changes to the system’s parameters such as, for 
instance, increases in the number of years used to calculate the 
pension and/or the putting back of the effective retirement age. 
BOX 2.3THE REFORM OF THE PENSIONS SYSTEM (cont’d)
Some countries (Sweden, Italy and certain central and eastern European countries) have 
opted for more extensive reforms, such as the transition towards a system which, being 
unfunded, is based on the defined contribution principle. Under this principle, pensions are 
proportionate to the contributions made by each individual over the course of their working 
life, they are duly updated on the basis of demographic and economic developments, and 
they depend on their age at the time of retirement. This rule entails greater transparency in 
the calculation of pensions, which encourages labour participation, lengthens working life 
and, in this way, ultimately raises the ratio of pensions received to wages.
The estimates available presage a strong increase in health spending as a result of 
population ageing, of around 1.6 pp of GDP to 2060.21 An analysis of public spend-
...whereas, with a view to 
enhancing transparency and 
system incentives, it would be 
desirable to move towards the 
proportionality of contributions 
to pensions
The dynamics of health 
spending are also worrying...
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The results show the saving from each reform expressed as a percentage of the envisaged increase in spending without reform.
b The estimates of Díaz-Saavedra et al. (2010) include (1) and (2), but not (3). In these, the increase in the simulated retirement age is 1.4 years. 
c In this model, the minimum frequency is annual. Accordingly, to approximate the estimated raising of the retirement age by 1.1 years, an increase of one year in 
the retirement age is simulated. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the total effect of the reforms, i.e. the sum of (1), (2) and (3), is not equal to individual 
sum of each reform, owing to the interactions between them.  
THE IMPACT OF THE REFORM ON FUTURE PENSION SPENDING. A COMPARISON OF EXISTING ESTIMATES (%)
Increase in the 
retirement age (1)
Lengthening of 
calculation period (2) 
Change in scale 
(3)
Total effect
(1) + (2) + (3)
Sustainability factor
2009-2050 period
    Government 15 15 8 38 15
    Díaz-Saavedra et al. (2010= (ƃret. 1.4 years) (b) — — — 38 —
    De la Fuente and Doménech (2011) — — — 40 —
    Banco de España model (ƃret. 1 year) (c) 14 26 11 43 —
2009-2060 period
    De la Fuente and Doménech (2011) — — — 39 —
    Banco de España model (ƃret. 1 year) (c) 7 22 10 37 —
21  See European Commission and CPE (2009), “The 2009 Ageing Report: economic and budgetary projections for 
the EU-27 Member States (2008-2060)”, European Economy, no. 2/2009.
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ing by function in the decade prior to the crisis reveals the strong growth of this 
item, with annual rates close to 9% between 1997 and 2007, and exceeding 20% of 
total public spending. A breakdown of the annual average growth of per capita 
health care spending shows, moreover, that the contribution of the non-demograph-
ic factors (associated, inter alia, with supply-side elements) is estimated to be very 
high; consequently, extrapolating past behaviour to the future, the increases in 
health spending in the long run might exceed those arising from the purely demo-
graphic effect.
RECENT REFORMS TO PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE EU-15
Reforms to system parameters
Calculation of pensions
Retirement 
age
Incentives to 
carry on 
working
Measure
Updating of 
contribution 
bases
Updating of 
the pension
Sustainability 
factor
Dejned 
contribution
Notional 
accounts
Germany X X X X
Austria X X X X
Belgium X X X
Denmark X X X
Spain (a) X
Finland X X X X X
France X X X X X
Greece X X
Netherlands
Ireland X
Italy X X X X X X
Luxembourg X
Portugal X X X X X X
United Kingdom X X X
Sweden X X X X
DESCRIPTION OF SUSTAINABILITY FACTORS IN PLACE IN EU-15 PENSION SYSTEMS
Germany
Denmark
Finland
France
Italy
Portugal
Sweden
Structural reforms
The amount of the pension depends directly on "transformation coeEjcients", which in turn depend on life expectancy. 
These shall be revised every ten years.
The amount of the pension will be adjusted according to the relationship between life expectancy at 65 in 2006 and life 
expectancy at that same age in the year immediately prior to retirement .
The amount of the pension will be adjusted on the basis of life expectancy as at the age at which retirement becomes 
effective, with no distinction by sex.
The degree of indexation of the pension to wage growth will be adjusted on the basis of the difference between the 
change in the number of contributors to the system and the increase in the number of pensioners. 
Increases in life expectancy at the age of 60 will translate as from from 2005 into the retirement age being put back so 
that the average number of years pension collection will remain set at 19.5 years. The new estimates, which will be 
updated every 5 years, will come into force 10 years after.
The amount of the pension is adjusted on the basis of the changes that arise in life expectancy as from 2010.
The reference period used to calculate the amount of the pension is adjusted on the basis of the the increases that 
arise in life expectancy at 60, so that the relationship between the reference period for the calculation of the pension 
and the number of expected years in retirement holds constant.  
PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE EU-15 TABLE 2.4 
 
  
SOURCES: CPE, European Commission and Banco de España.
a Measures forming part of the draft pension system reform submitted to Parliament by the government in March 2011 are not included.  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 65 ANNUAL REPORT, 2010 2. THE FISCAL OUTLOOK FOR SPAIN AFTER THE CRISIS
The improved efficiency of health spending might provide for cost savings by bearing on certain 
regulatory factors22, including most notably price mechanisms (little used in Spain), the regula-
tion of supplier prices and a degree of competition in the provision of services (see Table 2.5).23
In Spain, the general government sector employed somewhat more than 15% of all wage-
earners in 2009, with total gross wages amounting to close to 20% of economy-wide 
employee compensation, on average, in the period 1999-2010. in terms of public spend-
ing, the significance of this variable is even greater, since it accounts for around 26% of the 
total. In the ongoing fiscal adjustment, and according to the latest Stability Programme 
Update, the contribution of the cut in this total gross wage bill between 2009 and 2014 
might account for around 30% of the total reduction in the budget deficit.
Employee compensation has played a dual role in other countries’ successful consolidation 
strategies, helping make the adjustment durable and reducing its effect on economic activ-
ity in the short term. The interaction between public- and private-sector wages is the main 
channel through which the cushioning or offsetting of the potential restrictive effect of the 
containment of public-sector employee compensation on GDP is instrumented. In the case 
of the Spanish economy, the evidence indicates that the multiplier effect on activity of a 
reduction in employee compensation is positive even in the short term.24 Using this relation-
ship between public- and private-sector wages may be particularly relevant in a context in 
which the growth of the economy requires significant gains in competitiveness. For this to 
be possible in the current circumstances, the reform of collective bargaining is vital.
In any event, it should be borne in mind that, when aggregate fiscal adjustment needs are con-
siderable, measures based on restricting public-sector total gross wages face certain limits, 
given their potential impact on the efficiency and sufficiency of services. In this respect, in terms 
... although gains in efficiency 
in this sector can be achieved
Public-sector employee 
compensation should play a 
key role in the fiscal 
adjustment...
Value of the indicator (a)
Spain Maximum in the OECD
Price regulation 5.30 5.90 0.011
Control of access to specialists 6.00 0.00 (c) -0.005
Control of objectives 2.80 5.70 0.009
Price mechanisms 1.30 3.10 0.020
Development of private coverage 3.00 6.00 0.003
Elasticity of changes in regulation 
on eEjciency (b)
HEALTH CARE SECTOR REGULATION INDICATORS AND ESTIMATE OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT 
OF REGULATORY CHANGES ON EFFICIENCY 
TABLE 2.5 
 
 
SOURCE: Hernández de Cos and Moral Benito (2011), drawing on OECD data. 
a All the indicators range from 0 (minimum) to 6 (maximum). 
b Obtained using the regression of an estimated level of eEjciency for each country on the basis of 20 health care policy indicators considered by the OECD. The 
table shows only indicators and their estimated elasticity in cases in which this is signijcant.  
c In the case of this indicator, given that estimated elasticity is negative, the value in the table is the minimum, not the maximum, in the OECD countries.
22  These results should be viewed with caution given that they do not always prove robust to the measure of 
health care spending efficiency used. See P. Hernández de Cos and E. Moral Benito (2011), Eficiencia y regu-
lación en el gasto sanitario en los países de la OCDE, mimeo.
23  Specific recent regulatory decisions by the government attempt to influence the reduction in prices and distri-
bution margins. For example, Ministerial Order SPI/3052/2010 of 26 November 2010, determining sets of drugs 
and their reference prices, and also regulating specific aspects of the reference price system, and Royal Decree 
8/2010 of 20 May 2010, adopting extraordinary measures for the reduction in the budget deficit (Chapter 5, 
health measures).
24  See F. De Castro and P. Hernández de Cos (2008), “The economic effects of fiscal policy: the case of Spain”, 
Journal of Macroeconomics, 30, pp.1005-1028.
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of restricting public-sector employment, consideration must be given to the fact that, according 
to the MAP (General Government Ministry), the main weight of public employment in Spain is 
concentrated in activities that are complementary to the private sector (Justice, Security Forces, 
general administration) or potentially substitutive of private activity, but which are considered 
basic public services (education and health, almost 45% of the total).25 The staff employed in 
public corporations account for less than 5% of total public-sector employment in Spain.
As regards compensation per employee, the estimates available show there is some lee-
way for the adjustment, given that significant positive wage differences are observed be-
tween compensation per employee in the public sector as opposed to the private sector, 
even when controlling for individual characteristics.26 These differences would be chiefly 
concentrated in the lower-skilled strata.
Turning to public investment, it should be borne in mind that the growth of non-residential 
public productive capital was close to 4.5% on average between 1994 and 2007, which 
allowed the gap between Spain and the other euro area countries in terms of the public 
capital/population ratio to be reduced by more than 20 pp to 85% of the average for the 
euro area at end-2009. Likewise, the public investment/GDP ratio in 2009 stood at 4.4% 
of GDP in Spain (2.8% on average in the euro area); accordingly, the weight of this variable 
could be reduced without harming the necessary process of convergence.27 The reduction 
in the European funds that were used in the past to fund a significant portion of this public 
investment also makes it necessary to rationalise future investment projects to some ex-
tent. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the positive effects of public invest-
ment on productivity appeared to arise only from specific components, such as infrastruc-
ture, and these may moreover be cut significantly as from certain thresholds.
The weight of some spending items, in particular other transfers and current payments, 
capital transfers and subsidies, is high, accounting in 2010 for almost 9% of total public 
... while public investment 
projects should be 
rationalised...
...as should public transfers 
and subsidies, whose weight 
in public spending is high
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CHART 2.5
SOURCE: Eurostat. 
25  For a classification of public-sector activities that are substitutive of or complementary to private activities, see 
R. Fiorito and T. Kollintzas (2004), “Public goods, merit goods, and the relation between private and government 
consumption”, European Economic Review, 48, pp. 1367-1398.
26  J. I. García-Pérez and J. F. Jimeno (2005), Public sector wage gaps in the Spanish regions, Documentos de 
Trabajo, no. 0526, Banco de España. See also R. Giordano and D. De Palo (2011), The public sector pay gap in 
selected euro area countries, mimeo, Banca d’Italia.
27  Moreover, it should be taken into account that much of the investment in infrastructure is by the corporate 
public sector or funded (at least in part) by the private sector.
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spending and around 4% of GDP. Currently, more than half the subsidies and transfers are 
aimed at public and private companies, which include most notably infrastructure and 
transport companies, along with those aimed at promoting employment and at interna-
tional cooperation. There would therefore be room for rationalisation in this field, on the 
basis of effectiveness criteria and bearing in mind the potential distortionary effects that 
this type of transfer generates. In this area, the latest Stability Programme Update consid-
ers significant reductions in this type of spending of around 1.8% of GDP in the 2014 
horizon.
The weight of spending on unemployment benefits rose to 3% of GDP in 2010, a signifi-
cantly higher level than the European average, as a result of Spain’s high unemployment 
rate. Conversely, active employment policies accounted in 2008 for only 0.6% of GDP, 
below the EU average (see Chart 2.5). This difference is even greater when analysed in 
terms of spending per unemployed person. The breakdown of spending on active policies 
shows, moreover, that almost 35% of active policy expenditure in Spain was earmarked 
for the concession of Social Security rebates (compared with 23% in the EU), while spend-
ing on training accounted for only 19% (36% in the EU).
Against a background of high unemployment levels, employment policies should be 
chiefly aimed at preventing this increase in joblessness from becoming structural. To 
do this, it should be borne in mind that the available empirical evidence shows that 
the effectiveness of Social Security rebates is very limited, whereas unemployment 
benefits have negative effects on unemployment exit rates, lengthening the duration 
of unemployment and increasing the likelihood of it becoming structural. In this re-
spect, active and passive employment policies should be reorganised and greater 
control maintained over effective job search by workers. Active policies should re-
duce the funds currently assigned to rebates, which should be confined to the groups 
facing most employability difficulties, in line with the reform approved in 2010. Also, 
these funds should be earmarked to a greater extent for training, with highly specific 
technical content.28
Lastly, employment policy 
should be reorganised, giving 
greater weight to the so-called 
“active policies”
28  See C. Alonso-Borrego, A. Arellano, J.J. Dolado and J.F. Jimeno (2004), Eficacia del gasto en algunas políticas 
activas en el mercado laboral español, Documento de Trabajo no. 53, Fundación Alternativas, Madrid.
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SOURCE: OECD (2011), Taxing Wages 2010, OECD Publishing.
a The average tax wedge on employment income for each standard individual is obtained as the sum of personal income tax derived from employment income plus 
social security contributions borne by the employer and the worker, on one hand, and the related gross average wage of private-sector full-time employees, on 
the other.   
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SOURCES: Taxation trends in the European Union - 2010 Edition (Eurostat)
a The data for Portugal and Greece are for 2006.
b The implied rates on consumption are calculated as the ratio of the sum of revenue from taxes on consumption (VAT, taxes on energy, taxes on tobacco and 
alcohol, and other taxes on specijc consumption) to household jnal consumption in national territory. The implied rates on labour are calculated as the sum of all 
direct taxes and social security contributions, paid both by wage-earners and employers, that are levied on employment income, divided by the total compensation 
of wage-earners who work in national territory.   
c The implied rates on jrms' capital are obtained as the ratio of all tax revenue arising from taxes levied on business income and on capital, on one hand, to the sum 
of jrms' net operating surplus, interest, dividends and other net property income received, on the other. The implied rates on households' capital are calculated as 
the ratio of the sum of taxes on households' capital income and the returns on business activities, on one hand, to the sum of imputed income, the net operating 
surplus and households' and not-for-projt private institutions' mixed income, mixed income of the self-employed, and interest, dividends and other net property 
income received by households and not-for-projt private institutions. 
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Given the scale of the fiscal adjustment needed, having to introduce tax changes to 
accompany the foregoing spending cuts cannot be ruled out. Further, it should be 
taken into account that a significant portion of the fiscal deterioration has been due to 
the reduction in revenue, which will not foreseeably be reversed in the medium term 
to pre-crisis levels. These changes should take into consideration the role that the 
level and structure of taxation play in respect of the economy’s potential growth and 
competitiveness. Nor should it be forgotten that another function of tax systems is to 
contribute to the redistribution of income among the different agents. The change in 
the size and composition of public spending programmes should, therefore, be com-
plemented with tax reforms which, along with being compatible with the goals of fair-
ness that should be established, combine an increase in tax-raising capacity with 
improved efficiency.
In keeping with these criteria, when tax increases are necessary, they should be in the form 
of taxes that have fewer distortionary effects on growth and the allocation of resources. 
Examples of such taxes are those on real estate and on consumption. Currently, Spain’s 
lower tax pressure relative to other developed countries is due to the lower weight of those 
taxes considered less distortionary, in particular indirect taxes (see Charts 2.6 and 2.7). 
4.3  PUBLIC REVENUE
On the revenue side, 
measures could include 
increasing indirect taxation 
and reducing fiscal expenses
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SOURCES: 2010 State Budget (Report on tax benejts) and IGAE (National Audit .Ejce).
a Gross revenue is the sum of actual revenue and of jscal expenses.
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VAT rates, even after being raised in 2010, remain below the average for the OECD coun-
tries. Moreover, the ratio of VAT revenue to that which would be obtained were the stand-
ard rate to be applied to all consumer spending stands in Spain at 56%; accordingly, one 
option to increase revenue might be to broaden the base of the tax. Along the same lines, 
the weight of excise duties in general, and of environmental levies in particular, is signifi-
cantly lower than in other developed countries.
So-called “fiscal expenses”, arising from the presence of deductions and exemptions on 
different taxes, represent a major cost in terms of revenue-raising, they add complexity to 
the tax structure and in some cases they exert significant adverse effects on efficiency and 
even on fairness (see Chart 2.8). They should therefore be rationalised. Specifically, ac-
cording to information provided by the State budget on tax benefits, fiscal expenses in 
Spain account for around 42% of VAT revenue raised, for almost one-third of personal in-
come tax revenue and for one-fifth of corporate income tax revenue. The source of these 
fiscal expenses is highly diverse. In the case of VAT, the biggest portion arises from the 
application of low rates to specific goods, while under personal income tax, they are as-
sociated above all with exemptions/deductions on employment income, but also with the 
preferential treatment that investment in housing29 and contributions to pension schemes 
receive. Under corporate income tax, fiscal expenses correspond to various incentives in 
respect of investment, the promotion of SMEs and the development of R+D projects.
In sum, the fiscal policy priority in the coming years should be a vigorous adjustment that 
provides for public finances to be redressed swiftly and soundly. In parallel, the spending- 
and revenue-side measures ultimately adopted should strengthen the contribution of fiscal 
policy to the economy’s potential growth, which will require greater efficiency in public 
policy action.
In sum, public revenue and 
spending policies should 
urgently redress public 
finances and contribute to 
economic growth in the 
medium term
29  Here it should be recalled that the habitual dwelling deduction was eliminated for taxpayers exceeding a spe-
cific income threshold. In addition to this marking significant progress in tax neutrality between house-purchase 
versus house-rental decisions, it will also entail a gradual reduction in the current fiscal spending derived from 
this personal income tax deduction.
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THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE EURO AREA
In 2010, as a whole, the world economy continued the process of recovery and financial 
normalisation with which it had ended 2009 and grew by 5%, following the contraction of 
0.5% posted in the previous year. The emerging economies, whose fundamentals had 
scarcely been affected by the crisis, recovered more strongly and grew by 7.3%, which 
accounted for more than three quarters of world growth. The more gradual upturn of 3% 
experienced by the developed economies varied notably across countries, the United 
States and Japan being the most buoyant economies in this group. However, in most 
cases – the United Kingdom, the euro area and Japan – activity has still not returned to its 
pre-crisis levels as seen in Chart 3.1.
In the developed economies the recovery was subject to fluctuations and uncertainties 
throughout the year. The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area and doubts about the 
soundness of the upturn in the United States seriously affected confidence and markets 
around the second quarter. It was only with the support from fresh monetary and fiscal 
stimuli in the United States that confidence in the recovery was restored in the last four 
months of the year. Notwithstanding this, the risks to the recovery remained high and in-
cluded, most notably, the upward trend in commodity prices, triggered by the strong 
growth of the emerging economies, and the ongoing sovereign debt problems in Europe. 
Furthermore, at the beginning of 2011 major shocks occurred – there was a wave of insta-
bility in the Arab world and an earthquake with grave consequences in Japan – which have 
exacerbated certain of these risk elements.
During 2010, ongoing wide output gaps, weak labour markets and the process of reor-
ganisation of public and private balance sheets constrained the expansion of domestic 
demand in the developed economies and eased inflationary pressures. However, increas-
es in commodity prices, which intensified in 2011, have lifted inflation from average rates 
of approximately 1% in mid-2010 to the present level of more than 2%. In the emerging 
economies, inflationary pressures have been stronger and in certain cases – mainly in Asia 
– inflation rates have exceeded their pre-crisis levels.
The recovery was accompanied by the normalisation of international trade, which in 2010 
increased by 12% in volume and exceeded its pre-crisis levels. Noteworthy were the 
buoyancy of the trade of (and between) emerging countries and the fact that global imbal-
ances once again widened, albeit moderately. The return of financial flows towards emerg-
ing economies has been very strong, accentuating the risks of some of them overheating. 
The reorganisation of international financial flows reflects the adjustment of the global fi-
nancial system to a situation in which the outlook for emerging economies is better than 
that for advanced economies, while the latter continue to correct the excesses which led 
to the crisis.
Economic policies continued to play an essential role as a support for activity. In fact, un-
certainty about the recovery and the financial situation led to the postponement of the exit 
strategies from expansionary monetary policies, which were anticipated at the beginning 
of the year, and there was even some further loosening in the United States and Japan. In 
the fiscal arena, there was a pronounced difference in behaviour between the fiscal con-
solidation in Europe - prompted by sovereign debt problems in the euro area - and fresh 
fiscal stimuli in Japan and the United States.
1  Introduction
In 2010, the world economy 
made progress in emerging 
from the crisis and grew by 
5%, underpinned by the 
buoyant emerging economies, 
whereas the recovery in the 
advanced economies was 
more gradual
Inflation rates have risen from 
very low levels, driven higher 
by the upswing in commodity 
prices
International trade returned to 
a normal footing and 
international capital flows 
picked up
Economic policies continued 
to play an essential role as a 
support for activity
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
UNITED STATES
    GDP (a) 0.0 -2.6 2.9 2.4 3.0 3.2 2.8
    CPI (a) (f) 3.8 -0.4 1.6 2.4 1.8 1.2 1.3
    Current account balance (% of GDP) -4.7 -2.7 -3.2 -3.0 -3.4 -3.4 -3.1
    General government balance (% of GDP) -6.3 -11.3 -10.6 -10.7 -11.1 -10.4 -10.3
JAPAN
    GDP (a) -1.2 -6.3 3.9 5.6 3.1 4.9 2.2
    CPI (a) (f) 1.4 -1.4 -0.7 -1.2 -0.9 -0.8 0.1
    Current account balance (% of GDP) 3.2 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6
    General government balance (% of GDP) -4.1 -10.2 -9.6 -7.4 -7.1 -7.3 -7.5
EURO AREA
    GDP (a) 0.3 -4.1 1.8 0.8 2.0 1.9 2.0
    CPI (a) (f) 3.3 0.3 1.6 1.1 1.5 1.7 2.0
    Current account balance (% of GDP) -0.7 -0.4 0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6
    General government balance (% of GDP) -1.9 -6.3 -6.5 — — — —
UNITED KINGDOM
    GDP (a) -0.1 -4.9 1.3 -0.3 1.6 2.5 1.5
    CPI (a) (f) 3.6 2.2 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.1 3.4
    Current account balance (% of GDP) -1.6 -1.7 -2.5 -2.6 -2.1 -2.4 -2.9
    General government balance (% of GDP) -3.6 -8.6 -8.9 -7.3 -9.5 -7.9 -10.7
CHINA
    GDP (a) 9.6 9.2 10.3 11.9 10.3 9.6 9.8
    CPI (a) (f) 5.9 -0.7 3.3 2.2 2.9 3.5 4.7
    Current account balance (% of GDP) 9.3 4.9 5.2 4.5 5.4 7.2 5.3
    General government balance (% of GDP) -0.8 -2.8 -1.6 6.5 4.6 -1.0 -11.8
LATIN AMERICA (b) (c)
    GDP (a) 4.3 -2.0 6.3 5.9 7.9 6.0 5.3
    CPI (a) (f) 7.8 6.4 6.4 6.1 6.6 6.3 6.7
    Current account balance (% of GDP) -0.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7
    General government balance (% of GDP) -0.5 -2.9 -2.2 -2.7 -2.5 -2.1 -2.0
NON-EURO AREA EU MEMBER STATES THAT JOINED EU IN 2004 OR 2007 (b) (d)
    GDP 4.4 -3.4 1.9 0.6 2.0 2.1 2.8
    CPI (a) (f) 6.4 3.6 3.1 3.0 2.7 3.1 3.7
    Current account balance (% of GDP) -7.4 -2.7 -2.6 -1.0 -2.0 -4.4 —
    General government balance (% of GDP) -3.6 -6.9 -6.4 — — — —
PRO-MEMORIA: GDP GROWTH (e)
    World 2.5 -1.0 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.0 4.6
    Developed countries 0.1 -3.5 2.6 2.1 2.7 3.0 2.4
    Emerging countries 5.7 2.1 7.9 8.7 8.6 7.3 7.1
PRO-MEMORIA: INFLATION (e)
    World 4.5 2.9 3.3 3.0 2.8 3.0 3.6
    Developed countries 1.6 0.1 1.5 1.6 1.1 1.3 1.7
    Emerging countries 8.1 5.2 6.2 4.7 4.8 5.1 5.7
2010
2008 2009 2010
MAIN MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS TABLE 3.1 
SOURCES: Banco de España, IMF and national statistics.
a Annual percentage change. 
b The aggregate for the different areas has been calculated using the weight of the countries making up such areas in the world economy in the previous year, in 
PPP. Based on IMF information.
c Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Peru.
d Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania.
e Quarterly data based on a sample of countries representing 90% of world GDP.
f Quarterly CPI corresponds to the average for the quarter. 
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The outlook for the global economy is one of a gradual recovery, although it will be ham-
pered by the adjustments which are still pending in the developed economies and subject 
to notable uncertainty. The deterioration of public finances and the upward trend in com-
modity prices will reduce the authorities’ margin for manoeuvre and may undermine con-
fidence again. In parallel, the global economy remains immersed in a process of profound 
structural change characterised by the increasingly important role of emerging economies 
as engines of economic growth (see Box 3.1) and a new framework of international coop-
eration in the formulation of economic policies.
At the beginning of 2010 global economic activity continued to recover against a backdrop 
of moderate inflation, carrying on the trend that began in the second half of 2009. World 
GDP increased at a year-on-year growth rate of 5.1% in Q1, boosted mainly by the emerg-
ing economies, which grew by 8.7% year-on-year (see Chart 3.2). For their part, the ad-
vanced economies expanded by 2.1% year-on-year (3.1% in annualised quarter-on-quarter 
terms), supported by stockbuilding and private consumption; the external sector’s contri-
bution to growth was negative despite the recovery of exports. The upturn was more robust 
in the United States and Japan, which posted annualised quarter-on-quarter growth of 
3.7% and 6%, respectively, and more moderate in the United Kingdom. In any event, 
Emerging from the crisis will 
be a slow process and 
inflationary risks will become 
more important
2  Economic and financial 
developments
In 2010 Q1, global economic 
activity continued to pick up, 
more sharply in the emerging 
economies...
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The emerging economies have become increasingly important actors 
in the global economy, raising their share of world GDP, trade and fi-
nancial flows. This process strengthened from the turn of the century 
and intensified further during the financial crisis. Also as a result of the 
crisis, there have been significant changes in the governance of inter-
national economic institutions, which have crystallised into greater 
participation by the emerging countries, more in line with their relative 
weight in the world economy. Within the group of emerging econo-
mies, these trends have been particularly strong in the most sys-
temically important countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China, col-
lectively known as the BRICs).
Traditionally, the medium- and low- income economies (included here 
in the category emerging economies), which account for most of the 
world’s population, have recorded similar growth rates to the ad-
vanced countries, which has limited real convergence between these 
two groups of countries. However, in the last decade the advanced 
economies have grown by about 2% and the emerging economies 
by somewhat more than 6%, a disparity that, according to IMF long-
term forecasts, will be sustained over the period 2011-15. This pro-
gress has enabled these countries to improve their living standards 
significantly, and has been reflected in an increase in the human de-
velopment index and in a sharp rise in per-capita GDP (of 28.3% 
between 2000 and 2009). Within the emerging economies, the four 
BRIC countries are among those that have grown most (by 8% on 
average between 2000 and 2010, a rate that is expected to be sus-
tained between 2011 and 2015), and those that have converged 
most rapidly with the developed countries (see Chart 1). This strong 
growth over the last ten years has led to a significant increase in the 
share of the emerging economies in world output, from one third in 
1980 to almost one half now, a level that will be clearly exceeded in 
2015 (53% of world GDP). The BRICs’ share of world GDP rose from 
12% in 1980 to 25% in 2010, and could reach 29% in 2015, with 
China accounting for the largest part of the increase. Given their 
strong relative growth rate and the increase in their share of the world 
economy, the contribution of emerging economies to world growth 
BOX 3.1THE GROWING WEIGHT OF EMERGING ECONOMIES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY1
1  See, for more details, “El creciente peso de las economías emergentes 
en la economía y gobernanza mundiales: los países BRIC”, Documentos 
Ocasionales, No. 1101, Banco de España.
SOURCES: IMF, World Bank and UN.
a Current IMF dejnition
b Brazil, Russia, India and China.
c IMF estimates in WEO, October 2010.
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BOX 3.1THE GROWING WEIGHT OF EMERGING ECONOMIES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (cont’d)
has also increased substantially; in the last decade these countries 
have accounted for more than half of world growth (see Chart 2).
This progress has been made against a background of greater inte-
gration in the world economy of the emerging economies, which 
have also become the main beneficiaries and engines of globalisa-
tion. This process has been accompanied by a gradual improvement 
– albeit uneven across countries – in the institutional and macroeco-
nomic framework of these economies, which has helped them to 
avoid the most negative effects of the crisis and to draw a dividing 
line from their own past.
The integration has taken place in both the trade and financial 
spheres, although it has been more pronounced in the former. The 
emerging economies increased their degree of openness to trade 
significantly from 2000 and are playing an increasingly important role 
in world trade (see Chart 3). The higher degree of openness of the 
developing economies largely reflects greater trade between the 
emerging regions themselves. Such trade increased from 25.1% of 
the total external trade of these economies in 1990 to 37.6% in 2009. 
The foreign trade of these countries is basically centred on raw mate-
rials, the BRIC countries being particularly important here, either as 
net exporters (Brazil and Russia) or as net importers (China and In-
dia). Notwithstanding the bias towards trade in raw materials, China 
(in manufacturing), India (in services) and other emerging economies 
(in particular in Asia) are rapidly increasing the technological content 
of their exports.
As in the case of trade, the financial integration of the emerging econ-
omies has intensified in recent decades. Direct investment has played 
a notable role in this process. While in 1990 direct investment flows 
were practically confined to the advanced economies (99% of out-
flows and 87% of inflows), in 2009 the developing economies re-
ceived 38.2% of all direct investment inflows (see Chart 4) and were 
responsible for 15% of all outflows. Around half of the inflows and 
outflows of direct investment in the emerging economies correspond 
to the BRICs, with China standing out as the second largest recipient 
of direct investment inflows. The increase in the share of other capital 
flows has been less pronounced, partly due to the restrictions on the 
openness of the capital account that persist in some important coun-
tries, although Brazil and other Latin American and Asian countries 
play an important role in international flows of portfolio and fixed in-
come investment. Moreover, the favourable outlook for growth in the 
short and medium-term and lower macroeconomic volatility have 
reduced the perception of risk traditionally associated with the 
emerging economies and may contribute to a reorientation of inter-
national capital flows towards these economies in the coming years. 
This process is not risk-free, given the volatility and institutional fragil-
ity that still characterise many of these economies.
The growing weight of the emerging economies on the international 
stage means that the main actors are no longer limited to the G7 
countries. Indeed, the financial crisis has led to an increase in the 
weight of these economies in global financial institutions. Factors 
contributing to this change have been the relatively favourable behav-
iour of the emerging economies during the crisis and the need to in-
volve them in the economic policy responses required to overcome it. 
The changes in world economic governance over the last three years 
have taken place in numerous spheres: the G20’s acquisition of pre-
eminence over the G7, the creation of the Financial Stability Board, 
with the participation of the emerging G20 countries, and the in-
crease in their weights and voting power in the World Bank and IMF 
in 2010. Furthermore, the summits of heads of state of the so-called 
BRICs have begun to become institutionalised, reflecting the greater 
institutional links between emerging economies, with the aim of pre-
senting a common front at the global level.
The result of these macroeconomic, trade and financial develop-
ments will be a world economy that is increasingly more globalised, 
multipolar and independent than it was at the end of the 20th cen-
tury. Global governance structures, in which the emerging econo-
mies have acquired greater prominence, are adapting to this new 
situation, and mechanisms are taking shape to coordinate all the 
important actors, so as to ensure that growth in the world economy 
is more balanced and sustainable. However, this reshaping of global 
governance structures is neither free of difficulties nor of challenges, 
starting with the active and constructive involvement of the systemic 
emerging countries in the most important areas of international eco-
nomic relations, such as global imbalances, financial reform, trade 
agreements and efforts to combat climate change.
growth in the developed economies continued to be underpinned by stimulus policies and 
its foundations remained fragile: employment was weak and unemployment rates were high 
(see Chart 3.3); indebtedness was still excessive in the non-financial private sector; restruc-
turing was still needed in financial systems and activity in real estate markets was minimal.
In the emerging economies the recovery was gaining momentum in early 2010, particularly 
in China, which posted growth of approximately 10% year-on-year in Q1, and in the rest of 
emerging Asia and Latin America, which expanded by rates of around 8.5% and 6%, re-
spectively. This buoyancy was driven by strong domestic demand and, in particular, by in-
vestment, a growth pattern that indicated a certain independence from developed econo-
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mies, in the absence of fresh shocks (see Chart 3.2). In Eastern Europe, by contrast, where 
the crisis had hit harder, the expansion was more moderate. The increase in trade between 
emerging economies, especially the Asian economies, was also faster (see Chart 3.3).
The performance of financial markets continued to improve at the beginning of 2010, in 
line with the trend that began half way through the previous year (see Chart 3.4). The early 
months of the year were marked by the recovery of the appetite for risk and lower volatil-
ity, which returned to its levels prior to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. This favourable 
environment gave rise to stock market gains, a rise in long-term interest rates and a nar-
rowing of the spreads on corporate and emerging sovereign bonds. The increase in profits 
and the notable level of issuance on capital markets improved the corporate sector’s fi-
nancial capacity despite weak bank lending (see Chart 3.5).
However, there were underlying weaknesses behind this favourable performance. The ad-
vanced economies’ financial systems – still immersed in restructuring processes – had not 
… and was accompanied by 
an improvement in the 
financial environment, which 
was not without weaknesses
SOURCES: IMF, Datastream, JP Morgan, Eurostat, national statistics and Banco de España.  
a G4: United States, Japan, United Kingdom and euro area. Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Mexico. Emerging Asia: India, 
Hong Kong, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Taiwan and Singapore. New EU members: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria and Rumania.  
b In China, the government consumption component represents total consumption (government and private).
c Contribution, in percentage points, to the annualised quarterly change in GDP. 
d In-house calculations based on data for 57 countries that represent 90% of world GDP. The aggregates have been calculated using the weight of the countries 
in the world economy in the previous year, in PPP, according to IMF information.  
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resumed their role as intermediaries in the financing of firms and households, and credit 
continued to adjust. As for the bank deleveraging and recapitalisation processes, vulner-
abilities remained on the liabilities side, with substantial volumes of short-term financing, 
and there were still troubled segments in the financial system in some countries. Further-
more, since end-2009 problems had been incubating on the sovereign debt markets, 
which would ultimately affect confidence in banking systems.
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Growing instability on certain European sovereign debt markets peaked in May when the 
turmoil associated with fiscal difficulties in Greece, after spreading to the euro area, af-
fected global markets, including emerging ones, which had been the most resilient until that 
time. World stock markets recorded considerable losses and there was a sharp increase in 
volatility, although not as extreme as that in September 2008. Furthermore, the process of 
issuance returning to normal on fixed-income markets came to a halt. Investors’ search for 
In May, the European sovereign 
debt crisis unleashed a bout of 
instability on global markets 
and activity in the advanced 
economies began to show 
signs of weakness
SOURCES: Datastream and Bloomberg.
a VIX index (volatility of the Standard & Poors 500 index) and 5-year US CDX investment grade credit risk index.
b EMBI+ for Latin America and EMBI Global for Asia and Central and Eastern Europe.
c Industrial corporate bonds. Differentials vis-à-vis swaps.
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safe havens resulted in a fresh decrease in US bond yields – and in those of other advanced 
economies – with the result that the ten-year yield dropped to levels of around 2.5% in 
summer, approaching the lows recorded after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The dol-
lar and yen also appreciated strongly; at the beginning of June the dollar traded against the 
euro at its highest levels since 2006 ($1.21/€), as shown in Chart 3.4. In this scenario, 
banks’ financing conditions tightened at the same time as their credit risk deteriorated.
The unfavourable impact on financial markets was accentuated by the signs of a slow-
down in the US economy, which emerged during the second quarter of the year. This 
change was determined largely by the downturn in the housing market, which occurred 
when part of the tax relief it enjoyed ended. Furthermore, on the labour market, employ-
ment showed signs of renewed weakness, while the unemployment rate reached levels of 
approximately 9.5% and the labour force fell owing to a discouragement effect.
The response of the European authorities to the Greek crisis, the results of the stress tests 
of European banks released in July and the publication of business and bank profits, 
mainly in the United States, contributed to the stabilisation of financial markets over the 
summer, although doubts remained about the recovery. US GDP growth in Q2 (1.7% in 
annualised quarter-on-quarter terms), which was published in July, confirmed the loss of 
economic momentum and the weakness of private consumption. The lack of vigour spread 
Throughout the summer 
markets stabilised, while 
uncertainty about the economy 
prompted a fresh round of 
monetary and fiscal stimulus in 
the United States…
SOURCES: Datastream, Bureau of Economics, Federal Reserve, ECB, Bank of England, Banco de España, Bank of Japan and Dealogic.  
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to other economies such as Japan’s, while the United Kingdom recorded a recovery (that 
turned out to be temporary) following several quarters of sluggishness, which was led by 
buoyant private consumption.
The signs of economic weakness prompted an expansionary turn in the economic policy 
stance in the United States. Following the gradual (and passive) withdrawal of support for 
liquidity and financing during the first half of the year, the Federal Reserve pre-announced 
at the end of August a fresh phase of non-conventional monetary expansion, which began 
to be implemented in November. In addition to the monetary impulse, in December a new 
substantial fiscal stimulus package was introduced. Japan also implemented a new fiscal 
programme in that period, albeit on a more modest scale. These two cases contrast with 
the fiscal adjustment introduced in Europe, including the United Kingdom, as a result of 
the sovereign debt crisis in certain countries in the euro area (see Section 3.1).
The stimulus measures in the United States prompted a notable improvement in the eco-
nomic outlook at the same time as they contributed to anchoring the confidence of the fi-
nancial markets, despite representing a serious setback for fiscal consolidation. The easing 
of financial tensions was reflected in a stock market rally and an improvement in credit and 
financing markets in the last stretch of the year. This trend was particularly pronounced in 
the emerging markets, where capital inflows notably stepped up at the end of summer, 
coinciding with the new expansionary turn in US monetary policy. This situation unleashed 
strong tensions in exchange rates due to the dollar’s tendency to depreciate against most 
currencies; in particular, the euro returned to levels of approximately $1.40.
Coinciding with the fresh stimulus in the United States, US long-term bond yields in-
creased to around 3.5% at end-2010, mainly reflecting better expectations for growth. 
This rise in long-term rates contributed to easing strains in exchange rates and capital 
flows to emerging economies, alleviating monetary policy dilemmas in these countries at 
a time when inflationary pressures were increasingly evident. In this context, the triggering 
of a new episode in the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area in November, caused by 
problems with banks in Ireland, had a very limited impact on international financial markets 
in comparison with the episode in May.
Overall, the world economy ended 2010 with a growth rate that was slowing slightly (close 
to 4.5% in annualised quarter-on-quarter terms) and a favourable outlook. The emerging 
economies remained notably robust, growing by 7.1% year-on-year in that period. For 
their part, the developed economies also experienced a slight deceleration and expanded 
by 2.4% year-on-year (with an annualised quarterly growth rate of 1.5%), partly owing to 
the fall in inventories. In the United Kingdom and Japan growth decelerated and negative 
quarter-on-quarter growth rates were recorded on account of the fall in private demand. 
However, in the United States activity rose in the last part of the year and GDP increased 
by 3.1% in annualised quarter-on-quarter terms in Q4, supported by private consumption 
and the favourable contribution from the external sector. In any event, output gaps in the 
major developed economies were still negative at the end of 2010 and unemployment 
rates held at historically high levels (see Chart 3.3).
In the early months of 2011, the main trends discussed have firmed: the recovery in the 
United States, strengthened by the revival of the labour market and the normalisation of 
financial markets. The ongoing problems in the euro area – with the bailout of Portugal in 
April – have not significantly affected global markets, while the political crisis in the Arab 
countries and the earthquake in Japan are having a global impact, since they contribute to 
... which contributed to 
improving the economic 
outlook and anchoring the 
confidence of financial 
markets, although it triggered 
strong movements in 
exchange rates
The new strains which 
appeared in autumn in the 
euro area did not have a 
significant impact on 
international markets
In the final stretch of 2010, 
world growth moderated 
slightly, although the US 
economy picked up
Despite the substantial 
negative shocks in the early 
months of 2011, the outlook 
remains favourable
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the rise in commodity prices but without having seriously compromised the confidence in 
the recovery.
Price developments remained contained in the first half of 2010, but inflation posted wide-
spread rises after the summer (see Chart 3.6). The main factor behind this increase was 
the rise in commodity prices (agricultural products, metals and oil), which held on a rising 
trend throughout the year, that was only briefly interrupted in Q2, and gained strength in 
the final quarter (see Chart 3.6). In 2010, as a whole, the overall index increased by 24%, 
with notable rises in food (28%) and oil (23%) prices. This trend, which was the result of 
growing demand from emerging countries, continued in the early months of 2011 and was 
strengthened in certain cases by cyclical supply factors (see Box 3.2).
Inflationary pressures were more pronounced in the emerging economies than in the ad-
vanced economies. In the United States inflation reached 1.5% year-on-year at end-
2010, which was lower than in the euro area (2.2%), whereas in Japan it held at negative 
Inflationary pressures only 
began to become widespread 
towards the end of the year, 
driven by the notable rise in 
commodity prices
SOURCES: Datastream, Goldman Sachs, national statistics and Banco de España.
a CRB indices.
b Aggregate calcuated on the basis of data for 57 countries representing 90% of world GDP.
c Aggregate calculated on the basis of data for 45 countries representing 83% of world GDP.
d India, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.
e Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Croatia.
f Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
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Commodity prices rose sharply from mid-2010 and in many cases 
were higher in early 2011 than in 2008 (see Chart 1). This general 
rise poses significant challenges for the developed economies, 
owing to the potential impact on inflation and the risk to the eco-
nomic recovery.
The dominant factor in the general rise in commodity prices is the 
increase in world demand, stemming principally from the emerg-
ing economies (in particular, from China) and, to a lesser extent, 
from the recovery in the developed economies. As a result of this 
increase, the world demand for many commodities (including 
foodstuffs) is at an all-time high. Behind these developments lie 
cyclical factors, and also structural ones, relating to changes in 
consumption habits. In the case of oil, the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) expects the demand for oil in 2011 to be more than 
89 million barrels per day (mbd), as compared with 86 mbd in 
2008. The emerging economies are responsible for the increases 
in the demand for oil in recent years, given that energy efficiency 
improvements and the severe economic crisis in the advanced 
economies have significantly reduced their demand (see Chart 2).
At the same time, various supply-side factors have also temporar-
ily affected the prices of some commodities. Notable in the case of 
foodstuffs have been poor harvests, primarily due to adverse 
weather conditions, which have led to export restrictions in some 
countries. In the case of oil, since the beginning of the year, politi-
cal tensions in various producing countries in North Africa and the 
Middle East have generated fears of a significant reduction in pro-
duction.
Moreover, the upward trend in prices may have been exacerbated 
by an increase in financial flows into commodity markets, against 
BOX 3.2RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMODITY PRICES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPED ECONOMIES
SOURCES: International Energy Agency, Bloomberg, Datastream and Banco de España.
a Forecast according to the International Energy Agency.
b The shock simulated relates to a 2% reduction in global production excluding Saudi Arabia.
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a background of abundant liquidity at the global level and of a 
higher relative preference on the part of investors for this type of 
assets. However, the evidence on the causality between flows and 
prices in these markets is not conclusive. The question is even 
more complex in the case of those commodities that have rela-
tively high storage costs, such as oil, in which investments are 
made in futures and options markets. The channels through which 
the prices of these financial instruments may affect spot prices are 
not clear.
Higher commodity prices have effects on inflation and activity. As 
regards inflation, the pass-through of the rise in international pric-
es for commodities to their domestic prices depends on ex-
change rate fluctuations against the dollar (the reference currency 
for most commodity prices), duties and taxes, the ability of im-
porters to mitigate the increase by lowering their margins and 
transport and distribution costs. For their part, changes in do-
mestic commodity prices may affect consumer prices through 
various channels. First, an increase in commodity prices has di-
rect effects on the CPI, which will be all the larger the greater their 
weight in the representative consumption basket. Second, there 
will be indirect effects, in the form of increases in production and 
distribution costs, which are more important in the case of energy. 
Finally, the so-called “second-round effects”, which reflect the 
incorporation of the initial rise in prices into price and wage for-
mation processes, so that the original shock is eventually passed 
through to inflation expectations and underlying inflation. The 
various studies that have analysed the impact of a rise in oil pric-
es on inflation in the developed economies generally find rela-
tively moderate effects, which principally stem from the direct 
impact of the higher cost of commodities on inflation. Thus, a 
10% increase in the price of oil would involve a rise in the euro 
area CPI of some 0.2-0.4 pp.1
At the same time, higher commodity prices have a contractionary 
impact on the net importing economies via three main channels. 
First, relative prices change, causing households and firms to 
spend a higher proportion of their income on goods derived from 
such commodities, to the detriment of other products. Second, 
firms’ production costs rise. And third, they may give rise to a con-
tractionary monetary policy response. In the net exporting econo-
mies, by contrast, the impact is expansionary, through the in-
crease in the terms of trade. However, it should be pointed out that 
the impact on activity will be very different depending on whether 
the rise in commodity prices is due to a sudden reduction in sup-
ply or to an increase in demand, owing to higher global economic 
growth.2
The recent tensions in the Arab countries make consideration of 
a scenario of reduction in the world supply of oil pertinent. The 
model used includes the consumption and production decisions 
of oil importers and exporters, taking into account, in particular, 
the different and strategic role of Saudi Arabia as the “dominant 
producer”, i.e. the only country with surplus production capaci-
ty.3 The results show that, given a fall in the supply of a pro-
ducer equivalent to 2%4 of the world market, the oil price would 
increase by 12% (see Chart 3). In response to this rise, Saudi 
Arabia would increase its oil production to make up for part of 
the fall in supply, so that the fall in world production would be 
smaller (0.5%). The initial impact on the GDP of the developed 
economies would be -0.4 pp, a fall that would be progressively 
absorbed and disappear after three years (see Chart 4). Accord-
ingly, the effects on the activity of the developed economies of 
an oil supply shock would be moderate, in line with the results in 
the literature.5
BOX 3.2RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMODITY PRICES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPED ECONOMIES (cont’d)
2  For an in-depth discussion of the different responses of the economy 
and oil prices to changes in world supply and demand, see Anton Nakov 
and Galo Nuño (2010), “Un modelo sencillo para analizar las causas y 
consecuencias de las variaciones en el precio del petróleo”, Boletín 
Económico, February, Banco de España, pp. 67-78.
3  For a technical description of the model used, see Anton Nakov and 
Galo Nuño (2009), “Oilgopoly: a general equilibrium model of the oil-
macroeconomy nexus”, Documentos de Trabajo, No. 0932, Banco de 
España.
4  As a reference, Libya represents 1.8% of the world oil market and during 
the crisis its market share fell by 75%.
5  The cited paper by Strauch et al. (2010) presents values of 0.2-0.4 pp, 
for a broad range of models, in response to a rise of 10% in oil prices. 
Some authors also stress that the impact of oil price shocks on GDP has 
been diminishing on account of the lower rigidities in labour markets, 
lower oil consumption per unit of GDP and the improvement in the con-
duct of monetary policy. In this connection, see O. Blanchard and J. Gali 
(2007), “The Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Shocks: Why are the 2000s 
So Different from the 1970s?”, NBER Working Paper No. 13368.
1  See, for example, Rolf Strauch et al. (2010), “Energy markets and the 
euro area macroeconomy”, Occasional Paper Series, No. 113, ECB or 
Luis J. Álvarez et al. (2011), “The Impact of Oil Price Changes on Span-
ish and Euro Area Consumer Price Inflation”, Economic Modelling, No. 
28, pp. 422-431.
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rates, although in the closing months of the year it moved into positive territory. By con-
trast, in the United Kingdom, it climbed to 3.7%, and breached 4% at the beginning of 
2011. The performance of core inflation was more stable and moderate, in line with the 
persistently wide output gap and surplus capacity. Similarly, inflation expectations re-
mained firmly anchored. By contrast, in the emerging economies inflation rose to 5.6% at 
end-2010, reflecting the higher weight of food and energy in their consumption baskets 
(although subsidies tend to mitigate fluctuations in final prices), strong private demand 
and narrower output gaps, which in Asia and certain Latin American economies had al-
ready closed. By region, inflation at end-2010 stood at 6% in Eastern Europe, 6.9% in 
Latin America and 5.1% in emerging Asia. Core inflation also showed a slight upward 
trend (in China and Brazil, in particular) and inflation expectations rose in some econo-
mies. The rising trend in inflation continued into the early months of 2011, as a result of 
the continuous upswing in commodity prices: in February inflation was 2.1% in the ad-
vanced economies and 5.7% in emerging economies, and in many Asian and some Latin 
American countries it has breached its pre-crisis rates. This situation has prompted a 
notable change in the monetary policy outlook, in particular in the developed economies, 
as described below.
At the beginning of 2010, gradual economic recovery and financial normalisation presaged 
a progressive withdrawal of the support given as a result of the crisis, albeit at different 
paces in the developed and emerging countries (more gradually in the former and more 
decisively in the latter). However, several events altered these prospects and contributed 
to accentuating the differences in the conduct of economic policies between emerging 
and developed countries, and also among the latter.
The main developed economies began the year with the intention of exiting their extraor-
dinarily expansive policies, which were implemented in response to the crisis. The chal-
lenge they faced consisted of reducing public support, which was leading to inflationary 
risks and doubts about the sustainability of fiscal positions, without harming the recovery.
In the monetary policy area, the debate centred on how and in what sequence non-stand-
ard measures would be withdrawn and when official interest rate rises would begin. The 
improvement in the financial and banking situation led to a natural unwinding of the use by 
financial institutions of certain assistance. Thus, in Q1, most of the extraordinary liquidity 
facilities in the United States and in the United Kingdom expired and the asset purchase 
programme of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England was completed. In the euro 
area too certain measures, such as the covered bond purchase programme and special 
longer-term refinancing operations, came to an end. In contrast, the Bank of Japan contin-
ued to introduce new measures, against the backdrop of persistent deflation. Neverthe-
less, uncertainty about the strength of the recovery and the absence of inflationary pres-
sures led to the postponement of when interest rate rises were expected – even in the 
United Kingdom, despite its higher inflation – a trend that was to continue throughout the 
year. Official rates were raised in other developed economies that were further ahead in the 
cycle (Sweden, Australia and Canada).
In spring the uncertainty surrounding the euro area sovereign debt crisis and doubts about 
the strength of the recovery in the United States delayed the withdrawal of monetary stim-
ulus and led to divergence in economic policy stances. Overcoming the sovereign debt 
crisis became a necessary priority in the euro area, whereas in the United States – and in 
a slightly different context, in Japan – concerns centred on avoiding a possible double-dip 
in activity and, even, the risk of deflation.
3  Economic policies
3.1  ECONOMIC POLICY 
DIVERGENCE IN THE 
DEVELOPED ECONOMIES
At the beginning of 2010, a 
progressive exit from non-
standard monetary policy 
measures in the developed 
economies was anticipated, 
against a backdrop of 
withdrawal of the stimuli 
introduced as a result of the 
crisis
The sovereign debt crisis in 
the euro area and uncertainty 
about the recovery in the 
United States opened up a 
widening gap between the 
economic policies of the 
developed economies
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 87 ANNUAL REPORT, 2010 3. THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE EURO AREA
The notable deterioration in fiscal variables in 2009 called for a gradual, but decisive, with-
drawal of the fiscal stimulus (see Chart 3.7). However, public debt increased further in 
2010 (by around 8 percentage points (pp) of GDP in the advanced economies as a whole), 
while fiscal deficits barely declined, standing at around 10% of GDP in the United States, 
Japan and the United Kingdom, and 6% in the euro area. The tensions prompted by the 
sovereign crisis in May led to an acceleration of fiscal adjustment in the euro area coun-
tries (see Chapter 4) and also in the United Kingdom (see Chart 3.7). In the latter country, 
the new government introduced a drastic fiscal adjustment (based on spending cuts and 
tax measures, including an increase in VAT of 2.5 pp and a new tax on banks), which will 
reduce the structural deficit by more than 8 pp of GDP over the next five years.
In marked contrast, activity doubts in the United States and Japan led to fresh fiscal ex-
pansion plans towards the end of the year. The main measure in the United States was the 
approval in December of a new fiscal package, of more then $800 billion (almost 6% of 
2010 GDP) for the next 10 years, notable being the extension of tax cuts that were due to 
expire and of unemployment benefits. This plan may raise the structural deficit by between 
1.5 pp and 2 pp of GDP, in 2011 and 2012, and delay the start of fiscal consolidation. For 
its part, Japan introduced a new fiscal package of around 1% of GDP in October and fol-
In the fiscal sphere, the euro 
area sovereign crisis 
accelerated the adjustment in 
Europe, while in the United 
States and Japan new fiscal 
stimulus plans were 
introduced towards the end of 
the year
SOURCES: IMF, Datastream, Bloomberg, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Banco de España.
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b IMF forecasts.
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lowing the earthquake in March 2011 approved a supplementary budget of a similar 
amount for the reconstruction work.
In the monetary policy sphere, the weakening of activity led to the possibility of new non-
standard monetary policy easing in the United States and in the United Kingdom in the 
summer. This was not the case in the euro area, which did however continue to provide 
ample liquidity to the financial system and put in place a government bond purchase pro-
gramme for the countries most affected by the sovereign tensions, to restore the transmis-
sion mechanism. Official interest rates remained unchanged in all cases during 2010, al-
though in the first few months of 2011, in the face of the rise in inflation, the date on which 
the markets expected official interest rate rises to begin moved forward (see Chart 3.8). In 
fact, the upward cycle in the euro area began in April, with a rise in interest rates of 25 
basis points (bp), to 1.25%.
The second phase of quantitative easing in the United States (known as QE II) was an-
nounced in August and commenced in November. It consists of the staggered purchase 
by the Federal Reserve System of $600 billion of Treasury bonds, to be completed in June 
2011, along with the reinvestment of another $300 billion of balance sheet assets reach-
ing maturity. The intention was to ease monetary and financial conditions, by reducing 
long-term interest rates and increasing the prices of a range of financial assets, in order 
to improve the outlook for agents and to increase their inflation expectations. Notwith-
As regards monetary policy, 
there was a new phase of 
quantitative easing in the 
United States
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standing the debate on the effectiveness and risks of QE II, subsequent developments 
appear to indicate that it has contributed to this objective, although long-term interest 
rates rose sharply following the start of the programme, the initial downward movement 
having occurred in advance. For its part, in October the Bank of Japan extended its lend-
ing facilities and its programme for the purchase of financial assets (including govern-
ment securities), with a new fund equivalent to 1.1% of GDP. After the earthquake in 
March, it doubled the volume of purchases and injected massive amounts of liquidity. In 
the United Kingdom, the possibility of an extension of non-standard measures eventually 
disappeared, owing to the risk that agents’ expectations would become unanchored, 
given that inflation has been standing at more than one percentage point above target for 
the last two years.
There are many reasons for the divergence in the economic policies of the main developed 
economies: differences in diagnosis, strategy and priorities in the presence of inflationary 
risks and economic weakness, and different degrees of freedom to design policies. How-
ever, in an increasingly integrated global economy, in which the policies of the largest 
countries have implications for the rest, these divergencies may generate tensions and 
reactions by other countries, as has already happened in the monetary and foreign-ex-
change arena after QE II in the United States, undermining the international coordination 
efforts that were established after the crisis (see Section 4.3).
The emerging economies avoided the impact of the crisis more successfully than the de-
veloped ones. Their recovery has been more rapid, assisted by robust economic funda-
mentals, less need to deleverage than in the developed economies and zero or low expo-
sure of their financial systems to problematic assets. The situation in the EU Member 
States that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 has been different. Most of them were hit hard 
by the crisis and their recovery has been weaker, owing to the larger imbalances and finan-
cial vulnerabilities accumulated during the years leading up to the crisis, as well as their 
close economic links to the euro area.
The combination of improved growth prospects in the emerging economies, renewed ap-
petite for risk in global financial markets and the persistence of very low interest rates in 
the developed economies led to a resurgence of capital flows towards the emerging coun-
tries during 2010. In Asia and Latin America these flows exceeded their pre-crisis levels 
(see Chart 3.9). These flows intensified after the summer, given the expectations of further 
monetary stimulus in the United States, creating significant difficulties for macroeconomic 
management and the fear of excessive exchange-rate appreciation. A significant portion 
of these larger flows towards the emerging economies is possibly permanent in nature, 
being the result of a global reallocation of capital, associated with better growth prospects 
and reflecting the weight and growing importance of these regions in the world (see Box 3 .1). 
However, the capital inflows are perceived in these countries as having a temporary 
component – especially after their intensification at the end of 2010 – with the attendant 
risks of excessive exchange-rate appreciation or sudden reversal.
The sizeable capital inflows and appreciation pressures coincided with growing pres-
sures on inflation, giving rise to a monetary policy dilemma in the Latin American and 
Asian economies. On the one hand, interest rate rises were desirable to contain the 
increase in inflation – against a background of closing output gaps and rising commod-
ity prices – and to avoid the unanchoring of inflation expectations. On the other hand, 
interest rate rises might contribute to fuelling the capital inflows and increasing the 
pressure on the exchange rate. The emerging economies responded to this challenge 
The economic policy 
divergence reflects both 
differences in the economic 
situation and in the 
assessment of medium and 
long-term risks 
3.2  ECONOMIC POLICY 
DILEMMAS IN THE 
EMERGING ECONOMIES
Expectations of strong 
economic growth in the 
emerging countries were 
confirmed
2010 saw sizeable capital 
inflows, that were especially 
large in certain countries
The capital inflows, combined 
with upward inflationary 
pressures, posed a dilemma 
for monetary policy
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with a combination of measures: interest rate rises, controlled appreciation and accu-
mulation of reserves, as well as administrative or macro-prudential measures, and even 
capital controls.
Interest rate rises were made in Asia and in most Latin American countries, although they 
were interrupted or toned down when capital inflows were at their strongest, following the 
summer. Many countries also used quantitative measures – primarily increases in reserve 
requirements – to tighten monetary conditions. With regard to exchange rates, larger ap-
preciations were generally tolerated in Latin America than in Asia. In China the authorities 
announced a return to the pre-crisis exchange-rate regime and permitted some apprecia-
tion of the renminbi against its reference basket, but its extent was limited. There was also 
a generalised intensification of accumulation of reserves to mitigate exchange-rate appre-
ciation, with the result that the holdings of these assets reached new historic highs (see 
Chart 3.9).
SOURCES: Datastream and IMF.
a Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, Central and Eastern Europe, Confederation of Independent States, Middle East and emerging Asia.
b IMF forecasts. 
c CPI-based. An increase (decrease) denotes an appreciation (depreciation) of the currency.
d Areas analysed: Emerging Asia (India, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Philippines), Central Europe (Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland) and Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Peru).
e Areas analysed: Emerging Asia (India, Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Philippines), Central Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland) and Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Colombia).
f 2010: latest data available.
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Many countries considered it necessary to resort to other kinds of measures (summa-
rised in Table 3.2) to deal with the heavy capital inflows and their impact on exchange 
rates. In some countries measures were taken to liberalise financial outflows. In other 
cases, macro-prudential-type measures were adopted to moderate the effects of capi-
tal inflows, such as limits on the growth of real-estate lending or loan-to-value (LTV) 
ratios. Also, measures to hinder the financial movements of non-residents (capital con-
trols) were adopted, with specific features depending on the country concerned, nota-
ble among them being taxes on portfolio transactions in Brazil and South Korea. Unlike 
in previous episodes, capital controls had greater international acceptance, albeit only 
as a last resort.
A contractionary fiscal policy stance in the emerging economies might have facilitated the 
management of exchange rate and monetary policies against a background of highly dy-
namic activity and, in some cases, of overheating. However, although the fiscal results 
were favourable, in marked contrast to the developed economies, the fiscal policy stance 
was not clearly restrictive in practically any country.
The seriousness of the crisis and the subsequent response have highlighted the need to 
articulate macroeconomic and financial policies to avoid the appearance of imbalances 
and to make progress in establishing a more stable economic and financial environment. 
This section reviews the progress towards this objective in three fundamental areas: i) fi-
nancial system rationalisation and restructuring; ii) private sector balance sheet adjust-
ment and fiscal consolidation in the main developed economies, and iii) the coordination 
of international economic policies, to mitigate the risks of re-emergence of global imbal-
ances and of reappearance of financial excesses.
Notable among the measures 
adopted were those to 
moderate capital inflows
Fiscal policy stances did not 
help alleviate the economic 
policy dilemma
4  Towards a global 
environment of greater 
economic and financial 
stability
The achievement of greater 
global economic and financial 
stability requires 
strengthened multilateral 
coordination and the 
adoption of reforms
COUNTRY
(implementation date in brackets)
Brazil (Oct-10 and Mar-11), Thailand (Oct-10)
South Korea (Nov-10)
Establishment of minimum investment period Indonesia (Sep-10)
Thailand (Feb-10 and Sep-10), Chile (Nov-10),
Peru (various)
China, Hong Kong, South Korea (Mar-11)
increasing capital requirements Brazil (Dec-10)
China (various), India (Oct-10), Brazil (Dec-10),
Indonesia (Dec-10), Malaysia (Mar-11),
Turkey (various), Peru (various)
Increasing reserve requirements for foreign-currency deposits Peru (Jul, Sep and Oct-10)
South Korea (Jun-10), Brazil (Jan-11),
Peru (Feb-11), China (Mar-11)
Restrictions on LTV (loan-to-value) and DTI (debt to income) 
in real-estate loans
Increasing reserve requirement (a)
Limit on banks' short foreign-currency positions
MEASURE
Financial kow restrictions 
(capital controls)
Financial kow liberalisation
Tax on jnancial inkows
Liberalisation of capital outkows
Macro-prudential measures
MAIN FINANCIAL FLOWS MANAGEMENT AND MACRO-PRUDENTIAL MEASURES TABLE 3.2 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Cash ratios can also be considered to be an alternative monetary policy measure, although they are increasingly being used with macro-prudential objectives. 
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In 2010 banking activity improved. Most banks reinforced their financial position during the 
year, with the support of strengthening balance sheets and progressive divestment, on one 
hand, and the gradual normalisation of certain wholesale funding and bond issuance mar-
kets, on the other (see Chart 3.5). Also, the profits of international banks recovered to 
around their pre-crisis levels. This behaviour was not homogeneous however: US and Brit-
ish banks achieved high profitability, while that of Japanese and euro area banks was more 
moderate. Capital ratios rose significantly, in line with this improvement and in response to 
the financial crisis. This bolstering of capital took place against a background of stricter 
regulatory requirements and, in some specific cases, with the injection of public capital. 
Cross-border activity remained relatively moderate, but international banks increased their 
exposure to emerging areas, in particular to Latin America and Asia, where the banking 
systems were only temporarily affected by the crisis. Notwithstanding these positive de-
velopments, the process of reorganising and reshaping the banking and financial system 
has yet to be completed, and bank lending and financing conditions continue to be con-
strained by supply-side factors. In addition, numerous segments of the securitisation mar-
kets have still to be reactivated. At the same time, the weakness of the demand for credit 
and the financial fragility of borrowers are also limiting growth in lending to the private 
sector, which is notably slack.
The improvement in the financial sector continued to be underpinned by sizeable support, 
both from governments and central banks. At the end of 2010, the total amount of public 
support actually used by the financial sector stood at around 20% of GDP in the main 
economies, which was almost the same as in the previous year (see Chart 3.10). In gen-
eral, there was a reduction in the support in the form of Treasury guarantees and central 
bank liquidity and financing facilities, which was offset by the increase in central bank as-
set purchases. In the United States, public support stood at 22% of GDP as at end-2010 
(5 pp less than at end-2009), with a notable reduction in the support in the form of capital 
injections. The level of financial support in the United Kingdom remains the highest among 
the main advanced economies, at more than 50% of GDP, although it has fallen slightly. In 
Japan and in the euro area there was a fresh increase in support in 2010, although from 
much lower levels (6% and 15% of GDP, respectively). Given the nature of this support, in 
which outright purchases and capital injections are gaining in weight, it is likely to be main-
tained for a prolonged period.
In 2010, the financial and regulatory reform initiatives coordinated at the global level lost 
some of their prominence to domestic ones. However, among the former, the approval by 
the G20 in November of the set of measures known as Basel III should be highlighted. 
These measures involve a strengthening of the capital and liquidity requirements to be met 
by financial institutions, at the global level, although some aspects have still to be devel-
oped (liquidity ratios, systemic institutions, etc.) and the period for full compliance is gen-
erous (until 2018, in some cases).
Among the reforms proposed at the national level, the Dodd-Frank law was passed in the 
United States and in the United Kingdom the government presented a consultative doc-
ument outlining a new reform, which must be approved in 2011. The main characteristics 
of both these financial reform programmes are set out in Table 3.3. They have common 
elements, such as the far-reaching review of regulatory and supervisory structures and 
the creation of institutions in the macroprudential area and for the protection of financial 
service consumers. Unlike the gradual strategy adopted by European countries, the US 
reform proposes a global transformation, extending to most of the financial sector, to 
reduce the probability of new crises and to mitigate their potential effects on the economy 
4.1  FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
REFORM: SITUATION, 
PROSPECTS AND 
PROCESSES
The processes to adjust and 
reorganise the banking sector 
moved forward last year …
… driven by the continued 
existence of sizeable public 
support …
… and regulatory and financial 
reform
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and, in particular, on public finances. The reform proposed by the new British govern-
ment focuses more on the regulatory architecture and assigns a larger role to the Bank 
of England.
One adjustment that needs to be made following the crisis is linked to the excessive in-
debtedness of the private sector in the main developed economies and to the necessary 
deleveraging process (see Chart 3.10). In the United States, Japan and the United King-
dom (in contrast to the euro area) the ratio of non-financial private-sector debt tended to 
decline in 2010. In the case of households the decline reflects the increase in disposable 
income, high savings rates and weak lending. In the corporate sector, the fall was main-
ly the result of rises in financial asset prices. However, private sector deleveraging is 
proceeding slowly and, on historical evidence, can be expected to continue for several 
years. Persistently very high debt ratios not only hamper economic recovery (by limiting 
the leeway for private demand expansion), but also represent a risk to financial stability, 
since further adverse developments may lead to default, with negative repercussions for 
creditors.
4.2  DELEVERAGING 
PROCESSES
Private-sector indebtedness in 
the main advanced economies 
continues to hamper 
economic recovery and 
endanger financial stability 
SOURCES: Datastream, Goldman Sachs, national statistics, Banco de España, Federal Reserve, ECB, Bank of England and Bank of Japan. 
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On top of these problems of excessive private-sector indebtedness has come the sharp 
increase in public debt (by 15 pp of GDP on average in the main advanced economies 
since 2008), which has offset the reduction in private debt. The upward trend in public debt 
is still far from being contained in most of the advanced countries, and highlights problems 
of fiscal sustainability and the general need for consolidation in the advanced economies, 
in addition to the adjustment imposed by the sovereign crisis in Europe. As discussed in 
Section 3.1, in countries like Japan and the United States, which also display unsustaina-
ble long-term fiscal trends (see Chart 3.7), fiscal consolidation has been postponed, since 
it has been subordinated to short-term priorities. In short, the need for fiscal adjustment 
and ongoing private-sector deleveraging will weigh on growth prospects in the advanced 
economies in the coming years.
Following the sharp correction recorded in 2009, global imbalances grew moderately last 
year, in line with the recovery and the increase in commodity prices (see Chart 3.10). This 
growth was reflected in the slight increase in the absolute value of current-account bal-
ances, to 4.5% of world GDP, although this was well below its pre-crisis levels (around 6% 
in 2006). Among countries with current-account deficits, that of the United States in-
creased slightly, to 3.2% of GDP, less than half its level in 2006. Among countries with 
surpluses, the increase in those of oil exporting countries was notable. By contrast, the 
surplus in China fell slightly, to 5.2% of GDP. As a result of this growth in imbalances, they 
have become one of the G20’s main concerns once again.
The financial crisis highlighted the complexity of the links between economies and finan-
cial systems, and the overriding need for international coordination of national actions in 
order to achieve balanced growth that is sustainable in the medium term. The G20 has 
consolidated its position as the main forum for this coordination, underpinned by the 
In addition, there are problems 
arising from the increase in 
public-sector indebtedness
4.3  GLOBAL IMBALANCES AND 
INTERNATIONAL POLICY 
COORDINATION
Global imbalances grew in 
2010, following the significant 
correction in 2009
The G20 has consolidated its 
position as the forum for 
economic policy coordination 
at the international level …
UNITED STATES UNITED KINGDOM
Nature and state of the 
reform
General: Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act.
Partial, gradual and segmented 
reforms. Current institutional 
framework focus.
Approved, but still to be 
implemented.
Approval of legislation foreseeable 
for mid-2011.
Financial stability
Financial Stability Oversight 
Committee (FSOC).
Financial Policy Committee.
coordination Presided and coordinated by the 
Treasury.
Led by the Bank of England.
Supervision Multiple supervisors.
Solvency supervisor separate from 
market performance (Twin Peaks).
Treatment of systemic 
institutions
Separation of activities Volcker rule and other limits.
Under study by the Independent 
Commission on Banking.
Consumer protection
Independent agency attached to 
Federal Reserve.
Independent agency.
Remuneration systems
Higher capital and liquidity requirements, strengthened supervision, new 
resolution regimes, living wills and stress tests.
Principles based: deferred salaries and conditionality based on medium-
term performance.
COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL REFORMS TABLE 3.3 
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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prominence within it of the emerging economies, in line with their greater importance at the 
world level (see Box 3.1). Against this background, reduction of global imbalances is one 
of its main objectives. In addition to repeating the need for orderly and gradual fiscal ad-
justment, the G20 has recommended countries with current-account deficits to take 
measures to stimulate saving and promote competitiveness, while urging surplus coun-
tries to adopt measures to stimulate internal sources of growth. With the aim of fostering 
greater commitment among its members, the G20 has based this debate on a “Mutual 
Assessment Process” and has just defined a set of indicators of macroeconomic imbal-
ances for countries of major global importance, in relation to which assessments and 
policy recommendations can be made.
Notwithstanding the intense activity centred on the G20, the impetus for coordination 
weakened last year. The different rates of economic recovery and the different domes-
tic priorities have given rise to diverging policy responses, as analysed in Section 3, 
which have not always been well received by the rest of the economies. In particular, 
the new expansionary phase of monetary policy in the United States acted as a trigger 
for significant intervention in the foreign exchange markets by emerging countries and 
some developed countries, such as Japan and Switzerland, and led to greater resort to 
administrative measures and capital controls, that ultimately run the risk of segmenting 
international capital markets, and thus acting against the climate of international coor-
dination.
In short, the results of international policy coordination were ambiguous last year. On one 
hand, a certain fatigue can be perceived, following the peaks of tension in the economic 
crisis, and a trend towards the prevalence of national interests. At the same time, the G20 
has consolidated its position as the forum for governance of the world economy and has 
an intense agenda.
The baseline scenario of the economic outlook for 2011 is for continuity of the global re-
covery, although at a more moderate rate than in 2010. According to the IMF’s latest fore-
casts, world growth in 2011 will be 4.4%, half a percentage point down from 2010, and the 
notable difference between the advanced and emerging economies will be maintained. 
This scenario is subject to notable downside risks, particularly in the developed econo-
mies, where the economic momentum continues to be based largely on policies of mon-
etary and fiscal stimulus. Self-sustaining growth in domestic demand and, in particular, 
private consumption requires a significant improvement in labour markets (which is still 
insufficient, despite the positive signs in the United States, in the first quarter of 2011) and 
progress in deleveraging. At the same time, a stronger pick-up in private productive in-
vestment in the United States cannot be ruled out, owing to the strength of company bal-
ance sheets and the firming of confidence.
The deterioration in public finances and its link to the fragility of the financial systems 
are another important source of risks. The new fiscal stimulus programmes in the 
United States have sustained growth in the short run, but have postponed fiscal con-
solidation, while concerns have been growing regarding the situation of state and lo-
cal authority finances, which could erode the long-term fiscal position. In general, 
there is a risk of a sudden and substantial rise in the cost of financing public debt in 
the developed economies, given the imbalance between the supply and demand for 
public debt securities that may be generated during the recovery. The increase in 
long-term rates may have a further negative impact on domestic demand and finan-
cial stability.
... although, the impetus for 
coordination has weakened
5  Outlook and risks
The economic outlook is for 
continued growth at a 
somewhat more moderate 
rate, with significant downside 
risks, owing to the weakness 
of the fundamentals in the 
developed economies...
… intensified by the fragility of 
public finances…
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At the same time, despite the improvement in the financial situation, the restructuring of 
some banking systems has still not been completed, and the necessary reshaping of the 
financial architecture will depend on the implementation of regulatory reform at the na-
tional and global levels. The impact of these developments on financing conditions, the 
flow of credit and, more generally, activity, is still uncertain.
The most palpable risks in the current situation arise from the upward trend in commodity 
prices (in particular, that of oil), which has intensified since early 2011 owing to the con-
flicts in the Arab countries. The direct impact on activity may be limited, but the possible 
monetary policy reactions to a sharp rise in inflation, and their impact on uncertainty, when 
confidence has still not been firmly established, would have more significant consequenc-
es. In addition, the policy dilemmas in the emerging economies may be exacerbated. In 
these economies risks of overheating and of increases in financial vulnerabilities are dis-
cernible, although the uncertainty associated with greater inflationary pressures may re-
duce the attractiveness of these economies and stem inflows. In any case, from a long-
term perspective, the higher commodity prices, inevitably associated with growing demand 
from the emerging economies, may constrain global growth capacity and affect its distri-
bution by region.
In short, although the recovery in the world economy seems to be firming, the obstacles 
and challenges are notable, and the risks are on various fronts, including the inflation one. 
Against this background, economic policies designed to strengthen the foundations of 
growth and financial stability should prevail over more short-term stimuli, although these 
have been vital at the most acute moments of the crisis.
... against a background in 
which the normalisation and 
reshaping of the financial 
system remains slow 
The rise in commodity prices 
is a serious threat to global 
growth 
These risk factors require the 
implementation of policies to 
strengthen the outlook for 
growth and financial stability 
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The economic recovery proceeded throughout last year and 2011 to date, driven by the 
strength of the world economy, the expansionary economic policy stance and the fiscal 
policy stimulus in the first half of the year (see Chart 4.1). Nevertheless, in 2010 the euro 
area faced a severe sovereign debt crisis which affected various member countries and 
posed a serious threat to the stability of the area. The gravity of the situation called for 
substantial reform of the institutional framework underpinning the euro area, directed par-
ticularly at the mechanisms of economic policy coordination and supervision. The role of 
structural policies was also strengthened so as to achieve greater efficiency in the use of 
factors of production and return to a path of sustained economic growth, which is vital in 
those economies that have to reabsorb imbalances accumulated in the past.
The doubts about the sustainability of public finances in various euro area member coun-
tries, which are at the origin of the sovereign debt crisis, stemmed from a combination of 
diverse factors. General government finances deteriorated notably as a result of the acti-
vation of automatic stabilisers during the crisis, the roll-out of discretionary stimulus meas-
ures and, in some countries, the loss of the extraordinary revenue associated with the real 
estate boom and the use of public funds to stabilise the banking sector. Moreover, in some 
cases the starting level of public debt was already high at the outset of the crisis, a situa-
tion which was aggravated by the high contingent liabilities arising from the foreseeable 
impact of progressive population aging on the public pension system and by the uncer-
tainty surrounding the return of the funds invested in bank restructuring processes. How-
ever, leaving aside these purely fiscal developments, the growth outlook for some euro 
area economies was inauspicious due to the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances 
over the past decade, which has given rise to high levels of private indebtedness, substan-
tial loss of competitiveness and elements of fragility in banking systems.
The crisis also highlighted fundamental fragilities in the instruments of coordination and 
macroeconomic supervision of the euro area, which proved to be insufficient to instil the 
necessary degree of discipline and give due attention to the macro-financial imbalances 
developing in some economies and requiring corrective economic policy action. It also 
became apparent that the euro area authorities did not have formal mechanisms for coor-
dinated crisis management and resolution, which meant that the required financial assis-
tance had to be hastily designed and implemented. Both of these shortcomings take on 
greater importance in a situation in which, as the current crisis has shown, shocks are 
propagated between euro area countries substantially more rapidly and intensely: the 
drastic repricing of one country’s sovereign risk was rapidly transformed into a heightened 
perception of bank vulnerability, a change in the assessment of the economic situation in 
other countries and a widespread crisis of confidence in the euro area.
The credit rating of public debt was downgraded in all of the most strongly affected coun-
tries and sovereign spreads rose suddenly, albeit to differing extents depending on the 
fiscal and economic situation and outlook of the countries involved (see Chart 4.2). Greek 
public debt was downgraded to speculative status and its spread over the German bund 
exceeded 1,200 basis points (bp) despite the financial assistance received in May. The 
rates in Ireland and Portugal climbed to 700 bp and 600 bp, respectively, above the Ger-
man bund. The deterioration in sovereign risk premia in Spain, Italy and Belgium was more 
limited, but significant at times, particularly in Spain.
1  Sovereign debt crisis
in the euro area
The sovereign debt crisis 
prompted a reform of the 
institutional framework
and an overhaul of the 
priorities of economic policy
The crisis stemmed from 
major imbalances in some 
Member States
... but also evidenced 
deficiencies in the design
and functioning of policy 
coordination and crisis 
prevention and resolution 
mechanisms in the EU
and the euro area
Sovereign spreads widened
to differing extents
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The tension also affected other financial variables, in some cases very unevenly across 
sectors and countries. The euro exchange rate depreciated by more than 10% in nominal 
effective terms from October 2009 to end-2010, against a background of high volatility. 
The EUROSTOXX 50 index fell by 6% in the year and, save the German DAX which rose 
by more than 16%, the main European stock exchanges fell sharply, particularly in the fi-
nancial sector and in the countries hit hardest by the crisis (see Chart 4.3). Moreover, the 
fall in government bond prices exposed the euro area banking sector to losses in their 
available-for-sale asset portfolios, while the perceived greater fragility of the public sector 
weakened the explicit or implicit guarantee that it can provide to the financial system. The 
institutions of the most affected countries faced more limited access to the wholesale 
funding markets and encountered serious liquidity problems, having to resort to Eurosys-
tem funds and, in extreme cases, to emergency liquidity assistance from their respective 
national central banks. By contrast, non-financial corporations and, above all, households 
were comparatively less affected by these tensions, since they scarcely passed through to 
the availability and cost of bank loans, although countries did vary somewhat in this re-
spect. Against a background of notable weakness in demand, lending followed a similar 
cyclical pattern to that observed historically.
After serious deficiencies were found in the statistical information on its public accounts 
and various months of hesitation and reluctance, Greece finally requested financial as-
sistance in May. This support amounted to €100 billion, provided under a programme of 
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bilateral loans from euro area countries (€80 billion) and from the IMF, subject to strict 
conditionality. Further, to reduce the risk of contagion, a new financial assistance 
scheme was designed which, under similar conditions to those of the Greek programme, 
would be available until mid-2013 to any euro area member needing it. This scheme 
comprises: the new European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), a euro area 
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instrument able to mobilise up to €60 billion; the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF), able to grant loans with a maximum guarantee of €440 billion from euro area Mem-
ber States; and IMF financing equal to up to 50% of the amount drawn from the EFSM 
and the EFSF. The tensions during the summer were eased by establishment of these 
instruments, along with the commencement of work to improve European governance, 
the publication of bank stress tests and the expediting and strengthening of fiscal con-
solidation plans with a firm commitment to introduce structural reforms in some euro 
area Member States.
However, the situation changed when in Ireland the deterioration in the financial position 
of its banks sparked a fresh outbreak of tensions. The excessive size of the Irish banking sec-
tor relative to the economy as a whole, the concentration of real estate risk and its depend-
ence on wholesale financing made this sector extremely vulnerable to the international fi-
nancial crisis (from 2008), to the intense domestic recession and to the adjustment in the 
Irish real estate sector. These circumstances forced activation of the financial support 
mechanisms at the end of November, with an assistance programme valued at €85 billion, 
which included funds to be contributed by the Irish government itself and bilateral loans 
from the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark.
Later, in April 2011, Portugal also requested financial support from the European institu-
tions and the IMF. The institutional paralysis in this economy following the resignation of 
the government, when a fresh fiscal adjustment plan was rejected in parliament, made it 
the focus of the tensions. Its problems achieving fiscal consolidation objectives had previ-
ously been highlighted, against a background in which the competitive imbalances accu-
mulated in recent years and the high indebtedness of firms and households hampered the 
attainment of a sustained rate of growth. The support programme approved in May 
amounted to €78 billion, to be distributed equally between the EFSF, the EFSM and the 
IMF, and, like the previous programmes, it is subject to strict conditionality, with relatively 
ambitious structural reform measures required.
The recurrent bouts of instability during the first few months of 2011 were also fuelled 
by the lack of determination on the part of the governments to clarify certain details of 
present and future support mechanisms. In this context, in March the European Coun-
cil sanctioned the legislative reforms in progress to strengthen the domestic economic 
policy coordination and mutual supervision mechanisms and adopted significant 
measures to further the design of the future European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
which will begin to function in July 2013. Also, to strengthen the governments’ resolve 
to establish policies more favourable to growth and more consistent with the financial 
integration environment achieved in the euro area, the heads of state and government 
of the euro area decided to establish the Euro Plus Pact. The new strengthened gov-
ernance framework was thus practically given its final shape. In the medium term, this 
new framework will reduce the probability of a repetition of situations like the present 
one and, in the event they do occur, give the area the necessary tools to manage them 
effectively.
However, in the shorter term, sovereign risk spreads continue to fluctuate sharply, reflect-
ing the complexities of the situation in Ireland, in Portugal and, fundamentally, in Greece. 
The difficulties that have become apparent in complying with the timetable envisaged in 
the programme for Greece are presenting the euro area with a challenge unprecedented in 
its short history; a significant effort will be required to rule out the possibility of unpredict-
able traumatic scenarios for the common European project.
... but the worsening of the 
situation of the banking sector 
and of the Irish public 
finances, and the difficulties
in agreeing on an internal 
economic adjustment 
programme in Portugal
(in 2011) required activation
of the new support 
mechanisms
In March 2011 substantial 
changes to the institutional 
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were adopted, but the area 
continued to confront the 
biggest challenge of its history
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During 2010 the recovery in economic activity that commenced in mid-2009 continued, so 
that GDP grew by 1.7%, following a decline of 4.1% in 2009. As seen in Table 4.1, goods 
and services exports grew notably, following the collapse recorded in 2009, thanks to the 
boost from world trade, while the increase was somewhat more contained in the case of 
imports, in line with their smaller decline in the recession. Accordingly, the contribution of 
net external demand was very positive, and the largest to have been recorded since the 
start of Stage Three of EMU. The contribution of the change in inventories was also large 
in historical terms.
2  Macroeconomic 
developments: 
consolidation
of the recovery
In 2010 the recovery in the 
euro area firmed, underpinned 
by foreign trade and the 
change in the inventory cycle 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
DEMAND AND OUTPUT (quarter-on-quarter rates):
    Gross domestic product 0.3 -4.1 1.7 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.3
    Private consumption 0.4 -1.1 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4
    Government consumption 2.3 2.5 0.7 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1
    Gross jxed capital formation -1.0 -11.2 -1.0 -0.2 2.1 -0.2 -0.5
        Non-residential private investment 0.3 -14.9 0.7 0.7 2.5 0.4 0.8
        Residential investment -5.3 -10.7 -3.6 -0.6 0.7 -0.3 -0.2
        Public investment 1.6 5.1 -3.4 -3.8 -0.1 -0.4 -1.5
    Exports 0.7 -13.1 10.9 3.0 4.5 2.1 1.5
    Imports 0.6 -11.7 9.0 3.6 4.2 1.5 1.0
    Contributions to GDP growth in percentage points:
    Domestic demand 0.5 -2.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1
    Change in stocks -0.2 -0.9 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.0 -0.1
    External demand 0.0 -0.7 0.8 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
PRICES AND COSTS (year-on-year rates):
    Consumer prices (annual average) 3.3 0.3 1.6 1.1 1.6 1.7 2.0
    GDP dekator 2.1 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.0
    Unit labour costs 3.7 3.8 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.2
    Compensation per employee 3.2 1.4 1.7 1.6 2.1 1.5 1.6
    Labour productivity -0.4 -2.3 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.1 1.8
GENERAL GOVERNMENT (% of GDP):
    Total expenditure 46.9 50.8 50.8
    Current expenditure 43.1 46.6 46.6
    Public investment 2.6 2.8 2.7
    Total revenue 44.9 44.5 44.4
    Primary dejcit (–) / surplus (+) 1.0 -3.5 -3.5
    Dejcit (–) / surplus (+) -2.0 -6.3 -6.3
    Public debt 69.8 79.2 84.2
LABOUR MARKET:
    Total employment (quarter-on-quarter rates) 0.8 -1.8 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
    Unemployment (% of labour force) 7.7 9.5 10.1 10.0 10.1 10.1 10.0
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (% of GDP)
    Current account -1.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -0.8 -0.3 0.2
DEBT RATIOS:
    Households (% of GDI) 95.6 97.4 98.7 97.3 98.4 98.4 98.7
    Non-jnancial corporations (% of GOS) 494.4 555.5 538.1 554.3 549.4 545.8 538.1
2010
2008 2009 2010
EURO AREA: MAIN MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS TABLE 4.1 
SOURCES: ECB, European Commission and OECD. 
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Domestic demand also recovered, although less strongly. Among its components, private 
consumption – notable on account of its relative importance – increased, despite the re-
duction in disposable income, driven by the growth in financial and non-financial wealth 
and by the improvement in expectations regarding the economic situation. Fiscal consoli-
dation in the euro area countries resulted in a notable slowdown in government consump-
tion and a sharp fall in public investment. Finally, there was a pick-up in business invest-
ment, spurred by the expansion in final demand, while residential investment fell for the 
third year running, since the adjustment in the real-estate sector in some euro area coun-
tries has still not been completed.
Euro area employment declined slightly in 2010 as a whole, but tended to stabilise over the 
year as hours worked recovered to their pre-crisis levels (see Charts 4.1 and 4.4, and 
Box 4.1). However, the rate of unemployment increased again, with joblessness concen-
trated among young people and the long-term unemployed, which involves a loss of hu-
man capital.
By country, significant differences in the performance of activity were recorded, with a 
vigorous increase in GDP in Germany and significant falls in Greece and Ireland, as a con-
sequence of the general collapse in the components of their domestic demand, largely 
associated with the low levels of confidence and the application of the highly restrictive 
fiscal policies needed to restore fiscal sustainability and market confidence. Increased 
buoyancy in the German economy was based partly on the export growth, assisted by the 
robust growth in the world economy, but also by the business restructuring and structural 
reforms undertaken over the last decade, which have resulted in competitiveness improve-
ments. In addition, German domestic demand displayed a comparatively strong recovery, 
owing to the buoyancy of equipment investment, which was driven by exports, and of 
government consumption, given the limited need for fiscal adjustment.
Since the beginning of 2010, the developments in the harmonised index of consumer 
prices (HICP) have been determined by the strong rise in its energy and food components, 
linked to the progressive increase in commodity prices. This tendency intensified from the 
end of the year, as a consequence of the rise in the price of oil stemming from the bouts of 
political instability in certain oil producing countries, so that inflation reached 2.8% in April 
2011, up from 1% in January 2010 (see Chart 4.1). The year-on-year rate of change in the 
prices of the most stable components of the HICP (services and non-energy industrial 
While growth in domestic 
demand was weaker
Employment stabilised
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been very marked
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During the recent economic and financial crisis, there has been 
less job destruction in the euro area as a whole, in relation to the 
fall in activity (see table below). However, this aggregate perfor-
mance masks very diversified behaviour. In Austria, Belgium and 
Germany, despite the contraction in activity, the decline in em-
ployment has been very limited or even zero, in contrast – espe-
cially in Germany – with the crisis experienced at the beginning 
of the 1990s. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Spain and 
Ireland stand out not only because employment over-reacted to 
the fall in activity, with the numbers employed declining by more 
than 8%, but also because job destruction has lasted longer 
(see Panel 3).
The diversity of employment’s reaction to the fall in activity seems 
to be in response to the combination of three factors:1 the idiosyn-
cratic nature of the recession in certain countries, aside from the 
global financial shock; the structure of national labour markets; 
and the different economic policy responses implemented by gov-
ernments.
In Spain and Ireland the contraction in activity has been accompa-
nied by a specific shock in the real estate sector. Thus, in Ireland, 
the decline in the construction sector seems to have directly ex-
plained half of the job destruction (see Panel 1), with a reduction of 
this sector’s weight in the labour force of more than 4 pp during 
the crisis. In Spain 40% of the jobs destroyed were in construc-
tion,2 a sector that represented 12% of total employment in the 
economy at the beginning of the crisis.
The labour market legislative framework in each country has also 
played an important role in limiting or amplifying the scale of the 
contraction in employment.3 In line with economic literature, job 
destruction has been more contained in countries with greater sta-
bility in contracts (linked to higher firing costs) and with more flex-
ible collective bargaining systems. This positive effect of the insti-
tutional framework on incentives to maintain employment has 
been particularly important in those countries with higher demand 
for skilled labour in which, therefore, the potential costs to firms of 
laying off employees are higher. This has been the case of Ger-
many and Austria, where, although the proportion of skilled work-
ers among new generations joining the labour market is constant-
ly increasing as a result of the inversion of the population pyramid, 
these workers are not sufficient to replace those leaving the labour 
force (see Panel 2, where skill is approximated by educational at-
tainment level).
Finally, all the governments in the euro area have implemented 
new economic policy measures or have strengthened existing 
ones with a two-fold objective. On one hand, this was to stimulate 
employment demand, either through specific employment policies 
(short-time work programmes, cuts in social security contribu-
tions) or through fiscal stimulus programmes (reduction of direct 
taxes, creation of public-sector employment, aid for specific sec-
tors, such as the automobile sector). On the other, it was to miti-
gate the adverse effects of unemployment (training programmes, 
the strengthening of job seeking agencies, the increase in unem-
ployment assistance benefit). However, the economic situation 
and structural framework of each country prompted certain gov-
ernments to use certain measures more intensively. For instance, 
countries like Germany, Belgium and Italy have strengthened their 
short-time work programmes, which was reflected in the contrac-
tion in the number of hours worked per employee – by up to 4% in 
Germany and 2% in Italy and Belgium. In countries with more spe-
cific shocks, government efforts were focused on supplementing 
the income of the unemployed, updating their training and foster-
ing new activities.
Ultimately, the varied response, in terms of employment, of the 
various euro area countries to the recent contraction in activity has 
underlined the importance of an institutionally flexible labour mar-
ket within a monetary union. Moving towards wage bargaining 
models which permit flexible adjustments to changes in the eco-
nomic situation of firms; hiring models which encourage the in-
vestment in human capital; and education systems which enhance 
future workers’ adaptability and mobility have become a key ele-
ment, not only for cushioning the negative effects of a recession 
but also for boosting the recovery of activity. Accordingly, those 
countries which weathered the recession best in terms of employ-
ment (Germany, Belgium and France) are those which began to 
record the first signs of job creation in 2010 (see Panel 3).
BOX 4.1DETERMINANTS OF THE ASYMMETRICAL BEHAVIOUR OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE EURO AREA
1  See OECD Employment Outlook 2010.
2  In the Boletín Económico December 2010 the contraction of housing 
investment is estimated to account for 60% of the jobs destroyed during 
the crisis in Spain, if the spill-over effects on other sectors of the econo-
my are considered.
3  See Chapter 3 of IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010 and the ECB 
Final Report of the Wage Dynamics Network (December 2009).
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BOX 4.1DETERMINANTS OF THE ASYMMETRICAL BEHAVIOUR OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE EURO AREA (cont’d)
Rate of change in employment (%) (d)
Crisis 2008 Q3 - 2010 Q1 Crisis 1992 Q1 - 1993 Q2 Crisis 2008 Q1 - 2009 Q2
Ireland -10.3 0.5 1.0
Spain -8.1 1.8 1.7
Finland -3.2 2.8 0.3
Portugal -3.1 0.8 0.6
Euro area -2.4 1.0 0.3
Netherlands -2.0 1.1 0.1
Italy -2.0 1.0 0.2
Greece (a) -1.8 n.a. 0.2
France -1.4 0.5 0.1
Austria (a) -1.0 n.a. 0.3
Belgium -0.5 0.5 -0.1
Germany -0.1 1.0 0.0
RATE OF CHANGE AND ELASTICITY OF EMPLOYMENT
Elasticity of employment to GDP (b)
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a The data for Austria and Greece are from Eurostat and are only available to 2009 Q4.
b 3GDBNMSQ@BSHNM@QXRS@FDR@QDCDjMDC@RSGDODQHNCADSVDDMSGDK@RSPT@QSDQNEONRHSHUDPT@QSDQNMPT@QSDQFQNVSGNE@BSHUHSXHMSGDDTQN@QD@@R@VGNKD@MCSGD
 last Puarter of Puarter-on-Puarter decline.
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NM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BANCO DE ESPAÑA 107 ANNUAL REPORT, 2010 4. THE EURO AREA AND THE COMMON MONETARY POLICY
goods) held at low levels, owing to the persistence of a high degree of economic slack in 
the area and wage moderation, which have offset the increases in indirect taxes and the 
recovery in profit margins that followed their sharp fall during the recession.
Against this background, and with some differences across countries, loans to households 
and non-financial corporations displayed a mild tendency to recover, which has continued 
in 2011, while the credit standards for the approval of loans maintained the restrictiveness 
built up in the past (see Chart 4.5). This increase in financing, along with the weakness of 
income in these sectors, caused the household debt ratio to rise slightly, while that of firms 
was corrected downward somewhat (see Table 4.1).
During 2010, it became clear that the policies to expand demand deployed with full force 
to combat the financial crisis in the previous period had reached their limits. Monetary 
policy remained expansionary, against a background of an absence of medium-term infla-
tionary pressures and slow growth. The ECB’s Governing Council kept its key policy rate 
at 1% until its meeting of 7 April, when it decided to raise it by 25 bp (see Chart 4.6). At the 
same time, the situation in the markets led the Eurosystem to extend the duration of its full 
allotment liquidity tenders. The extraordinary six and twelve-month loans that were intro-
duced when tensions on the financial markets were at their highest matured, without the 
generation of frictions, reducing gross liquidity. Also, the covered bond purchase programme 
The growth in loans to the 
private sector was contained
3  The role of demand-
side policies: reaction 
and limitations
The expansionary capacity
of demand-side policies was 
becoming exhausted. 
Monetary policy maintained
its expansionary stance
and a broad range of non-
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came to an end in June following the staggered purchase of €60 billion. This measure had 
been established in 2009 to mitigate the distortions generated by the crisis in this market 
segment and so avoid repercussions for the flow of bank credit and the interest rates 
charged for such credit. Similarly, the heightened tensions in certain public debt markets 
and their negative impact on the transmission mechanism led to the establishment of the 
Securities Markets Programme in May 2010, which concentrated on the sterilised pur-
chase of government bonds in the secondary markets of the countries most affected. 
During the first few months of this programme the purchases amounted to €60 billion. 
Subsequently, more purchases were made for smaller amounts, and the total portfolio 
acquired had risen to somewhat more than €76 billion by the end of April. 
In 2010 in the euro area as a whole, fiscal policy continued to make a decisive contribution 
to the recovery in economic activity, through the operation of automatic stabilisers and 
support to the banking system. However, after the first few months of the year the discre-
tionary measures to stimulate demand and support the labour market that had been de-
ployed during 2009 were progressively phased out and the excessive deficit situation in 
most of the euro area countries forced them to draw up medium-term fiscal consolidation 
plans, against a background in which the economic recovery began to firm. This change 
of direction in fiscal policy meant that the euro area deficit remained practically unchanged 
from the previous year, at 6% of GDP, although this represents a deterioration of almost 
6 percentage points (pp) from 2007. The cyclically adjusted deficit barely rose, as compared 
with an increase of 1.8 pp in 2009 (see Chart 4.7). The debt ratio for the euro area as a 
whole reached 85.4% of GDP, historically a very high level.
The tensions in the sovereign debt markets in April and May focused attention on the risks 
inherent in a situation of widespread excessive deficits and forced decisive and relatively 
rapid corrective measures to be taken to allay investors’ doubts regarding the sustainabil-
ity of public finances. The sovereign debt crisis thus led not only to the need to abandon 
the expansionary stance with which fiscal policy had responded in Europe to the first ef-
fects of the international financial crisis, but also to some urgency to turn it around so as 
to reduce long-term interest rates (by reducing the risk premium), giving space to private 
spending to recover momentum and contribute to a revival in activity. The first economy to 
step up its efforts was Greece, in return for the concession of financial assistance. Follow-
ing the extraordinary meeting of the Ecofin Council at the beginning of May, Spain introduced 
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consolidation measures to supplement those envisaged in its stability programmes and 
brought forward some of those planned for 2011. In the final quarter of the year it was 
Ireland that, after recognising a deficit of close to 30% of GDP in 2010, largely linked to the 
cost of the bank rescue operations, had to draw up a fiscal consolidation plan. Portugal 
also adopted packages of additional measures on various occasions. The other econo-
mies designed austerity programs which have generally begun to be applied this year. 
Under the consolidation plans established, the euro area general government deficit is 
expected to decline to almost 4% of GDP in 2011, and to below 3% in 2030.
The turmoil in the sovereign debt market has highlighted structural weaknesses in the in-
stitutional architecture of the monetary union, which were not given sufficient attention 
during the years of expansion but which now pose an unprecedented challenge to the 
area’s stability. Since the start of Stage Three of EMU, the agreed arrangements for eco-
nomic governance have been based on the principle of subsidiarity, whereby each state 
has maintained sovereignty over all economic policy decisions other than those of mone-
tary policy, although they have been subject to coordination mechanisms of varying de-
grees of strictness, designed to reduce the negative externalities that measures intro-
duced in one economy may have on the other countries in the area. In the case of fiscal 
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policy, the Stability and Growth Pact was established to maintain budget discipline, while 
macroeconomic and structural policies were subject to laxer peer review-based coordi-
nation mechanisms. This framework has proved insufficient to achieve the degree of eco-
nomic policy consistency necessary in a monetary union. On one hand, the SGP was not 
capable of promoting sustained fiscal consolidation during the expansionary phase, to 
give countries sufficient leeway to confront the downturn. The degree of discretion exist-
ing in the application of this procedure allowed many EU countries to fail to comply with 
the established deficit and debt thresholds repeatedly, without any effective mechanism 
being put in place to resolve the situation (sanctions or some other type of incentive). In 
many economies high levels of private indebtedness, substantial competitiveness losses 
and weaknesses in banking systems built up, which were not given due attention. Nor 
were there instruments available to channel financial support rapidly and transparently to 
those countries that might need it as part of an orderly crisis management process. As a 
backdrop to all this, an unprecedented degree of trade and financial integration signifi-
cantly increased the speed and force with which difficulties are transmitted from one 
economy to another.
The European institutions and governments decided to undertake a far-reaching review of 
this governance regime to correct the problems detected and to avoid similar situations 
occurring in future. The “Special Van Rompuy Group” was set up for this purpose in spring 
2010, with the mandate of studying how to make the architecture of the euro area more 
solid. The EU, ECB and all the EU Member States participated in this working group. The 
review of the institutional framework undertaken as a result of the group’s conclusions 
focuses on three fundamental areas: strengthening the SGP to increase fiscal discipline, 
improved supervision of macroeconomic imbalances and the creation of a permanent 
crisis-management mechanism. Although there are still aspects that may be changed dur-
ing the process of approval by the European Parliament, which should be concluded in 
June 2011, the fundamental elements are already well defined.
In the fiscal sphere, the reform assigns greater importance to the public debt criterion, as 
originally envisaged by the SGP. First, a more rapid adjustment path towards medium-term 
objectives is proposed for countries with a level of debt of over 60% of GDP and, second, 
when this threshold is exceeded an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) will be opened or, if 
one has already been opened, will not be closed, even if the deficit is below 3% of GDP, 
as long as the debt-to-GDP ratio is not being reduced satisfactorily. Moreover, the incen-
tives for governments to achieve a greater degree of compliance are strengthened, with 
the introduction of a broader, more transparent system of sanctions, to be activated at an 
earlier stage. It is also intended to make the application of these sanctions more auto-
matic through the reverse voting procedure, which involves automatic approval of the 
Commission’s proposals, unless they are rejected in time by a qualified majority of the 
governments. In addition, reform of the national fiscal frameworks is proposed, including 
the need for the accounts, statistics and forecasting practices to be adapted to EU rules, 
the adoption of multi-year fiscal planning to guarantee the medium-term objectives agreed, 
the establishment of rules limiting the expansion of public spending and indebtedness, 
and the creation of independent fiscal councils to supervise the design and execution of 
budgetary policy.
The reform introduces a new framework for the prevention and correction of excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances, including an early warning mechanism to prevent such im-
balances from jeopardising financial stability in the euro area. On its preventive side, this 
new mechanism will seek to identify the countries with a potential risk of “excessive imbal-
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ance”, using a set of economic indicators complemented by expert analysis. The exces-
sive imbalance procedure will be initiated once it is considered that said imbalance reach-
es an excessive scale. It will recommend the adoption of a series of corrective measures 
over a specific period for the country in question, and it might conclude with sanctions if 
the recommendations are repeatedly not fulfilled.
The strengthening of the fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance instruments will mini-
mise the possibility of vulnerabilities arising in the future that may jeopardise euro area 
stability. However, it is not reasonable to believe that this or any other framework might 
be capable of obviating that probability. The third pillar of the reform, therefore, resides on 
the setting up of a permanent crisis-management mechanism, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), which will come into force in mid-2013, replacing the EFSF. To do this, 
article 136 of the EU Treaty has had to be amended, leaving the no bail-out clause in ar-
ticle 125 intact. This mechanism has an effective lending capacity of €500 billion, and it 
is intended to provide funds to solvent economies facing liquidity problems, under strict 
conditionality and at non-concessional interest rates. The financial assistance will nor-
mally take the form of loans and, in exceptional cases, of debt purchases on the primary 
market, without therefore attaining the operational flexibility that the Eurosystem had pro-
posed. In exceptional cases of insolvency, the mechanism will provide for an orderly re-
structuring of debt, which will be tackled on a case-by-case basis through negotiation 
with private creditors.
To provide for better coordination of the various economic policy decisions under this new 
framework, it was agreed to set up the European Semester. This will take place during the 
first six months of each year and will conclude with the formulation of specific fiscal, mac-
roeconomic and structural recommendations for each country. In January this year, the EC 
presented its Annual Report on Growth, which contains a roadmap for the euro area-wide 
economic policy that the different governments should take into consideration when set-
ting out their respective Stability Programmes and their National Reform Plans. Also inte-
grated into this new instrument is the revision of the preliminary structural reforms under 
the Europe 2020 strategy, approved in spring 2010 and whose main objectives are the 
increase in employment rates and social cohesion, the promotion of innovation (where 
hardly any improvements have been observed since the Lisbon strategy was set in place), 
the use of renewable energies and energy efficiency, the reduction in the early school leav-
ers rate and an increase in the proportion of the population completing higher studies. The 
aim is to re-launch growth-boosting policies that lessen the impact the crisis may have 
exerted on potential GDP and that prevent the re-emergence of imbalances.
Significant among the recommendations in the aforementioned report is, in the fiscal area, 
the advisability of pursuing the ongoing reform of pensions systems which many euro area 
economies have tackled in recent years, adapting benefits to the changes in life expec-
tancy and in the population pyramid, while encouraging people to work to a later age. 
Emphasis is also placed on the need for national fiscal frameworks and institutions to in-
clude rules restricting public spending and debt levels, in line with SGP commitments.
For progress in correcting macroeconomic imbalances, the economies that have built up 
losses on competitiveness should revise their collective bargaining arrangements so as to 
attain greater consistency between wage increases and changes in productivity. The 
countries with persistent current-account surpluses should analyse the causes that check 
the buoyancy of their demand. It is also considered important to boost the potential of the 
single market by means of the full transposition of the Services Directive in all the Member 
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States, the liberalisation of professional services and the development of instruments to 
attract private capital to finance growth, such as private equity funds. And, finally, it is 
recommended that social security contributions be reduced, setting this off by bolstering 
other taxes, that employment contracts be made more flexible and that disincentives to a 
second member of a family unit joining the labour market, which are present in some in-
come tax systems, be eliminated.
While all the foregoing measures involve a substantial improvement to the European gov-
ernance framework, the final results will obviously continue to depend largely on govern-
ments’ readiness to meet the commitments undertaken. To reinforce this commitment, the 
euro area heads of state and government signed the Euro Plus Pact in March 2011 with 
the aim of fostering competitiveness and employment, contributing to the sustainability of 
public finances and reinforcing financial stability. The priorities and measures considered 
in the Pact largely coincide with those in the EC’s Annual Growth Report under the afore-
mentioned procedures and instruments for the oversight of compliance therewith. But the 
Pact raises governments’ commitment to the maximum political level.
Finally, in the financial field, the crisis has also highlighted the shortcomings of a regula-
tory framework based exclusively on the prudential supervision of individual institu-
tions, one that is insufficient to appreciate in full the complex interrelatedness of finan-
cial assets and intermediaries that ultimately give rise to systemic risks. These 
considerations have led to the definition of a new, specific economic policy area, name-
ly macroprudential policy. This area has an eminently pre-emptive gearing and has the 
dual aim of making the financial system as a whole more resilient to shocks and mini-
mising the impact on the real economy in instances of crisis. The pursuit of macropru-
dential policy is being addressed through numerous national and international initia-
tives. In the European Union, this task has been assumed by the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB), which has been fully operational since January 2011. This body is 
part of the European Financial Supervision System, which incorporates three new Euro-
pean supervisory authorities entrusted with microprudential duties. The ESRB, in which 
the ECB and the ESCB central banks participate, will oversee the European financial 
system as a whole. It will be tasked with identifying systemic vulnerabilities and with 
issuing non-binding warnings and recommendations, so that corrective measures may 
be adopted.
The projections available generally suggest that the pick-up in activity will continue to firm 
this year and next, albeit at a slower pace and in an environment still shrouded in uncer-
tainty, which poses highly complex risks on both the domestic and European fronts.
In the domestic policy sphere, several economies have to readjust spending in a way that 
will enable their public and private debt levels to become more sustainable. And, at the 
same time, they must restore lost competitiveness through productivity gains and wage 
containment. Strict compliance with fiscal consolidation commitments, which is a pre-
requisite for the area as a whole, poses a challenge which is all the greater the lesser the 
growth prospects for each country. In this connection, it is also essential to see through 
far-reaching structural reforms which, in addition to bringing adjustments about, increase 
growth potential, prevent the crisis from exerting a durable impact on labour markets and 
enhance the capacity to export to markets where the competitive pressures from the 
emerging economies are increasingly more demanding.
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In recent months euro area inflation has risen notably due largely to 
dearer commodity prices in international markets and to the increase 
in certain indirect taxes as a result of fiscal consolidation efforts. In 
particular, according to an accounting breakdown of the year-on-year 
growth of the HICP, it is estimated that the direct impact of these com-
ponents’ behaviour would explain around 60% of the increase in the 
inflation rate between February 2010 and February 2011 (see Panel 1). 
On the basis of historical evidence, these factors could generate indi-
rectly upward pressures on prices. For instance, certain estimates in-
dicate that a permanent increase of 10% in oil prices would represent, 
after three years, an average increase in the euro area HICP of 0.5 pp. 
0.1 pp would be due to price rises in goods which use any of the 
dearer inputs and another 0.1 pp would be as a result of the second-
round effects arising when the revision of inflation expectations 
prompts agents to demand increases in wages and margins.1 How-
ever, according to economic theory, inflation depends positively on 
future inflation expectations but also negatively on the level of eco-
nomic slack and, consequently, these indirect effects could have a 
more limited impact in a situation such as the present one.
The most recent empirical studies which approximate the level of 
slack using the output gap or the distance between recorded and po-
tential growth have shown that, in practice, it is difficult to find a stable 
relationship between these three variables. This can be attributed ba-
sically to three factors. Firstly, potential growth is measured with a high 
level of imprecision. Accordingly, Panel 2 shows that, at a time of great 
uncertainty such as at present, the discrepancies between interna-
tional organisations’ forecasts about the level of economic slack in the 
euro area for the period 2010-2012 may be high. In any event, all the 
estimates agree that the level of euro area activity is clearly below its 
potential and will remain so for the next two years. This is confirmed 
by the behaviour of the indicator of production capacity utilisation and 
of several measures of slack in the labour market.
Secondly, it is difficult to estimate which part of the temporary 
price variations ultimately feed through to households’ and firms’ 
inflation expectations. Accordingly, Panel 3 shows that, although 
BOX 4.2THE IMPACT ON INFLATION OF TEMPORARY SHOCKS IN SITUATIONS OF ECONOMIC SLACK
3  HICP: SHORT AND LONG-TERM FORECASTS (b) 4  RATE OF CHANGE IN THE PRIVATE CONSUMPTION DEFLATOR
2011 2012 Long term 2009 2010 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Consensus (July 2010) 1.5 1.5 1.9 Rest of the world (c) -0.5 -0.1 -0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0
Consensus (October 2010) 1.6 1.5 2.1 Oil prices -0.2 0.4 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.3
Consensus (March 2011) 2.3 1.8 2.1 Financial factors 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1
Eurobarometer (July 2010) 1.5 1.6 1.9 Wages and prices 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
Eurobarometer (October 2010) 1.4 1.7 1.9 Private demand 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Eurobarometer (March 2011) 2.2 1.8 2.0 Government demand 0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Productivity -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
Private consumption 
dekator
-0.4 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.2
2010
-15 
-10 
-5 
0 
5 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
  2005                                 2006                2007                  2008                  2009                  2010                  2011                  2012
 OECD  EC
 
 IMF  STANDARDISED CU (a) (right-hand scale) 
2  ESTIMATES OF THE OUTPUT GAP 
% of potential GDP 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
2008                                  2009                               2010                               2011 
 OTHER  INDIRECT TAXES 
 ENERGY (EXCL. IND. TAXES)  HICP 
1  CONTRIBUTION OF ENERGY AND INDIRECT TAXES TO THE YEAR-ON-YEAR 
RATE OF CHANGE IN HICP 
% 
SOURCES: EUROSTAT and Banco de España. 
 
a Production capacity utilisation. 
b The Consensus of July 2010 did not include forecasts for the long term or for 2012 and, consequently, the forecasts published in April 2010 were used. The 
Consensus of March 2011 did not include long-term forecasts and, consequently, those published in October 2010 were used. The Eurobarometer of March 
2011 did not include long-term forecasts and, consequently, those published in January 2011 were used. 
c The rest of the world includes global demand, world prices and the world interest rate. 
 
a
1  See Strauch et al. (2010), Energy Markets and the Euro Area Macroecon-
omy, Occasional Paper no. 113, European Central Bank.
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inflation forecasts for 2011 have been revised upwards due to the 
recent rises in oil prices, both the forecasts for 2012 and the long-
term inflation expectations remain stable at approximately 2%.
Finally, it should be noted that the degree of correlation between in-
flation and the output gap depends on the nature of the shocks af-
fecting the economy. In particular, shocks which raise production 
costs, as is the case of oil prices, tend to reduce current and poten-
tial output to a similar extent and, consequently, the increase in pric-
es is not accompanied by significant variations in the output gap.
In this connection, according to the Banco de España’s BEMOD 
model,2 which distinguishes between different types of shocks, 
the rise in oil prices explains a very significant part of the in-
crease in European inflation (approximated in this case by the 
private consumption deflator) during the second half of 2010 
(see Panel 4). Similarly, in the first three quarters of the year 
wages have grown slightly higher than would be suggested by 
their determinants, compared with the moderation seen in the 
first decade of this century. By contrast, the fiscal consolidation 
plans and timid recovery of private demand are helping to con-
tain price rises, which suggests that the output gap remains 
negative. Finally, accommodative monetary policy contributed 
to the recovery during 2010 and to containing deflationary pres-
sures. Thus, supply shocks seem to explain a relevant portion 
of the increase in inflation in a situation of relative production 
slack.
Consequently, the final effects on inflation of the current rise in 
prices, which is closely linked to the increase in oil prices, will de-
pend crucially on the capacity of economic policy to keep inflation 
expectations anchored.
BOX 4.2THE IMPACT ON INFLATION OF TEMPORARY SHOCKS IN SITUATIONS OF ECONOMIC SLACK (cont’d)
The possibilities of growth spreading throughout the euro area also depend on the ongoing 
European banking system restructuring, downsizing and recapitalisation processes being 
satisfactorily concluded. Preserving financial stability will help break the vicious circles in 
which risks to economic growth, fiscal imbalances and bank funding difficulties all com-
bine, impairing agents’ confidence and translating into unwished-for tightening of financ-
ing conditions.
In the European arena, monetary policy also faces a complex horizon in which it will have 
to progressively adapt its current accommodative stance to the present cyclical upturn in 
the area as a whole, ensuring inflation expectations are anchored so as to prevent the re-
cent tensions stemming from dearer commodities and food from causing second-round 
effects on wages (see Box 4.2). Further, the ongoing withdrawal of the unconventional 
measures that were introduced at the most critical junctures of the financial crisis must be 
finalised, as retaining them longer than necessary might impair their effectiveness and 
detract from the central bank’s credibility, give rise to distortions in relative asset prices 
and delay reforms in the banking sector. Such a task, however, will call for careful timing 
of decisions, so as to prevent tensions arising on markets where the situation is still one of 
relative fragility.
The level of financial integration and economic interdependence attained in the euro area 
means a high degree of ambition must be maintained in the process of revision of Euro-
pean governance. Along these lines, the Eurosystem has called for the inclusion of more 
demanding criteria for the correction of imbalances and - especially in the fiscal area – 
greater automaticity for supervision and sanctioning procedures so as to make them less 
vulnerable to the willingness of national governments to comply with the commitments 
they have undertaken. It is also essential that the various mechanisms established by euro 
area governments to preserve financial stability across the area should have sufficient re-
sources and the appropriate instruments to effectively perform their functions. Finally, it 
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2  See J. Andrés, P. Burriel and Á. Estrada (2006), Bemod: a DSGE model 
for the Spanish economy and the rest of the euro area, Working Paper 
no. 0631, Banco de España, and J. Andrés, S. Hurtado, E. Ortega and C. 
Thomas (2010), “Spain in the euro: a General Equilibrium Analysis”, 
SERIEs Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Vol. 1, pp. 1 and 2.
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would also be advisable to reflect on how to deploy the other instruments available to the 
EU (including the budget) to support the adjustment and reform processes in countries 
facing difficulties.
More immediately, Greece’s apparent difficulties in returning to the market in 2012, as ini-
tially envisaged in their financial support programme, have raised uncertainty among in-
vestors and given rise to untimely debates about how realistic traumatic scenarios of slip-
page in the degree of economic integration attained in Europe and, therefore, of 
backtracking in the common European project may be. So that the considerable efforts to 
shape a new and more effective governance framework may come to fruition, this chal-
lenge - perhaps the most difficult one faced by the euro area since its creation - must first 
be conclusively overcome.
5 THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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In 2010, activity declined slightly, by -0.1%, reflecting a negative carry-over effect deriving 
from the intense contraction in 2009. That said, the Spanish economy commenced its re-
covery in 2010, with a slight increase in activity in each quarter except for the third. As 
seen in Chart 5.1, the upturn in 2010 was modest in comparison with the loss of output 
during the recession: as against a cumulative decline in activity of almost 5 percentage 
points (pp) in 2008 and 2009, in 2010 activity recovered by barely 0.6 pp. In 2011 Q1 this 
process of slow growth continued with output growth of 0.3%. The outlook for 2011 and 
2012, according to the Spanish economic projections report published by the Banco de 
España in March, is one of continuation of this gradual recovery, although the pre-crisis 
level of output will still not have been reached by the end of 2012.
This pace of recovery is also slower than the one observed following the recession of the 
early 1990s. Among other factors, this is due to the negative performance projected for gov-
ernment consumption and housing investment in 2011 and 2012, in comparison with 1995 
and 1996, as a result of the greater intensity of the fiscal and real-estate-market adjustment 
in the present crisis. By contrast, the recovery in government consumption is not projected to 
be very different in the next two years from that seen in the mid-1990s and the contribution of 
net external demand to output is projected to be even higher in 2011 and 2012, despite the 
absence of the exchange rate instrument. The recovery in activity is therefore expected to be 
gradual as a result of the adjustment of the imbalances accumulated during the upturn and of 
the fiscal deterioration that emerged during the crisis, which are currently manifest in the need 
to reduce public demand to make it more consistent with the resources available, while the 
possibilities of an expansion in private demand are limited by the high indebtedness. In this 
process, the improvement in net exports will support growth and permit a reduction in the 
recourse to external saving. The slowness of the pick-up in activity also contrasts with the 
stronger recovery discernible in the euro area. Although the depth of the recession in the euro 
area was similar to that in Spain, in terms of the decline in output, there was a significant in-
crease in activity in the euro area in 2010, which is expected to continue in 2011 and 2012.
The severity of the recession and slowness of the recovery have resulted in substantial excess 
capacity in the Spanish economy, which is manifest in a very large negative output gap and 
high rate of unemployment, and have had a significant negative impact on potential output.
The strains in the euro area financial markets stemming from the sovereign debt crisis were 
reflected in a significant rise in the cost of financing for general government and credit in-
stitutions, and in greater difficulty for the latter to obtain access to wholesale markets. The 
strains reached a peak in November. Subsequently, the risk premiums of resident issuers 
have tended to fall, within a context of marked volatility, although they remain relatively 
high (over 200 basis points (bp) in May 2011).
The cost of bank financing for households and non-financial firms also increased from 
mid-2010 (see Chart 5.2). This was the result of the increase in interbank yields and, from 
early 2011, of a progressive passing through of the rise in the cost of financial institutions’ 
liabilities to the margins they apply to their transactions with customers. Credit standards 
remained restrictive and, according to the Bank Lending Survey (BLS), tightened further, 
albeit moderately, in 2010 Q2, basically as a consequence of the financial strains. Subse-
quently they have remained unchanged, except in 2011 Q1, when they tightened again 
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somewhat in the household financing segment. The turmoil also led to a rise in the cost for 
non-financial firms of issuing fixed and variable-income securities.
The price of financial and real assets declined in 2010 (the IBEX 35 index fell by 17.4% and 
the value of housing by 3.5%, which in the latter case made a total fall from the peak val-
ues recorded in early 2008 of 13% in nominal terms and 18% in real terms). This also 
contributed to the tightening of financial conditions, although the depreciation of the nom-
inal effective exchange rate had the opposite effect. In the first few months of 2011, stock 
markets recovered, growing by 7.5% in the period to 6 May 2011, but the price of housing 
fell by a further 2.6% in Q1, making a total fall of 20% in real terms, and the euro appreci-
ated significantly.
Against this background, non-financial private sector debt continued to reflect a pattern 
of slow deleveraging in the case of households and selective deleveraging in that of 
firms. Household liabilities remained practically unchanged in 2010, although they have 
contracted slightly since the beginning of 2011, while in the case of non-financial corpo-
The decline in the price of 
financial and real assets also 
contributed to the tightening 
of financial conditions, but the 
exchange rate depreciation 
had the opposite effect
Despite the stagnation of the 
debt of households and non-
financial corporations...
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rations bank lending was reduced in activities linked to the real-estate sector, while its 
growth was close to zero or slightly positive in other activities. The developments in bank 
lending and in indebtedness in general are analysed in detail by sector in Chapter 6 of 
this Report.
Despite the stagnation of household liabilities in the last few years, the household debt 
ratio has barely fallen from the high levels it reached in 2007, owing to the slackness of the 
sector’s income. However, the associated debt burden continued to fall in 2010 as a whole, 
thanks to the decline in the average annual cost of outstanding debt, although interest 
rates began to increase in the final months of the year. In the case of non-financial corpo-
rations, the recovery in corporate earnings contributed to a larger – albeit moderate – cut 
in the debt ratio, and also in the associated debt burden, which was driven by the decline 
in the average cost of outstanding debt. That said, the corporate sector remains highly 
leveraged, although the situation varies from sector to sector (see Box 6.2).
A fiscal consolidation process was initiated in 2010. This process began with the approval 
in December 2009 of the State budget for 2010 and was reaffirmed by the February 2010 
Stability Programme Update (SPU), which set a path to cut the deficit to 3% of GDP in 
2013. In May 2010, as a consequence of the European sovereign debt crisis, the Spanish 
government decided to speed up the consolidation process, with more of the adjustment 
to be made in 2010 and 2011, while maintaining the target of a budget deficit of 3% of GDP 
in 2013. The deficit cutting path was thus adjusted to 9.3% of GDP in 2010 (as against the 
9.8% initially planned), 6% in 2011 (as against the target of 7.5% of GDP established in the 
January 2010 SPU) and 4.4% in 2012 (as against the previous level of 5.3%). 
The provisional budget outturn data for general government as a whole for 2010 show an 
improvement of 0.1 pp on the target of 9.3% of GDP, which would mean that the deficit was 
cut by almost 2 pp with respect to 2009 (see Table 5.1). This result was based on an in-
crease of 1 pp in the revenue-to-GDP ratio and a fall in the spending ratio of 0.8 pp. The 
adjustment was focused on capital expenditure, which was reduced by 1 pp of GDP, and 
final consumption expenditure (compensation of employees and inputs), which contributed 
0.5 pp. Other spending items, such as subsidies and current and capital transfers moder-
ated significantly, but were higher than initially planned. By contrast, social benefits rose by 
0.7 pp of GDP, given the inertia of spending on pensions and the high degree of persistence 
of spending on unemployment benefits. On the revenue side, the strong growth in indirect 
taxes (in particular, in VAT receipts) offset the less dynamic performance of direct taxes and 
social contributions. Notable by sector were the improved performance of central govern-
ment in relation to the target set, the disappearance of the traditional social security surplus 
and the failure by regional and local governments to comply with their targets.
Partly on account of this large deficit, public debt increased significantly, from 53.3% of 
GDP in 2009 to 60.1% in 2010, although, given the favourable starting situation it re-
mained well below the EU average. The increase in debt was due to the high budget defi-
cit, which was partly offset by the effect on the debt ratio of positive nominal GDP growth 
(0.5 pp of GDP) and by the deficit-debt adjustments (2 pp of GDP). The interest burden 
associated with this level of debt reached 1.9% of GDP in 2010, increasing by somewhat 
more than 0.1 pp of GDP with respect to 2009, owing to the larger volume of outstanding 
debt, despite a slight fall in the implicit financing rate. In the coming years, given the ex-
pected trend in public debt and interest rates, the interest burden will continue to rise rela-
tive to GDP, which will increase the magnitude of the fiscal drive needed to reduce the 
budget deficit.
... the household debt ratio 
barely changed, owing to the 
unfavourable performance of 
household income, while that 
of firms fell slightly
2 Economic policies
2.1 FISCAL POLICY
2010 marked the 
commencement of a 
vigorous fiscal adjustment, 
which has gone beyond 
the initial plans
The provisional results for 
2010 show that the budget 
deficit targets were achieved 
– an important milestone for 
the credibility of the rest of the 
consolidation path
Public debt increased 
significantly in 2010, to 60% 
of GDP, which is still well 
below the EU average
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The structural improvement in government finances more than offset the negative con-
tribution of the business cycle and the interest burden (see Chart 2.2). Primary structural 
spending was reduced by somewhat more than 1 pp of GDP, basically due to the with-
drawal of the stimulus measures that affected 2009 (see Table 5.2), while tax rises and 
the withdrawal of temporary revenue-side measures contributed 2 pp of GDP. Despite 
this improvement, the structural government deficit remained high in 2010, at around 
8% of GDP.
The budget results for 2010 show that the main risks in future will be associated, first, 
with the behaviour of regional and local governments. In this respect, fiscal discipline 
among regional and local governments, in particular the former, depends crucially on 
strict compliance with a measure adopted in 2010: approval by the Fiscal and Finan-
cial Policy Council of the criteria to be followed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Finance when authorising regional government debt operations during the period 
2010-13. These criteria lay down two general rules: the indebtedness of regional gov-
ernments must be in line with the deficit-reduction path; and no operation will be au-
thorised that increases the level of indebtedness of a regional government until the 
Fiscal and Financial Policy Council has issued a favourable report on its rebalancing 
plan. These criteria were applied for the first time in November 2010 and affected two 
The adjustment of the budget 
deficit in 2010 was essentially 
structural
The budget results for 2010 
show that the main risks of 
deviation are associated, first, 
with the behaviour of regional 
and local government...
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1  NON-FINANCIAL RESOURCES 39.4 40.4 41.1 37.1 34.7 35.7
    Current resources 38.6 39.7 40.6 36.9 34.7 35.7
        Taxes on products and imports 12.2 12.3 11.7 9.9 8.7 10.1
        Taxes on income and wealth 10.9 11.7 12.9 10.8 9.6 9.4
        Social contributions 12.9 12.9 13.0 13.2 13.3 13.2
        Other current resources (a) 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1
    Capital resources (b) 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.2 -0.1 0.0
2  NON-FINANCIAL USES (c) 38.4 38.4 39.2 41.3 45.8 45.0
    Compensation of employees 10.0 10.0 10.2 10.9 11.9 11.7
        Other jnal consumption expenditure 7.6 7.6 7.7 8.2 8.8 8.5
        Social benejts other than social transfers in kind 11.6 11.5 11.6 12.4 14.5 15.2
        Subsidies 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
        Interest (c) 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.9
        Other transfers 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.7
    Capital uses 4.9 5.1 5.4 5.4 5.9 4.9
        Gross capital formation 3.6 3.7 4.0 3.9 4.4 3.7
    Other capital uses (d) 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.2
3  NET LENDING (+) OR NET BORROWING (-) (c) (3=1-2) 1.0 2.0 1.9 -4.2 -11.1 -9.2
MEMORANDUM ITEMS:
    Final consumption 18.0 18.0 18.4 19.5 21.1 20.8
    Primary surplus 2.8 3.7 3.5 -2.6 -9.4 -7.3
    Gross debt (c) 43.0 39.6 36.1 39.8 53.3 60.1
MAIN GENERAL GOVERNMENT NON-FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS TABLE 5.1
% of GDP 
SOURCE: Structural indicators of the Spanish economy and the EU, Banco de España.
a Includes gross operating surplus.
b The negative sign in 2009 is due to the adjustment for uncertain revenue included with that sign in these resources.
c According to the Excessive Dejcit Procedure methodology.
d Includes net acquisitions of noMjnancial non-produced assets. 
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regional governments, Murcia and Castile-La Mancha, which had to specify their man-
datory adjustment plans. Likewise, a measure was approved in 2010 that only allows 
local governments to seek long-term public or private credit in 2011 if their debt does 
not exceed 75% of their revenues and the credit is to be used for investment already 
in progress, or else for co-funded projects. Also, homogeneous regional government 
data on the budget outturn for the previous quarter were published for the first time in 
December 2010. This practice, which has continued at the beginning of 2011 and will 
be repeated on a quarterly basis, amounts to a significant advance in terms of trans-
parency.
The magnitude, nature and composition of the spending cuts needed to achieve the tar-
gets set mean that their fulfilment is uncertain. First, a significant proportion of public 
spending in Spain is associated with items that have traditionally displayed significant 
upward inertia, such as spending on education, health and pensions. Second, spending 
on unemployment benefits, against a background of very high rates of unemployment, 
amounted to 3 percentage points of GDP in 2010, the highest level in the euro area. The 
saving measures proposed should be specific and must be accompanied by considera-
tions of efficiency in the provision of services and by further structural reforms, like the 
recent pensions reform (see Box 2.3).
... and, second, with the inertia 
observed in certain spending 
items
Increase (+)/Reduction (-) 2010 2011
Cyclically adjusted general government balance 2.8 2.9
Interest payments 0.1 0.3
Cyclically adjusted general government primary balance 2.9 3.2
BREAKDOWN OF THE CYCLICALLY ADUSTED PRIMARY BALANCE
    Total revenues 1.6 0.9
        Total taxes and social contributions 1.6 0.6
            Legislative changes 1.3 0.7
            Progressiveness 0.0 0.1
            Decoupling of the tax base from GDP -0.1 -0.1
            Residual (unexplained effects) 0.3 -0.1
        Other revenues -0.1 0.2
    Primary expenditure -1.4 -2.3
        Social benejts 0.5 -0.1
            Of which: retirement pensions 0.3 0.2
            Of which: unemployment benekts 0.1 -0.1
        Subsidies 0.0 -0.3
        Compensation of employees -0.3 -0.6
        Inputs -0.3 -0.3
        Public investment -0.7 -0.8
        Other expenditure -0.5 -0.3
    Memorandum items:
        General government balance (as a percentage of nominal GDP) 1.9 2.9
        Cyclical component (as a percentage of nominal GDP) -0.9 -0.1
FACTORS EXPLAINING CHANGES IN THE CYCLICALLY ADJUSTED GENERAL GOVERNMENT BALANCE 
IN SPAIN (a)  
TABLE 5.2 
Percentage of trend GDP 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The jscal balance is presented in accordance with the Excessive Dejcit Protocol dejnition.
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On 28 April 2011 the government presented a new Stability Programme Update (SPU) for 
the period 2011-14. This SPU confirms the budget consolidation path to 2013 approved in 
May 2010, which, if complied with, will enable the Stability Pact limits to be complied with, 
in accordance with the recommendations of the European Council. The general govern-
ment deficit would stand at 3% of GDP in 2013 and the public debt-to-GDP ratio would 
stabilise at slightly below 70% of GDP in 2012-13, up from 60.1% in 2010. The SPU also 
presents the deficit target for 2014 (2.1%), when it is planned to reduce public debt to 
68.9% of GDP. If these targets are achieved, the strategy proposed in May 2010 of bring-
ing forward to 2010 and 2011 70% of the structural adjustment for the whole of the period 
2009-13 would be validated. In addition, from the viewpoint of the quality of public fi-
nances, of the total adjustment to be made in the period 2009-13, 65% comes from 
spending reductions, and 35% from the adjustment of government consumption (21% of 
the total from the reduction of compensation of employees). However, the April 2011 SPU 
is based on a macroeconomic scenario that entails relatively high GDP growth rates and if 
these are not confirmed the achievement of the fiscal projections would be complicated. 
In this respect, the SPU includes a commitment to comply with the government deficit 
reduction targets even if the actual macroeconomic scenario is less favourable than the 
one envisaged.
The year 2010 was characterised by the gradual withdrawal of certain policies designed to 
sustain short-term demand that had been introduced during the crisis. However, the re-
sources used to finance productive investment and the working capital of SMEs and the 
self-employed, through different ICO facilities, were maintained. In addition, a new pro-
gramme of ICO financing at market prices was approved for the period 15 June 2010 to 31 
December 2011, under which direct loans were granted to the self-employed and SMEs, 
with the credit risk involved assumed by the ICO. From its launch until March 2011, around 
3,000 applications were approved under this programme, with an average amount of 
€40,000.
In addition, certain structural reforms were introduced, including notably the labour market 
reform. The aims of this reform, approved through an emergency procedure in June and 
ratified by Parliament in September, include the reduction of duality and wage rigidity, two 
of the main structural problems in the Spanish labour market. The main changes made by 
this Law are, first, improvement in the actual possibilities of wage opt-out, so that, follow-
ing the reform, this is permitted if the firm and workers agree to it, irrespective of the provi-
sions of the higher-level agreement. Second, the encouragement of permanent hiring, by 
increasing the possibilities for objective dismissal, through redefining the economic 
grounds (which now include the current or anticipated adverse situation of the firm), and 
by significantly widening the eligibility criteria for employment-promoting contracts (with 
lower firing costs). New limits are established for temporary hiring, the maximum duration 
of a contract for a specific task being limited to two years, which can be extended to three 
by agreement, and the costs of termination of temporary contracts are increased, to 12 
days per year worked in 2015. Private employment agencies are permitted to act in the 
labour intermediation process, in cooperation with the public employment service, which 
should facilitate the process of matching job offers with job seekers. Finally, the possibili-
ties for making applications for suspension of contracts or short-time working are wid-
ened, with the aim of smoothing employment adjustments.
It is still too early to assess the extent to which the aims of the Law are being achieved, 
given the short period since its approval and the difficulty in untangling its influence 
from other developments in recent months relating to the cycle. The greater possibili-
The recent updated Stability 
Programme sets an 
appropriate consolidation 
path, which must be strictly 
complied with
2.2 OTHER ECONOMIC 
POLICIES
Certain demand policies 
introduced during the crisis 
were withdrawn in 2010...
... and certain structural 
reforms were introduced, 
among which that of the 
labour market, with the aim of 
reducing duality and wage 
rigidity, was notable
The evidence on the impact of 
the reform is still limited
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ties for wage opt-outs should result in more moderate wage settlements, but this, as 
mentioned below, was not apparent in the first few months of 2011. At the end of 2010 
an increase in hiring based on employment-promoting contracts was detected, in line 
with expectations, although the total number of permanent contracts has barely in-
creased (see Table 5.3). Finally, there was a rise in applications for short-time working 
in the second half of 2010, in line with the new incentives provided by the reform, and 
there is also some evidence of an increase in the percentage of dismissals on objective 
grounds.
Following the approval of this Law certain additional measures were introduced in relation 
to the labour market. Inter alia, the use of part-time contracts for certain groups is pro-
moted and there are plans to design individualised programmes to improve the employa-
bility of the groups most affected by the crisis.
This reform was supplemented 
by subsequent developments 
which combine incentives for 
short-term hiring with changes 
to active policies
Total
permanent (a)
Permanent
employment
promoting (a)
Temporary
employment
ratio (b)
Part-time
ratio (b)
Number of 
employees
Weights
2000 8.7 — 32.2 8.0 1,282 2.1 —
2001 9.3 — 32.2 8.1 771 0.6 18.2
2002 9.0 4.7 31.8 8.3 1,268 1.8 18.1
2003 8.7 4.4 31.8 8.4 2,008 2.4 14.0
2004 8.7 3.9 32.5 9.1 525 0.9 11.6
2005 9.0 1.7 33.3 12.3 850 1.2 10.6
2006 11.8 3.9 34.0 12.1 157 0.3 8.9
2007 11.9 4.6 31.7 12.1 226 0.4 7.7
2008 11.5 3.5 29.3 12.3 2,675 1.8 10.6
2009 9.4 1.6 25.4 13.3 20,591 3.7 15.2
2010 8.5 1.9 24.9 14.0 38,136 12.7 18.3
2009 
Q1 11.1 1.8 25.4 13.2 4,843 2.6 15.3
Q2 9.6 1.7 25.2 13.5 6,948 4.8 15.4
Q3 8.3 1.5 25.9 12.8 5,640 5.2 14.8
Q4 8.6 1.5 25.1 13.9 3,160 2.8 15.1
2010 
Q1 9.6 1.6 24.4 14.0 3,304 4.2 16.3
Q2 8.7 1.5 24.9 14.2 2,517 3.7 17.1
Q3 7.5 1.7 25.6 13.4 10,096 18.0 18.7
Q4 8.4 2.7 24.8 14.2 22,219 22.8 21.6
2011 
Q1 (e) 9.4 2.0 24.8 14.8 9,930 22.4 24.1
APPLICATION FOR SHORT-TIME 
WORKING (c)
OBJECTIVE 
DISMISSAL (d)
PERMANENT AND PART-TIME HIRING (a) 
TABLE 5.3 LABOUR MARKET: SOME IMPORTANT INDICATORS 
SOURCE: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración and INE.
a The weight of this type of hiring in total hiring. 
b Ratio to EPA employees.
c Number of workers affected by an application for short-time working and their weight in the total number of workers subject to all types of labour force adjustment 
applications. 
d Initial benejciaries of contributory benejts as a result of an objective dismissal as a percentaje of all benejciairies as a result of dismissals or applications for labour 
force reduction. 
e 2011 Q1 only covers January and February in the case of objective dismissals.
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As regards other reforms, notable, first, are the measures approved to make the pur-
chase and rental of housing fiscally comparable, through the elimination of the deduc-
tion for house purchase for incomes above a certain threshold and the equalising of the 
deductions for purchase and rental for other incomes from 1 January 2011. This reform 
amounts to significant progress in tax neutrality with respect to the two ways of pos-
sessing housing, which is especially necessary in the case of Spain owing, among oth-
er aspects, to the low weight of rented housing and the perverse effects of this on 
worker mobility.
In addition, the Law on default1 was amended in order to limit the power of general govern-
ment and large firms when establishing payment conditions, which during the crisis appear to 
have had a particularly adverse impact on the liquidity of SMEs and the self-employed. Also, 
the process of transposition of the Services Directive continued in 2010, with the approval of 
the Law to Reform the Retail Trade Law, which reduces the administrative burden of setting 
up retail establishments, although the regional governments have retained most of the re-
gional licences required for the opening of large retail outlets.
In February 2011 the sustainable economy Law was approved, which includes, inter 
alia, a set of measures designed to reduce the time needed to start up a business that 
has already been incorporated. Given that the most onerous part, in terms of time and 
money, of the process of creating a firm is precisely that of starting up the business, 
implementation of the measures envisaged in this Law could simplify this process 
considerably.
With regard to the regulatory environment, the sustainable economy Law establishes cer-
tain principles of good regulation. To apply these principles, the Law requires that an ex-
ante analysis be carried out of the regulatory impact of every initiative, as well as an ex-
post analysis to verify the achievement of its aims. In addition, modification of the 
organisational structure of the National Energy Commission, the Telecommunications Mar-
ket Commission and the National Postal Sector Commission is proposed, with a reduction 
in the number of board members in each case, the establishment of a non-renewable 
6-year term, a prohibition on the attendance of members of the government or senior 
management at board meetings and the acts of these regulatory bodies concluding ad-
ministrative proceedings. Together these changes may give these regulatory bodies great-
er independence. Also, among measures to reform the financial market, in line with inter-
national agreements to increase transparency and enhance corporate governance, the 
sustainable economy Law amends the Securities Market Law so that listed companies 
make available to their shareholders a remuneration report to be approved by the share-
holders in general meeting.
As regards the energy sector, measures were adopted at the end of the year to contain 
the creation of future tariff deficits and the Electricity Debt Amortisation Fund (FADE, 
by its Spanish initials) was set up during the year, with the object of providing liquidity 
to electricity utilities through securitisation of the accumulated debt deriving from the 
tariff deficit. In addition, a reduction in subsidies for renewable energy was approved.2 
Finally, in the context of the fiscal consolidation process a programme of partial priva-
tisations was announced, which would affect both the management of airports and 
lotteries.
As regards other policies, 
noteworthy were the 
elimination of the housing 
deduction for incomes above 
a certain level, the approval of 
the retail trade law...
... as well as the approval of 
the sustainable economy Law, 
which includes, among other 
measures, simplification of the 
administrative steps involved 
in starting up a business 
activity and an improvement in 
the regulatory environment
Finally, the approval of 
measures to moderate the 
increase in the tariff deficit and 
the promotion of a 
privatisation programme is 
also noteworthy
1  Law 15/2010 of 5 July 2010 on measures to combat default in commercial transactions.
2  For photovoltaic installations the premiums and the hours eligible for premiums have been reduced.
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The adjustment of national demand, which had been very intense in 2009, continued in 
2010, albeit at a more moderate pace, of -1.1% (see Table 5.4). This slowdown in the de-
cline in domestic agents’ spending was the result of opposite movements in its public and 
private components.
Private consumption, which grew by 1.2%, behaved irregularly in 2010, since certain tem-
porary factors (including notably the rise in VAT rates on 1 July) led to a shift in the timing of 
spending decisions, which tended to be concentrated in the first half of the year (see Chart 
5.3). This phenomenon particularly affected the acquisition of durables, whose timing was 
also influenced by the extension to the first half of the subsidies for new car purchases. In 
the year as a whole, car purchases fell, although the consumption of durable goods grew 
moderately.
Household disposable income declined by 4.4% in real terms, the largest fall in recent 
decades (see Chart 5.4). This decline, which contrasts with the increase of 1.6% in 2009, 
is explained by the confluence of various factors. First, the change in fiscal policy stance 
moderated the contribution of general government to household income, while the boost 
provided in 2009 by net interest income was reversed in 2010, with income deducted from 
households, since interest receipts declined to a greater extent than interest payments. In 
addition, wage income fell again, since the lower intensity of job destruction was offset by 
the greater wage moderation in the private sector and the cut in the wages of public-sector 
employees. Finally, the decline in nominal income, by -1.1%, was exacerbated by the loss 
of purchasing power deriving from the rise in inflation.
Despite the fall in real income, consumption rose modestly. In the context described of 
deteriorating income, this led to a sharp fall in the household saving rate, which stood 
at 13.1% at end-2010, down almost 5 pp from 2009, although still somewhat above its 
historical average level. This seems to reflect the desire of households to smooth their 
consumption, by lowering their saving rate from the high levels of 2008 and 2009. This 
cushioning role for savings has been underpinned by a certain stabilisation in con-
sumer confidence, partly influenced by the moderation in the rate of deterioration of the 
labour market, although uncertainty remained high and confidence was sensitive to 
various events, such as the strains in the sovereign debt market and, in 2011, the rise 
in oil prices and interest rates. In this respect, against a background of continued de-
clines in real income, the rise in consumption in 2011 will be marginal. This, at least in 
the short term, will not prevent a further fall in the saving rate, until there is some sign 
of a recovery in income.
Last year residential investment remained very weak, as a consequence of the gradual 
stabilisation of housing starts at very low levels, while a larger number of houses continued 
to be completed (see Chart 5.5). This led to a further decline in the volume of construction 
in progress, the growth rate of which stood at around -17%. The execution of new residen-
tial projects continued to be curbed in 2010 by the slackness of demand and by the pres-
ence of a significant volume of unsold housing, which led housing starts to stand at around 
125,000, approximately one-sixth of their level just three years earlier. However, the con-
vergence in recent quarters between starts and completions points towards stabilisation 
of the rate of housing construction and, therefore, of residential investment towards the 
end of this year.
3 Demand
3.1 NATIONAL DEMAND
National demand continued to 
adjust in 2010, but at a more 
moderate pace compared with 
2009
The path of private 
consumption over the year 
was bumpy, owing to the 
bringing forward of spending 
caused by the VAT increase 
in July
Household income fell...
... which led households to 
smooth their consumption 
using their savings
Residential investment 
continued to decline owing 
to the low level of 
commencement of new 
projects and the stock 
of unsold housing is still 
very high
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In 2010 the cycle of successive contractions in house purchases that started in 2007 came 
to an end, with positive year-on-year growth of around 6% and 490,000 houses sold. How-
ever, this amount represents little more than 50% of the peak level, recorded in 2006. In 
addition, the timid growth last year in transactions partly reflects the bringing forward of 
purchase decisions caused by temporary fiscal factors, such as the increase in indirect 
taxes in July 2010 and the partial elimination in January 2011 of tax deductions for the pur-
chase of principal residences. Simultaneously, other more permanent factors appear to 
have had mixed effects. On one hand, purchase decisions were driven by an improvement 
in accessibility indicators associated with the falls in the prices of residential assets and 
with the low interest rates that predominated during the year on average. On the other 
hand, the weakness of household income and the tightening of mortgage credit standards 
appear to have had a negative effect on the volume of transactions. Housing starts are cur-
rently estimated to be below the demand for new housing, so that the stock of unsold hous-
ing will gradually be absorbed, although residential investment can be expected to remain 
markedly slack for some years, which should also affect prices. In this respect, Box 5.1 
makes an international comparison of the adjustment of housing prices during the crisis.
In 2010 certain temporary 
factors helped to sustain the 
demand for housing
% of GDP (a) RATE OF CHANGE (b)
2000 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
NATIONAL DEMAND 103.1 102.2 5.1 5.2 4.1 -0.6 -6.0 -1.1
HOUSEHOLDS AND NPISHs
    Final consumption expenditure 59.7 58.4 4.2 3.8 3.7 -0.6 -4.2 1.2
        Durable consumption 6.3 3.7 5.5 3.8 3.3 -14.6 -10.9 3.8
        Non-durable consumption 53.4 54.7 4.1 3.8 3.7 0.7 -3.7 1.1
    Housing 6.1 4.7 6.1 6.2 2.5 -10.7 -24.5 -16.8
CORPORATIONS
    Private productive investment (c) 16.6 14.1 7.4 7.7 3.8 -2.4 -18.2 -0.6
        Construction 4.8 5.4 5.7 4.8 -0.6 1.2 -7.7 1.6
        Capital goods 7.3 4.8 9.1 10.5 10.2 -4.0 -29.2 3.7
        Other (d) 4.4 3.9 7.1 7.5 0.8 -4.1 -16.2 -8.2
GENERAL GOVERNMENT
    Final consumption expenditure 17.2 20.9 5.5 4.6 5.5 5.8 3.2 -0.7
    Gross jxed capital formation 3.2 3.7 7.8 7.5 13.1 -1.5 11.2 -17.3
        Construction 2.3 2.7 7.3 8.1 13.7 -4.4 14.6 -21.0
        Capital goods 0.8 1.0 9.3 6.0 11.3 7.5 1.8 -6.2
MEMORANDUM ITEMS:
    Gross jxed capital formation 25.8 22.6 7.0 7.2 4.5 -4.8 -16.0 -7.6
        Capital goods 8.1 5.9 9.2 9.9 10.4 -2.5 -24.8 1.8
            Machinery 5.7 4.3 6.9 10.3 11.7 0.4 -23.1 2.1
            Transport 2.4 1.6 14.0 9.1 7.6 -8.9 -28.9 0.9
        Construction 13.3 12.8 6.1 6.0 3.2 -5.9 -11.9 -11.1
            Housing 6.1 4.7 6.1 6.2 2.5 -10.7 -24.5 -16.8
            Other construction 7.2 8.1 6.2 5.8 4.0 -0.8 -0.1 -7.2
        Other (d) 4.4 3.9 7.1 7.5 0.8 -4.1 -16.2 -8.2
CONSUMPTION AND GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION BY INSTITUTIONAL SECTOR TABLE 5.4 
SOURCE: INE and Banco de España. 
a National Accounts, base 2000, current prices. 
b National Accounts, base 2000, rates of change of volume indices. 
c Includes investment by sole propietors.  
d This investment includes real estate, legal, accounting, consultancy and software services, among others. 
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Private non-residential investment continued on the path of mild recovery that began in 
late 2009, reaching positive year-on-year growth rates in the second half of 2010, although 
in the year as a whole it posted a modest decline, of 0.6%. This gradual improvement oc-
curred thanks to the favourable behaviour of external demand and the improvement in 
industrial confidence. Also, the annual average cost of bank financing fell, while other 
credit conditions, although they remained tight, did not deteriorate with respect to 2009. 
Finally, the financial position of firms improved in 2010, with a slight correction of the debt 
ratio and an increase in profitability, which eased the financial pressure on investment (see 
Chart 6.6). In 2011, the gradual improvement in domestic demand and a continuation of 
the favourable behaviour of exports are expected to boost business investment, despite 
the foreseeable increase in the cost of financing.
Behaviour varied considerably across products. In particular, capital goods expanded 
moderately, partly because, following the sharp decline in 2009, their replacement de-
mand increased. The overall adjustment of investment in capital goods during the crisis 
has been more drastic than in the euro area, and the initial phase of the cyclical upswing 
is proving more muted than in similar episodes in the past (see Chart 5.5).
Business investment 
continued the mild recovery 
that began in late 2009, driven 
by exports
Spending on capital goods 
posted a positive growth rate 
in 2010, although, in 
comparison with similar past 
episodes and with the euro 
area, its recovery has been 
moderate
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BOX 5.1THE HOUSE PRICE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
Since 2007 a group of advanced countries, Spain among them, 
have seen their real estate markets undergo a severe adjustment. 
Previously, during the upturn, many of these economies had wit-
nessed high growth in house prices and notably buoyant resi-
dential investment, attaining levels that proved hardly sustaina-
ble either from the standpoint of productive and financial re-
sources geared to real estate activity or from that of asset 
valuation. From 1997 to 2007, real average house prices rose by 
115% in Spain, while they increased by almost 160% in Ireland, 
140% in the United Kingdom and around 80% in the United 
States. In France the increase was 50%, above the euro area 
average, which stood at 40% (see panel 1). In the current phase 
of the adjustment the excesses built up previously are being cor-
rected, with cross-country differences in the scale and pattern of 
adjustment (of prices and amounts).
In Spain’s case the upturn in the housing cycle was linked to 
strong demand-side pressures which, though underpinned in 
part by the course of certain fundamentals and met by a highly 
dynamic response in terms of the production of housing units, 
gave rise to strong pressure on the value of residential assets. 
Demographic factors (population and household size) deter-
mined high growth in the demand for housing, which was also 
boosted by the cut in real interest rates associated with the 
change in regime that Monetary Union membership entailed. As 
housing is a long-lasting asset, the demand for it and its price are 
highly sensitive to permanent declines in interest rates, espe-
cially when, moreover, conditions conducive to an increase in 
credit and in indebtedness prevail, as occurred in Spain. While 
the nature of some of these factors was common to other coun-
tries, their impact was heterogeneous and of differing intensity. 
Thus, for instance, whereas household debt in Spain rose to 
around 130% of GDI in 2007, this ratio was even higher in Ire-
land, at 200%. In other economies, such as France and, above 
all, the United States and the United Kingdom, the changes in 
these demand variables were less significant.
The rising course of house prices prompted a strong boost to 
activity in a large number of economies. In early 2007, at the 
height of the cycle, the production of new houses peaked in 
many markets. The strong growth in the volume of housing 
starts and, consequently, in construction was reflected in Na-
tional Accounts figures, whereby the weight of investment in 
housing in GDP moved on a rising trajectory in these areas, 
reaching particularly high levels in Ireland and Spain (14% and 
9%, respectively; see panel 2). Occasionally, the pressure of de-
mand on real assets was not confined to housing but also fed 
through to non-residential real estate assets (shopping centres, 
offices, etc.). That drove the exuberance of investment in this 
market segment, involving the disproportionate development of 
new projects, and prompted price trajectories in these assets 
which, ultimately, proved unsustainable. In these circumstanc-
es, the situation of the Irish real estate market was particularly 
paradigmatic.
Admittedly, the macroeconomic fundamentals in place during the 
expansionary phase could warrant a rising path in house prices 
and residential investment; but there is also consensus that the 
increases observed might contain a somewhat significant com-
ponent of overreaction. Thus, in relation to prices, and according 
to the analysis conducted by the International Monetary Fund, 
the residential market in Spain at end-2007 evidenced a level of 
prices in real terms that exceeded that warranted by its determi-
nants by 17%. That said, the figure estimated for other econo-
mies was higher (in Ireland, the United Kingdom and France, the 
overvaluation amounted to 32%, 28% and 22%, respectively) 
(see panel 3).
Although the excessive size of housing markets in these coun-
tries was patent in early 2007, the outbreak of the international 
financial crisis heightened the factors of fragility, giving rise to 
very sharp adjustment trajectories. In Ireland’s case, the fact that 
the rises in both house prices and residential investment during 
the boom was sharper suggested that the correction in this 
country might be greater than that in other economies. Indeed, 
on National Accounts data, the cumulative decline in residential 
investment from its peak to date would be close to 70% in Ire-
land, while the fall in other markets was less intense (57% in the 
United States and 43% in Spain, while in the United Kingdom the 
decline was approximately 20%).
The adjustment of house prices has also been sharper in Ireland, 
with a cumulative decline of 35% in real terms, similar to that 
observed for the United States. However, it should be stressed 
that, in the case of the US market, the adjustment had run its 
course in 2009 and that prices have held relatively stable since 
then. Conversely, the declining course of prices in Ireland has run 
to the present. In the United Kingdom, the real adjustment of 
house prices has been less pronounced, leading to a total fall of 
close to 17%. For 2011 and 2012, further declines in prices are 
forecast in Ireland and, more modestly so, in the United Kingdom.
In Spain’s case house prices, according to information from the 
Ministry of Development, have fallen in real terms by 20% from 
2007 to 2011 Q1 (and by 15% in nominal terms), slightly more 
sharply than in the United Kingdom. As earlier mentioned, the 
different trend in fundamentals would warrant a different correc-
tion in each case. But certain features of the Spanish mortgage 
market, where debtors respond with all their assets to debts in-
curred, compared with other countries, such as the United 
States, where liability is limited in some cases to the house that 
has been mortgaged, introduce an element which tends to limit 
the adjustment of prices in Spain. This characteristic can be 
seen, moreover, in Spain’s relatively small non-performing mort-
gage loan ratio compared with other countries.
It should also be underscored that the average adjustment of house 
prices in Spain masks significant differences in terms of the particu-
lar characteristics of each dwelling (geographical or inner-city loca-
BOX 5.1THE HOUSE PRICE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (cont’d)
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SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Fomento, AMECO, Datastream, IMF and Banco de España.
a The 2011 and 2012 forecasts are from the EBA central scenario (March 2011).
b World Economic Outlook (October 2007 and April 2008). For the United States the calculation is for 2006.
c Annual theoretical effort excluding deductions.
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BOX 5.1THE HOUSE PRICE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (cont’d)
tion, age, first or second home, etc.). Thus, the area encompassing 
the Mediterranean provinces and those close to the Madrid region 
have posted an average fall in prices that is 5 pp more marked than 
the national aggregate, whereas in other areas, by contrast, the de-
cline has been very small and even non-existent (see panel 6). It 
should likewise be highlighted that the real cumulative adjustment in 
house prices in Spain in the current cycle is similar, to date, to that 
which took place during the correction phase in the early 1990s. 
That said, moderate cuts might be expected to continue over the 
near horizon as a result of the sizeable overhang of houses for sale 
and of the foreseeable increase in the cost of mortgage financing, 
which will exert downward pressure on the value of the assets to 
ease its impact on the affordability indicators (see panel 5). As a 
result, the cumulative correction in house prices could amount to 
25% in real terms in 2012, drawing close to the path observed in the 
real estate crisis in the 1970s (see panel 4).
In a framework in which access to external financing (through borrowing or securities issu-
ance) remained highly restricted, the generation of internal funds enabled private produc-
tive investment to be sustained, in addition to some deleveraging. In 2010 business saving 
continued to grow, underpinned by the recovery in the gross operating surplus and the 
reduction in the interest burden. This increase in saving, along with the moderate fall in 
investment, enabled the financial position of firms to improve, with overall net lending of 
0.4% of GDP in 2010.
Finally, as mentioned, general government demand was contractionary. The stepping 
up in the spring of the budget consolidation process meant that government consump-
tion and public investment, which had previously helped to sustain domestic demand, 
ceased to do so in 2010. Moreover, given the pending fiscal adjustment, these spending 
components can be expected to continue to make a negative contribution over the next 
few years.
Net external demand again made a notable positive contribution to GDP growth in 2010 (1 
pp), although it was smaller than in 2009. The notable momentum of exports of goods and 
services (which grew by more than 10% in real terms) should be highlighted, while imports of 
goods and services also recovered, although to a lesser extent, recording modest growth 
(5.4% in real terms) given the weak rise in final demand. In the months that have already 
elapsed in 2011, trade flows have exhibited marked strength, especially in the case of exports, 
so that net external demand is expected to contribute positively to output again.
Following the collapse of world trade in 2009, goods exports were the Spanish economy’s 
main engine of growth in 2010, with an annual increase of 13.6%, which exceeded the 
growth in Spain’s export markets. The stimulus from the upswing in world trade and com-
petitiveness gains (largely due to wage containment) more than offset the negative effect of 
the progressive disappearance of the exceptional measures implemented in some countries 
last year, like the vehicle replacement support programmes that had stimulated sales abroad 
in 2009. Also, the weakness of national demand encouraged Spanish firms to sell their 
products abroad.
According to the information available at firm level, the drastic decline in goods exports in 
2009 was attributable, above all, to a reduction in the average amount exported by each 
firm and, to a much lesser extent, to the withdrawal of firms from export markets. This 
The increase in saving and the 
fall in business investment 
allowed the corporate sector 
to record net lending
General government’s 
contribution to demand was 
strongly contractionary
3.2 EXTERNAL DEMAND
In 2010 net external demand 
again made a positive 
contribution to GDP growth, 
thanks to more buoyant 
exports
Goods exports, favoured by 
the expansion of world trade 
and accumulated 
competitiveness 
improvements, drove the 
recovery of the Spanish 
economy
... with similar buoyancy 
across most geographical 
areas and products
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suggests that firms withstood the world trade crisis well, facilitating the subsequent recov-
ery in their sales. Although the presence of Spanish firms in the fastest-growing markets 
(in particular, in emerging economies) is still low, sales to these economies recorded very 
high growth rates in 2010 as a whole, which is contributing to the necessary geographical 
diversification of Spanish exports (see Chart 5.6). Finally, by type of product, the accelera-
tion in exports was across-the-board, although it was most notable in the chemicals and 
basic metals industries and transport equipment, while sales of cars, although growing by 
somewhat less, made a significant contribution to the recovery of exports in 2010, given 
their large weight in total exports.
In 2010 as a whole, Spain’s share of world exports, in real terms, improved slightly, having 
remained relatively stable in the previous two years, when the gain in share in the devel-
oped countries, in particular in the euro area, was offset by the loss in the emerging areas 
(see Chart 5.7). In the euro area, Germany also increased its market share, while those of 
France and, in particular, Italy declined. In the first few months of 2011 exports have con-
tinued to drive growth, displaying greater buoyancy than world markets, which suggests 
that Spain’s market share continues to expand.
The share of goods exports in 
world markets increased 
slightly
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Services exports also returned to a positive growth path in 2010 (4.2%), especially non-
tourism services (5.5%), in step with the growth in activity and, in particular, in goods trade 
and tourist flows, which boosted transport services. Tourism receipts benefited from the 
emergence from the economic crisis of some of the main countries that provide tourists for 
Spain and the weakness of the euro against the dollar and sterling. Along with an aggres-
sive price cutting policy, this helped to mitigate growing competition from the eastern 
Mediterranean countries. However, the negative impact of certain exceptional events, 
such as the temporary closure of European airspace due to a volcanic eruption in Iceland, 
adverse meteorological conditions and the air traffic controllers strike in Spain, meant that 
tourism receipts continued to post moderate growth rates in 2010 (2.5%). In 2011, the 
growth rate of services exports is expected to accelerate, as the economic position of 
Spain’s main customers continues to strengthen and tourists have been diverted towards 
Spain as a result of the geopolitical instability in certain Arab countries.
The recovery of goods imports was much more moderate than that of goods exports (with 
an annual increase of 6.2%), given the weakness of national demand and the rise in the 
prices of imported products, especially commodities. That said, import penetration in fi-
nal demand increased again in 2010. The pattern of imports over the year was largely 
determined by the bringing forward of consumption decisions to the second quarter from 
Services exports also 
recorded positive growth, 
although it was more 
moderate than in the case 
of goods
The rate of recovery of imports 
was influenced by two 
opposing factors: the 
weakness of domestic demand 
and the buoyancy of exports
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the third quarter (which indicates the dependence of the Spanish economy on goods for 
which there is no domestically produced equivalent). As at year-end, import growth was 
strongly linked to the buoyancy of exports, especially in those sectors that are highly 
dependent on imported inputs. In 2011 the growth of imports will again be constrained by 
the relatively moderate recovery in domestic demand, in particular private consumption, 
and by the increase in their prices, although the strength of exports may have some 
positive effect on imports.
The decline in activity in the market economy as a whole moderated by more than 4 pp in 
terms of gross value added (GVA), to -0.4%, which exceeded the decline in GDP as a whole 
by more than 3 pp. Both the industrial and the services sectors posted positive, albeit mod-
est, rates of change, following the notable falls in 2009, while GVA in construction con-
tracted at a high rate. For its part, the GVA of non-market services decelerated notably 
during the year, growing at an annual average rate of 0.8%, as against 2.1% in 2009.
Following the marked cumulative adjustment during the preceding two years, GVA in 
the industrial and energy sectors returned to positive growth rates in 2010 (1.3%), driv-
en by external demand (see Chart 5.8). All the large industrial sectors grew, except 
those producing capital goods, which continued to contract, but at a notably lower rate. 
The highest growth was in the intermediate goods (in particular, the chemicals industry, 
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in line with the buoyancy of this sector’s exports) and, to a lesser extent, non-food con-
sumer goods sectors.
Despite the modest recovery last year and at the beginning of 2011, the current level of 
industrial output is still approximately 20% lower than in 2007, which is a sharper contrac-
tion than in the main euro area countries. These developments are partly attributable to the 
spill-over effects of the decline in construction on certain industrial sectors. More posi-
tively, those sectors with a higher technological content suffered a smaller adjustment 
during the crisis and have performed more favourably during the early stages of the recov-
ery, which is probably related to their higher export orientation. However, their low weight 
in the industrial sector as a whole (around 7.5%) limits their contribution to the expansion 
of the sector, which will depend in future upon the behaviour of the medium and low-
technology, labour-intensive sectors, which are the largest.
GVA in market services increased by 0.4% in 2010, following the significant decrease of 
around 2% recorded the previous year. In comparison with industry, the sector’s contrac-
tion during the recession was much less intense. Moreover, production in market services 
industries has already generally recovered to around its pre-crisis levels. Activity in the 
wholesale and retail trade, which is the largest one, fluctuated during 2010 as a result of 
the introduction of VAT in July, although it generally remained weak, in line with consump-
tion. Other sectors, such as hotels and restaurants and transport and storage services, 
benefited from the buoyancy of goods exports and tourism, which partly offset the greater 
slackness of domestic activity.
GVA in construction continued the intense adjustment process that had commenced 
three years earlier, with a fall of more than 6% in 2010. As already seen when demand was 
analysed, this was attributable to continuation of the intense adjustment of residential 
investment and the sharp reduction in public investment, within the framework of fiscal 
consolidation.
Employment fell in 2010 at an average rate of 2.3% (4% in the market economy). As a re-
sult the total destruction of jobs since 2007 Q3 exceeds two million, which shows the se-
verity of the impact of the economic crisis on employment. However, the decline in em-
ployment was more than 4 pp less than in 2009 (see Chart 5.9). Going forward, as in the 
case of activity, the recovery in employment is expected to be slow.
Productivity in 2010 grew by 2.3%, a more moderate rate than in 2009, confirming once 
again the countercyclical nature of this variable in the Spanish economy. This behaviour is 
the result of the combination of a high degree of wage rigidity and strong segmentation of 
the labour market, which means that the adjustment to shocks takes place mainly through 
the level of employment, in particular, temporary employment. Since temporary workers 
on average have lower levels of training and experience than other workers, a reduction in 
their numbers leads to an increase in average productivity. In fact, temporary employment 
fell by 4% in 2010, while permanent employment declined by 1.5%. The same pattern of 
behaviour was seen right across the market economy, with the rise in productivity in indus-
try standing out.
Construction continued to be the sector in which most employment was destroyed in 
2010, with an average change of -12.5%, although the decline in employment in industry 
was also considerable (-5.8%). For its part, employment in non-market services grew by 
2.2%, a similar rate to 2009, although it decelerated as the year elapsed. According to 
Market services also showed 
some improvement, based 
mainly on domestic demand
The rate of decline in 
construction accelerated 
slightly, with adjustment in the 
residential component coming 
on top of the strong 
contraction in public works
5 The labour market
The destruction of 
employment continued in 
2010, but at a slower pace
Productivity, as usual, 
behaved countercyclically
In construction, employment 
continued to be destroyed at 
a marked rate...
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data from the Register of Personnel in General Government Service, growth was more 
moderate, at around 0.8% (on data to July 2010), as against 2.2% in 2009, as a result of 
the progressive application of the public sector employment reduction plan.
Although destruction of employment occurred in almost all sectors of the market econo-
my, the rate of deterioration moderated with respect to 2009. It can be seen from the 
quarterly profile for 2010 that the destruction of employment practically stopped in market 
services, while in agriculture there was timid job creation.
In contrast with previous crises the participation rate continued to display some strength, 
despite the severe deterioration in the labour market, with a moderate increase (of 0.1 pp, 
to 60%). This enabled the labour force growth rate to remain in positive territory (0.2%), 
despite being lower than in 2009 (0.8%), on account of the slowdown in the increase in the 
immigrant population that has been recorded since soon after the start of the crisis. Male 
participation and that of younger persons (aged 16-24) did respond negatively to the cycli-
... while in other sectors the 
fall in employment was halted
Participation decisions barely 
responded to the adverse 
labour market conditions
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cal situation. In the case of the latter there was an increase in their participation in training 
activities. The reduction in the participation of these groups was not sufficient, however, to 
offset the tendency towards greater female participation in the labour market.
The growth of unemployment moderated, but remained strong, standing at 11.6% in 2010, 
and the rate of unemployment rose to 20.1%, up more than 2 pp from 2009. This increase 
was broad-based, but more marked among the youngest, those with low skill levels and 
foreigners. Long-term unemployment rose sharply and its relative incidence (42.5%) stood 
at high levels (52.6% among 45-64 year olds), a worrying situation given the greater diffi-
culty that the long-term unemployed have returning to the labour market.
The signing in February 2010 of the 2010-2012 Employment and Collective Bargaining 
Agreement by the social partners, along with the significant cut in the wages of public-
sector employees and the moderate inflation rates deriving from the unemployment gap, 
created a more favourable setting for wage moderation in 2010. Compensation per em-
ployee in the market economy grew by 1.4%, down 2.3 pp from 2009, in line with the 
growth in wage rates agreed in collective bargaining (1.3%, as against 2.3% in 2009). The 
slowdown in non-market services was even sharper, with an average fall of 1.8% in 2010, 
owing to the general government wage cut.
However, the sharp rise in inflation in the final stages of 2010 and the first few months of 
2011 caused the wage increases in the agreements registered at the beginning of this year 
to be higher than those in 2010 (around 3%). There is therefore a risk that the high inflation 
in late 2010 and early 2011 will feed through into excessive wages, thereby hampering the 
recovery in competitiveness and employment.
The gradual increase in the rate of growth of the CPI, which had commenced in summer 
2009, continued last year (see Chart 5.10). Specifically, the average annual inflation rate in 
2010 was 1.8%, while in December the annual rate was 3%, 2.2 pp higher than in the 
same month a year earlier. This tendency for inflation to rise continued at the beginning of 
2011, until April, when it peaked at 3.8% and began to fall. The developments described 
reflect, above all, the concurrence of various predominantly temporary factors whose im-
pact on the rate of change of the CPI should, in principle, disappear during 2011. These 
factors include the rise in commodities prices (especially the oil price) on international 
markets, certain tax rises (within the fiscal consolidation framework) and the increase in 
certain regulated prices.
For this reason, to explain inflation developments in 2010 and early 2011 it is useful to 
break down the annual growth rate of the CPI, in order to quantify the approximate contri-
butions of each of these factors. The difference between the overall indicator and the total 
contribution of these factors gives a more accurate indication of underlying inflationary 
pressures. Specifically, of the 2.2 pp by which inflation increased between December 2009 
and December 2010, the temporary factors would together explain 1.4 pp, the residual 
part, unrelated to these factors, being 0.8 pp.
The behaviour of the prices of energy goods explains 0.7 pp of the increase in inflation last 
year. The notable acceleration in these prices in 2010 and early 2011 reflected, above all, 
an external shock, namely a significant rise in the US-dollar oil price, against a background 
of strong demand expansion in the emerging countries, geopolitical tensions in certain 
producing countries and a lack of exploration. However, other factors also contributed to 
the increase in energy prices. First, not only did the pre-tax prices of heating and vehicle 
Unemployment grew rapidly, 
but at a slower rate than in 
2009
Wages moderated in 2010...
... although there are signs of a 
rise in 2011
6 Prices and costs
Inflation is tending to rise, 
owing to factors that are, in 
principle, temporary... 
... such as the trend in energy 
prices...
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 141 ANNUAL REPORT, 2010 5. THE SPANISH ECONOMY
fuels swiftly reflect, as usual, the rise in the cost of oil, but the price increases were larger 
in Spain than in the euro area as a whole, which may be a consequence of insufficient 
competition in the sector, as well as the rigidity of energy demand in Spain. Second, the 
regulated prices of natural gas, butane gas and electricity were increased in order to bring 
them into line with cost.
Standing out among the fiscal consolidation measures with direct effects on prices is the 
July 2010 increase in VAT rates. Final prices would have increased by 1.1 pp if the tax 
change had been fully passed through. However, the various estimates available indicate 
that the actual pass-through was around 50%, so that the tax increase would explain 0.6 
pp of the change in the overall CPI. This pass-through is smaller than that estimated for 
the increases in VAT rates in 1992 and 1995, which may be because the weakness of 
household consumption at the current stage in the cycle caused part of the tax rise to be 
absorbed in producers’ and retailers’ margins. The increase in taxes on tobacco also had 
a discernible effect on the CPI.
On average last year, the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy increased by 0.6%, 
a record low rate. This was consistent with the slackness of demand, which led, in par-
ticular, to a marked slowdown in services prices. This containment of underlying inflation 
meant that, despite the larger increase in indirect taxes in Spain, the inflation differential 
... and indirect taxes
The CPI excluding 
unprocessed food and energy 
reached a record low...
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with respect to the euro area, in terms of the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy, 
was negative (-0.3%) for the second consecutive year.
The reduction of unit labour costs intensified relative to 2009, as a consequence of the 
greater containment of compensation per employee (which was more pronounced in the 
economy as a whole than in the market economy), since apparent labour productivity 
growth was lower than in 2009, reflecting the moderation of the job destruction process. 
At the same time, profit margins (approximated by the share of the operating surplus in 
value added) increased with respect to previous years, especially in the case of industry.
The rate of growth of private demand deflators increased in 2010, reflecting the strong ac-
celeration (by almost 17 pp) in import prices. For its part, the government consumption 
deflator fell in 2010 as a consequence of the public sector pay cuts. The acceleration of 
the domestic component of inflation, approximated by the GDP deflator, was more mod-
est. It increased by 1% in 2010, as against 0.6% in 2009.
For the second consecutive year there were improvements in the price and cost competitive-
ness indicators vis-à-vis the developed countries, so that part of the loss accumulated in 
previous years was recovered. The gains, which in the case of competition with non-euro area 
countries were favoured by exchange rate developments, were particularly intense in terms 
of unit labour costs. This improvement in competitiveness contributed, as already indicated, 
to the slight rise in the market share of Spanish exports, in real terms, on the world market.
In principle, the impact on the annual inflation rate of the factors that have been temporar-
ily driving it will tend to disappear gradually in the second half of 2011, which should en-
able consumer price inflation to stand at around 2% at the end of 2011 and at 1.5% in 
2012 as a whole. However, these projections are subject to a high degree of uncertainty, 
since the oil price is too. In addition, the indirect effects of past oil price rises on the prices 
of other goods and the emergence of so-called second-round effects (i.e. the inflationary 
effects that arise when, in response to an external shock, agents attempt to maintain their 
margins and wages in real terms) represent channels that may put further pressure on 
domestic prices. An inappropriate reaction by the various agents to the inflation shocks 
recorded during 2010 would lead to persistently higher inflation rates, competitiveness 
losses and reductions in employment and activity.
The Spanish economy’s net borrowing continued to decline in 2010, although less sharply 
than in 2009. On national accounts data, Spain’s net borrowing reached 3.9% of GDP, 1.2 
pp less than in 2009 (see Chart 5.11). This improvement mainly reflected the decline in the 
income deficit (by 0.9 pp of GDP) and in the non-energy trade balance (by 0.6 pp), with a 
slight increase in the services surplus. Also, the capital transactions surplus widened, by 
0.3 pp of GDP. These developments offset the increase in the energy deficit.
The decline in the income deficit basically reflects the notable increase, to an all-time 
high, in the direct investment dividends received by Spanish multinationals and the 
low average level of interest rates in 2010. In the latter case, the correction of the 
income deficit moderated during the second half, in line with the rise in the cost of 
financing.
... reflecting the sharp fall in 
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The notable rise in oil prices in 2011, the magnitude and duration of which is subject to 
great uncertainty, and the upward trend in interest rates limit the margin for correction of 
the external deficit. Given the considerable dependence of the Spanish economy on 
imported goods, especially energy, and the interest burden entailed by the debt as-
sumed in the past vis-à-vis the rest of the world, it is important to review through which 
channels additional and permanent corrections in the external deficit might be achieved 
(see Box 5.2).
The decline in the net borrowing of the Spanish economy in 2010 is explained by the fall in 
national investment (by 1.5 pp of GDP to 22.5%), which widely exceeded that in the gross 
national savings ratio (of 0.4 pp of GDP to 18.5%) (see Chart 5.12). It should be noted that 
the ratio of investment to GDP in Spain remains above that of the main European coun-
tries, despite the 8 pp decline in this ratio since 2007. In 2010 private-sector net lending 
The rise in the oil price and the 
increase in income payments 
abroad are not conducive to 
more significant declines in 
the external deficit in future
The lower public-sector net 
borrowing more than offset the 
reduction in the net lending of 
the non-financial private 
sector
BOX 5.2CHANNELS FOR CORRECTING THE SPANISH EXTERNAL DEFICIT
In 2010 the Spanish economy continued reducing its external 
deficit. On National Accounts data, net borrowing stood at 3.9% 
of GDP that year, 1.2 pp less than in 2009 and almost 6 pp down 
on the 2007 peak (see panel 1). This adjustment needs to con-
tinue, especially since Spain has built up a significant negative 
output gap, with a substantial decline in investment, which should 
lessen the resort to foreign saving. Further, in 2010 the primary 
external balance was still in deficit (2.2% of GDP), suggesting 
that, in the absence of vigorous growth in activity, the Spanish 
economy’s international investment position (IIP) will remain 
strongly negative. 
Some of the factors that have hindered the correction of the 
external deficit in 2010 Q2 point to the presence of certain 
weaknesses in the Spanish economy, which need to be ad-
dressed to achieve further and persistent reductions in the def-
icit. In 2010, net borrowing was affected by the higher pay-
ments to the rest of the world connected with the increase in 
the energy bill. The rise in oil prices1 and the Spanish econo-
my’s high dependence on imported energy inputs account for 
the significant deterioration in the energy balance that year, to 
3.3% of GDP (0.8 pp more than in 2009). Also, the rapid re-
sponse of other imports to the modest pick-up in final demand 
in 2010 suggests that the traditional high income elasticity of 
Spanish imports has not changed significantly during the down-
turn, although this aspect should be analysed with caution.2 
The buoyancy of exports and the slight increase in private con-
sumption in 2010 – demand components with a greater import 
content than investment in construction – largely explain the 
recovery in purchases abroad that year (31% and 38% of the 
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Goods and services balance -6.7 -5.8 -2.2 -2.2 -1.6 -1.3
    Energy balance -3.2 -4.1 -2.5 -3.3 -4.2 -4.2
    Non-energy goods and services balance -3.5 -1.7 0.4 1.1 2.6 2.9
Income -2.6 -3.0 -2.6 -1.7 -2.0 -2.3
Other -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Net borrowing -9.6 -9.2 -5.1 -3.9 -3.7 -3.7
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Primary external balance -7.0 -6.2 -2.5 -2.2 -1.7 -1.4
1  THE NATION'S NET BORROWING 
SOURCES: Departamento de Aduanas, INE and Banco de España. 
% of GDP 
SOURCES: International Energy Agency, Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
a Banco de España calculations based on the Input-Output framework of the Spanish National Accounts.
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total, respectively)3 (see panel 1). All told, thanks to the strength 
of exports, boosted by the recovery in global trade and the 
gains in competitiveness made over the past two years, the 
trade surplus in non-energy goods and services increased in 
2010 to 1.1% of GDP.
The forecasts for 2011 and 2012 indicate that the external defi-
cit will narrow marginally, despite the fact that goods and ser-
vices exports are expected to continue to perform well. The 
main obstacles to more rapid adjustment are, firstly, dearer oil 
(strongly affected by the growing geopolitical instability in the 
Arab world) and, secondly, the increase in the income deficit, 
owing to the rise in interest rates in the presence of a large 
negative IIP. Here it is worth reviewing the different channels 
through which the Spanish economy might correct its external 
deficit more quickly. Three possible channels for this improve-
ment are gains in price-competitiveness, greater openness to 
foreign markets and a reduction in import dependence, in par-
ticular energy dependence.
Spanish monetary union membership makes it impossible to resort 
to competitive devaluations to make Spanish products cheaper on 
foreign markets, and make imports dearer. Accordingly, gains in 
price-competitiveness must be generated through productivity 
gains and price and wage moderation, which would be more read-
ily attainable if measures were introduced to improve the workings 
of the markets for goods, services and productive factors. That 
would further allow an increase in those Spanish companies able to 
penetrate new markets, boosting the beneficial effects of gains in 
competitiveness on exports. Against this background, the Quar-
terly Macroeconometric Model of the Banco de España (MTBE)4 
has been enlisted to simulate the effect on the external deficit of a 
1 pp reduction in relative export prices in both 2011 and 2012.5 As 
can be seen in panel 2, this measure would allow the external defi-
cit to be reduced by 0.5 pp of GDP in 2012.
Export performance depends not only on how competitive ex-
ports are, but also on the intensity of the demand for them. The 
diversification of Spanish exports towards products with higher 
value-added and towards more dynamic markets would have a 
positive impact on their performance. In fact, were Spanish firms 
to progressively increase their sales to emerging countries so 
that Spanish export markets grew at a similar rate to world mar-
kets in 2011 and 2012 (i.e. by 7.5%, instead of the 6% project-
ed), then according to the MTBE there would be an improvement 
in the nominal trade balance from the first year, which would 
reach 0.6 pp of GDP in 2012. To encourage the diversification of 
exports towards countries with dynamic demand, firms’ access 
to culturally and geographically distant markets needs to be fa-
cilitated, and their establishment in such markets needs to be 
strengthened.
Finally, limiting the high degree of oil dependence, which ties the 
performance of the external balance to fluctuations in the price of 
crude, is crucial. Spain’s oil imports per unit of GDP are much 
higher than for the euro area as a whole (see panel 2). Were this 
difference halved over the coming years, the energy deficit would 
be reduced by around half a percentage point of GDP. Hence, the 
measures necessary to permanently reduce such external energy 
dependence must not be delayed.6
To avoid the growing demand for goods and services imports ham-
pering the correction of the external deficit during upswings it 
would also be desirable to reduce the high level of dependence on 
imports of goods with higher value-added and technology. Were 
the long-term income elasticity of Spanish imports to be reduced 
to similar levels to those observed in the large euro area countries, 
the favourable impact on the external balance of the above simula-
tions would be much greater.
BOX 5.2CHANNELS FOR CORRECTING THE SPANISH EXTERNAL DEFICIT (cont’d)
2011 2012
1  Gains in price-competitiveness of 1% in 2011 and in 2012 0.3 0.5
2  Growth in Spain's export markets of 1.4% in 2011 and 1.6% in 2012 0.3 0.6
3  Progressive reduction of net oil imports 0.2 0.5
TOTAL IMPACT 0.7 1.6
2   CUMULATIVE IMPACT ON SPAIN'S EXTERNAL DEFICIT OF DIFFERENT MEASURES 
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
% of GDP 
3  These weights are based on the import content of each of the final de-
mand components estimated using 2005 input-output tables.
4  To perform this simulation, the price elasticity of exports was increased, 
in line with the estimates at a more disaggregated level, and the re-
sponse of imports to changes in final demand was moderated.
5  Given the weight of unit labour costs, mark-ups and inputs in the export price 
formation process, this reduction in prices could be achieved through a further 
decrease of 1.5 pp in ULCs and mark-ups in each one of these two years.
6 The plan to step up energy saving and efficiency approved by the Coun-
cil of Ministers on 4 March includes a number of proposals to achieve an 
estimated total saving on energy imports of €2.3 billion per annum.
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BOX 5.2CHANNELS FOR CORRECTING THE SPANISH EXTERNAL DEFICIT (cont’d)
The simulations performed show that progress towards the 
achievement of external balance, which includes laying the 
foundations for curbing and reversing the upward trend in the 
negative IIP, requires ambitious measures on a number of 
fronts, to achieve more efficient price and wage setting, to in-
crease the productivity of firms and to reduce the dependence 
of the Spanish economy on imports, especially of energy. The 
simulations performed show that even if there were a rapid im-
provement in all these areas, which would reduce the external 
deficit in 2011 and 2012, the primary component would only be 
balanced in the latter year, so that the IIP would barely fall. 
That said, apart from reducing the external deficit, the above-
mentioned measures would boost activity, which would have 
favourable effects on financial market confidence in the growth 
capacity of the Spanish economy and on the sustainability of 
foreign debt.
was reduced (by 0.6 pp of GDP, to 5.4%), owing to the behaviour of households and fi-
nancial institutions, which cancelled out the improvement in the financial position of non-
financial corporations (which recorded net lending for the first time since 1996). Accord-
ingly, the decline in the nation’s net borrowing reflected the fall in that of general 
government (by 1.9 pp of GDP, to 9.2%). The correction of the budget deficit in the next 
few years is expected to be offset by a decline in private-sector net lending, so that the 
nation’s net borrowing will hardly be reduced. In this respect, more sustained progress in 
reducing the external deficit would require higher savings ratios or lower investment by 
households and firms.
The increase in the nation’s net borrowing was not reflected in the international investment 
position, owing to the impact of valuation effects. These effects resulted from the deprecia-
tion of the euro vis-à-vis the pound sterling and the US dollar and the fall in the prices of 
Spanish financial assets relative to foreign ones (in particular equities), and they made the 
net debit position fall by 4 pp of GDP in 2010, to stand at around 87%. In a year character-
ised by recurring strains on financial markets, net borrowing was mainly covered through 
portfolio investment in long-term fixed income, as a result of both the decline in the hold-
ings abroad of this type of security by residents in Spain and of investment by non-resi-
dents in government debt. Spain’s foreign debt (a variable that includes liabilities vis-à-vis 
non-residents that give rise to debt or interest payments, i.e. claims on Spain) fell by 2.8% 
of GDP in 2010, to 164%.
Despite its net borrowing, the 
Spanish economy’s net 
external indebtedness 
declined in 2010, owing to the 
positive impact of valuation 
effects
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FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN
Financial developments in Spain in 2010 were strongly influenced by the tension in the 
euro area financial markets. The most difficult moments stemmed from the debt crises 
of Greece (between May and June) and Ireland (between November and December), 
which prompted requests for financial assistance by these two economies. For the 
reasons explained in detail in Chapter 1 of this Annual Report, Spain was among the 
countries most affected by the ensuing crisis of confidence: the imbalances accumu-
lated during the phase of expansion and some areas of vulnerability aggravated by the 
crisis (such as labour market rigidities or certain structural aspects of the functioning 
of savings banks) fuelled investors’ misgivings. These tensions led to significant tight-
ening of financing conditions in wholesale markets, where risk premia rose and funds 
became less readily available. The most strongly affected sectors were general govern-
ment and credit institutions, which are the ones that raise most funds in these markets 
(see Box 6.1).
To address the crisis, European and national authorities took measures in various areas.1 
In the national financial area, which is the subject of this chapter, it should be remembered, 
first, that in 2009 the FROB had already been set up for the dual purpose of providing a 
solution for the institutions that had ceased to be viable and of promoting the integration 
of viable institutions by expediting their restructuring.
Action was taken in 2010 to increase financial transparency and so restore the confidence 
of investors in the Spanish financial system. Noteworthy here was the performance and 
publication, in coordination with the other EU authorities, of banking system stress tests in 
July 2010, which in Spain were conducted on a large number of institutions (well above the 
50% required), including all savings banks. Moreover, the results were published in greater 
detail. Subsequently, first savings banks, and subsequently all other banks, had to make 
public their level of exposure to the real estate sector (at end-2009) and disclose express-
ly and in detail each type of transaction and the collateral taken, as well as the amount, 
broken down by category, of potentially troubled loans to the sector (non-performing, 
doubtful, standard under special surveillance and foreclosed).
In the regulatory field, summer 2010 saw a tightening of provisioning rules, which were al-
ready comparatively more stringent in Spain than in other countries. The new legislation 
hastened the requirement to provision all past-due loans, albeit recognising explicitly the 
value of collateral (after severe haircuts). Also, the requirements regarding foreclosed as-
sets and assets given in satisfaction of debt were tightened to encourage their prompt sale. 
At that time savings bank law was reformed to remedy the main structural weaknesses of 
this sub-sector. More specifically, the professional standards required of savings bank man-
agers and directors were tightened and new channels established for raising high quality 
funds, through, among other options, the indirect exercise of financial activity via a public 
limited company having the nature of a commercial bank and able to issue ordinary shares.
The resurgence of tensions at the end of the year was conducive to the approval of Royal 
Decree-Law 2/2011, which raised the minimum required core capital to 8% or 10% of risk-
weighted assets, depending on certain characteristics of the institution (percentage of 
1 Introduction
Euro area financial market 
tensions shaped financial 
developments in Spain
Given this situation, numerous 
measures were taken in the 
financial area
1  For more details, see also Box 1.2 of this Annual Report.
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The public debt crisis caused problems of market confidence in 
various euro area are economies, with Spain among the countries 
most strongly affected. This meant that, in the two main waves of 
the crisis (in spring, centred on Greece, and in autumn 2010, in 
Ireland), risk premia rose on the securities issued by resident sec-
tors and fundraising became more difficult, especially for credit 
institutions. In the two bouts of the crisis, the measures taken by 
Spanish and European authorities finally contributed to the easing 
of tensions.
In the case of general government, the misgivings of the markets 
were accompanied by the downgrading of Spanish sovereign debt 
BOX 6.1THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL MARKET TENSIONS ON RESIDENT SECTOR FINANCING
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SOURCES: BCE, JP Morgan and Banco de España.
a Arithmetic mean of eight institutions.
b Three-jve year asset swap spread.
c Including jnancing through resident, but not non-resident, subsidiaries.
d Differences between the interest rates applied in new loans with the projections derived from a an interbank rate transmission model and the cyclical position of 
the economy (projections made with origin in January 2009). 
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relaxation x 1/2  – % of institutions perceiving  considerable relaxation x 1. 
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(S&P downgraded it from AA+ to AA in April 2010, Fitch down-
graded from AAA to AA+ in May, Moody’s from Aaa to Aa1 in Sep-
tember 2010 and then to Aa2 in March 2011). As a result of the 
deterioration of investor confidence, the cost of issuance rose 
from below 3.9% for 10-year bonds in December 2009 to more 
than 5.4% a year later, while the spread with respect to the Ger-
man bund, which was barely 60 bp in December 2009, rose to 200 
bp in June and 290 bp in late November 2010 (see Chart 1). Sub-
sequently, this risk premium tended downward amidst high volatil-
ity, although it continues to be high and subject to significant fluc-
tuations.
Financial institutions, some of whose credit ratings were down-
graded, were also affected by problems of investor confidence. 
Thus, the cost of issuing mortgage covered bonds (these assets, 
since they are secured by the best collateral, are those that have 
been most readily accepted by investors since the beginning of 
the economic and financial crisis) has increased considerably and, 
as result, the spread over the swap interest rate has risen from 
around 60 bp in 2009 to more than 290 bp on average in the clos-
ing months of 2010 (see Chart 2). Credit default swap (CDS) 
premia also increased. As with general government securities, in 
the opening months of 2011 the risk premia on securities issued 
by financial institutions decreased, although they remain well 
above their levels of 2009.
The crisis not only increased market financing costs, but also, 
when tensions were at a peak, affected the amount of funds 
raised by credit institutions. Thus, at the most critical time of the 
first wave of tension (in May and June), gross issuance by these 
institutions was insufficient to cover the maturities of outstand-
ing debt (see Chart 3). Hence, like the banks of other European 
countries, they had to resort to the liquidity provided by the Eu-
rosystem, a peak of €130 bn being reached in July (see Chart 4). 
At end-2010 net issuance again turned negative amidst the ten-
sions accompanying the Irish crisis, but on this occasion banks 
were able to cover their funding needs through repos traded in 
international central counterparty clearing houses (such as LCH, 
Clearnet or Eurex Clearing), once some of them had become 
members of these systems which diversify the risks assumed by 
providers of funds. In this way, recourse to the Eurosystem was 
reduced.
The tighter fundraising conditions in the wholesale markets also 
lead to an increase in competition for deposits, which caused 
the interest rates on these transactions to rise during the year 
from 1.3% in February 2010 to 1.6% in March 2011. The in-
crease in costs was not passed through immediately to house-
hold and corporate loans, since these had some leeway to ab-
sorb the shock. However, the increase in the margins applied to 
these transactions from the beginning of 2011 cannot be ex-
plained by their ordinary behaviour, indicating that a gradual 
pass-through seems to have commenced (see Chart 5. Hence, if 
the interest rates on new loans are compared with the projec-
tions derived from an interbank rate transmission model and the 
cyclical position of the Spanish economy, it can be seen that, 
both for house purchase loans to households and for loans to 
non-financial corporations, the rates remained in line with ex-
pectations for most of the year, but from early 2011 there was an 
increase in financial costs not explained by the model.1 Also, 
according to the bank lending survey, credit institutions slightly 
tightened credit standards in 2010 Q2, mainly as a result of the 
effect of market tensions, although subsequently they seem to 
have held them unchanged until the opening months of 2011, 
when they again tightened them in the household financing seg-
ment (see Chart 6).
Turning to non-financial corporations, there was also an increase 
in the cost of raising funds in the markets, the channel used by the 
largest firms, although less so than by financial firms and general 
government (see Chart 2). Unquestionably, the high international 
diversification of non-financial corporations contributed to them 
being less affected by the financial tensions.
Although tensions eased in the opening months of 2011, spreads 
and risk premia continue to be high. The persistence or worsening 
of this situation would entail some risks for the Spanish economy. 
Thus, in the case of general government, the higher interest rates 
demanded by the market, although they slowly pass through to 
the debt burden (at the pace that maturing debt is rolled over), 
exert continuous pressure on public finances. This weakens the 
net interest income of banks because the higher cost of liabilities 
cannot be passed through to loans that have already been grant-
ed. Lastly, both non-financial corporations and households may 
have to face additional tightening of the credit standards for new 
loans, since financial institutions will have to pass through to their 
customers the higher cost of funding. Furthermore, if in extreme 
situations the difficulties of some institutions in refinancing their 
debt on the markets become more serious, the need to make a 
more thorough adjustment to their balance sheets may lead to 
stricter credit standards.
BOX 6.1THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL MARKET TENSIONS ON RESIDENT SECTOR FINANCING (cont’d)
1  For more detailed information on the equations used in this projection 
exercise, see Nieto and Nieto (2011), La transmisión de los tipos de in-
terés de mercado a los tipos de interés bancarios en España.
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capital stock or voting rights held by third parties and relative weight of wholesale funding) 
and empowered the FROB to recapitalise those institutions failing to comply with these 
new requirements on their own.
In addition, the process of restructuring of the Spanish financial system initiated in the 
previous year was speeded up, so that by the cut-off date of this Annual Report the num-
ber of savings banks had been reduced from 45 to 18 institutions or groups. This process 
of integration has been accompanied by the restructuring of the institutions involved. The 
consolidation of the financial system, once it is operationally complete, will entail a sig-
nificant decrease in capacity, which will help to reduce the excess size accumulated dur-
ing the long expansionary stage. The implications of these changes are discussed in Sec-
tion 4 of this chapter, although other regular publications of the Banco de España, such as 
the Financial Stability Report and the Report on Banking Supervision in Spain, discuss in 
greater detail the situation of the financial system and the restructuring and recapitalisa-
tion strategy.
Since end-2010, Spain has tended to decouple from the countries most seriously affected 
by the market tension. The request for financial assistance by the Portuguese authorities 
in April 2011, and the deterioration in Portugal’s sovereign spread which preceded it, did 
not, in fact, have an impact on Spanish financial variables comparable to that caused by 
the Greek and Irish crises. In any event, risk premia remain at high levels and subject to 
fluctuations linked to the varying market perception of the various events relating to the 
development and management of the sovereign debt crisis in the various countries.
Against this background, the activity of credit institutions has been subject to significant 
pressure. First, the sovereign debt crisis led to a significant rise in their funding costs, both 
on the wholesale markets and, indirectly, in funds obtained through deposits, because of 
the heightened competition for alternative sources of funds. Second, they have continued 
absorbing the losses derived from the impairment of assets relating to construction and 
real estate development, a segment in which doubtless asset ratios have continued to 
grow rapidly (see Chart 6.1).
The cost of bank financing to households and firms has remained low. Since mid-2010, 
however, it has tended to increase as a result of progressive pass-through of the higher 
cost of financial institutions’ liabilities to loan interest rates. This pass-through is not yet 
complete, so further increases will probably be seen.
Meanwhile, credit standards remained stringent and, according to the bank lending survey 
(BLS), tightened further during the past year, albeit moderately, and also during the first 
three months of this year in the household lending segment.
Against this background, household debt remained practically stagnant in 2010 and has 
contracted slightly since the beginning of 2011. In firms, bank credit decreased in real 
estate-related activities, and in other areas showed practically zero or slightly positive 
growth.
Despite the stagnation of household liabilities in recent years, the debt ratio scarcely de-
creased from the high levels of mid-2008 due to income sluggishness (see Box 6.2). The 
notable weight of debt for house purchase and its long repayment period also help to 
explain the slowness with which household leverage is being corrected. Meanwhile, 
wealth again decreased in 2010, basically due to the loss in value of the real estate com-
… which contributed, along 
with others adopted at 
national and European level, 
to easing the tension, although 
risk premia remain at high 
levels and subject to high 
volatility
Credit institutions have come 
under significant pressure…
… and, since early 2011, they 
have begun to pass through 
the higher cost of liabilities to 
loans
The debt of households and 
non-financial corporations 
continued to show little 
dynamism…
… although debt ratios 
scarcely changed due to the 
behaviour of income
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The notable increase in household and non-financial corporation 
liabilities between the mid-1990s and the outbreak of the crisis 
took the debt of both these sectors to historically high levels, 
above those in the rest of the euro area. Household debt currently 
stands at nearly 125% of gross disposable income, above the 
euro area average (98%) and similar to the ratio in the United 
States (one of the 19%), although below that in the United King-
dom (151%) (see Chart 1). Since the highs of mid-2008, which 
practically tripled those of the mid-1990s, the decrease in this in-
dicator has been very slight (scarcely 5 pp). Two factors explain 
the slowness of this process: first, the weakness of household in-
come in this period (denominator of the ratio), and, second, the 
long debt repayment periods of house purchase loans.1 These 
loans constitute the bulk of the financing of this sector in Spain, 
and this, even in the current situation of little new lending, makes 
BOX 6.2DELEVERAGING OF THE NON-FINANCIAL PRIVATE SECTOR
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1  On average, in Spain the residual maturity of collateralised loans is 14 
years.
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it difficult to reduce liabilities quickly. Deleveraging must thus be a 
process sustained over time, the duration of which will depend, 
among other things, on the economy’s capacity to recover.
To assess the implications of the level of leverage, it is important 
to analyse the final purpose of the liabilities. In this respect, in 
Spain the higher household debt compared with other euro area 
countries can be traced to the residential mortgage component, 
since the ratio consumer credit is much the same fraction of gross 
disposable income as in other euro area economies. This, in turn, 
is related to the greater propensity to invest in housing in Spain 
(which reflects the greater preference for ownership and the popu-
larity of second homes), with the consequent higher levels of 
wealth, even after deducting debt (see Chart 2). Unquestionably, 
the fact that a large part of these liabilities is secured by assets 
tends to mitigate some sources of vulnerability associated with 
such debt. The greater wealth of households would, in principle, 
allow them to save a smaller proportion of their income and to 
spend less on rental than the households of other economies with 
a lower percentage of owner occupancy (see Chart 3). However, 
this situation is not exempt from significant risks, for the following 
reasons. First, although there are no homogeneous statistics to 
allow a comparison of the total debt burden of households, all the 
evidence indicates that, as a proportion of disposable income, the 
debt burden in Spain is higher than the euro area average, even if 
rental expense is added in, which reduces the funds available for 
consumption. Second, since wealth is more concentrated in prop-
erty ownership than in other countries, it tends to be less liquid, 
and thus less available for use in coping with unforeseen situa-
tions, and, in addition, it is more sensitive to changes in house 
prices, thus showing sharper negative wealth effects in situations 
like the present one of declining values. Lastly, a high level of debt 
increases vulnerability to interest rate rises (given the marked pre-
dominance of floating rate loans in Spain) or to adverse shocks in 
income (such as, for example, job loss). In this respect, the recent 
crisis has increased the percentage of households with debts 
which, as a result of the rise in unemployment, are in a more fragile 
position, which has naturally obliged them to cut spending more 
than if they did not have those financial obligations.
In the case of firms, corporate indebtedness in Spain, measured in 
terms of gross operating surplus, is higher than in the euro area as 
a whole and than in the United States and in the United Kingdom 
(see Chart 4). As with households, the scant dynamism of busi-
ness profits has constrained the correction of the debt to income 
ratio in the last few years (since 2008 it has decreased by 12 pp, 
scarcely 1% of its value).
The aggregate corporate debt indicator conceals, however, a high 
sectoral dispersion. Thus, Chart 5 shows that in most areas of 
activity the debt to income ratio is higher than in the rest of the 
euro area, the difference being extremely marked in some of them. 
In the case of real estate activities and construction, which ac-
count for a significant part of corporate debt in Spain (practically 
half of bank loans, the main financing instrument used by firms). 
The high volume of debt in these cases basically reflects the am-
ple stock of unsold real estate assets. As this stock is progres-
sively absorbed, these liabilities will tend to be transferred to the 
agents which acquired the real estate (mainly households), al-
though maybe some of these outstanding loans will end up being 
written off. All this will tend to reduce the debt ratio. Indeed, it is in 
firms of this type where debt adjustments have been sharpest in 
the last two years.
Also in manufacturing and in hotels and restaurants, the levels of 
debt are very high in comparison with those in other euro area 
countries, although, in these cases, the divergences have in-
creased particularly sharply since the outbreak of the crisis due to 
the unfavourable trend in income. It can therefore be expected that 
a portion of the deleveraging will take place through the recovery of 
business surpluses. In fact, in terms of balance sheet size, the dif-
ferences from other euro area economies are not so marked (see 
Chart 6). By contrast, in other sectors (wholesale and retail trade 
and transport, storage and communication), the leverage ratio is 
similar to or lower than in the rest of the euro area. In any event, the 
high corporate indebtedness detracts from the dynamism of in-
vestment because it makes it harder for firms to expand activity 
with debt financing, while the financial obligation to pay interest 
and repay principal reduce the funds available for expenses.
The deleveraging of the private sector initiated in the last few years is far 
from having concluded. The most important contribution to this pro-
cess will come from the recovery of income. Therefore, actions taken 
to boost economic growth are the best way to quickly complete the 
process which will prevent the high debt from weakening spending, 
especially in a setting in which interest rates will tend to increase.
BOX 6.2DELEVERAGING OF THE NON-FINANCIAL PRIVATE SECTOR (cont’d)
ponent as house prices fell by 3.5% in the year as a whole. With the 2011 Q1 figure, which 
showed an increased rate of contraction, the cumulative fall is 15% (20% in real terms) 
from the high at the beginning of 2008. It should also be kept in mind that there is a no-
table dispersion in wealth across the sector, so the aggregate indicators fail to capture 
the deterioration that may have taken place in the groups in a more fragile position, such 
as, for example, unemployed debtors. Also, the prolongation of the crisis and the pattern 
of slow recovery are eroding the resources that households can deploy to deal with the 
deterioration of their situation.
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In the case of non-financial corporations, the recovery of business profits, the scant dyna-
mism of borrowing and the lower average cost of outstanding debt gave rise to a slight 
decrease in the debt ratio and the associated debt burden. In any event, the leverage of the 
business sector as a whole remains high, although the dispersion within the sector is high.
The fiscal consolidation programme implemented by general government was instrumen-
tal in slowing the sector’s liabilities following the marked deterioration in public finances in 
2009, although they continued to grow rapidly. This, together with the scant economic 
dynamism, led to an increase in the public debt ratio and in the debt burden to GDP ratio.
Although financial market tensions have eased in the early months of 2011, the continuing 
high risk premia mean that the possibility of a worsening cannot be ruled out. This would 
be particularly injurious for an economy which continues to depend on the savings of the 
rest of the world. The higher cost of funding for institutions, the economic situation of 
some borrowers and financial institutions’ exposure to the real estate sector continue to 
pose significant challenges. Therefore, the actions aimed at strengthening the economy’s 
ability to grow and those designed to underpin the soundness of the financial system con-
tinue to be essential not only to restore the GDP growth rates needed to complete the 
convergence of the Spanish economy with the standards of the more developed European 
countries, but also to complete the process of recovery of investor confidence initiated at 
the beginning of the year.
The recovery of growth, moreover, is essential also for correcting the high leverage of the 
non-financial private sector, which has barely been corrected since the peaks recorded at 
the beginning of the crisis, and which continues to hinder the expansion of demand, since 
it reduces the scope for financing consumption and investment through borrowing and 
consumes a large part of the disposable income of the sector.
Spanish financial market prices were strongly affected by the tensions arising from the 
sovereign debt crisis. The yields on general government securities rose and the spreads 
over the German bund widened (see Box 6.1). The rise affected all terms, although it was 
somewhat sharper in the short- and medium-term tranches of the yield curve (up to three 
years), where yields increased by nearly two percentage points (pp) in 2010 (see Chart 6.2). 
Also, funding costs of financial institutions increased as a reflection of investors’ doubts 
regarding the situation of some savings banks. By contrast, the interest rates on securities 
issued by non-financial corporations increased more moderately, benefiting from the broad 
international diversification of the firms which use this type of instruments for financing.
The period of highest tension came at the end of November. Subsequently, the risk premia 
of resident issuers tended to decrease. The behaviour of volatility was not unrelated to the 
measures taken by Spanish and European authorities. In any event, these premia remain 
high and subject to major fluctuations.
The turmoil also spread to the stock markets, where prices fell and volatility rose, ending 
the favourable trend seen since March 2009. At the time of greatest debt market tension 
(at the end of November), the IBEX 35 was down by 22.4% on its end-2009 level. This 
performance was worse than those of the EUROSTOXX 50, the EU stock exchange index, 
which at that date was down by 10.6%, and the US S&P 500, which was up by 5.9%. 
Among the sectors showing the sharpest falls were real estate (55%) and finance (33.6%). 
Subsequently, this trend reversed, and stock markets rose in most sectors, although vola-
tility continued to be high.
The debt and debt burden of 
general government continued 
to rise
If the recent economic policy 
actions continue in the same 
vein as in the past, the 
recovery of investor 
confidence will firm, although 
risks persist…
… and the high private sector 
indebtedness continues to 
hinder the recovery of 
spending
2 The Spanish financial 
markets
2.1 MARKET PRICES
The sovereign debt crisis has 
raised the financing costs of 
resident issuers in the fixed 
income markets…
… and has caused stock 
market prices to fall and 
volatility to rise
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Net issuance of bonds by resident sectors fell sharply to €74 bn, compared with €190 bn in 
the previous year (see Table 6.1). This was explained basically by the decrease in net borrow-
ing by general government and credit institutions, although it was also true that the tighter 
financing conditions in these markets did not favour the use of this means of financing.
The bulk of net bond issuance was by general government (€76 bn). This amount, which 
represented a decrease of €51 bn with respect to 2009, resulted from an increase in the 
volume issued by regional governments and a decrease in issuance by State government, 
these variations being in line with the changes in the borrowing needs of these two sub-
sectors. Despite the tensions prevailing on financial markets and the downgrades in Span-
ish debt ratings by rating agencies, the Spanish bond auctions achieved ample coverage 
(demand to allotted funds) ratios, albeit at a progressively higher cost. Of the €63 bn is-
sued by the State, more than 93% was medium and long term, meaning that the average 
life of outstanding debt was lengthened from 6.4 to 6.6 years, thus contributing to reduce 
the refinancing risk.
As a result of credit institutions’ lower funding needs and of the wholesale market ten-
sions, monetary financial institutions and their resident and non-resident subsidiaries 
made net redemptions of bonds amounting to €15 bn. There was a shift towards instru-
ments involving lower risk. Thus, issues of paper guaranteed by the State and of covered 
2.2 THE PRIMARY MARKETS
Net issuance of marketable 
debt securities decreased 
appreciably…
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bonds amounted, in net terms, to €12 bn and €13 bn, respectively, while gross placements 
of other instruments were less than maturities. Against a background in which the securiti-
sation market continues to be inactive and in which institutions hold an ample volume of 
collateral, the balance of the securities issued by financial vehicle corporations (asset-
backed bonds) fell for the first time in many years. By contrast, net issuance by non-finan-
cial corporations turned positive again (€10 bn, including that by resident and non-resident 
subsidiaries). The higher net borrowing by firms of this type (basically large multinationals), 
whose business is highly diversified internationally, and the fact that these have been less 
affected by the financial turmoil explain the greater dynamism of this primary market seg-
ment compared with that of financial firms.
Equity issuance by both credit institutions and non-financial corporations increased, 
amounting in total to €15 bn, up 45% on 2009. However, it should be noted that this 
growth was heavily influenced by two specific transactions (one in each sector).
Secondary market activity varied across segments (see Table 6.2). In public debt, the vol-
ume traded remained somewhat below €19,000 bn, combining an increase in spot transac-
tions, which grew by nearly 90% despite momentary liquidity problems following the out-
breaks of tension in May and November, and a decrease in repo and sell/buy-back 
transactions. The fall in the latter is partly associated with problems of investor confidence 
since, when tensions peaked, investors perceived a high risk in bilateral repo transactions 
with Spanish institutions, believing there was a high negative correlation between the risk of 
default by financial institutions and the value of the asset used as collateral in these transac-
tions (Spanish Treasury debt). In the second half of the year some institutions begin to oper-
… but, by contrast, issuance 
of equity securities increased
2.3 SECONDARY MARKET 
ACTIVITY
Secondary market trading varied 
depending on the segment
2007 2008 2009 2010
NET ISSUANCE BY RESIDENTS 268.3 145.9 199.7 89.5
    FIXED INCOME 222.4 131.1 189.5 74.7
        Monetary jnancial institutions 78.2 -26.9 39.6 7.8
        Other jnancial intermediaries 146.5 104.6 21.5 -10.9
        Of which:
            Financial vehicle corporations 106.9 95.0 14.9 -5.9
            Subsidiaries of monetary knancial institutions 34.5 7.4 -8.8 -12.2
            Subsidiaries of non-knancial corporations 4.5 3.0 14.5 7.4
        Non-jnancial corporations 2.0 1.9 0.7 1.3
        Central government -4.7 50.2 119.4 63.2
        Regional and local government 0.4 1.4 8.4 13.2
    EQUITIES 46.0 14.8 10.2 14.8
        Monetary jnancial institutions 12.0 10.0 3.0 6.6
        Other jnancial intermediaries 3.5 1.4 0.4 0.1
        Non-jnancial corporations 30.5 3.4 6.8 8.1
PUBLIC OFFERINGS 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.5
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
    Net issuance by foreign subsidiaries 9.5 12.9 -2.0 -8.9
        Financial institutions 8.2 14.3 -3.4 -10.6
        Non-jnancial corporations 1.3 -1.4 1.4 1.7
ISSUANCE AND PUBLIC OFFERINGS OF MARKETABLE SECURITIES TABLE 6.1
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
 
€bn 
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ate in repo markets with central counterparties clearing houses, in which the supposed link 
is substantially diluted. In this way, trading was channelled partly through foreign trading 
platforms (such as BrokerTec or Eurex Repo), instead of through the Spanish debt market.
The volumes traded on the AIAF bond market remained around the levels of 2009. The 
decrease in spot transactions was offset by the increase in repo and sell/buy-back trans-
actions. A major feature was the fall in covered bond and asset-backed bond transactions, 
which had grown notably in the previous two years. By contrast, the downward trend in 
equity market trading volumes since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 was inter-
rupted. The volumes of spot and derivatives transactions moved up above €1,000 bn and 
€1,200 bn, respectively. However, this increase also reflected, at least in part, the climb in 
average prices, which raised the unit value of transactions.
The nation’s net borrowing decreased again last year, falling, in 12-month cumulated 
terms, to a figure equivalent to 3.9% of GDP (compared with 5.1% at end-2009, as shown 
by Chart 6.3). The behaviour of financial flows vis-à-vis the rest of the world evidences the 
considerable difficulties that the Spanish economy has had in raising funds abroad as a 
result of the euro area sovereign debt crisis.
In line with the lower borrowing requirements and the greater difficulty in raising funds as a 
result of the sovereign debt crisis, the funds received from abroad decreased again in 2010, 
being limited to a figure equivalent to 0.6% of GDP, down from the 4.9% recorded in the 
previous year and well below the 23.7% reached in 2007 (see Table 6.3). Capital inflows 
were channelled mainly through instruments issued by non-financial corporations and gen-
eral government, specifically loans from the rest of the world and shares, in the first case, 
and fixed income securities, in the second case. The funds raised by the latter instrument 
by general government amounted to 2% of GDP. By contrast, the volume of securities is-
sued by financial institutions held by the rest of the world decreased (by 1.1% of GDP in the 
case of credit institutions, and by 2.4% of GDP for other financial institutions including fi-
3 External investment in 
and financing of the 
Spanish economy
The financial tensions made it 
more difficult to raise funds 
abroad
Borrowing requirements were 
met through capital inflows 
channelled mainly in the form 
of instruments issued by 
general government and non-
financial corporations…
2007 2008 2009 2010
PUBLIC-DEBT BOOK-ENTRY MARKET (a) 22,664 19,944 18,522 18,552
    Spot 3,177 2,202 2,470 4,635
    Repos and sell/buy-back agreements 19,193 17,477 15,903 13,761
    Forward 294 265 150 156
AIAF FIXED-INCOME MARKET 900 2,401 3,692 3,658
    Commercial paper 482 577 529 383
    Covered bonds and asset-backed securities 329 1,740 2,849 2,413
    Other 90 83 314 862
STOCK EXCHANGE: FIXED INCOME 90 80 75 67
STOCK EXCHANGE: EQUITIES 1,670 1,245 898 1,038
MEFF DERIVATIVES MARKETS 1,451 1,073 710 1,263
    IBEX 35  1,384 989 622 1,158
    Equity derivatives 68 84 88 105
 TURNOVER ON SECONDARY AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS TABLE  6.2
€bn 
SOURCES: Bolsas y Mercados Españoles, Federation of European Stock Exchanges and Banco de España.
a Only includes transactions in State securities.
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nancial vehicle corporations). There was also a slight decrease in the net debit position in 
the interbank market, along with an accompanying change in its composition. In particular, 
flows in the form of collateralised transactions increased considerably, being favoured by the 
trading in central counterparty clearing houses, and uncollateralised net transactions fell.
The nation’s net borrowing was covered, lastly, by the reduction of external assets held by 
residents (3.3% of GDP). Noteworthy was the contraction in holdings of securities other 
than shares by an amount equivalent to 7% of GDP, in net terms, effected mainly by insti-
tutional investors and credit institutions. By contrast, there was an increase in acquisitions 
of shares and other equity securities (2.3% of GDP). In this line, the downward path fol-
lowed over the past two years by Spanish foreign direct investment was interrupted and 
this item increased by 0.9 pp to 1.6% of GDP, an amount similar to that represented by the 
direct investment of non-residents in Spain, which also increased by nearly 1 pp.
Despite the net negative sign of the nation’s financial transactions, the movements in prices 
(upwards in assets and downwards in liabilities) meant that the balance of the nation’s net 
liabilities to the rest of the world decreased by nearly 4 pp to around 85% of GDP, according 
to the Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy (see Chart 6.3). External assets amount-
ed to 130% of GDP, while gross liabilities were 215% (165% relating to gross debt and 50% 
to equity). Sectoral analysis shows that financial institutions had the largest net debit posi-
tion vis-à-vis the rest of the world, followed by general government (amounting in the first 
case to 52% of GDP and in the second to 25.4%). The net debit position of the non-finan-
cial private sector is close to 13% of GDP, down 4 pp on the previous year.
The effects of the crisis in Spain and the tensions in financial markets set in motion a 
merger and restructuring process in financial institutions which particularly affected 
savings banks. The objectives of this process, furthered by the creation of the FROB in 
… and also through the 
reduction of external assets 
held by residents
The balance of the nation’s net 
liabilities decreased slightly
4 Spanish financial 
intermediaries
4.1 CREDIT INSTITUTIONS2
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2  For more details of the situation of Spanish credit institutions, see the Report on Banking Supervision in Spain and 
the Financial Stability Report of the Banco de España, the specialised publications of the Banco de España which 
discuss these subjects in greatest depth.
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2007 2008 2009 2010
NET FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS -9.6 -9.2 -5.1 -3.9
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS (ASSETS) 14.1 0.7 -0.2 -3.3
    Gold and SDRs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
    Cash and deposits 1.4 -1.3 -3.2 -1.4
    Of which:
        Interbank, credit institutions (a) 4.2 -0.5 -1.7 -1.3
    Securities other than shares 1.6 1.3 0.0 -6.9
    Of which:
        Credit institutions 1.8 1.5 1.2 -3.0
        Institutional investors 0.0 -1.3 -0.5 -3.3
    Shares and other equity 8.8 1.7 1.6 2.4
    Of which:
        Non-knancial corporations 6.6 3.0 0.1 2.4
        Institutional investors -1.1 -1.6 0.3 0.8
    Loans 1.2 0.8 0.2 0.4
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS (LIABILITIES) 23.7 9.9 4.9 0.6
    Deposits 6.7 8.0 -0.5 -0.5
    Of which:
        Interbank, credit institutions (a) 6.7 6.2 0.7 -7.3
        Repos, credit institutions (b) 0.1 0.2 0.1 5.7
        Interbank, BE (intra-system position) -0.3 1.9 -0.8 0.2
    Securities other than shares 8.1 -2.7 3.8 -1.5
    Of which:
        General government -1.3 1.1 5.4 2.0
        Credit institutions 3.6 -1.9 1.1 -1.1
        Other non-monetary knancial institutions 5.8 -1.9 -2.6 -2.4
    Shares and other equity 4.6 3.2 1.1 0.8
    Of which:
        Non-knancial corporations 4.7 2.4 0.3 1.1
    Loans 3.1 2.9 0.3 1.2
    Other, net (c) 0.2 0.2 -1.1 -1.7
MEMORANDUM ITEMS:
    Spanish direct investment abroad 9.5 4.7 0.7 1.6
    Foreign direct investment in Spain 4.5 4.8 0.6 1.5
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATION  
Cumulative four-quarter data 
TABLE 6.3 
% of GDP 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Excluding repos. 
b Including transactions with central counterparty clearing houses. 
c Includes, along with other items, the asset-side caption showing insurance technical reserves and the neSkow of trade credit.
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2009, are various. First, after a period of vigorous growth in banking activity, the system 
as a whole had reached a size which, although commensurate with the relative weight 
reached in other developed economies, was excessive in a scenario characterised by a 
moderating trend in the growth rate of financial activity and by the need for deleveraging 
of a significant portion of Spanish households and firms. The concentration of financial 
institutions also aims to achieve synergies and economies of scale to make for more 
efficient financial intermediation. A larger size of the resulting groups should make it 
easier to achieve additional increases in efficiency and to access the capital markets. 
Along these same lines, the exercise of savings bank financial activity by limited liability 
companies licensed as banks broadens the range of instruments accessible to the lat-
ter, enabling them to issue ordinary shares. Finally, the process under way contributes 
to strengthening the solvency of the sub-sector and to improving its management ca-
pacity, since some of the more vulnerable institutions are now being absorbed by others 
in a stronger position.
Although the process of concentration is not limited only to savings banks, most of the 
concentration transactions are taking place in this sub-sector. This is basically because of 
the more pronounced imbalances accumulated in the phase preceding the crisis: faster 
balance sheet growth and excess capacity, greater need to raise funds through the issu-
ance of securities on wholesale markets instead of traditional instruments and a higher 
exposure to the real estate development sector. Nor should it be overlooked that these 
institutions were characterised by a singular corporate structure which hindered the issu-
ance of high-quality capital instruments (voting shares) in a crisis situation, when the vol-
ume of internally generated funds decreases considerably. Recent events have also dem-
onstrated the need for substantial improvements in the governance of these institutions.
As shown in the top left panel of Chart 6.4, the processes of concentration under way have 
involved most of the savings bank sector, although not all savings banks have made use 
of government funds. In terms of the credit system as a whole, the savings banks involved 
in mergers with assistance from the FROB represent somewhat more than 20% of total 
assets, while those that have undertaken processes of this type without the use of govern-
ment funds represent 11% of the total.
In this process up to December 2010, the FROB had committed a total of €11,559 million 
(see top right panel of Chart 6.4). On 10 March 2011, the Banco de España made public the 
additional amounts to be raised by the various Spanish credit institutions to comply with 
the new capital requirements approved at the beginning of 2011 on the basis of their situa-
tion at 31 December 2010. In all, they amount to a €15,152 million, of which €14,077 million 
related to savings banks. Subsequently, the initial project of the Banco Base institutional 
protection scheme (IPS), for which assistance of €1,493 million had been earmarked (this 
amount was included in the aforementioned €11,559 million), was aborted and the two in-
stitutions or groups resulting from that rupture designed their recapitalisation strategies to 
meet the new needs derived from the provisions of Royal Decree-Law 2/2011. This entailed 
some changes with respect to the situation in March. In any event, the amount of the sec-
tor’s recapitalisation needs finally covered by the FROB will depend on the private funds 
raised by institutions and on their possible strategic decisions on asset sales or concentra-
tion transactions. However, in any event, the final outcome will be that Spanish intermediar-
ies will find themselves, in September of this year (or March 2012 at the latest) with a mini-
mum core capital3 ratio of 8% or 10%, depending on the characteristics of the institution.
2010 saw a significant 
concentration in Spanish 
savings banks
The process has been 
supported only partially by 
government aid and 
accompanied by the 
recapitalisation of institutions
3  Defined in Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 of 4 March 2011. For more details, see Box 1.2 of this Annual Report.
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Although the process is still under way, the changes in 2010 entailed a significant transfor-
mation of the Spanish savings bank sector. In terms of the size of institutions and of their 
degree of concentration (see the bottom panels of Chart 6.4), it brought an increase in 
average size from €28 bn at end-2008 to €70 bn two years later. The number of savings 
banks decreased from 45 to 18 savings bank institutions or groups.
Institutionally, the process took the form of both mergers (seven operations) and the for-
mation of IPSs (five operations). The latter necessarily involve the formation of a commer-
cial bank which acts as the central institution of the IPS, carrying out its financial activity 
and to which the bulk of the group’s assets have been or will shortly be transferred. In this 
way, practically all financial activity is transferred to institutions which are limited liability 
companies, thereby altering the previous corporate structure. This movement was 
strengthened by the reform of the savings bank law and by the capital reinforcement re-
quirements laid down by Royal Decree-Law 2/2011.
The savings bank law reform included in Royal Decree-Law 11/2010 of 9 July 2010 
made it possible for all savings banks to indirectly exercise their financial activity 
through a commercial bank. Subsequently, Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 accentuated this 
trend by encouraging the entry of private investors in the capital of institutions. The in-
tention here is to foster more professional management, increase the role of market 
discipline and, at the same time, make it easier to raise additional top-quality capital 
All this has brought a 
substantial change in the 
structure of the savings bank 
sector
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Data drawn from consolidated balance sheets as at 31.12.2010. Situation at the beginning of May 2011.
b Estimated amounts, based on data at 31.12.2010, required to comply with Royal Decree-Law, according to the BE publication of 10 March 2011.
c Consolidated data. Those relating to December 2010 take into account the group structure at the beginning of May 2011. 
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where necessary. The Royal Decree-Law also increases the minimum level of core cap-
ital (10%, as against 8%) for those institutions that have not distributed to third parties 
equity securities representing 20% or more of their capital and raise a significant por-
tion of their funds in the wholesale financial markets. Compliance with the first part of 
these requirements requires the existence of an institution legally organised as a limited 
liability company which can issue these securities, leaving to one side the possibility of 
issuing non-voting equity units (“cuotas participativas”) of savings banks. In addition, it 
is made compulsory to choose the option of indirect exercise of financial activity in or-
der to be eligible for the new assistance from the FROB, which in all cases will take the 
form of acquisition of ordinary shares of the group. These acquisitions will necessarily 
be temporary and the related securities will be resold to private investors and within a 
maximum of five years, whereupon the final result will be the same.
On 14 April of this year the Banco de España approved the various strategies which the 
institutions involved had drawn up to meet the new capital requirements. Two weeks later, 
on 28 April and within the legally stipulated time period, those savings banks or groups of 
savings banks which have chosen the FROB as the primary source of capital funding to 
meet these new requirements submitted their plans.
Against this background, the consolidated total assets of Spanish institutions as a whole 
increased slightly as a result of the growth of business abroad, since that in Spain re-
mained practically stagnant, for the second year running (see Table 6.4).4 Moreover, in 
December the number of branches and staff in Spain had decreased by 6% and 5%, re-
spectively, from their peaks in 2008, and the institutions involved in merger processes with 
FROB support recorded the provisions needed to cover the cost of the agreed headcount 
and branch network reductions over the next few years.
The credit granted to the resident private sector also shrank slightly. According to the bank 
lending survey, this seems to be due to sluggish demand and shrinking supply. Demand 
remained basically stagnant in the case of non-financial corporations, fluctuated through-
out the year with no clear trend in respect of household residential mortgages and per-
formed somewhat more negatively in consumer credit and other lending to households. 
The credit standards for the approval of new loans continued to be st rict and generally 
tightened slightly in 2010 Q2, mainly as a result of wholesale financial market tensions, 
although subsequently they remained steady. In the early months of 2011 they tightened 
further in the household credit segment.
The interest rates applied in new loans to households and non-financial corporations re-
mained low. However, from the beginning of this year institutions have begun to pass 
through more actively the higher cost of their liabilities to their lending rates. This has re-
sulted in a rise of between 55 basis points (bp) and 115 bp in the cost of bank financing to 
households and firms between June 2010 and March 2011.
The difficulty in raising funds on the wholesale markets and their higher cost meant that 
the institutions temporarily had to resort more to the Eurosystem in spring and summer. 
Subsequently, such recourse to the Eurosystem decreased to account for only 1.4% of the 
consolidated total balance sheet at December 2010 (against 2% a year earlier) and have 
continued to decrease during this year. Their place has basically been taken by funds from 
Total assets in Spain remained 
stagnant and the number of 
branches and staff decreased
There was a decrease in the 
volume of credit granted
… and the cost rose 
moderately
...partly influenced by the 
financial market tensions
4  Owing to the restructuring carried out in the last few days of the year, the figures for 2010 had to be adjusted to make 
them comparable with those for 2009. This comparison must therefore be interpreted with caution.
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repo transactions carried out through foreign central counterparties. The net funds raised 
in this way amounted to around €60 bn at end-2010, against a value of practically zero at 
the beginning of that year. Nevertheless, the market tensions also prompted fiercer com-
petition for deposits from the public, the cost of which increased significantly (54 bp be-
tween December 2009 and March 2011, in time deposits).
Credit institutions also recorded significant write-downs. Thus, while the growth rate of 
doubtful assets moderated (from year-on-year growth of 48% in 2009 to 15% in 2010), 
provisions continued to increase at a rate of more than 25%. In 2010 additional provisions 
were charged to cover losses on foreclosed real estate and other commitments relating to 
Cumulative provisions and 
write-downs are high
Dec-09 Dec-10 Y-o-y rate (%) Dec-09 Dec-10 Y-o-y rate (%)
MAIN BALANCE SHEET ITEMS (% of TA)
TOTAL ASSETS (€bn) 3,739.9 3,816.5 2.0 3,142.4 3,122.0 -0.6
    Credit 64.1 63.4 0.8 61.5 61.2 -1.2
    Of which: resident private sector in Spain 56.1 55.4 -1.8
        Debt securities 13.5 12.8 -3.4 13.2 12.7 -4.6
        Other assets 22.4 23.8 8.8 25.3 26.1 2.6
LIABILITIES
    Banco de España and other central banks 3.3 2.5 -23.2 3.6 2.4 -33.7
    Interbank deposits (b) 14.2 15.6 12.0 17.6 19.6 10.5
    Customer deposits (c) 49.6 50.6 4.1 50.5 49.9 -1.7
    Of which: households and non-jn.corps. res. in Spain 29.3 30.4 3.1
        Marketable securities 17.0 14.6 -12.2 12.5 11.4 -9.6
        Other liabilities 9.8 10.9 13.2 9.8 11.0 12.1
        Equity 6.1 5.8 -2.4 6.0 5.6 -6.9
INCOME STATEMENT (% of ATA)
    (+) Interest income 4.10 3.35 -15.7 3.42 2.54 -25.0
    (–) Interest expense 2.12 1.57 -23.7 1.97 1.39 -28.8
    Net interest income 1.98 1.78 -7.1 1.45 1.15 -19.9
    Gross margin 3.01 2.78 -5.1 2.26 2.10 -6.3
    (–) Operating expenses 1.30 1.32 4.1 0.98 0.97 0.0
    (–) Write-downs of and provisions for jnancial assets 1.05 0.85 -14.9 0.77 0.72 -4.3
    Operating projt 0.67 0.61 -7.6 0.53 0.42 -21.1
    After-tax prNjt 0.54 0.47 -10.0 0.42 0.32 -23.7
RATIOS (%)
    Solvency 12.2 11.9
    Doubtful assets/TA 3.1 3.5 3.1 3.5
    Foreign operations/TA 23.3 26.3
    EEjciency (OE/GI) 43.1 47.2 43.2 45.1
    ROE (d) 9.3 7.5 7.1 5.7
CONSOLIDATED INDIVIDUAL
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENT (a) 
TABLE 6.4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Owing to the restructuring processes carried out in the closing days of the year, the 201jgures have had to be adjusted to make them comparable with those 
of 2009. This comparison therefore had to be regarded with some caution.  
b Including money market transactions with central counterparties. 
c Including liabilities to securitisatioMjnancial vehicle corporations. 
d Although stated at both consolidated and individual level, it should be noted that this item is more representative in the former case, since the individuaKjgure does 
not include all group operations. 
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planned staff reductions. In all, from January 2008 the sector has recognised and borne 
€96 bn of losses on its assets, representing approximately 5% of total credit to the private 
sector at December 2007 and 9% of GDP.
Provisioning charges, along with the contraction in net interest income, resulted in a fur-
ther decrease in net profits, which, however, remained positive (see Table 6.4).
Despite the lower profits earned, Spanish credit institutions continued to increase their 
top-quality capital (core capital) until it accounted for 9.5% of total risk-weighted as-
sets at end-2010 (including contributions from the FROB). At the same time, the overall 
solvency ratio decreased slightly from 12.2% in December 2009 to 11.9% twelve 
months later. During 2011, as a result of the new requirements approved by the govern-
ment in February, the less well capitalised institutions are making additional advances 
in this respect.
In any event, institutions still face significant challenges relating to the still-fragile eco-
nomic situation of some of their borrowers, the higher cost of their funding sources and 
their exposure to the real estate sector, so they will have to continue making efforts to 
strengthen their financial position and reduce their cost structure.
The activity of institutional investors continued to be affected by the competition for funds 
in the form of bank deposits and by the still high perception of risk by savers. This led, yet 
another year, to a decline in the net assets of collective investment companies and funds 
and to a modest increase in the case of insurance companies and pension funds (see 
Chart 6.5).
Holders of investment funds made net redemptions during the year, these withdrawals be-
ing most notable in those institutions with a more conservative investment policy (money 
market funds and short-term bond funds), which are the ones that compete most directly 
with credit institutions. Meanwhile, the renewed financial market tensions led to lower 
yields than in the previous year, practically across the board. Against this background, 
management entities continued to market mainly instruments of the conservative nature. 
The high debt issuance by Spanish general government and the greater preference for 
instruments issued by residents favoured a further increase in the holdings of securities of 
this type, while external assets decreased.
Investment by private equity institutions showed a notable recovery in comparison with 
the previous year, albeit based mainly on the activity of foreign operators. By contrast, the 
funds raised by Spanish private equity institutions decreased slightly with respect to 2009, 
as did those raised by real estate funds and hedge funds.
The process of savings bank concentration may affect the structure of the sector in the 
coming quarters, given the significant weight of savings bank subsidiaries in collective 
investment.
Following its significant deceleration between mid-2006 and end-2009, household debt 
remained practically flat in 2010 as a result of a slight increase in that incurred for real es-
tate purchases and a moderate decrease in consumer credit and other lending. Since the 
beginning of the current year, it has contracted slightly as a result of a decrease in both 
these components.
Write-downs and the 
contraction of net interest 
income resulted in a fresh 
decline in profits in 2010
The new capital requirements 
and the increased 
transparency should help to 
normalise access to market 
funding, although significant 
challenges persist
4.2 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
The competition from bank 
deposits and the high 
perception of risk by savers 
continued to affect the sector 
negatively
5 The financial flows and 
balance sheet position of 
the non-financial sector
5.1 HOUSEHOLDS
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Despite the scat momentum of household debt, the debt ratio of the sector remained 
steady due to the stagnation of income and to the high relative weight of debt for 
house purchases and the long mortgage loan maturities, which also influence the 
dynamics of household deleveraging (see Box 6.2). This indicator thus continues at 
high levels (at end-2010 it was around 125% of GDI, some 5 pp below the peak at 
mid-2008; see Chart 1 of Box 6.2). Meanwhile, net wealth continued to fall, basically 
as a result of the declining value of the real estate component, and, to a lesser extent, 
of the financial component. The debt burden also decreased again because of the fall 
in the average cost of financing (see Chart 6.6). However, this indicator captures 
movements in interbank interest rates with a certain lag, so foreseeably the rise in 
these rates since mid-2010 will gradually pass through to debt service in the next few 
quarters.
The lower debt burden contributed to a slight fall in the doubtful asset ratios of the sector 
in 2010 (in the previous three years they had trended upwards), both for house purchase 
loans and for consumer credit and other lending (down by 0.4 pp in both cases to stand at 
2.4% and 6.6%, respectively).
Household debt remained 
practically stagnant but the 
scan dynamism of income 
prevented the debt ratio from 
decreasing, while wealth and 
the debt burden continued to 
fall
The doubtful loans ratio 
decreased
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INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CHART 6.5
 SOURCES: Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, Banco de España and Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones.
a Shares and other equity in CIIs and reserves of insuranece companies and pension funds. In the case of credit institutions, deposits and repos of households and 
noMjnancial corporations. 
b Includes cash, deposits and repos.
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The latest available information from the survey of household finances shows that be-
tween 2005 and early 2009 the level of financial pressure increased more markedly in 
some segments which are comparatively more vulnerable. In households in which no 
member works, the proportion of those with some type of loan increased by more than 
6 pp (the equivalent of somewhat less than 2% of total households) during this period 
to 21%, while for the sector as a whole the rise was practically zero. This change, how-
ever, basically reflects the fact that a significant number of the members of indebted 
households moved from employed to unemployed status. In the households in which 
no member works, the percentage of those with a debt burden exceeding 40% of their 
income stood at nearly 25% at the beginning of 2009 (as against 16.6% for indebted 
households as a whole). By age group, younger households showed the largest in-
creases in the proportion exceeding this threshold. Thus, for example, in households 
headed by a person below age 35 (10% of household units), it rose to 24% (9.2 pp more 
than in 2005).
From mid-2010, the debt of non-financial corporations has followed a path of recovery and 
from 2010 Q3 its growth rate has been slightly positive. By instrument, this came about 
because lending by resident credit institutions contracted more slowly and lending by non-
residents picked up, while financing obtained via fixed income securities continued to 
grow quickly. Behind this recovery are a number of differing sectoral patterns, consistent 
with a process of selective deleveraging across the various areas of activity. Thus those 
linked to the housing market continued to show negative growth rates of bank credit, while 
the others posted year-end growth rates that were positive or around zero (see Chart 6.1). 
The available information indicates that the differences between larger firms and SMEs (in 
areas unrelated to the real estate sector) seem to be less marked than those observed in 
the more acute phases of the crisis.
Net borrowing by firms showed a credit balance for the first time since 1998, for an amount 
equivalent to 1.3% of GDP, according to the Financial Accounts. However, the financing 
gap, which approximates the funds required to bridge the difference between gross cor-
porate saving and gross capital formation plus permanent foreign investment, was positive 
and stood at 0.8% of GDP, 0.5 pp less than a year earlier.
This aggregate situation is 
compatible with a more 
vulnerable financial position of 
some segments of the 
population
5.2 FIRMS
Corporate financing showed 
greater dynamism from mid-
2010 onwards, although it 
varied significantly across 
sectors
The sector became a net 
lender for the first time since 
1998
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INDICATORS OF THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF HOUSEHOLDS AND NPISHs CHART 6.6
SOURCES: Ministerio de Fomento, INE and Banco de España.
a Estimated interest payments plus debt repayments.
b Balance of use of disposable income account.
c Gross saving less estimated debt repayments.
d Calculated on the basis of the estimated changes in the stock of housing, in the average area per house and in the price per square metre.
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The aggregate financial position of the sector showed a certain improvement. The re-
covery of economic results and the scan dynamism of liabilities meant that the debt 
ratio decreased slightly and profitability increased. This performance, along with the 
decline in the average cost of outstanding debt, allowed the debt burden to drop (see 
Chart 6.7). Moreover, in the sample of firms reporting to the Central Balance Sheet 
Data Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ), the dispersion of the distribution of these ratios 
decreased, since the improvement was more marked in those firms in a more unfa-
vourable financial position. The overall effect of this was a reduction in the synthetic 
indicators of financial pressure on investment and employment, from the peaks 
reached between the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010 (see Chart 6.7). These 
developments at aggregate level were compatible with uneven behaviour across sec-
tors. Thus, according to the CBQ, the improvement in these indicators was most ap-
parent in industry, a sector which had recorded a particularly marked deterioration in 
2009. Further, analysts revised upward the profit expectations of listed companies in 
2010, both for the long-term and for the short-term, and the growth rate for the latter 
turned positive.
The financial position 
indicators of firms showed a 
certain improvement
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Despite decreasing slightly, corporate debt continues to be high (around 800% of gross 
operating surplus), with no significant reduction since 2008. This ratio is particularly high 
in some sectors, such as construction and real estate services (see Box 6.2), where the 
doubtful assets ratio increased most sharply and reached 13.5% at end-2010 (against 
3.9% in other sectors).
The fiscal consolidation efforts made enabled the budget deficit to be reduced to 9.2% of 
GDP, 1.9 pp less than in 2009. The breakdown by instrument shows that the budget deficit 
was basically covered by long-term securities issuance for a net amount equivalent to 
6.9% of GDP (see Chart 6.8). Moreover, general government acquired securities amount-
ing to 1.7% of GDP, these investments being partly linked to the measures to support the 
financial system.
Despite slowing, the sector’s liabilities rose notably (their growth rate was 13.8%). This, 
along with the scant dynamism of GDP, resulted in an increase in indebtedness, which 
reached 60% of GDP at end-2010, nearly 7 pp more than in the previous year, and in the 
associated debt burden, albeit moderate taking it to 2% of GDP. Despite the rise in market 
interest rates, the average cost of liabilities scarcely changed, due to the slowness with 
which these movements pass through to interest payments.
5.3 GENERAL GOVERNMENT
Public sector net borrowing 
decreased, although it 
continues to be high…
… which gave rise to a 
significant rise in the sector’s 
liabilities and, as a result, in 
the debt and debt burden 
ratios
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This chapter of the Annual Report, devoted to the management of the Banco de España, 
is an overall summary of the most notable aspects of the institution’s activity in 2010. 
Some of these aspects will be addressed in greater detail in the monographic reports pub-
lished annually by various departments of the Bank (Banking Supervision, Balance of Pay-
ments, Claims Service, Central Balance Sheet Data Office, Central Credit Register, Re-
search Activities, Oversight of Payment Systems and Public Debt Market).
As in previous years, in 2010 the Banco de España’s activity as a Eurosystem member was 
intense. The Governor took part in the regular meetings of the Governing Council and the 
General Council of the ECB at which decisions on monetary policy, inter alia, were taken, 
as is explained in detail in Chapters 1 and 4 of this Annual Report.
A large number of professionals from the Banco de España participated in the committees, 
working groups and other Eurosystem bodies which prepare meetings and assist the 
ECB’s governing bodies in their decision-taking.
In the context of the activities related to the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), the Bank 
participated actively in the regular forecasting exercises of the Eurosystem and the ECB 
and in the drafting of the report on public finances as well as that prepared annually by the 
Committee on structural features which this year covered retail trade and its impact on 
price setting.
Also, as a member of the MPC and in coordination with the Market Operations Committee 
(MOC), the Banco de España contributed to adapting the operational framework to the 
circumstances arising from sovereign debt market instability which meant the reintroduc-
tion of certain exceptional measures to provide liquidity (that had begun to be withdrawn at 
the beginning of 2010) and the introduction mid-2010 of the Securities Markets Programme 
to acquire securities on the secondary market. The Banco de España took part concur-
rently in the discussions about the design of the strategy to withdraw the exceptional meas-
ures taken during the financial crisis as and when they ceased to be necessary.
In the field of payment systems, the Banco de España continued to participate in the man-
agement of TARGET2, which plays an essential role in monetary policy conduct and in the 
functioning of the euro money market. This system operated satisfactorily in 2010 and 
achieved an availability level of 99.99%. A new profile for internet-based access was intro-
duced in 2010 which was offered to participants with a low payment volume for which it 
will considerably simplify the system participation requirements.
The Banco de España contributed to the important progress made in 2010 in two of the 
main projects currently being implemented by the Eurosystem: TARGET2-Securities (T2S), 
in the area of securities settlement, and CCBM2, for collateral management in its credit 
operations.
T2S creates a centralised platform for the settlement of securities transactions in euro and 
other currencies. The Banco de España, together with the central banks of Germany, 
France and Italy, is responsible for developing and maintaining T2S. It also participates 
with one member on the T2S Programme Board, created by the Governing Council of the 
1  Introduction
2  Activities of the Banco 
de España as a 
member of the 
Eurosystem
The Banco de España’s 
activity with respect to 
committees and working 
groups was intense
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ECB with the aim of ensuring the timely and successful completion of the T2S Programme 
in 2014. The user requirements document was completed at the beginning of 2010 and IT 
and business development work continued. As for the preparation of the legal framework, 
the T2S guideline was published and progress was made in drawing up the agreements 
that will be entered into between the Eurosystem and the central securities depositories 
and central banks which do not belong to the euro area. Another important step was taken 
in November with the approval of the pricing for T2S.
In the area of CCBM2, in 2010 the user requirements document was finalised, the appro-
priateness of the project was confirmed on the basis of a qualitative and quantitative 
analysis, and the financial arrangements, the payment schedule of central banks and the 
project plan were approved. All the NCBs in the Eurosystem expressed their commitment 
to participate in CCBM2, although the modular structure of the future platform allows cer-
tain NCBs to opt for acquiring only specific functions. The Banco de España forms part of 
the various working groups created to manage the project and in 2010 assisted the central 
banks directly responsible for developing CCBM2 (Belgium and the Netherlands) with the 
design of certain functional aspects.
More than two years after the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) was launched, the Banco 
de España continued coordinating the work to achieve the successful transition to SEPA 
in Spain, leading the fora created for this purpose and encouraging and facilitating the 
migration of general government.
The Bank contributed to the drafting of the seventh SEPA Progress Report which includes 
the major milestones achieved since the publication of the previous report and the future 
challenges and key aspects for the success of this initiative. The report underlines the 
Eurosystem’s firm support for European legislators to set a SEPA migration end date, 
which will make a decisive contribution to achieving an integrated euro payments market.
In 2010 the Banco de España continued to perform the functions entrusted to it as a mem-
ber of the Eurosystem, for the production, safe-keeping, distribution and quality control of 
euro banknotes and for the fight against counterfeiting. In the area of banknote produc-
tion, the Banco de España undertook to comply with its production quota in the Eurosys-
tem which resulted in commissioning the production of 50 and 5 euro banknotes. As for 
the safe-keeping, storage and transport of banknotes, in addition to the banknotes the 
Bank owns, it holds custody of a portion of the banknotes owned by the ECB which are 
part of the Eurosystem’s strategic stock. The Bank participates actively in banknote distri-
bution throughout the euro area and was chosen for another year to assess the quality of 
banknotes in circulation in the Eurosystem.
The Bank played an important role in the preparation of the second series of euro bank-
notes which will be put into circulation in coming years. It participated in working meetings 
and performed technical tests at its premises.
The Banco de España participated actively in the work performed by the Banking Supervi-
sion Committee (BSC). This committee was disbanded after twelve years as a result of the 
creation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). The ESRB’s Advisory Technical 
Committee’s functions were going to overlap with those of the BSC. Similarly, the Govern-
ing Council decided to create the Financial Stability Committee, which commenced op-
erations at the beginning of 2011 and will support the Governing Council of the ECB in 
fulfilling its financial stability functions.
The Banco de España 
undertook to comply with its 
production quota of 50 and 5 
euro banknotes
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As for the compilation of statistics, the Banco de España has been active on the Statistics 
Committee and in the corresponding working groups. In addition to this, in 2010 it chaired 
the task force which decided that it was appropriate to enlarge the current lists of mone-
tary financial institutions (MFIs), investment funds and financial vehicle corporations and 
create a Eurosystem Register of Institutions which can be useful in areas other than statis-
tics and, specifically, for the ESRB.
As a member of the ESCB, the Banco de España participated in the preparation of 
two half-yearly reports of the ECB on financial stability and contributed to the analysis 
of the same frequency undertaken for the Financial Stability Table of the Economic 
and Financial Committee. Also noteworthy in this connection are two other publica-
tions: the report on banking structures and the report on recent developments in su-
pervisory structures of Member States of the European Union. Lastly, mention must 
be made of the work, undertaken in close cooperation with the Committee of Euro-
pean Banking Supervisors (CEBS), on the analysis of the impact of new prudential 
requirements which specifically include the pro-cyclicality of minimum capital require-
ments.
The new institutional framework for financial supervision in the EU was finally approved at 
the end of November 2010 and came into force on 1 January 2011. Thus, the European 
System of Financial Supervision was given legal form through an EU Regulation. It is based 
on two pillars:
— The ESRB, responsible for macro-prudential oversight of the EU in order to 
contribute to the prevention or mitigation of systemic risk. The president and 
vice-president of the ECB and the governors or presidents of the national cen-
tral banks of EU countries are members of the ESRB’s General Board, which 
also has a scientific and a technical advisory committee.
— Three European supervisory authorities created on the basis of the European 
Committees of Supervisors: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the Euro-
pean Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). These authorities are entrusted 
with contributing to setting common supervisory standards and practices.
In December 2010 the first meeting of the Risk Management Committee (RMC) was held. 
It was created by the Governing Council of the ECB, around the structure of the Risk Man-
agement Working Group (RMWG) which until then reported to the MOC. The main function 
of the new Committee consists of the surveillance, measurement and management of fi-
nancial risk generated by Eurosystem operations.
The Banco de España continued to work on consolidating its international profile. For this 
purpose, it maintained a smooth dialogue with central banks, financial supervisors and 
regulators, as well as with multilateral organisations, both bilaterally and within interna-
tional fora, many of which have been created in the wake of the crisis.
In the EU, the Banco de España was involved, as part of the Spanish delegation, in various 
Community working groups and committees.
As in previous years, the Governor participated together with European central bank gov-
ernors and finance ministers in the informal ECOFIN meetings, the first held in April 2010 
The new institutional 
framework for financial 
supervision in the EU was 
approved in November 2010
3 International activities
3.1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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in Madrid, coinciding with the Spanish presidency of the EU Council, and the second in 
September 2010 in Brussels, under the Belgian presidency.
The work of the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) in its full composition, with the 
participation of central banks, focused primarily on the regular review of the EU’s eco-
nomic and financial situation and the annual analysis of the stability and convergence 
programmes, and the excessive deficit procedures which had been initiated. Secondly, the 
Committee continued to coordinate a joint European position at international meetings of 
the G20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
which in 2010 included the reform of quotas and of IMF governance.
The work schedule of the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) placed particular empha-
sis on the work undertaken in the first half of 2010 prior to the renewal of the Lisbon 
Strategy (the 2020 Strategy) and on discussions on the reform of economic governance 
in Europe.
Noteworthy in the supervisory realm was the Banco de España’s contribution to the activ-
ity of the CEBS, the most notable points of which were as follows:
— Provision of technical advice to the European Commission on successive 
amendments to the capital directives, including the incorporation into Euro-
pean regulations of the FSB’s recommendations and standards on compensa-
tion, which were finally approved in December 2010, and the introduction of 
the prudential requirements of Basel III, which are still pending implementing 
regulations.
— Cooperation and convergence of supervisory practices through the prepara-
tion of new guidelines and the updating of previous ones. For instance, in 2010 
guidelines were published on joint assessment and joint decision regarding 
capital adequacy, remuneration policy, liquidity cost, recognition of external 
credit assessment institutions, operational risk, concentration risk, stress 
tests, risk transparency during periods of crisis and risk management.
— Work connected with supervisory transparency and restoring market confi-
dence. The stress tests were performed in summer 2010 to analyse the sol-
vency of a large group of European banks in situations of stress. The Banco de 
España participated actively in these tests which in the case of Spain covered 
practically all credit institutions.
In the global financial arena, the FSB (of which the Banco de España is a member) 
continued the work which it had begun the previous year on the treatment of the mor-
al hazard of systemic institutions. Furthermore, it began to analyse other issues such 
as the regulation and supervision of activities outside the banking sector and the inten-
sity and effectiveness of a supervision model. Also worthy of note are the peer reviews 
which are of two types. On one hand, there are thematic reviews, one was published 
on compensation in 2010 and another two were begun on risk disclosure and mort-
gage origination practices. On the other, there are country-specific peer reviews: the 
first report on Mexico was published in September and the FSB worked in 2010 on the 
reports on Spain and Italy, which were published at the beginning of 2011. Finally, the 
work by the Board to assess vulnerabilities in the financial system should be under-
lined.
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The activities of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), restricted to central banks, 
were especially intense this year. Particularly noteworthy were the bi-monthly meetings of 
governors and the work conducted in the different committees on which the Banco de 
España is present. These include, in particular, the Committee on the Global Financial 
System and the Markets Committee. The Bank made a significant contribution at the vari-
ous events organised by the BIS and, in particular, to the extensive network of working 
groups resulting from the above-mentioned committees, which included, most notably, 
the joint organisation of a roundtable discussion on the future of international banking in 
Mexico city.
The change made by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) with respect to 
capital and liquidity was particularly important at international level. This reform is part of 
its response to the lessons learnt during the crisis and was backed by the FSB and the 
leaders of the G-20.
In relation to these measures, and especially within the framework of systemic institutions, 
the approval of the proposal on contingent capital prepared by the Basel Committee 
should be underlined.
Within the framework of cross-sectoral supervision, the Bank was involved in the work of 
the Joint Forum (an international group of bank, securities and insurance supervisors) 
which in 2010 focused on commencing the update of the principles on conglomerates 
dating from 1999 and the preparation of a report on modelling for the banking and insur-
ance sector. Similarly, intra-group support, the framework of securitisations and the use of 
credit ratings in various financial products were analysed.
The Banco de España continues to preside, along with the Federal Reserve Bank of Phila-
delphia, the International Operational Risk Working Group (IORWG), whose main aim is to 
act as a centre of competence for advanced operational risk management among central 
banks. The Working Group, which meets annually, brings together operational risk man-
agement officers of more than 40 central banks and monetary authorities.
As is customary, the Bank works closely with the IMF, both at institutional level and provid-
ing support to the Spanish representatives in this organisation. To this end, the Bank con-
tributed actively to preparing and defining stances on the matters discussed at the IMF 
which were of particular importance for Spain.
The Fund’s activity in 2010 was dictated, on one hand, by developing measures and pro-
viding financing to assist countries to exit the crisis and, on the other, to studying and 
applying preventive measures with a view to the future. The IMF handled the increase in 
the institution’s quotas, approved the expansion of the New Arrangements to Borrow (in 
which Spain participates) and made them more flexible and modernised its own catalogue 
of financing instruments.
Furthermore, in 2010 the IMF actively assisted the EU to support European countries with 
financing problems (in particular, Greece and Ireland). In order for the representation of 
countries at the IMF to better reflect the current status quo in the global economy, the 
structure of the Fund’s Executive Board was discussed. As a result of concern about 
strengthening financial and multilateral supervision, new reports were prepared and man-
datory assessments of the financial system for systemically-important countries were im-
posed.
The Basel Committee 
reformed the capital rules
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The Banco de España also collaborated with the IMF, as in previous years, in discus-
sions on the customary Article IV reports relating to the countries of most interest to 
Spain. In particular, in 2010, discussions were held on the Article IV reports on Spain and 
on euro area policies. In the field of multilateral surveillance, the Banco de España also 
contributed comments on the IMF’s half-yearly World Economic Outlook and Global Fi-
nancial Stability Report discussed at its bilateral meetings in which the Banco de España 
participates.
During 2010, the Banco de España has become increasingly more actively involved in 
G-20 projects. Accordingly, it prepared reports on important issues for this forum such as 
financial regulatory reform, coordination of macroeconomic policies to strengthen the 
global framework for growth, reform of the international monetary system and the strength-
ening of global financial insurance networks.
In 2010 the Bank maintained its close collaboration with the main multilateral development 
banks (the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank) and, at a bilateral level, with other central banks and banking supervisors, through 
high-level and technical meetings. Also, as in previous years, the Bank was included in the 
Spanish delegations participating in the periodic meetings of the Paris Club and in OECD 
and EU working groups on export credit.
Collaboration with Latin American organisations was stepped up. Thus, in the case of the 
Center for Latin American Monetary Studies (CEMLA), which is the main forum for coordi-
nation of Latin American central banks, the Bank participated in the meetings of gover-
nors, of the Alternates Committee, of the Audit Committee and of the Treasury Committee. 
It also participated in CEMLA’s working groups, and can be considered one of the chief 
contributors to its training activities, a good number of which are organised jointly.
Lastly, the Bank continued to strengthen its ties with the Latin American supervisors 
through the Association of Supervisors of Banks of the Americas (ASBA). Accordingly, in 
2010 various seminars were held in Brazil, Uruguay and Spain. The main themes of work 
during the year were stress tests, liquidity and microfinance.
One element that makes a decisive contribution to the external projection of the Bank is 
the provision of technical cooperation and assistance to other central banks and supervi-
sory and regulatory agencies. In recent years this activity has grown steadily, with the 
Banco de España viewed as a benchmark in the field of central banking and financial 
regulation and supervision. The Bank has extended the technical cooperation subject to 
prior planning, which is provided bilaterally or through collaboration with various multilat-
eral organisations such as CEMLA, the ASBA, the Central American Monetary Council, the 
IMF, the World Bank and the BIS Financial Stability Institute.
The forms of technical cooperation include courses and seminars, study and working vis-
its to the Bank, experts from the Bank sent to missions in situ, technical assistance ac-
tivities and attending to an almost constant stream of consultations on a wide variety of 
subjects. The Bank offers training individually and in collaboration with other institutions 
either through face-to-face sessions or in combination with e-learning. 17 courses were 
organised in total in 2010.
As for geographical distribution, as in previous years, in 2010 technical cooperation was 
concentrated mainly in the area of Latin America, on language and cultural grounds and 
The Banco de España has 
become more actively 
involved in G-20 projects
Sustained growth continued in 
cooperation and technical 
assistance
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also for financial and economic reasons. In other geographical areas, such as the Mediter-
ranean basin and eastern Europe, the Bank applied the same model as in previous years, 
essentially providing cooperation in conjunction with other central banks and supervisory 
agencies, by participating in several programmes coordinated within the Eurosystem and 
financed with EU funds. The Bank’s Internal Audit Department is contributing to the TACIS 
III project for Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States, in col-
laboration, together with another eight Eurosystem central banks and the ECB, with the 
Central Bank of Russia. In turn, experts from the Financial Regulation Department are 
contributing to the progress made in a programme for the Eurosystem, in collaboration 
with another 14 central banks and the ECB, for the EU accession and potential accession 
countries. Similarly, the Information Systems Department is participating in a joint Euro-
system programme to provide technical assistance to the Central Bank of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
During 2010 the Banco de España worked intensely on the organisation of high-level 
events and meetings aimed at sharing knowledge and exchanging views on topical issues.
The key event was the Fifth High-Level Seminar of the Eurosystem and Latin American 
Central Banks, organised jointly with the European Central Bank (ECB), which took place 
on 10 December 2010 in Madrid. The seminar addressed the economic repercussions of 
and economic policy responses to global imbalances and financial flows. It was presided 
by the Governor of the Banco de España and the President of the European Central Bank, 
Jean-Claude Trichet. It was attended by governors, deputy-governors and high-level offi-
cials of central banks in Latin America and the Eurosystem, in addition to the representa-
tives of organisations such as the European Commission and CEMLA.
During the Spanish presidency of the European Union, a high-level seminar was held in 
April at the Bank’s headquarters which was organised jointly with EUROFI and attended by 
leaders of the financial sector and national and international public authorities, including 
Finance Ministers, central banks, regulators and supervisors. Its purpose was defining 
priorities to reform the financial regulatory and supervisory framework.
Also within the framework of the Spanish presidency an informal seminar of the Working 
Group of the Council of the European Union on export credit was organised in May to-
gether with the State Secretary for Trade. The seminar analysed various aspects of financ-
ing trade and the presence of Spanish banks in Latin America. Lastly, as is customary, 
there were various presentations of reports at the Banco de España by international insti-
tutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank “El Mundo Post-Crisis Financiera 
Global: Lecciones, Desafíos y Perspectivas para América Latina” (The World in the wake 
of the Global Financial Crisis: Lessons, Challenges and Outlook for Latin America), the 
World Bank (Annual Report on Economic Outlook) and the IMF (World Economic Outlook).
In 2010 the Banco de España organised numerous conferences of a more academic na-
ture (see Section 4.2.).
Economic analysis and research are essential for performing the functions entrusted to the 
Banco de España. In 2010 analysis and research on the Spanish economy and its interna-
tional environment were carried out fundamentally to give advice to the Bank’s governing 
bodies for the performance of said functions. As a result of these activities, 39 working 
papers and 2 occasional papers were published as well as 47 articles in academic journals 
and specialised books (22 of which in anonymously refereed journals).
3.2  CONFERENCES, MEETINGS 
AND SEMINARS 
ORGANISED BY THE 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA
4  Economic analysis and 
research
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The research agenda of the Banco de España revolved around four major areas:
— Macroeconomic modelling and forecasting.
— Monetary policy and its transmission mechanisms.
— Financial stability.
— Spanish economy.
The Banco de España’s research agenda in 2010 centred on the analysis of the crisis and 
its economic policy implications. In particular, special attention was paid to: studying the 
adjustment and recovery process of the world economy and, to a greater extent, the euro 
area and the Spanish economy; improving the integration of financial and real aspects into 
usual macroeconomic analysis; the analysis of credit and the optimal indebtedness of 
corporations and households; the identification of the optimum size of the financial sec-
tors and the most suitable policies for preventing them from becoming oversized; the in-
clusion of elements of financial stability in the formulation of monetary policy; the role of 
fiscal policy in the current situation; the sovereign debt crisis in certain European coun-
tries; the effect of the crisis on the level and rate of potential growth; and suitable struc-
tural policies for promoting potential growth.
As regards macroeconomic modelling and forecasting, the main findings obtained refer to 
the incorporation of expectations into the quarterly macroeconomic model used for the 
analysis and forecasting of the Spanish economy, the development of general equilibrium 
models with rational agents to simulate fiscal measures in Spain and the extension of dy-
namic factor models to identify turning points in the principal economic variables and the 
further development of tools to predict activity in the very short term. As for tools for 
analysis, at the end of 2010 the preliminary findings of the Survey of Household Finances 
(EFF-2008) were published which provide a detailed approximation of the financial situa-
tion of Spanish households and, therefore, greater information for the analysis of con-
sumption and saving decisions.
The two main results in relation to the analysis of monetary policy and its transmission mech-
anisms relate to i) the analysis of optimal monetary policy when there are restrictions on in-
debtedness and monopolistic competition in the banking system, and ii) monetary policy 
implementation through possible changes to central banks’ deposit and lending facilities.
In 2010 research on financial stability and analysis of the international financial system 
continued to focus on various aspects of the crisis and on regulatory measures designed 
to reduce the likelihood and impact of such crises. Research began on counterparty risk 
analysis, work advanced on the different mechanisms for mitigating procyclicality in a risk-
sensitive regulatory framework, various aspects of stress-testing methodology were ad-
dressed and progress continued in the analysis of the role of competition in risk taking. 
Other topics addressed were the analysis of the international capital flows, global imbal-
ances and the risk diversification associated with financial integration, and of the determi-
nants of sovereign risk and financial crises.
Lastly, research on the Spanish economy covered two major subject areas. Firstly, the 
adjustment of the Spanish economy and its determinants have been researched in greater 
depth, paying particular attention to the impact of institutional and structural characteris-
4.1  PRIORITY AREAS OF 
ANALYSIS
The research agenda centred 
on the crisis and its economic 
policy implications
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tics (the labour market, demography and business structure, openness to foreign trade 
and the real estate sector). Secondly, research examined the rationale for economic policy 
recommendations in different areas (fiscal policy, structural policy) and evaluated their 
macroeconomic impact.
The Banco de España’s connections with academia and with the economic research units 
at other central banks and international institutions were maintained through the four tra-
ditional channels.
First, the analysis and research produced by the Banco de España was presented and 
discussed at national and international seminars, and conferences, and published through 
the profession’s usual channels.
Second, the Banco de España organises several series of seminars, in which members of 
the academic community participate, including a weekly economic research seminar. As 
regards scientific meetings, the Banco de España organised, with other institutions, five 
international conferences: the conference on Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal 
Policies, in February; the seminar Towards more Efficient Labour Markets, organised with 
the IMF in May; the seventeenth European Summer Symposium in International Macroe-
conomics (ESSIM), organised jointly by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) 
at the Bank’s facilities in Roda de Bará (Tarragona), in May; the second International Jour-
nal of Central Banking (IJCB) Financial Stability Conference titled, The Theory and Practice 
of Macro-Prudential Regulation, held in June by CEMFI at the Banco de España, and the 
conference Financial Globalization: Shifting Balances, organised jointly with the World 
Bank and the Barcelona Centre de Recerca en Economía Internacional de Barcelona 
(CREI) in July.
The Bank also sponsored sessions at academic conferences, such as those of the Euro-
pean Economic Association and the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association.
Third, the Banco de España continued to contribute to research networks, both within the 
Eurosystem for analysis of the euro area economy, such as that set up to work on marco-
prudential regulation, and in Latin America, such as that set up in CEMLA. The Bank also 
maintains its regular visitor and external adviser programmes, which promote projects that 
may be considered strategic in different areas of analysis and research.
Lastly, 2010 saw the second edition of the Programa de excelencia en educación e in-
vestigación en economía monetaria, financiera y bancaria (Programme for excellence in 
monetary, financial and banking economics education and research) aimed at promot-
ing excellence in teaching and research in the areas of macroeconomics, monetary 
policy, finance, financial system supervision and international economics, through the 
establishment of cooperation agreements with universities and research centres to se-
cure grants for recruiting teaching and research staff and for undertaking research pro-
jects. 
The three main channels for the dissemination and communication of the Banco de Es-
paña’s research findings are the Working Paper and Occasional Paper series and the 
monthly Boletín Económico which, along with regular articles on the economic situation, 
includes summaries of completed or ongoing research and the Revista de Estabilidad Fi-
nanciera. All these activities are included in the Economic Research Portal, a section on 
the Bank’s website.
4.2  RELATIONS WITH 
ACADEMIA
4.3  DISSEMINATION AND 
COMMUNICATION
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At 31 December 2010, a total of 481 institutions of various kinds were supervised by the 
Banco de España, of which 339 were credit institutions (CIs). The Banco de España exer-
cises a process of ongoing supervision of these institutions1.
The essential aim of the supervisory process is to keep updated each institution’s super-
visory risk profile, taking the appropriate measures to correct it when necessary. To this 
end, the Banco de España has 22 operational inspection divisions and seven support or 
cross-departmental divisions, comprising bank examiners, senior analysts, IT auditors, 
junior analysts and administrative staff.
The number of inspections in 2010 amounted to 179, 39 of which were still under way at 
31 December, and essentially include traditional on-site inspections and continuous mon-
itoring on-site.
In 2010 the above-mentioned continuous monitoring on-site, which involves a perma-
nent presence at the institution, was extended to 15 groups of CIs compared with ten 
in 2009. This system is particularly intensive in the case of the two main banking groups. 
More than 50 individuals are assigned to these banking groups only to perform this 
function.
A further 329 special reviews were also performed in relation to CIs, including:
— Specific monitoring actions, apart from those mentioned above, such as, for 
example, studies of claims arising from troubled assets.
— Examination of internal capital adequacy assessment reports prepared by in-
stitutions and the supervisory process arising from such examination.
5  Banking supervision 
and regulation
5.1  SUPERVISOR Y ACTIVITY
The Banco de España 
supervises 339 credit 
institutions
The number of groups of CIs 
in which supervisory teams 
have a permanent presence 
was increased to 15
31.12.10
INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISED BY THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA 339
    Banks 72
    Savings banks (a) 36
    Credit cooperatives 82
    Branches of foreign credit institutions 89
    Specialised credit institutions 59
    Electronic money institutions 1
OTHER 143
    Mutual guarantee and reguarantee companies 25
    Currency-exchange and money-transfer bureaux 61
    Appraisal companies 55
2
TOTAL 482
INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISED BY THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA TABLE 7.1 
a The jgures relate to the number of institutions included in the Register of Institutions at 31.12.10. However, in the case 
of the savings banks, as a result of the merger and integration processes this jgure was reduced to 18 institutions or 
groups plus CECA.  
1  Available in the “Banking Supervision” section of the Banco de España’s website: www.bde.es/webbde/en/.
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— The impact analysis of regulatory changes on each institution.
— The most important actions arising from relations with national and interna-
tional supervisors and bodies in the case of groups of CIs with a presence in 
Spain and other countries.
— The stress tests.
In addition, the Banco de España conducted the various administrative procedures sub-
ject to prior authorisation: loans to senior officers, the taking of qualifying holdings in 
Spanish institutions, acquisitions of qualifying holdings or of control abroad, etc.
Against this background, letters were sent to supervised institutions containing 192 re-
quirements relating to matters such as: credit risk (loan approval criteria and credit risk 
classification and provisioning), management and internal control, own funds and solven-
cy, and other matters (transparency vis-à-vis customers, deficiencies in reporting to the 
Banco de España’s Central Credit Register, etc.). As usual, credit risk was the main area of 
recommendations, with 108 requirements, or 56% of the total.
On 22 May 2010 the Banco de España resolved to replace the directors of CajaSur and to 
appoint the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB) as the institu-
tion’s provisional administrator, as a consequence of its viability problems. This action was 
conducted within the new framework established by Royal Decree-Law 9/2009 and was 
resolved in just 55 days with its adjudication through a competitive process to Bilbao Biz-
kaia Kutxa (BBK). This was the only precautionary “intervention” measure that needed to 
be adopted during 2010. The process of resolution of the crisis of Caja Castilla-La Mancha 
(CCM), that commenced in 2009, was also concluded in 2010, with its assets and liabilities 
being integrated into Cajastur. Unlike the action in relation to CajaSur, the approach to the 
handling of the crisis of this institution was traditional and involved the participation of the 
Savings Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund.
In relation to the internal models of the eight Spanish groups of CIs authorised to use internal 
ratings based (IRB) methods to calculate regulatory capital for credit risk, the processes for 
authorising new portfolios continued in accordance with the successive roll-out plans pre-
sented to the Banco de España, which include the approval of exposures at subsidiaries 
abroad in close coordination with local supervisors. In addition, the monitoring of the models 
already approved has been strengthened, especially with regard to the modifications that the 
institutions are introducing. A key element in the monitoring of the models is the review of the 
internal control framework that institutions have to ensure that the approved models are 
maintained and used appropriately. With regard to the validation of internal models to calcu-
late the regulatory capital for operational risk, in 2010 the conditions for approval and the re-
sults of the operational risk model approved for a Spanish group were monitored.
The Banco de España continued to work actively in the area of international supervisory 
cooperation, through “colleges of supervisors”. The Banco de España hosted the meet-
ings of the colleges of the two Spanish international banking groups and participated, in 
its capacity as host country supervisor, in six meetings of colleges of banking groups with 
foreign parents.
In 2010 five cooperation agreements of the kind provided for in Article 131 of Directive 
2006/48/EC, relating to the supervision of European groups of credit institutions with sub-
56% of all requirements 
referred to credit risk
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sidiaries in Spain, and a bilateral cooperation agreement with an EU country (Rumania) 
were signed. In addition, the cooperation agreement between EU financial supervisors, 
central banks and ministries of economic affairs and finance for cross-border financial 
stability signed in 2008 was extended to all the countries in the European Economic Area 
(Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein).
In 2010 a total of seven sanctioning proceedings were opened against institutions of vari-
ous kinds including: a credit institution (a savings bank); a currency-exchange and cross-
border money transfer bureau and other companies, that were engaging without the cor-
rect authorisation in activities restricted to credit institutions (in one case), or in the 
purchase and sale of foreign currency and the arrangement of cross-border money trans-
fers (in another three cases). Finally, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against a for-
eign foundation for breach of the rules on qualifying holdings, and a proceeding initiated in 
2009 was extended to the director of a currency-exchange bureau.
In addition, in order to clarify any potential liability of directors and managers of sanctioned 
institutions, 50 sanctioning proceedings were opened against them in 2010, in conjunction 
with the proceedings brought against the corresponding institutions.
In 2010 a total of 7 cases against various types of institutions and 22 cases against direc-
tors and managers were resolved.
In relation to the proceedings opened against a savings bank, an appraisal company and 
a currency-exchange and cross-border money transfer bureau, the following were im-
posed:
— Four sanctions on institutions and 38 sanctions on their directors or managers 
for the commission of very serious infringements.
— Six sanctions on institutions and 28 sanctions on their directors or managers 
for the commission of serious infringements.
— Two sanctions on institutions for the commission of minor infringements (le-
gally directors or managers cannot be sanctioned for these infringements).
Similarly, proceedings were resolved against another type of legal entity for the pursuit of 
certain activities without the mandatory authorisation. Thus, a sanction was imposed on a 
legal entity for engaging in the activity of arranging cross-border money transfers without 
having obtained the necessary authorisation from the Banco de España or being duly reg-
istered. In another three proceedings three legal entities were sanctioned for engaging 
without authorisation in activities legally restricted to credit institutions.
Notable among the proceedings resolved is one against a savings bank and 20 members 
of its board of directors and management, in which this credit institution was found to have 
committed three infringements, two of which were classified as very serious and the third 
as serious. As regards the very serious infringements, deficiencies were found in its or-
ganisational structure, in its internal control mechanisms and in its administrative and ac-
counting procedures, and such deficiencies were found to have jeopardised the viability 
and solvency of the institution, for which reason sanctions were imposed on the savings 
bank and on 17 of the members of its board of directors and management subject to the 
proceedings, since they were considered responsible for this situation. Also the institution 
5.2  IMPOSING OF SANCTIONS
In 2010 seven sanctioning 
proceedings were opened 
against supervised institutions 
and 50 of their directors
Seven sanctioning 
proceedings against 
institutions and 22 against 
directors or managers were 
resolved, resulting in 82 
sanctions
A savings bank was 
sanctioned for committing one 
serious and two very serious 
infringements
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was found to have failed for at least six months to meet 80% of the capital requirements 
made, so that the relevant sanction was imposed on the institution, and 16 of the 20 direc-
tors and managers subject to the proceedings were considered responsible for this in-
fringement. Finally, the savings bank was considered to have committed a serious infringe-
ment by failing to comply with the rules in force regarding the limits on exposures, as a 
result of which a sanction was imposed on the institution. Of its directors and managers, 
16 were considered responsible for this conduct and the relevant sanction was imposed 
on them.
Aside from the proceeding described above, disciplinary proceedings against an apprais-
al company and a currency-exchange and cross-border money transfer bureau and their 
corresponding directors or mangers were resolved. This type of institutions supervised by 
the Banco de España must comply with the applicable sectoral regulations because it is 
considered that it is necessary to ensure that they function correctly due to the activity 
they perform and its impact on the financial sector.
Appraisal companies issue reports and certificates which can be used in the mortgage 
market and determine the value of assets used as collateral by credit institutions. Con-
sequently, on one hand, their valuation must be reliable and documented, respecting 
regulatorily established criteria, and on the other, their organisation must have the ad-
ministrative, technical and human resources attributes which guarantee their internal 
control.
Thus, in view of the importance of such an activity, in the proceeding resolved in respect 
of an appraisal company and its directors four sanctions were imposed for very serious 
infringements (one on the company and the other three on each of its directors), since the 
contents of the appraisals were found to lack veracity and consistency and, in particular, 
the data and evidence arising from the valuation activity performed failed to match. Also, 
four sanctions were imposed for serious infringements (one on the company and the other 
three on each of its directors) arising from organisational deficiencies of an administrative 
and technical kind and relating to personnel in the internal control procedures that guaran-
tee the correct performance of appraisals. And finally, one sanction was imposed for the 
commission of one minor infringement, owing to non-compliance with the applicable rules 
on civil liability insurance.
It is essential that the accounting records of currency-exchange and cross-border money 
transfer bureaux provide a true and fair view of the institution concerned and that, in turn, 
its capitalisation levels are above the minimum required.
In the proceeding resolved against a currency-exchange bureau, the latter was found to 
have committed a very serious infringement, consisting of fundamental irregularities in its 
accounting records that prevented the entity’s net worth and financial position from being 
known, for which sanctions were imposed on the bureau and on the two directors. Also, 
the bureau was found to have committed three serious infringements arising from its fail-
ure to perform various obligations, these being the obligations to have a minimum level of 
capital, to duly provide information to the supervisory authority and, finally, to perform only 
those operations it is authorised to perform, for which three sanctions were imposed. The 
directors of the bureau were considered likewise responsible for these infringements and 
a total of three sanctions were imposed on each. Finally, a sanction was imposed on the 
bureau for a minor infringement consisting of a breach of the rules regulating the recording 
of its transactions.
An appraisal company 
committed one very serious, 
one serious and one minor 
infringement
A currency-exchange and 
cross-border money transfer 
bureau committed one very 
serious, one minor and three 
serious infringements
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A legal entity was sanctioned for performing the activity of cross-border money transfers 
professionally with the public without having obtained the necessary authorisation from 
the Banco de España or having been duly registered.
Similarly, three legal entities were sanctioned for pursuing the activities of taking repayable 
funds from the public, which are restricted to credit institutions, without having obtained 
the corresponding authorisation to do so. Furthermore, they were required to immediately 
cease such activities.
Most of the sanctions imposed were fines, a total of 13 of varying amount were imposed 
on institutions and 66 on directors or managers. Similarly, in one case it was considered 
appropriate to impose three sanctions of public reprimand (published in the Official State 
Gazette) on an institution. In the same case, considering the particular responsibility of two 
directors or managers for the offence, it was also agreed to impose on each one two sanc-
tions disqualifying them from serving as a director or manager at any credit institution or in 
the financial sector.
In addition to the foregoing, in 2010 a proceeding against a credit institution for non-
compliance with minimum reserve requirements was resolved. This type of proceeding is 
brought and resolved by the European Central Bank and the Banco de España is respon-
sible for processing it.
The Banco de España worked intensely in 2010 to develop and implement the organisa-
tional and disciplinary regulations applicable to institutions subject to supervision. Note-
worthy among the nine circulars published is the circular on the solvency of credit institu-
tions, which includes various EU rules aimed at promoting improvements in risk 
management (especially of liquidity-related risks) through guidelines included in an annex 
to the circular. The accounting changes were equally important and included most nota-
bly: changes to the treatment of consolidated financial statements and of business com-
binations; the delimitation of the special accounting register of credits and loans which 
serve as coverage for issues of mortgage securities and, especially, the improvements 
introduced in the analysis and provisioning of credit risk and impairment losses on fore-
closed assets.
Also worth mentioning is the establishment of compulsory general principles for advertis-
ing by credit institutions, since the prior authorisation regime was replaced by one which 
is more in line with that of other financial institutions. Noteworthy among the other circulars 
is that completing the Law and Royal Decree regulating the qualifying holdings in credit 
institutions by harmonising their treatment at European and sectoral level with that of in-
surance and investment companies.
In addition to issuing the aforementioned implementing regulations, the Bank partici-
pated actively in drafting rules at different levels on banking and financial matters, 
which ultimately resulted in the corresponding external and internal reports being re-
leased. And, in the same vein, it participated in several international committees and 
working groups on banking regulation, which covered especially matters of solvency, 
accounting, financial institution management (corporate and self-governance) and 
transparency of operations.
As an extension of its regulatory function, the Bank also interpreted and applied the regu-
lations governing the activity of institutions, especially the solvency and accounting regu-
Four legal entities were 
sanctioned for pursuing 
activities without the 
corresponding authorisation
5.3  REGULATORY ACTIVITY 
AND CHANGES
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circular addressing the 
solvency of credit institutions 
and that amending the 
provisioning of credit risk
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lations, settling many enquiries received from institutions, other departments of the Bank 
or other regulatory agencies. It also provided technical assistance on regulatory matters 
both in and outside Spain (participating in various working groups, organising seminars, 
etc.). At this point, mention should also be made of the monitoring and checks performed 
on issues of financial instruments eligible as own funds made by credit institutions involv-
ing, in 2010, the resolution of 81 proceedings.
As regards exercise of the Bank’s power in the area of transparency and bank customer 
protection, almost 3,700 cases were processed until the removal in June of the authorisa-
tion regime, prior to publication, of advertising projects referring to the cost or rates of 
return of the products offered. There were 833 cases in relation to the verification and 
registration of brochures that refer to fee and commission charges (prices of bank servic-
es). Furthermore, the Bank Customer’s Portal, a section on the Banco de España’s website 
that aims to provide guidance, in 2010 recorded a total of 2,329,523 pages viewings and 
handled almost 5,100 enquiries, 2,500 of which received a written reply.
Lastly, the Bank also plays a part in proceedings for the creation of supervised institutions, 
and of amendment of their articles of association, advising the Minister for Economy and 
Finance and drawing up the mandatory reports. And it is responsible for various public 
registers, such as the register of supervised institutions and their agents, and confidential 
registers, including, in particular, the register of senior officers.
In 2010 there were various regulatory changes which included most notably:
1 Changes that aim to improve the legal regime applicable to credit institutions. 
For instance:
— Royal Decree-Law 11/2010 of 9 July 2010 on the governing bodies and 
other aspects of the legal regime for savings banks. This Royal Decree-
Law essentially aims to make it easier for the savings banks to have ac-
cess to core capital, to promote the professionalisation of their governing 
bodies and to provide new forms of engaging in their financial activity.
2 Changes that aim to strengthen the solvency of credit institutions and to pro-
mote restructuring processes. These include:
— Royal Decree-Law 6/2010 of 9 April 2010 on measures to promote eco-
nomic recovery and employment. This Royal Decree-Law clarifies the re-
gime applicable to the credit institutions in institutional protection schemes 
(IPSs), expedites the orderly restructuring process of the sector through 
the FROB and facilitates the operations of financial vehicle corporations.
— Royal Decree 628/2010 of 14 May 2010 amending Royal Decree 2606/1996 
of 20 December 1996 on credit institution deposit guarantee funds and 
Royal Decree 948/2001 of 3 August 2001 on investor compensation 
schemes. This Royal Decree completed the transposition of European 
regulations on deposit guarantee schemes which were amended in 2009.
3 Changes that affect the operational framework within which credit institutions 
and other financial intermediaries work. These include:
5.3.1  Regulatory changes
The reform of the legal regime 
of savings banks makes it 
easier for them to have access 
to capital and provides new 
forms of engaging in their 
financial activity
The regulation applicable to 
payment services and banking 
advertising was amended
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— Ministerial Order EHA/1608/2010 of 14 June 2010 on transparency of con-
ditions and information requirements for payment services. This Ministe-
rial Order completes the transposition of European regulations on pay-
ment services which, in matters of transparency, are subject exclusively to 
its provisions. Furthermore, it repeals existing provisions on the valuation 
rules of banking operations.
— Ministerial Order EHA/1718/2010 of 11 June 2010 on regulation and con-
trol of the advertising of banking services and products. This replaces the 
regime in force until then of prior authorisation of the advertising of credit 
institutions by a two-pronged monitoring system based on the establish-
ment of general principles and criteria and requirements in relation to ap-
propriate internal control mechanisms. The advertising activity of payment 
institutions is subject to a similar regime.
— Ministerial Order EHA/1665/2010 of 11 June 2010 implementing Arti-
cles 71 and 76 of Royal Decree 217/2008 of 15 February 2008 on the 
legal regime of investment firms and of other investment services enti-
ties. This Ministerial Order transferred to the CNMV the competence 
on standard contracts and the verification and registering of fee and 
commission charges relating to transactions and services performed 
on the public debt book-entry market, which until then corresponded 
to the Banco de España. At the same time it modifies the procedures 
for the verification and registering of the fees/commissions relating to 
investment services, provided by investment firms and credit institu-
tions.
4 The fourth and final group comprises rules addressed to financial institutions 
other than credit institutions that are supervised by the Banco de España. For 
instance:
— Royal Decree 712/2010 of 28 May 2010 on the legal regime governing 
payment services and payment institutions. This implements the legal re-
gime of payment institutions in a similar way to that of other financial insti-
tutions, by taking into consideration the specific features and operating 
limitations of payment institutions.
These changes are completed by the above-mentioned implementation of the organisa-
tional and disciplinary regulations applicable to credit institutions, in the form of the follow-
ing circulars of the Banco de España:
— Circular 1/2010 of 27 January 2010 concerning statistics on interest rates ap-
plied to deposits and loans vis-à-vis households and non-financial corpora-
tions.
— Circulars 2/2010 of 27 January 2010, 3/2010 of 29 June 2010 and 8/2010 of 30 
November 2010 amending Circular 4/2004 of 22 December 2004 on public 
and confidential financial reporting rules and formats.
— Circular 4/2010 of 30 July 2010 on agents of credit institutions and the agree-
ments entered into for the regular provision of financial services.
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— Circular 5/2010 of 28 September 2010 on the information that the potential 
acquirer of a qualifying holding in a credit institution must submit.
— Circular 6/2010 of 28 September 2010 on the advertising of banking services 
and products.
— Circular 7/2010 of 30 November 2010 developing certain aspects of the mort-
gage market.
— Circular 9/2010 of 22 December 2010 amending Circular 3/2008 of 22 May 
2008 on the determination and control of minimum own funds.
Finally, the changes made to the EU regulatory framework include, for our purposes here, 
only the following:
— Directive 2010/76/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 No-
vember 2010 amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capi-
tal requirements for the trading book and for resecuritisations, and the supervi-
sory review of remuneration policies. In addition to introducing certain 
improvements in the management of risks arising from operations with certain 
financial instruments, this directive attempts to make credit institutions’ remu-
neration structures compatible with more appropriate management of their risks.
The entry into force of Circular 3/2010 of 29 June 2010 amending the criteria to be applied 
by credit institutions in the provisioning of credit exposures and of foreclosed assets en-
tailed the updating of the formats of the confidential returns for reporting such information 
and of the instructions and correlations for preparing it.
The Circular meant, furthermore, that the information of mutual guarantee companies 
would be out of date, since the regulations governing credit institutions in this connection 
are applicable to these financial auxiliaries. Until the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Fi-
nance updates the ministerial order on the presentation of accounting information by mu-
tual guarantee companies, these companies have been requested to voluntarily submit the 
updated information in accordance with the new criteria.
Likewise, in 2010 the Banco de España continued to participate very actively within the 
CEBS, which was replaced by the European Banking Authority, in revising the accounting 
returns with prudential information (FINREP) and the solvency returns (COREP) in order to 
prepare shared formats for use in the European Union from 2013.
As a result of the publication of Banco de España Circulars 1/2010 and 2/2010, it was 
necessary to modify, from the data as at 30 June 2010, the returns submitted by credit 
institutions in order to comply with the European Central Bank’s statistical reporting re-
quirements in relation to interest rates and information on the balance sheets of MFIs. The 
Bank capitalised on this in order to make the use of XBRL compulsory for the submission 
of this information, thus continuing its policy of introducing this standard as a system for 
receiving and validating all financial information from institutions supervised by it.
As a prior step for the preparation of the XBRL taxonomy of statistical information, a multi-
dimensional data model was constructed, which is compatible with the ECB’s taxonomy, 
and will serve as a benchmark for preparing taxonomies in the future.
5.4  FINANCIAL AND 
PRUDENTIAL REPORTING
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All the financial statements were incorporated in 2010 into the telematic system estab-
lished for financial reporting purposes and the receipt of this type of information on paper 
was almost completely eliminated.
The Banco de España manages the Central Credit Register (CCR), which contains indi-
vidualised information on the credit exposure of reporting institutions (basically credit in-
stitutions) to their customers. This information is used by the institutions for granting and 
monitoring exposure. It is also utilised by the Banco de España, in conjunction with the 
data from the accounting and own funds statements of the reporting institutions, for pru-
dential supervision and other tasks which are legally entrusted to it, maintaining the confi-
dentiality of the individual data.
In 2010 the number of exposures declared to the CCR decreased from 32.9 million at 
end-2009 to 32 million at end-2010 (down 2.8%), although the total amount of these ex-
posures held at the €3.8 billion of December 2009. The number of different borrowers 
declared to the CCR declined from 17.4 million at end-2009 to 17.1 million at end-2010 
(down 1.7%).
As part of its function to provide reports to reporting institutions, in 2010 the CCR sent 
a total of 290.3 million automatic reports compared with 297.2 million in 2009, represent-
ing the second consecutive annual decline, which in this case amounts to 2.3%. Also, 
for the second year running, requests for reports for new lending transactions declined 
from 5.2 million in 2009 to 4.6 million in 2010 (down 11.54%), which reflects less lending 
in the system.
Borrowers’ requests for reports rose from 110,741 in 2009 to 117,154 in 2010. This growth 
was particularly significant on account of the new service offered by the CCR from April for 
obtaining the reports over the Internet using a digital signature (issued by the Spanish 
public printing works for individuals and legal entities and the electronic national identity 
card). This channel was used intensively to request 25,452 reports from 15 April to 31 
December 2010.
568 claims were made to the CRR by borrowers, who exercised their right to rectify data, 
compared with 508 in 2009 (up 11.8%). From 1 December 2010 it is also possible to sub-
mit claims online and 19 claims were made in this way in December.
As regards the exchange of information with the central credit registers managed by six 
other central banks of EU Member States (Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and 
Portugal), as at September 2010 (date of the latest available data), the CCR received 
information on exposures of 4,045 Spanish legal persons (an increase of 3.3% on the 
same period a year earlier) recorded in the other central credit registers, amounting to 
€230,770 million (down 1%). In turn, the CCR sent to these registers information on 1,662 
legal persons resident in the other six countries (down 9.2%), relating to exposures 
amounting to €40,097 million (down 12%).
The implementation of monetary policy in the euro area is carried out in a coordinated 
fashion by the European Central Bank and the national central banks. The Governing 
Council of the ECB takes the monetary policy decisions, while the national central banks 
perform the liquidity providing/absorbing operations and manage the collateral provided 
by the credit institutions within their purview.
5.4.3  Electronic 
documentation
5.5  CENTRAL CREDIT 
REGISTER
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The gradual withdrawal of exceptional measures adopted to address the financial crisis in 
2010 was delayed significantly by the sovereign debt crisis which was at its worst in May 
and November. As a result of the problems observed in May, the Eurosystem implemented 
the Securities Markets Programme which was a temporary addition to the Covered Bonds 
Purchase Programme that began in July 2009 and which ended on 1 July 2010. At the end 
of 2010, the Eurosystem held in total under the two programmes a portfolio of €135 billion, 
€13 billion of which were managed by the Banco de España.
As in 2009, during 2010 the funding granted by the Eurosystem through its monetary 
policy operations was higher than credit institutions’ liquidity requirements and, conse-
quently, they placed their surplus liquidity in the deposit facility. However, during 2010 the 
structure of Eurosystem operations showed a notable return to normal: volumes in the 
main refinancing operations increased and those in longer-term refinancing operations 
decreased (particularly due to the maturity in June of the one-year refinancing operation) 
and, finally, use of the deposit facility has declined substantially.
The average liquidity requirements of the euro area as a whole and of Spain performed very 
similarly, falling by 6.5% and 6.8%, respectively. Spanish institutions continued along the 
same vein as in the previous two years, increasing their use of Eurosystem funds and acting 
as net lenders to the rest of the European banking system. Thus, Spanish institutions ob-
tained net funding from the Eurosystem that totalled €96 billion, an increase of 30% with 
respect to 2009. However, this change was amply offset by the increase in funds delivered 
through TARGET to the rest of the European system which amounted to €61 billion.
Once again in 2010 the gross financing obtained by Spanish institutions in Eurosystem li-
quidity injection operations stood on average at 15% of the total which represents a sig-
nificant increase from 11.4% in 2009. However, this change in their share of financing was 
reversed partially in 2010 Q4 and, as a result, stood at 13.2% in December 2010.
In addition to the above-mentioned Eurosystem portfolios, the Banco de España owns a 
portfolio of euro-denominated fixed-income bonds with an average outstanding balance 
of €80 billion in 2010. Holdings of foreign currency denominated assets stood on average 
at $13 billion. As at 31 December 2010, assets in euro, foreign currency and gold totalled 
€96 billion.
Throughout 2010 the Banco de España continued to manage part of the ECB’s foreign 
reserves which had an average volume of $7 billion.
The Spanish system of large-value payments, TARGET2-Banco de España (the Spanish 
component of TARGET2) operated soundly and stably in 2010, reaching availability of 
100%. During the year the system processed more than 7.5 million transactions, remain-
ing flat with respect to 2009, in line with the transactions processed by TARGET2 overall. 
Transactions amounting to more than €88 billion were settled which is 5% down on the 
previous year’s figures.
With regard to retail payments, around 1,590 million transactions, totalling approximately 
€1.7  billion were processed through the National Electronic Clearing System (SNCE), 
which is managed by Iberpay, a company owned by the system’s participants. The total 
transactions processed by SNCE recorded a year-on-year growth rate of 2.8%, similar to 
that in 2009. The amounts processed hardly changed in 2010 and the strong year-on-year 
decline in 2009 came to a halt.
As a result of the sovereign 
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As for the adaptation of the Spanish retail payments system to SEPA (the Single Euro Pay-
ments Area), noteworthy is the entry into force of Payment Services Law 16/2009 which 
together with the incorporation of a set of improvements in the design and processing of 
SEPA payment instruments contributed to the highly significant growth in the volume of 
SEPA-compliant credit transfers from Spain. The number of SEPA transactions processed 
increased four-fold during 2010 (65.7 million transfers compared with 16.8 million in 2009), 
meaning that the migration rate reached its highest level in November 2010 of around 
22%. This figure continued to be considerably higher than the average for Europe as 
whole.
However, the situation is different for SEPA direct debits. Although practically all Spanish 
institutions have been able to offer this new Pan-European instrument since November 
2010, its use is still very limited.
As for the adaptation of bank payment cards to SEPA, it should be noted that during 2010 
the introduction of the international EMV standard in ATMs and POSs was practically com-
pleted (100% and 94%, respectively). Approximately 70% of the total number of cards in 
circulation had migrated to this new technology which is based on the inclusion of a chip.
The Banco de España continued to represent the institutions owning Iberpay, at their re-
quest, at STEP2 which is managed by EBA Clearing. Thus, these institutions can ex-
change SEPA credit transfers with any institution in the single payments area. The transfer 
operations processed through this “payment gateway” (Iberpay-Banco de España-STEP2) 
are settled in the accounts that the institutions represented hold in TARGET2-Banco de 
España. In July 2010 a new “payment gateway” service came into operation for SEPA di-
rect debit transactions.
During 2010 the Banco de España continued to perform its task of oversight of payment 
systems, with the aim of contributing to their security and efficient operation. The fifth edi-
tion of the Annual Report on Oversight of Payment Systems2 was published to provide 
information on the most notable developments in national payment systems and the over-
sight activities carried out.
TARGET2 and the SNCE are the main payment systems subject to oversight. The over-
sight tasks of TARGET2 are undertaken jointly with other Eurosystem central banks and 
are coordinated by the ECB, while the oversight of SNCE is performed by the Banco de 
España in accordance with the shared criteria and policies set for the whole Eurosystem. 
In 2010, the Bank began an exercise to evaluate the degree of compliance with the basic 
oversight principles applicable to the SNCE which will end in 2011 and whose general 
findings are planned to be published in the Annual Report on Oversight of Payment Systems.
In 2010, within the framework of Eurosystem agreements for euro banknote production, 
the Banco de España was responsible for producing 844 million 50 and 5 euro banknotes 
(it was responsible for 50 and 20 euro banknotes in 2009). These banknotes were pro-
duced following the quality and security standards set by the Governing Council of the 
ECB. Part of the total amount produced was used to cover domestic requirements, while 
the remainder was sent to other Eurosystem central banks, according to the agreements 
and distribution timetables established. Also, the Banco de España received consign-
ments of banknotes of other denominations produced by other Eurosystem members.
SEPA credit transfers from 
Spain increased significantly
70% of bank cards already 
include the new chip
6.2.1  Oversight of payment 
systems
6.3  BANKNOTE MANAGEMENT
2  Available in the “Publications” section of the Banco de España’s website at www.bde.es/webbde/en/
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In 2010 the Bank received 3,200 million banknotes from credit institutions, 11% more than 
the previous year’s figure. In turn, the Banco de España delivered 3,007 million banknotes 
to credit institutions, 10.4% more than in 2009. As in previous years, the volume of bank-
notes received exceeded those withdrawn, resulting in net negative issuance of 5, 10 and 
20 euro banknotes. In any event, these figures do not signify a reduction in the number of 
banknotes in circulation given the sizeable inflows of notes into Spain which are intro-
duced by visitors from other European countries.
In the area of banknote custody and distribution, the Banco de España continued working 
on the improvement of a system to distribute banknotes and coins flexibly and swiftly, 
guaranteeing they are available anywhere in Spain in the amounts and with the character-
istics required at the lowest possible cost. As a result of close collaboration with the bank-
ing industry very particular logistic activities have been managed effectively and safely.
One of the Banco de España’s functions is to monitor the quality of cash in circulation by 
withdrawing counterfeits and maintaining high quality banknotes. In this area, on a daily 
basis the Bank checks and monitors counterfeits which appear in the market in collabo-
ration with the police and the legal authorities in Spain, the ECB and other central banks 
that issue euro banknotes and coins. As a result of this coordination, considerable suc-
cess has been achieved in the fight against counterfeiting by identifying and withholding 
several consignments of counterfeit banknotes before they were put into circulation. As 
for the quality and fitness of banknotes in circulation, the Bank continued to analyse and 
check the banknotes which are withdrawn daily from circulation, destroying those which 
are damaged and replacing them with new or high-quality used banknotes. More than 
3,900 million banknotes were checked and sorted at the Banco de España throughout 
the year.
The adaptation period for Spain to comply with the rules established by the Eurosystem in 
the European framework for euro banknote recirculation (ECB Decision of 16 September 
2010) ended on 31 December 2010. This framework affects all cash handlers and estab-
lishes very strict rules for the rigorous monitoring of the authenticity of euro banknotes in 
circulation and levels of quality and fitness. Consequently, at end-2010, all the banknotes 
dispensed by Spanish ATMs had been subject to a prior test for genuineness and classi-
fied by fitness, according to the rules established, by machines certified by the Bank or 
that came directly from it. Furthermore, all the banknotes recirculated over the counter had 
been manually processed by trained professionals or by machines which passed the tests 
agreed by the Eurosystem. The procedure represents an important guarantee for Europe-
an citizens as regards the authenticity of euro banknotes in circulation and is a first-rate 
instrument for preserving and maintaining the public’s confidence in euro banknotes.
The Banco de España also has the function, entrusted to it by the Treasury, of putting 
coins into circulation. In 2010 1,022 million coins were put into circulation and 245 million 
were withdrawn from circulation, with the result that net issuance grew by 777 million coins 
to 15,645 million coins at year-end. Also in this area, as with banknotes, important legal 
provisions were adopted that will strengthen monitoring and checking systems to guaran-
tee the authenticity and the quality of the coins in circulation.
In accordance with the corresponding regulations, the Banco de España continued to 
implement the Fund for the Acquisition of Financial Assets (FAFA), acting as its agent and 
custodian through the Treasury Special Schemes Support Service. This task includes the 
management of the cash flows generated by the securities in its portfolio and undertaking 
At end-2010, 100% of the 
banknotes dispensed by ATMs 
had been subject to 
authenticity and quality 
checks
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the valuation adjustments of assets due to changes in prices, as well as keeping the ac-
counts of transactions and preparing its annual accounts and periodic reports.
In 2010 the repo transactions arranged as a result of the first auction for the acquisition of 
assets matured and the resulting amount was paid into the Treasury.
The statistical function of the Banco de España is established in its Law of Autonomy and in 
the National Statistics Plan. The Law of Autonomy provides that the Banco de España shall 
compile and publish statistics relating to its functions and that it shall assist the ECB in the 
compilation of the statistical information needed for the fulfilment of the functions of the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks (ESCB). The main statistics compiled by the Banco de España 
under the Law of Autonomy relate to financial institutions and markets and to interest rates. 
The statistics compiled under the current Plan are the Balance of Payments and the Interna-
tional Investment Position, the Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy, the Survey of 
Household Finances, and Public Debt, according to the Excessive Deficit Protocol (EDP).
In addition, the Banco de España, through its Central Balance Sheet Data Office, compiles 
information on the balance sheet position and the results of non-financial corporations, 
using questionnaires completed voluntarily by the reporting firms, and on the annual ac-
counts filed by non-financial corporations at the Mercantile Registries. All these statistics 
are published in the Boletín Estadístico, in monographic publications and on the Banco de 
España’s website.
Apart from compiling and disseminating the above-mentioned statistics, the Bank also 
uses statistics produced by other Spanish agencies and supervisors (INE, IGAE, ministries, 
CNMV, DGSFP, etc.) and by international organisations as a source for another area of sta-
tistical work that it makes available to its own analysts and to the general public. Moreover, 
Banco de España representatives take an active part in international statistical fora (within 
the ESCB, the European Commission through Eurostat, the European Committee of Central 
Balance Sheet Data Offices, the IMF, BIS, OECD, etc.). The Bank also maintains databases 
that permit analysis of the evolution of the variables for which data are collected.
During 2010 the statistics were updated and disseminated along with the corresponding 
methodological notes and notes on changes, in accordance with the calendar which is 
kept up to date on the Banco de España’s website. The most notable elements of the 
other work undertaken by the Banco de España are mentioned below.
The Bank began to compile and send statistics to the ECB under the latter’s new require-
ments on credit institutions’ financial returns, securitisation operations and interest rates 
applied to customers, which is detailed in Circulars 1/2010 and 2/2010, both of 27 January 
2010. Also in accordance with the ECB’s guidelines, the Bank began to compile new sta-
tistics on financial vehicle corporations. Furthermore, work began within the framework of 
the ESCB to provide information security by security on the financial assets in the form of 
marketable securities held by resident sectors and the time series for the Bank Lending 
Survey began to be disseminated on the Banco de España’s website.
During 2010 work continued on adapting the information system on cross-border eco-
nomic transactions to Regulation 924/2009 on cross-border transactions and to the sixth 
edition of the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, which 
was completed and published by the IMF in 2009. Accordingly, the information require-
ments were determined by the ECB and Eurostat. Similarly, a European procedure for the 
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exchange of information on intra-European investment came into operation which repre-
sents the first practical experience in the area of the systematic regular exchange of infor-
mation on specific cross-border operations.
2010 saw the completion of the work to adapt the various products of the Central Balance 
Sheet Data Office to the Spanish National Classification of Economic Activities (CNAE-2009). 
This new classification was included in the data contributed to the European database BACH 
(Bank for the Account of Companies Harmonised), which was also provided for the first time 
with the information of small companies which filed their data at the Mercantile Registries, 
notably increasing the coverage of Spain. Lastly, following the line adopted in previous years 
to increase the dissemination of its products and to facilitate electronic access to corpora-
tions and users in 2010 all its publications were disseminated via the Internet.
In addition to the improvements in the infrastructure for collecting, exchanging and ac-
cessing statistical information (which are partly related to the projects mentioned in previ-
ous sections), work continued in this area to provide data collection procedures by elec-
tronic means, with the introduction of a new Internet application for receiving information 
from corporations and individuals and with the inclusion of these procedures in the Banco 
de España’s Virtual Office.
The most important challenge in 2010 for the Claims Service was the need to handle the 
drastic rise in the volume of claims in the two previous years.
Consequently, the Claims Service was compelled to introduce new working and organisa-
tional methods in order to maximise its resources and boost efficiency.
The data on the Claims Service’s activity during 2010 show that it has continued to grow, 
albeit more smoothly than in previous years (more detailed information is provided in the 
Claims Service’s annual report). For instance, during 2010 the number of written claims 
received rose by approximately 7% with respect to the previous year. Similarly, the number 
of claims resolved increased by around 11% over 2009.
In 2010 signed reports totalled 4,865, up 4% on 2009.
The Service’s activity in the area of enquiries decreased in comparison with 2009 since 
3,394 queries were submitted electronically, 1,443 fewer than in the previous year.
Notable in raising the Service’s external profile at European level was its participation in 
the two annual meetings of FIN-NET, the European network for settling cross-border finan-
cial disputes out of court in the European Union, of which Spain is a founder member.
Similarly, the Claims Service participated actively in the conferences and seminars given 
to employees of Municipal Offices for Consumer Affairs under the Financial Education Plan 
2008-2012 (see Section 9.2.2), implemented jointly by the Banco de España and the Na-
tional Securities Market Commission (other institutions such as the Directorate General of 
Insurance and Pension Funds, the Ministry of Education and the National Consumer Af-
fairs Institute, among others, have become involved).
As a public agency, the Banco de España has the obligation of accountability vis-à-vis the 
general public, although in the case of the Bank a balance must be struck between this 
obligation and the need for confidentiality, a key element in performing its duties as finan-
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cial system supervisor. The communication policy of the Banco de España has a twofold 
objective: to improve knowledge about the Bank’s functions and actions and to contribute 
to the confidence of citizens in the financial system. The need to strengthen confidence in 
the financial system has become particularly important in the context of the current finan-
cial crisis and, consequently, transparency about the situation of the banking system has 
been constant in all the communication activities performed by the Bank in 2010.
During 2010, the Bank’s relations with the media focused on the international financial 
crisis and the restructuring of Spain’s financial system. For instance, most of the public 
speeches by the Bank’s management during this period addressed the economic outlook 
and the reform of the banking system. The challenges facing the financial system also 
gave rise to the vast majority of requests for information received and were present in 
many of the Bank’s publications.
In addition to the usual informative meetings to disseminate the work of the Bank’s various 
departments, worth noting was the media coverage of the results of the stress testing of 
credit institutions and of the information on the savings banks restructuring process. The 
presentation of the financial education website www.finanzasparatodos.es (“finance for every-
one”) (see Section 9.2.2) in May, the award ceremony of the Bernácer prize in June and that 
of the King Juan Carlos economics prize in November were also widely reported in the media.
Following the previous year’s trend, in 2010 a high number of requests for interviews were 
made by foreign media, which as described above, centred on the consequences of the 
crisis for the Spanish financial system. Overall, various representatives of the Bank gave 
around 30 interviews (a third more than in the previous year), most of them to foreign media. 
The reform of the banking system stimulated the interest of the international specialist 
press, which resulted in a rise of 70% in requests for interviews from foreign media with 
respect to 2009. As has become customary, approximately a quarter of the interviews given 
in this period came within the Bank’s branch network-based communication plan, the pur-
pose of which is to acquaint local and regional media with the Banco de España’s activities.
Nonetheless, as in previous years, the main channel for communicating the Bank’s view-
point regarding the economic situation and the financial system was its regular publica-
tions, such as the Annual Report, the Economic Bulletin and the Financial Stability Report, 
and the public speeches made by its management. In addition to the Governor’s regular 
appearances before Parliament (in June, to present the Annual Report, and in October, 
before the Parliamentary Budget Committee and in November, before the Senate Budget 
Committee), the Deputy Governor, as Chairman of the Governing Committee of the FROB, 
appeared before Parliament in June, September and December to report in camera on the 
FROB’s action to date. In addition to these appearances, members of the Bank’s govern-
ing bodies participated in more than 40 domestic and international fora.
As a result of the Banco de España’s commitment to offer direct information to the public, its 
most important communication channel in terms of speed, efficiency and cost, is its website.
The access statistics corroborate the importance of the website. In 2010 there were 
2.7 million visitors in total compared with 2.4 million in the previous year, up 12.5% on the 
previous year. The number of pages visited by users exceeded 25 million, as against 
23 million in 2009, representing an increase of 8%.
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In 2010 the process of translating the website into English was completed in order to sat-
isfy the growing demand for information from international users. In addition, more than 
200 projects relating to architecture, the enlargement or improvement of content were 
undertaken for a website comprising more than 2,000 pages and 20,000 files.
Together with the website, the Banco de España has made available to users several por-
tals which are aimed at covering the specific information needs of certain segments. Note-
worthy among these Portals is the Bank Customer’s Portal, which was visited by more 
than 500,000 users, and the content included in the Educational Portal created in 2010, 
which recorded more than 84,000 visitors.
Also noteworthy is the role played by the Virtual Office, opened in January 2010, which has 
enabled members of the public, corporations, financial institutions and general govern-
ment to perform administrative procedures and submit queries electronically to the Banco 
de España. In its first year of existence it was visited by 89,000 users and the most fre-
quently requested administrative procedure was the “Request for reports on exposures 
from the Central Credit Register by borrowers”.
In 2010 the Banco de España handled 53,658 requests from corporations and members of 
the public from various specialised information points. Noteworthy, in terms of volume, 
were the 31,627 enquiries received from the public by the Claims Service about several 
aspects of their relationship with banks. In turn, the Bank Customer’s Portal processed 
5,100 requests and the Statistical Information Service responded to around 11,000. The 
most commonly requested information related to financial statistics (institutions and mar-
kets) followed by interest and exchange rates.
In line with the Banco de España’s wish to make itself better known to different social 
groups, last year it distributed 31,000 copies of informative materials and 15,000 units of 
informative and educational products of the Eurosystem and of the European Commis-
sion. These items were distributed by post and during guided visits of the Bank. Further-
more, there were more than 36,000 downloads from the Educational Portal of various edu-
cational materials (brochures, presentations and videos).
The Bank has a policy of multilingual presentation of the materials which, since they are 
addressed to the residents of regions with co-official languages, require translation and it 
actively participates in the translation into these languages of materials which are pro-
duced by the Eurosystem for the general public.
The Financial Education Plan is a joint project of the Spanish National Securities Market Com-
mission and the Banco de España, which aims to improve the financial education of current and 
future users of financial services. For this purpose, in 2010 two of the Plan’s more far-reaching 
initiatives were implemented: the portal www.finanzasparatodos.es (“finance for everyone”) and 
the pilot programme to provide financial education in Compulsory Secondary Education.
The portal, which was presented in May, includes basic practical advice, tools and other 
means for managing personal finances. Since its launch until year-end, more than 
1,046,051 pages were visited. The website also contains resources and games for young 
people, and educational guides can be downloaded.
In this academic year, in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, the Bank introduced 
a pilot programme to familiarise secondary school students with financial culture. More 
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than 2,600 students in the third year of Compulsory Secondary Education from 32 schools 
throughout Spain took part in this programme. Once the results have been analysed, the 
initiative will cover all 15 year old students.
Additionally, in 2010 the Banco de España participated regularly in educational fora organ-
ised by universities and other academic bodies.
During its fifth year of existence, the Virtual Classroom, an educational portal for young 
people to foster knowledge of the Banco de España and spread awareness of its mission 
to guarantee the stability of prices, payments and the financial system, became estab-
lished as a learning tool for the educational community. This is clear from the fact that 
270,000 portal pages were consulted by over 61,000 visitors during 2010.
The Competition for Schools organised by the Banco de España for upper-level secondary 
and middle-level vocational training students is an educational instrument which fosters 
excellence and the entrepreneurial spirit of students and has aroused growing interest 
among schools since it was created. The 4th Competition for Schools, held in the 2009-
2010 academic year, merited the participation of 2,430 students from 486 schools, which 
is considerably higher than the figures for last year when 1,716 students from 214 teams 
competed.
The 4th Competition for Schools (dedicated to financial stability), in which 486 teams from 
public and private schools throughout Spain took part, was divided into a first general 
qualifying round and a second round consisting of a written contribution based on the 
theme “Financial stability: a task for all”. The winner was the Camilo José Cela Secondary 
School located in Pozuelo de Alarcón (Madrid). The diploma and prize (eight laptop com-
puters) were awarded at a ceremony presided by the Deputy Governor of the Banco de 
España.
The Educational Corner, the section of the Educational Portal on the Banco de España’s 
website for primary school teachers and students, permits the downloading of educa-
tional support materials and provides supplementary activities for the students to do in 
class or at home. These materials include, most notably, “The Safe”, a game for use in the 
classrooms of upper primary school students, which aims to promote basic knowledge 
about the euro, the Banco de España and the ECB through a game in which students and 
their teacher represent different agents in the real financial economy. The teams of stu-
dents face situations, questions and problems which they must resolve with the help of 
background information cards which can be acquired from other teams in a sort of infor-
mation market. Each question is resolved with a transaction involving euro banknotes and, 
consequently, the game includes specimen euro banknotes enabling students to handle 
them and identify their characteristics and security features. In 2010, 440 schools request-
ed the Bank to send this game to them.
The Banco de España provides for institutional and educational visits to its headquarters 
in Madrid and to its branches. In 2010 it welcomed more than 4,900 visitors compared with 
2,500 visitors in 2009. Furthermore, at the end of 2010 volunteers from the Sports and 
Cultural Club of Banco de España Employees began to help with the guided visits.
In 2010, the Banco de España carried out communication activities as a member of the 
ESCB. In addition to helping to define and implement the Eurosystem’s communication 
strategy through its participation in the Eurosystem and ESCB Communications Commit-
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tee and to publishing ECB press releases and communications on its website, the Com-
munication Department carried out various initiatives under the Eurosystem communica-
tion plan, notably including the visit of Spanish media to the ECB, the updating of 
information materials, in particular, those on euro banknotes and the preparation of inter-
active educational materials and of a competition on price stability for upper secondary 
school students.
As at 31 December 2010, the Banco de España’s headcount amounted to 2,709 employ-
ees, the lowest figure in the last five years.
This decrease was due especially to the retirement of an exceptionally high number of 
employees (145 in total) which represent 6% of the headcount. This was partly on account 
of changes in the legislation governing retirement in Spain and partly on account of a large 
group of employees reaching retirement age in 2010.
As for the breakdown of headcount, the number of more highly qualified employees con-
tinued to increase and reached approximately 60% of the total, while the number of less 
qualified employees continued to contract (currently 7.3% of the total).
Under the internal mobility project introduced in 2007 to facilitate the professional devel-
opment of employees, 222 employees changed job in 2010, 9% of headcount compared 
with 8% in 2009. Similarly, 30 positions of responsibility were filled internally as opposed 
to only two which were filled externally through a competitive examination.
Also as a result of active policies for equal opportunities, the proportion of females in the 
workforce grew again with respect to the previous year and currently stands at slightly 
more than 40%.
In the area of in-house training, the Executive Commission approved the 2010-2013 four-year 
Training Plan, which includes different types of programmes. These will focus particularly on 
technical training, which will be organised into seven schools of technical knowledge.
In 2010, the number of hours of training given amounted to 143,099 in total, which repre-
sents an average of 51 hours per employee and a total of 5,074 places were taken up on 
training courses, following the same trend as in the previous year. 68% of the workforce 
attended a training course in 2010 and 197 employees attended international courses. 99 
employees from other central banks and international bodies participated in Banco de 
España training courses.
During 2010 27 selection processes for permanent posts were organised, 15 internal pro-
cesses and 12 external ones, involving 417 and 9,382 applicants, respectively. These 
posts were filled successfully.
Furthermore, 202 individuals were selected to fill temporary posts in order to cover staffing 
needs arising from Eurosystem projects and short-term absences, up to the legally permit-
ted coverage levels.
As in past years, in order to contribute to the practical training of university students, the 
Bank continued the previous trend of welcoming in each academic year a representative 
number of suitable university students who wish to gain practical working experience in 
the financial sector (in total, there were 61 grant-holders in different areas of the Bank).
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Last year was particularly significant because of the wage cut introduced by Royal Decree-
Law 8/2010 of 20 May 2010, adopting extraordinary budget-deficit-reduction measures.
The Banco de España applied the corresponding reduction to employee remuneration in 
line with the provisions of the above-mentioned Royal Decree-Law through an agreement 
with the staff trade union representatives.
As part of the reorganisation of the Directorate General Services, the Procurement and 
General Services Department assumed the functions of the Maintenance, Construction, 
and Security Services, in order to optimise resources.
In the area of procurement the Annual Plan approved for 2010 was fully complied with and 
a total of 191 procurement processes were transacted. Furthermore, 204 contracts were 
extended and prices were renegotiated leading to a considerable reduction in costs.
From the standpoint of joint Eurosystem procurement, the Banco de España participated 
actively in the work of the Eurosystem Procurement Coordination Office, it was involved in 
two working groups and five joint tenders, and eleven new documents on good procure-
ment practices were drawn up.
The activity of the Maintenance and Works Service during 2010 addressed the improve-
ment in the reliability of facilities, greater energy efficiency and the removal of architectural 
barriers as well as recovering space at the Cibeles premises.
Noteworthy in the branch network were the following:
— Overhaul of cash handling rooms at the Zaragoza branch.
— Renovation of electromechanical installations in Zaragoza and Bilbao.
— Updating and extension of the fire-prevention system in Seville and of the air-
conditioning system in Valencia.
— Also, the Plan to Improve Security and Video Surveillance Systems began and 
will continue in 2011.
In 2010 the Information Systems Department was reorganised and the number of divisions 
and units was reduced to increase efficiency and improve system availability, in line with 
the shared target of the whole Directorate General Services.
Developments regarding Eurosystem projects, apart from those described in section 2 in 
relation to TARGET2-Securities, were as follows:
— MOP (Market Operations Platform): an agreement was reached between the 
central banks of France, Spain, Italy and Germany and the ECB to develop the 
project and subsequently supply the service to the Eurosystem. The Banco de 
España and the Bank of France will lead the project and will host the develop-
ment and production systems.
— Eurosystem Public Key Infrastructure (ESCB-PKI): as a result of the reorgani-
sation of the IAM (Identity and Access Management) project, the Banco de 
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España will undertake this project on its own (making it the first service that it 
will provide to the Eurosystem as a supplier) and it should be in operation in 
September 2011.
— ESCB Mail Program: this project which is led by the Banco de España, is 
geared at providing a new mail infrastructure which will permit the secure ex-
change of messages between ESCB members. Part of the work was under-
taken in 2010, in collaboration with the Bundesbank and the Bank of Italy, in-
cluding the replacement of the CebaMail mail system by another system with 
new technology called ESCBMail.
As for operational applications, noteworthy was the introduction of the CDI system to 
manage banknote cash transactions. Once it had been implemented and brought on 
stream, work commenced on a new system to handle cash deposits and withdrawals both 
of banknotes and coins in accordance with international standards.
The most salient actions in respect of IT infrastructures are as follows:
— Creation of two new devices for the telematic exchange of information with 
external institutions: the automated exchange of operations (ITO) and the ex-
change of files via the Internet (ITW), which open up new possibilities and are 
more flexible.
— Signing of two major strategic agreements:
— Four-year agreement to cover the capacity requirements of the central 
computers and their maintenance as well as the software licenses required.
— Software license and maintenance agreement for 2011-2013.
— Updating of security rules. Three new internal regulations were published.
— Completion of the work to increase the connection speed between branches 
and Madrid and the installation of alarm systems linking branches to police 
stations.
— Commencement of a project to modernise the telephone system which will in-
troduce IP-based voice technology (or IP telephony), unifying the voice and 
data networks and improving the availability of the service in case of a disaster.
In the area of business continuity, a new room was equipped exclusively for restarting the 
most critical business processes in crisis situations. Due to this new room, it was possible 
to perform the restarting exercises for the first time under real working conditions, as rec-
ommended by best practices. Likewise, a tool to automate communications for crisis situ-
ations was used for the first time.
During 2010 initiatives continued to be implemented in the form of projects relating to 
electronic administration and the modernisation of documentation processing.
On 1 January the Banco de España’s Virtual Office came into operation. The Virtual Office 
is the website available to members of the public who wish to deal with the Bank elec-
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tronically. During 2010 information on 34 processes and services was published on this 
website with descriptions tailored to target audiences, along with the related technical 
specifications and regulations. More than 97,000 members of the public used this service 
to perform administrative procedures and the Bank answered their questions through the 
queries mailbox.
Following the Virtual Office, the next step in implementing the electronic administration 
model is bringing the Electronic Register into operation. For this purpose, in 2010 the nec-
essary efforts were made to standardise the prior physical registration processes required: 
a Single General Register system was created at the Banco de España, the corresponding 
regulations were enacted (Internal General Register Circular 2/2010 of 22 December 2010) 
and a computer application was installed which ensures full integration of the recording of 
entries in the register in Madrid and at the branches. The foregoing will make it possible to 
address the electronic register project in 2011, which represents a direct improvement to 
the services provided to the public and which, internally, also simplifies and streamlines 
management and strengthens the monitoring of the registration processes and their legal 
certainty.
Also, in order to modernise the filing of documentation, an ambitious project was under-
taken to re-organise and optimise storage space in the Archives which freed up 12,400m 
of shelves (part of the space recovered will be used for offices), the Bank’s collections 
were reorganised and a computer program was installed to locate and monitor them.
As for the Bank’s historical, art and document collections, particular attention was paid to 
its magnificent collection of architectural plans. The cataloguing of nearly 1700 plans was 
completed, 430 were restored, and they were digitalised in accordance with the standard-
ised equipment maintenance procedures.
In 2010 the new budget control computer software was implemented. It improves man-
agement and control procedures in respect of the Bank’s expenses and investments.
In 2010 the new accounting software continued to be improved and greater automaticity 
was achieved in submitting financial statements to the ECB.
Also in 2010, following the preparation of the Bank’s first risk maps, the information ob-
tained continued to be used and the risk mitigation measures proposed by each of the 
Bank’s departments were implemented. Similarly, after the methodology, which was used 
previously to determine the risks and processes, was adjusted, the first two-year review of 
the Bank’s processes as a whole began, which will lead to the preparation of a new risk 
map at the end of 2011.
Lastly, as regards the Bank’s international presence, it continued to work closely in respect 
of training with members of Latin American central banks.
According to the Statute approved by Internal Circular 4/2007 of 20 July 2007, the aim of 
internal auditing is to evaluate the efficacy, sufficiency and suitability of all the systems and 
procedures established for the management and control of risks. The internal audit func-
tion is performed by the Internal Audit Department, which reports directly to the Governor. 
In addition, the Internal Audit Department must afford the Audit Committee of the Govern-
ing Council all such assistance as it may request and provide it with any information it may 
need.
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The Internal Audit Department’s audit activity is specified in an Annual Plan approved by 
the Governor and reported to the Executive Commission. In accordance with the 2010 
plan, the Internal Audit Department carried out the following main audits: annual accounts 
of the Banco de España; the report envisaged in Law 44/2002 on Financial System Reform 
Measures; administration of the IT security of the Directorate General Banking Regulation; 
authorisations and administrative procedures of the Directorate General Banking Supervi-
sion; procurement processes of the Procurement and General Services Department; gen-
eral government statistics; the processing of proceedings; advice for participation in inter-
national meetings; monitoring the access of individuals and merchandise to the buildings 
at the Cibeles complex; the ECB’s strategic stock of banknotes; banknote production; 
recording of financial instruments related to monetary policy operations; monetary policy 
operations; maintenance and operation of IT infrastructures and systems, and payment 
systems oversight. Finally, it monitored the recommendations of the specific audits of the 
Banco de España and of those common to the ESCB.
ANNUAL ACCOUNTS OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA
2010
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1  INTRODUCTION
The annual accounts of the Banco de España (“the Bank”) as established by Article 29.1 
of its internal rules, approved by a Resolution of the Governing Council of 28 March 2000 
(Official State Gazette (BOE) of 6 April 2000), comprise the balance sheet, the profit and 
loss account and the notes on the accounts. The accounts have been prepared in accord-
ance with the internal accounting rules and principles of the Banco de España. These rules 
and principles are based on the accounting framework established for national central 
banks (NCBs) of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)1 pursuant to Article 26.4 
of the Statute of the ESCB on standardisation of accounting and reporting procedures 
relating to operations undertaken by NCBs. In the cases not regulated by Eurosystem ac-
counting legislation, the Banco de España applies its internal policies based on generally 
accepted accounting principles adapted to the special characteristics of the operations 
and functions of a central bank.
In accordance with the provisions of Articles 29 and 32 of its internal rules, the Bank’s 
annual accounts have been audited by the Internal Audit Department and analysed 
and examined by the Audit Committee appointed for the purpose by the Bank’s Gov-
erning Council. The accounts have also been audited by independent external audi-
tors, as stipulated by Article 29 of the Bank’s internal rules and Article 27 of the Statute 
of the ESCB.
Under the provisions of Article 4.2 of Law 13/1994 of 1 June 1994 of Autonomy of the 
Banco de España, it is for the government, upon proposal by the Minister for Economic 
Affairs and Finance, to approve the Bank’s balance sheet and accounts for the year, which 
will be sent to Parliament (Cortes Generales) for informational purposes. The Governing 
Council of the Bank, under the provisions of Article 21.g) of the aforementioned Law, is 
responsible for preparing the Bank’s annual accounts.
Unless otherwise indicated, the figures are expressed in millions of euro. Those relating 
to 2009 are presented solely for comparison with 2010. Due to rounding, on occasions 
the totals included in the balance sheet, profit and loss account and notes on the an-
nual accounts may not equal the sum of the individual figures. The structure of the 
Banco de España balance sheet differs from that of previous years with regard to the 
numbering of various items, due to the full and total adoption of the central bank an-
nual balance sheet format set out in Annex VIII of the European Central Bank Guideline 
of 11 November 2010 on the legal framework for accounting and financial reporting in 
the ESCB (ECB/2010/20).
This document presents the accounts for the year 2010. Section 2 includes the bal-
ance sheet and profit and loss account at 31 December 2010; Section 3 contains the 
notes on the accounts, with the accounting policies that have served as a framework 
for their preparation, the explanatory notes on the most important aspects of the bal-
ance sheet and profit and loss account, and the changes in capital, reserves, provi-
sions and revaluation accounts; and Section 4, in compliance with Article 4.2 of the 
Law of Autonomy, details the contributions made to the Deposit Guarantee Funds and 
1  Guideline of the European Central Bank of 11 November 2010 on the legal framework for accounting and finan-
cial reporting in the ESCB (ECB/2010/20).
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the loans and transactions agreed on other than an arm’s-length basis or which in any 
other way entail a loss of profit or losses for the Bank, along with the estimated 
amount.
Finally, Annexes 1 and 2 include the reports of the external auditors and of the Bank’s 
Audit Committee on the annual accounts presented in the preceding sections.
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2 BALANCE SHEET AND PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT
NOTE NUMBER 2010 2009
ASSETS
1 Gold and gold receivables 1 9,555.49 6,938.31
2 Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in foreign currency 14,040.29 12,306.81
2.1 Receivables from the IFM 2 4,782.17 4,119.17
2.2 Balances with banks and security investments, external loans 
and other external assets 
l 
3 9,258.12 8,187.65
3 Claims on euro area residents denominated in foreign currency 4 0.06 0.01
4 Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in euro 907.25 1,014.96
4.1 Balances with banks, securities investments and loans 5 907.25 1,014.96
4.2 Claims arising from the credit facility under ERM II — —
5 Lending to euro area credit institutions related to monetary policy
operations denominated in euro 6 61,550.47 90,087.62
5.1 Main rejnancing operations 20,285.31 657.70
5.2 Longer-term rejnancing operations 39,662.77 89,421.45
5.3 Fine-tuning reverse operations 1,585.00 —
5.4 Structural reverse operations — —
5.5 Marginal lending facility — —
5.6 Credits related to margin calls 17.39 8.47
6 Other claims on euro area credit institutions denominated in euro 7 2.04 1,151.64
7 Securities of euro area residents denominated in euro 8 87,827.96 84,340.68
7.1 Securities held for monetary policy purposes 13,906.71 3,400.37
7.2 Other securities 73,921.24 80,940.31
8 General government debt denominated in euro 9 4,081.98 4,665.45
9 Intra-Eurosystem claims 10 20,945.82 13,121.19
9.1 Participating interest in ECB 801.70 663.30
9.2 Claims equivalent to the transfer of foreign reserves 4,783.65 4,783.65
9.4 Net claims related to the allocation of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem 15,360.48 7,674.24
9.5 Other claims within the Eurosystem (net) — —
10 Items in course of settlement 1.06 0.34
11 Other assets 3,708.73 4,324.48
11.2 Tangible and intangible jxed assets 11 254.61 240.45
11.3 Other jnancial assets 12 47.18 50.45
11.4 Off-balance sheet instruments revaluation differences 13 — —
11.5 Accruals and prepaid expenses 14 1,891.39 2,126.12
11.6 Sundry 15 1,515.55 1,907.47
TOTAL ASSETS 202,621.16 217,951.50
BALANCE SHEET OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2010 
EUR m 
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NOTE NUMBER 2010 2009
LIABILITIES
1 Banknotes in circulation 16 91,917.98 88,273.78
2 Liabilities to euro area credit institutions related to monetary
policy operations denominated in euro 17 26,964.03 35,089.02
2.1 Current accounts (covering the minimum reserve system) 19,950.00 24,736.02
2.2 Deposit facility 6,997.50 10,352.00
2.3 Fixed-term deposits — —
2.4 Fine-tuning reverse operations — —
2.5 Deposits related to margin calls 16.53 1.00
3 Other liabilities to euro area credit institutions denominated in euro 0.14 0.09
5 Liabilites to other euro area residents denominated in euro 9,488.74 32,725.57
5.1 General government 18 9,336.63 31,233.05
5.2 Other liabilities 19 152.11 1,492.52
6 Liabilities to non-euro area residents denominated in euro 20 400.15 264.49
7 Liabilities to euro area residents denominated in foreign currency 0.93 0.86
8 Liabilities to non-euro area residents denominated in foreign currency 0.76 0.69
8.1 Deposits, balances and other liabilities 21 0.76 0.69
8.2 Liabilities arising from the credit facility under ERM II — —
9 Counterpart of special drawing rights allocated by the IMF 22 3,272.05 3,078.08
10 Intra-Eurosystem liabilities 23 50,864.34 41,033.92
10.2 Liabilities related to promissory notes backing the issuance of ECB debt certijcates — —
10.3 Net liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem — —
10.4 Other liabilities within the Eurosystem (net) 50,864.34 41,033.92
11 Items in course of settlement 24 138.39 103.69
12 Other liabilities  300.24 375.92
12.1 Off-balance-sheet instruments revaluation differences 25 30.43 79.67
12.2 Accruals and income collected in advance 26 80.96 69.06
12.3 Sundry 27 188.84 227.19
13 Provisions 28 5,478.81 5,312.04
14 Revaluation accounts 29 9,274.59 7,020.16
15 Capital and reserves 1,950.00 2,000.00
15.1 Capital 30 1,000.00 1,000.00
15.2 Reserves 31 950.00 1,000.00
16 Proðt for the year 32 2,570.00 2,673.18
TOTAL LIABILITIES 202,621.16 217,951.50
BALANCE SHEET OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2010 (cont'd)  
EUR m 
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Countersigned by
The Governor,
MIGUEL FERNÁNDEZ ORDÓÑEZ
The Comptroller,
JOSÉ MIGUEL GARCÍA HERNANDO
NOTE NUMBER 2010 2009
1 Interest income 1 4,450.57 4,669.85
2 Interest expense 2 1,040.39 1,005.29
3 Net interest income (1 – 2) 3,410.18 3,664.57
4 Realised gains/losses arising from jnancial operations 3 366.04 108.54
5 Write-downs on jnancial assets and positions 4 793.89 193.12
6 Transfer to/from provisions for foreign exchange rate, price and credit risks 5 407.96 688.14
7 -835.81 -772.72
8 Fees and commissions income 20.07 23.77
9 Fees and commissions expense 11.12 13.20
10 Net income from fees and commissions (8 – 9) 6 8.95 10.57
11 Income from equity shares and participating interests 7 191.04 117.94
12 Net result of pooling of monetary income 8 253.47 193.99
13 Other income and losses 9 -11.56 -12.93
14 TOTAL NET INCOME (3 + 7 + 10 + 11 + 12 + 13) 3,016.27 3,201.42
15 Staff costs 10 228.40 230.96
16 Administrative expenses 11 117.83 121.51
17 Depreciation of tangible and intangible jxed assets 12 27.34 25.58
18 Banknote production services 13 61.71 71.45
19 Other expenses 3.27 2.85
20 TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES (15 + 16 + 17 + 18 + 19) 438.54 452.35
21 Transfers and additions to other funds and provisions 14 7.73 75.89
22 PROFIT FOR THE YEAR (14 – 20 – 21) 15 2,570.00 2,673.18
Net result of ðnancial operations, write-downs and risk provisions (4 – 5 – 6)
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA FOR THE YEAR ENDING 31 DECEMBER 2010 
EUR m 
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The annual accounts of the Banco de España present fairly its net worth, financial and eco-
nomic position. They have been drawn up in accordance with the following accounting princi-
ples: prudence, recognition of post-balance-sheet events, going concern, the accruals principle, 
consistency and comparability, no offset, matching of revenues and expenses, and materiality. 
These principles conform to those set out in the accounting guides and instructions of the ECB.
The annual accounts have been prepared on a historical cost basis, modified as necessary 
to include market valuation of trading-book securities, gold and the foreign currency posi-
tion. Futures shall be valued daily at market price and significant participating interests at 
underlying book value.
Transactions in assets and liabilities are generally recorded on the settlement date, except 
that forward transactions in foreign currencies are booked at the spot settlement date. If a 
period end falls between the trade date and the spot settlement date, both spot and for-
ward transactions are recognised at the trade date.
The specific valuation criteria applied to the various assets and liabilities were the following:
Gold is recorded at acquisition cost,2 which is determined by the cash amount paid in the 
transaction including any related expense.
The cost of sales is obtained by applying the daily net average cost method. In the event that 
the cash to be paid or received is specified in a currency other than the euro, it is translated 
into euro at the mid-market exchange rate two business days before the settlement date.
On the last day of each month, gold stocks are valued at the market price in euro per troy 
ounce of fine gold. Unrealised gains or losses (except for unrealised losses at year-end) 
are reflected in an adjustment account and credited or debited, respectively, to a revalua-
tion or expense account.
Unrealised losses existing at the end of the year are taken to the profit and loss account 
and the average book value is modified. Such losses are considered irreversible in subse-
quent revaluations.
Sales of gold against foreign currency under repurchase agreements are recorded as off-
balance-sheet items, with no effect on the balance sheet. The foreign currency received by 
way of consideration is recorded on the assets side, with the obligation to repay it being 
recorded simultaneously on the liabilities side. Possible differences arising between gold 
delivered spot and that received forward are recorded as if there had been an independent 
outright sale or purchase at the time of maturity of the transaction.
Spot purchases or sales of foreign currencies are recorded at the settlement date, affect-
ing the foreign currency position from that date. Gains and losses on the spot sale of for-
3.1  Accounting policies
1  BASIC PRINCIPLES
2  BASIS OF ACCOUNTING
Gold
Foreign currencies
3 NOTES ON THE ACCOUNTS
2  As at 31/12/1998 its acquisition cost was adjusted to the market price then prevailing and the unrealised gains 
were credited to revaluation accounts. These gains are subsequently taken to profit and loss when the asset is 
sold or, alternatively, they are used to offset unrealised losses.
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eign currencies are similarly considered to be realised from the settlement date. Mean-
while, foreign exchange forward purchase and sale transactions shall be recognised in 
off-balance-sheet accounts at the spot date of the transaction, affecting the foreign cur-
rency position as at that date. The gain or loss on the transaction shall also be considered 
to be realised on that date. If a period-end falls between the trade date and the spot set-
tlement date, the transactions have to be recognised at the trade date.
Purchases are recorded at acquisition cost in euro. Purchases and sales of foreign curren-
cies against euro are valued at the exchange rate agreed in the transaction. When foreign 
currencies are bought and sold against other foreign currencies, the euro valuation is at 
the mid-market exchange rate of the currency sold on the trade date. Transactions in a 
foreign currency that do not modify the overall position therein have no effect on the book 
value of such position.
The cost in euro of foreign currency sold is calculated using the daily net average cost 
method.
Accrued interest denominated in foreign currency is recorded on a daily basis, generally 
using the mid-market rate on each day. If the rate on the relevant day is not available, the 
latest mid-market rate available shall be applied. Accrued interest receivable or payable 
denominated in foreign currency shall form part of the foreign currency position.
Foreign currencies are revalued monthly to market price. This revaluation is performed 
without netting unrealised gains against unrealised losses on the various currencies. Un-
realised gains and losses (except for unrealised losses at year-end) are reflected in adjust-
ment accounts and credited or debited, respectively, to revaluation and expense accounts.
Unrealised losses existing at the end of the year are taken to the profit and loss account 
for the year, in which case they affect the average cost of the currency in question. Such 
losses are considered irreversible in subsequent revaluations.
The criteria applied are the same as those indicated in the preceding section for foreign 
currencies.
SDRs and the net position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are valued at the year-
end SDR market exchange rate by the same methods used for other currencies.
The Banco de España holds three separate securities portfolios: a trading portfolio, a held 
to maturity portfolio and a monetary policy portfolio (set up in accordance with the ECB 
Governing Council decisions of 7 May 2009, 4 June 2009 and 9 May 2010).
In all three cases, the securities are recorded initially at acquisition cost, which is deter-
mined by the cash amount paid, less any accrued gross coupon.
The cost of securities sold or redeemed is determined by the average book value of the 
security in question. The securities in the held-to-maturity portfolio may not be sold except 
in exceptional circumstances and with the authorisation of the Operations Committee.
Trading portfolio securities are revalued monthly to market price. This revaluation is car-
ried out without any netting of unrealised gains and losses on different security codes. 
Unrealised gains and losses (except for unrealised losses at year-end) are reflected in 
Foreign banknotes
Special drawing rights (SDRs)
Securities
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adjustment accounts and credited or debited, respectively, to revaluation and expense 
accounts. Unrealised losses existing at the end of the year are taken to the profit and loss 
account. Their amount is credited directly to the securities account, and the average 
book price – and therefore the internal rate of return – of the security code concerned is 
modified. These unrealised losses are considered irreversible. The year-end adjustment 
was made using the market prices as at 28, 29 and 30 December 2010, depending on the 
class of security involved.
Securities within the held-to-maturity portfolio and the monetary policy portfolio are not 
subject to any periodic valuation, except for recognition, where applicable, of loss of value 
due to asset impairment.
Any premiums, discounts and coupons that have accrued but are not due are recorded in 
accruals accounts, using the internal rate of return of each security code for their calcula-
tion within each portfolio. These accruals are recorded daily.
The above references to acquisition cost and market prices shall, in relation to securities 
denominated in foreign currency, be understood to refer to the currency concerned, these 
amounts being translated into euro, as stipulated in the “Foreign currencies” section.
Reverse repurchase agreements involving securities are recorded on the assets side of the 
balance sheet as collateralised outward loans for the amount of the loan. Securities ac-
quired under reverse repurchase agreements are not revalued or included in the securities 
portfolio.
Repurchase agreements involving securities are recorded on the liabilities side of the bal-
ance sheet as an inward deposit collateralised by securities, the balancing entry of which 
is the cash received. Securities sold under this type of agreement remain on the Bank’s 
balance sheet and are treated as if they had remained part of the portfolio from which they 
were sold. Repurchase agreements involving securities denominated in foreign currencies 
have no effect on the average cost of the currency position.
In direct loans of securities, repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements conducted 
simultaneously are accounted for separately, each being recorded according to the valua-
tion rules set forth in the preceding two paragraphs.
Automated security loans (contracts empowering a depository of securities to lend them 
to a third party in overnight transactions, subject to certain contractual limitations) are not 
recorded in the balance sheet. The only item accounted for is the income, which is re-
corded in the profit and loss account. Transactions outstanding at year-end are recorded 
off-balance sheet.
Where there is any reasonable doubt about the recovery of an asset, it is recorded in a 
separate account and the relevant provision set aside.
These are valued at their nominal amount.
The ECB establishes the conditions applicable to the monetary policy operations con-
ducted by Eurosystem central banks and the need to obtain adequate collateral for 
them. Also, Article 32.4 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB stipulates that the 
Governing Council may decide that national central banks shall be indemnified, in ex-
Repurchase agreements 
involving securities
Doubtful debtors
Loans to financial institutions 
and balances with EU central 
banks
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ceptional circumstances, for specific losses arising from monetary policy operations 
undertaken for the ESCB. Indemnification shall be in a form deemed appropriate in the 
judgment of the Governing Council; these amounts may be offset against the national 
central banks’ monetary income (see Note 28 on the balance sheet and Note 8 on the 
profit and loss account).
In accordance with the Guideline of the European Central Bank of 11 November 2010 on 
the legal framework for accounting and financial reporting in the European System of Cen-
tral Banks (ECB/2010/20), they are valued at nominal amount (see Notes 9 and 28 to the 
balance sheet and Note 5 to the profit and loss account).
Shares and participating interests in national and/or international institutions, including the 
participating interest in the European Central Bank (ECB), are valued at cost. The partici-
pating interest in Bolsas y Mercados Españoles, Sociedad Holding de Mercados y Siste-
mas Financieros S.A. is valued at its underlying book value.
Fixed assets are defined as those non-financial assets owned by the Bank that are in-
tended be used for a period exceeding 12 months and contribute directly or indirectly to 
fulfilling its objectives and/or to the probable generation of income in the future and, in 
addition, their cost can be reliably assessed.
Fixed assets are generally valued initially at cost, defined as the amount of the monetary 
disbursements made or committed to, including any costs directly attributable to bringing 
the asset to the location and condition necessary for it to be capable of operating in the 
intended manner, such as transport, installation, professional fees for legal services, non-
refundable taxes and the fair value of other consideration given.
Trade discounts and those for defects in assets received are recorded as a reduction in the 
cost of the related assets. Cash discounts and those for late delivery are recorded in the 
profit and loss account under other income or, where appropriate, as a reduction in ex-
penses, and do not affect the acquisition cost of the asset purchased.
Fixed assets are deemed not to include those assets which, although meeting the condi-
tions to be classed as such, do not generally exceed the amount of €600 (€6,000 in the 
case of buildings, structures and plant in buildings), although there may be exceptions, 
normally for control reasons.
Only extensions, replacements, rehabilitations and improvements that exceed €6,000 are 
capitalised, provided also that the elements replaced can be removed from the balance 
sheet or that they are fully depreciated.
Computer applications developed specifically for the Banco de España the cost of which 
does not exceed €300,000 are recorded directly as expenses and are not eligible for sub-
sequent capitalisation.
After initial recognition, fixed assets are valued at acquisition cost less accumulated de-
preciation or amortisation and any impairment losses.
The acquisition cost of a fixed asset, net of its residual value, is depreciated or amortised 
systematically during its useful life on a straight-line monthly basis from the month follow-
ing that in which it was recognised in the accounts. Generally, all depreciable/amortisable 
Loans to the State
Shares and participating 
interests
Tangible and intangible fixed 
assets
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fixed assets are estimated to have a residual value of zero unless there is a deep, liquid 
market for assets similar to the one whose residual value may be received. Land, the art 
collection and fixed assets under construction are not depreciated.
The depreciation/amortisation rates and estimated useful lives applied to the various fixed 
assets in 2010 were as follows:
An asset is impaired when its book value exceeds the recoverable value. In this case, and 
only if the amounts are significant, an impairment loss is recognised by simultaneously 
reducing the item’s book value and modifying its depreciable/amortisable base.
The ECB and the NCBs, which together comprise the Eurosystem, have issued euro bank-
notes since 1 January 2002.3 The total value of euro banknotes in circulation is recorded 
by allocating to each Eurosystem NCB, on the last working day of each month, an amount 
based on the banknote allocation key.4
The ECB has been allocated a share of 8% of the total value of euro banknotes in circula-
tion, whereas the remaining 92% has been allocated to the NCBs and divided amongst 
them according to their weightings in the capital key of the ECB. The share of banknotes 
allocated to each NCB is disclosed under the item “Banknotes in circulation” on the liabil-
ity side of their respective balance sheets.
The difference between the value of the euro banknotes allocated to each NCB in accord-
ance with the banknote allocation key and the value of the euro banknotes that it actually 
puts into circulation also gives rise to remunerated intra-Eurosystem balances. These 
claims or liabilities, which incur interest,5 are disclosed under the item “Intra-Eurosystem: 
Net claims/liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem” 
(see “Intra-Eurosystem balances” in this section on accounting policies).
Banknotes in circulation
Depreciation
/Amortisation Rate (%) Useful life (years)
Buildings and structures 2 50
Renovation work 4 25
Plant in buildings 10 10
Security-related plant in buildings 20 5
Furniture and jttings 10 10
OEjce machines for the handling of banknotes and coins 10 10
Other NEjce machines 20 5
Computer equipment 25 4
Transport equipment. Cars and motor bikes 25 4
Transport equipment. Trucks and buses 10 10
Library collection 10 10
Other tangible jxed assets 20 5
Computer applications 20 5
Industrial property — Number of years of 
exclusive use
3  Decision of the European Central Bank of 13 December 2010 on the issue of euro banknotes (ECB/2010/29).
4  The banknote allocation key is that which results from applying 92 % to the Eurosystem subscribed capital key.
5  Decision of the ECB of 25 November 2010 on the allocation of monetary income of the national central banks of 
Member States whose currency is the euro (ECB/2010/23).
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From 2002 until 2007, the intra-Eurosystem balances arising from the allocation of euro 
banknotes were adjusted in order to avoid significant changes in the relative income posi-
tions of the NCBs that initially formed part of the Eurosystem as compared with previous 
years. The adjustments were effected by taking into account the differences between the 
average value of banknotes in circulation of each NCB in the specified reference period6 
and the average value of banknotes that would have been allocated to them during that 
period under the ECB’s capital key. The adjustments were reduced in annual stages until 
the end of 2007. However, this mechanism has also been applied in the case of new Mem-
ber States adopting the euro so as to calculate the amount of compensation correspond-
ing to each of them under the aforementioned calculation method. This adjustment is 
gradually reduced over a six-year period, being held unchanged during each financial year.
The interest income and expense on intra-Eurosystem balances relating to banknote al-
location is cleared through the accounts of the ECB and is disclosed under “Net interest 
income” in the profit and loss account.
Under the ECB Decision of 25 November 2010 (ECB/2010/24) on the interim distribution 
to euro area NCBs of the ECB’s income on euro banknotes in circulation arising from the 
8% of euro banknotes assigned to it and from securities purchased under the Securities 
Markets Programme, this income belongs to the NCBs and will be allocated in full to them 
in the financial year in which it accrues. Settlement takes place in January of the following 
year, in the form of an interim distribution of the income. The Governing Council may de-
cide to reduce ECB income on euro banknotes in circulation by the costs incurred by the 
ECB in connection with the issue and handling of banknotes. This Decision establishes 
that the ECB Governing Council shall decide before the end of the financial year whether 
all or part of the ECB’s income arising from the aforementioned SMP securities and, if 
necessary, all or part of the ECB’s income on euro banknotes in circulation should be re-
tained to the extent necessary to ensure that the amount of the distributed income does 
not exceed the ECB’s net profit for that year. The ECB Governing Council may also decide 
to transfer all or part of this income to an ECB provision for foreign exchange rate, interest 
rate, credit and gold price risks.  The amount distributed to NCBs is shown in the profit and 
loss account item “Income from equity shares and participating interests”.
Intra-Eurosystem balances arise from the Banco de España’s participating interest in the 
ECB, claims equivalent to the reserves transferred to the ECB and the net balance result-
ing from the transfers issued and received by TARGET27 among the national central banks 
of the ESCB, including the ECB. They also arise from the balances vis-à-vis the ECB re-
sulting from allocation of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem, from the outcome of the 
contribution and allocation of monetary income and from the positions vis-à-vis the ECB 
owing to the deferral of sundry receipts and payments.
In the case of TARGET2 operations, the resulting balance is included as an asset or liabil-
ity, as appropriate, under the balance sheet item “Other claims/liabilities within the Euro-
system (net)”. Intra-ESCB balances arising from the allocation of euro banknotes within 
the Eurosystem are included, depending on their net amount, as an asset or liability under 
“Net claim/liability related to the allocation of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem” (see 
“Banknotes in circulation” in this section on accounting policies).
Intra-Eurosystem balances
6  The reference period taken has a duration of 24 months and it begins 30 months prior to the euro cash change-
over date.
7  Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 218 ANNUAL REPORT, 2010 ANNUAL ACCOUNTS OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA
Income and expenses are recognised in the period in which they accrue.
Realised gains and realised and unrealised losses are taken to the profit and loss account. 
To calculate the acquisition cost of items sold, the average cost method is used for securi-
ties and the daily net average cost method is used for foreign currencies and gold. In the 
case of unrealised losses on any item at year-end, its average cost is reduced to the end-
of-year market price and/or exchange rate.
Unrealised gains are not recognised as income, but are transferred to a revaluation ac-
count.
Unrealised losses are taken to the profit and loss account if they exceed previous revalu-
ation gains recorded in the corresponding revaluation account, and are not reversed in 
subsequent years against new unrealised gains. Unrealised losses in any one security or 
currency or in gold are not netted against unrealised gains in other securities or currencies.
Premiums or discounts on purchased securities are calculated and shown as reductions of 
or additions to interest income and accrued over the remaining life of the securities con-
cerned, together with the accrued coupons, according to the internal rate of return method.
The Pension Scheme for Bank employees is of the defined-contribution type. The Pension 
Fund of which this Scheme forms part is external and closed-end. Contributions made by 
the Banco de España on behalf of the employees who, having joined the Bank after 1 
February 1986, are eligible to and do participate in the Scheme, are established at 7.5% 
of the so-called “regulating salary”, consisting of the salary items determined in the 
Scheme Rules. The amounts contributed by the Bank are recognised as a current expense 
in the year to which they relate.
In application of the principle of prudence, the liabilities side of the balance sheet includes 
provisions approved by the Executive Commission of the Banco de España which are 
considered necessary to cover adequately, on objective criteria, the risks derived from the 
financial positions held and other losses of a diverse nature (see Note 28 on the balance 
sheet).
Foreign exchange forward currency positions, which comprise transactions and forward 
legs of foreign exchange swaps, are included in the net foreign currency positions in order 
to calculate foreign exchange gains and losses.
As a general rule, profits and losses arising from off-balance-sheet positions are recog-
nised and treated in a similar manner to those arising from on-balance-sheet assets and 
liabilities. Specifically, in application of the economic approach, the gains and losses on 
positions in interest rate futures are considered to be realised at the time when they are 
settled net each day. Since these futures are denominated in foreign currency, such settle-
ments shall affect the foreign currency position on the day on which they take place.
These annual accounts were prepared using Bank estimates to quantify some of the as-
sets, liabilities, expenses, commitments and, in particular, provisions recorded in them 
Recognition of income
and expenses
Pension Scheme
Provisions
Off-balance-sheet positions8
3  CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING 
THE ESTIMATES MADE
8  The net position under foreign exchange forward transactions and swaps, and the foreign-exchange gains and 
losses generated by such position are shown in the balance sheet under items 11.4 on the assets side and 12.1 
on the liabilities side, depending on their sign.
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(see Note 28 on the balance sheet). As regards monetary policy operations, since they are 
conducted jointly in the Eurosystem, the estimates made by the ESCB are also taken into 
account [see Notes 6 and 8.a) on the balance sheet].
These estimates assume an ongoing slow economic recovery and instability in some 
debt markets. Although these estimates are based on the best information available at 
end-2010, future events may require them to be changed in the coming financial years. 
Any such changes would be made prospectively in accordance with current account-
ing rules.
Assets, liabilities and the profit and loss account are adjusted on the basis of events taking 
place between the end of the accounting period and date of preparation of the annual ac-
counts, should those events materially affect the Banco de España’s year-end financial 
position. The events occurring after year-end which do not affect the assets and liabilities 
at that date do not give rise to adjustments thereto, although if they are material they are 
disclosed in the notes on the accounts.
The Banco de España’s gold holdings amount to €9,555.49 million, consisting of 9.054 
million troy ounces9 of fine gold valued at a market price of €1,055.42 per ounce. These 
holdings did not change during the financial year. The value of these holdings is €2,617.18 
million more than in 2009, as a result of the rise in the market price (at end-2009 the price 
per ounce was €766.35). This increase is included in the liability revaluation accounts. The 
cost of the gold holdings is €850.43 million.
This item has three components:
a) The position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the reserve tranche. 
This is the euro equivalent of the SDRs relating to the foreign currencies as-
signed to the IMF due to Spain’s initial quota and successive increases in it 
and due to the granted to the IMF.
b) Special drawing rights (allocations). These represent the euro equivalent of 
the successive allocations of this currency by the IMF. The changes in alloca-
tions are essentially due to loan agreement transactions with third countries 
and to interest receipts or payments resulting from positions vis-à-vis the IMF.
c) Other claims on the IMF. These reflect the amount that the Banco de España 
has provided to the IMF as a contribution to the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility and the bilateral loan agreement between the IMF and Spain. 
The facility is used to finance low-interest loans to the poorest countries. The 
Banco de España has given a commitment to contribute up to SDR 830 mil-
lion to it, the amount drawn down at end-2010 being €393.51 million (SDR 
340 million). The bilateral loan agreement concluded to support the IMF’s 
ability to provide balance of payments assistance to its members has a limit 
in SDRs equivalent to €4,140 million and the transactions carried out in 2010 
totalled €301.68 million (SDR 261 million).
The breakdown in 2009 and 2010 is as follows:
4  POST-BALANCE-SHEET 
EVENTS
3.2  Notes on the balance 
sheet
1  GOLD AND GOLD 
RECEIVABLES
2  CLAIMS ON NON-EURO AREA 
RESIDENTS DENOMINATED
IN FOREIGN CURRENCY.—
RECEIVABLES FROM THE IMF
9  One troy ounce is equal to 31.1035 grams.
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The overall amount of claims on the IMF increased by €663.00 million with respect to the 
balance at end-2009.
The increase in the reserve tranche position account (€151.46 million) is basically due to 
the Banco de España’s net contributions to the IMF for loans to third countries (Greece, 
Latvia, Serbia and Ukrania, among others). Of this increase, €110.40 million related to the 
net increase in amounts denominated in foreign currencies and €41.07 million to the effect 
of the change in market foreign exchange rates between the two years. Spain’s IMF quota 
was not changed in 2010, remaining at SDR 3,048.90 million.
The increase of 173.01 million in the special drawing rights (allocation) account was due to 
the effect of the year-end market foreign exchange rates, which accounted for an increase 
of €201.21 million, less the decrease in foreign currency due to the net effect of loan dis-
posals and repayments (€28.20 million).
The increase in the “Other claims on the IMF” account (€338.53million) is due to the 
Banco de España’s contributions to the IMF’s PRGF III programme and the transactions 
under the bilateral loan agreement, which resulted in an increase of €297.31 million, and 
to an addition of €41.21 million resulting from the change in exchange rates between 
the two years.
SDRs are valued at the year-end market rate, calculated by the ECB for all the Eurosystem 
national central banks, of €1 = SDR 0.864155. The SDR is defined in terms of a basket of 
currencies. Its value is determined as the weighted sum of the exchange rates of four ma-
jor currencies: the US dollar, the euro, the yen and the pound sterling. The interest rate, 
which is updated weekly, remained between 0.40% and 0.22% during the year.
This item includes current accounts, deposits, debt security investments in the trading and 
held-to-maturity portfolios and other claims on non-euro area residents denominated in 
foreign currency. The held-to-maturity portfolio consists of securities with fixed or determi-
nable payments which the Banco de España intends to hold until maturity.
The total amount as at 31 December 2010 was €9,258.12 million, with the following break-
down:
3  CLAIMS ON NON-EURO AREA 
RESIDENTS DENOMINATED
IN FOREIGN CURRENCY.—
BALANCES WITH BANKS
AND SECURITY 
INVESTMENTS, EXTERNAL 
LOANS AND OTHER 
EXTERNAL ASSETS
Type of asset 2010 2009 Change
Reserve tranche position 692.76 541.30 151.46
Special drawing rights (allocation) 3,394.22 3,221.20 173.01
Other claims on the IMF 695.19 356.66 338.53
TOTAL 4,782.17 4,119.17 663.00
EUR m 
Type of asset 2010 2009 Change
Deposits 142.11 144.65 -2.55
Security investments 9,115.69 8,042.39 1,073.30
    Trading portfolio 3,712.65 4,149.24 -436.59
    Held-to-maturity portfolio 5,403.04 3,893.15 1,509.88
Other 0.32 0.60 -0.28
TOTAL 9,258.12 8,187.65 1,070.47
EUR m 
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As at 31 December 2010, 99.88% of these assets were denominated in US dollars. The 
equivalent value in euro of this US dollar amount was transferred to the balance sheet at 
the year-end market exchange rate (€1 = USD 1.3362).
The increase in the balance of this item (€1,070.47 million) was due to the net effect of the 
factors listed in the following table:
This balance sheet item may include current accounts, balances with banks and security 
investments. Its balance of €0.06 million at 31 December 2010 is €0.05 million more than 
that of the previous year, due to the increase in the balance of US dollar denominated 
demand accounts at monetary financial institutions.
Included here is the balance of current accounts at correspondents and trading and held-to ma-
turity portfolio securities denominated in euro. The held-to-maturity portfolio consists of securities 
with fixed or determinable payments which the Banco de España intends to hold until maturity.
The breakdown is as follows:
Of the total of this heading (€907.25 million), most (€907.05 million) relates to fixed-income 
securities included in the held-to-maturity portfolio, which increased by €1.24 million with 
respect to the balance as at 31 December 2009. This portfolio consists of euro-denomi-
nated securities issued by international organisations (the European Investment Bank and 
the Bank for International Settlements) and by non-euro area States. The trading portfolio, 
which had a balance of €108.94 million at 31 December 2009, had a zero balance at the 
end of the reporting year as a result of sales in 2010.
This item includes the amount of the euro-denominated lending to euro area credit institu-
tions through which monetary policy is implemented. The total amount of these loans in 
the Eurosystem as a whole is €546,747 million, of which €61,550.47 are included in the 
balance sheet of the Banco de España. Pursuant to Article 32.4 of the ESCB/ECB Statute, 
any counterparty risks that materialise in monetary policy operations must be shared by all 
Eurosystem banks in proportion to their share of the subscribed capital of the ECB accord-
ing to the capital keys in force when these risks materialise (see the provision for counter-
party risks in Eurosystem monetary policy operations, in Note 28.- Provisions).
4  CLAIMS ON EURO AREA 
RESIDENTS DENOMINATED
IN FOREIGN CURRENCY
5  CLAIMS ON NON-EURO AREA 
RESIDENTS DENOMINATED
IN EURO.—BALANCES WITH 
BANKS, SECURITY 
INVESTMENTS AND LOANS
6  LENDING TO EURO AREA 
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
RELATED TO MONETARY 
POLICY OPERATIONS 
DENOMINATED IN EURO
Reason for change           Amount
Net investment 397.66
Changes of market exchange rates as at 31 December 671.05
Changes of securities market prices as at 31 December 3.16
Accrued interest receivable -1.59
Other 0.18
TOTAL 1,070.47
EUR m 
Type of asset 2010 2009 Change
Balances with banks
EUR m
0.20 0.21 -0.01
Security investments 907.05 1,014.75 -107.70
  Trading portfolio — 108.94 -108.94
  Held-to-maturity portfolio 907.05 905.81 1.24
TOTAL 907.25 1,014.96 -107.71
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The breakdown by type of transaction is as follows:
Throughout the whole of 2010, against a background of money market tensions in the euro 
area, the ECB continued to conduct liquidity-providing operations of various maturities to 
meet the additional liquidity demands of counterparties.
The balance of this item as at 31 December 2010 is 31.68% less than that of 2009. How-
ever, the average daily balance of the financing granted during the year increased by 
22.68% (€99,291.50 million in 2010, against €80,937.90 million in 2009).
They are executed through liquidity providing reverse transactions with a weekly frequen-
cy and a maturity of one week, normally by means of standard tenders. These operations 
play a pivotal role in achieving the aims of steering interest rate, managing market liquidity 
and signalling the monetary policy stance. However, in 2010, continuing the trend initiated 
in previous years, they were used less than longer-term refinancing operations. In this con-
nection, it should be noted that only 12.36% of annual average financing was extended 
through them. In 2010 these operations were conducted at fixed rate with allotment of the 
total amount bid.
The balance of this item at 31 December 2010 was €20,285.31 million (€657.70 at 31 Decem-
ber 2009) and its daily average balance during the year was €12,270.58 (€15,544.88 in 2009).
These operations aim to provide counterparties with additional longer-term refinancing. In 
2010 operations were conducted with maturities equal to the reserve maintenance period 
and with maturities of three and six months. From October 2008, these operations are also 
conducted at fixed rate with allotment of the total amount bid, although in 2010 a floating-
rate three-month refinancing operation was also carried out.
The balance of these operations at end-2010 amounted to €39,662.77 million (64.44% of 
the total), having decreased by €49,758.68 with respect to the previous year. However, the 
average balance increased (from €65,354.89 in 2009 to €86,561.06 in 2010), representing 
87.20% of overall financing in the year.
The purpose of these operations is to regulate the market liquidity situation and control 
interest rates, particularly to smooth the effects on interest rates caused by unexpected 
market fluctuations. Owing to their nature, their frequency is not standardised.
Their balance at end-2010 was €1,585.00 million. In 2010 four fine-tuning reverse opera-
tions took place in the Eurosystem. Financing was obtained by Spanish credit institutions 
in all of them.
a  Main refinancing operations
b  Longer-term refinancing 
operations
c  Fine-tuning reverse 
operations
Type of operation 2010 2009 Change
Main jnancing operations  20,285.31 657.70 19,627.61
Longer-term rejnancing operations 39,662.77 89,421.45 -49,758.68
Fine-tuning reverse operations 1,585.00 — 1,585.00
Structural reverse operations — — —
Marginal lending facility — — —
Credits related to margin calls   17.39 8.47 8.92
TOTAL 61,550.47 90,087.62 -28,537.15
EUR m 
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These are reverse open-market transactions through standard tenders to enable the Euro-
system to adjust its structural liquidity position vis-á-vis the financial sector.
The end-2010 balance was zero, as it was at the previous year-end. No structural reverse 
operations took place during the year.
Counterparties may use the marginal lending facility to obtain overnight liquidity from na-
tional central banks at a pre-specified interest rate against eligible assets. This interest rate 
is penalised with respect to the intervention rate set in the weekly tenders or in main refi-
nancing operations.
The balance at the end of 2010 was zero. As in 2009, there were few of these operations 
during the year. 
Under Eurosystem rules for monetary policy management, all operations providing li-
quidity to the banking system must be backed by adequate underlying assets ac-
cepted by the system as eligible for use as collateral. If, after daily valuation, the mar-
ket value of the assets used as loan collateral has fallen below the lower trigger point 
set for each security, the counterparty must provide additional assets or cash (see 
Note 17 on the balance sheet). If the market value of the underlying assets, following 
their revaluation, exceeds the amount of the financing obtained from the national cen-
tral bank plus the variation margin, the counterparty may withdraw an amount of un-
derlying assets equal to that excess (or receive this difference as a cash payment in its 
account).
In the national central banks that make margin calls by debiting or crediting the accounts 
of credit institutions, as is the case for the Banco de España, these debits or credits are 
the balancing entries of the asset-side or liability-side accounts reflecting the changes in 
these margins. These balance sheet accounts are remunerated at the interest rate applied 
in main refinancing operations.
As at 31 December 2010 this item had a balance of €17.39 million, up €8.92 million with 
respect to the previous year.
This item includes claims on credit institutions unrelated to monetary policy opera-
tions. Its balance of €2.04 million as at 31 December 2010 includes the amount of the 
correspondent accounts with credit institutions The decrease with respect to the pre-
vious year (€1,149.60 million) resulted from the repayment in 2010 of all the liquidity-
support loans granted to credit institutions in the previous year (€1,150 million as at 31 
December 2009).
This item includes the amount of euro-denominated fixed-income securities issued by 
euro area residents which were acquired by the Banco de España for monetary policy 
purposes under the covered bond purchase programme10 and under the securities mar-
kets programme.11 These securities were classified as held-to-maturity (see “Securities” in 
Section 3.1 “Accounting policies”. The securities purchases under the covered bond pur-
chase programme were completed in June 2010.
d  Structural reverse operations
e  Marginal lending facility
f  Credits related to margin calls
7  OTHER CLAIMS ON EURO 
AREA CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
DENOMINATED IN EURO
8  SECURITIES OF EURO AREA 
RESIDENTS DENOMINATED
IN EURO
a  Securities held for monetary 
policy purposes
10  Decision of the ECB of 2 July 2009 on the implementation of the covered bond purchase programme 
(ECB/2009/16).
11  Decision of the ECB of 14 May 2010 establishing a securities markets programme (ECB/2010/5).
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The balance of this item at 31 December 2010 was €13,906.71 million and there was no 
objective evidence that these assets were impaired at year-end.
The total amount of the securities acquired by all Eurosystem NCBs under the aforemen-
tioned securities markets programme amounted to €60,873.44 million, of which €7,382.70 
million were included in the balance sheet of the Banco de España. Pursuant to Article 
32.4 of the ESCB/ECB Statute, any risks that materialise in the securities included in this 
portfolio must be shared by all Eurosystem central banks in proportion to their share of the 
subscribed capital of the ECB according to the capital keys in force.
This item includes that part of the Bank’s trading and held-to-maturity portfolios which 
consists of euro-denominated fixed-income securities issued by euro area residents that 
are not held for monetary policy purposes. The held-to-maturity portfolio consists of secu-
rities with fixed or determinable payments which the Banco de España intends to hold 
until maturity. The breakdown of this item is as follows:
The balance of this item as at 31 December 2010 was €73,921.24 million, of which 44.7% 
related to trading portfolio securities and the remainder (55.3%) to held-to-maturity securities.
Overall, these securities decreased by €7,019.07 million in 2010. It was, however, trading 
securities which underwent a decrease, of €7,252.60 million, whereas held-to-maturity 
securities increased by €233.53 million.
Specifically, the changes were for the reasons reflected in the following table:
This portfolio includes securities issued by general government and by financial institu-
tions in the euro area. It should be noted that all purchases of debt issued by general 
government are in the secondary market, none being direct subscriptions of security 
issues.
This item includes loans which, by virtue of their respective laws of creation, were granted to 
the State prior to the entry into force of Law 21/1993 of 29 December 1993 on the State 
budget for 1994. Initially they were to be repaid at their nominal amount on a straight-line 
b  Other securities
9  GENERAL GOVERNMENT 
DEBT DENOMINATED
IN EURO
Security investments 2010 2009 Change
Trading portfolio 33,027.21 40,279.80 -7,252.60
Held-to-maturity portfolio 40,894.03 40,660.51 233.53
TOTAL 73,921.24 80,940.31 -7,019.07
EUR m 
Reason for change Trading portfolio
Held-to maturity 
portfolio
Total
Net purchase of securities -5,744.07 343.28 -5,400.78
Unrealised gains at year-end (a) -830.85 — -830.85
Unrealised losses at year-end (a) -790.92 — -790.92
Accrued implicit interest 113.25 -109.76 3.49
TOTAL -7,252.60 233.53 -7,019.07
EUR m 
 
a As stated in Section 3.1 "Accounting policies", no periodic valuation is performed on the held-to-maturity portfolio. 
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basis over twenty-five years by means of yearly payments as from 1999, inclusive, in accord-
ance with transitional provision seven of the aforementioned law. However, on 26 March 2007 
an agreement was entered into with the central government to bring forward the repayment 
schedule of these loans, such that they mature in full by 2015 at the latest and the Treasury 
can request early repayment of all or part of them. Loans repaid early are paid by the Treasury 
at the cash amount of their market value at the time. A provision has been set up for losses 
arising from early repayment of these loans (see Note 28 on the balance sheet).
Under that agreement, in 2010 two instalments of the Law 3/1983 loan (that of the report-
ing year and the last outstanding instalment of the original repayment schedule) and the 
instalments of the other two loans corresponding to the reporting year were paid.
The outstanding nominal balance as at 31 December 2010 of the loans granted to the 
State amounted to €4,081.98 million, broken down as follows:
The change was solely due to yearly repayments on the above-mentioned loans, as set out 
above. The amounts are shown in the above table.
This heading includes the amounts of the following items:
Pursuant to Article 28 of the ESCB Statute, the ESCB national central banks are the sole 
subscribers to the capital of the ECB. Subscriptions depend on the participating interests 
fixed in accordance with Article 29 of the ESCB Statute based on each country’s share in 
the total population and gross domestic product of the ESCB countries per data furnished 
by the European Commission. These subscriptions must be adjusted every five years or 
whenever new Member States join the European Union, i.e. when their NCBs join the 
ESCB. Since 1 January 2009 the Banco de España’s key for subscription of ECB capital 
has been 8.3040%.
In 2010 the ECB decided to increase its subscribed capital by €5 billion, from 
€5,760,652,402.58 to €10,760,652,402.58, with effect from 29 December 2010 and the 
euro area national central banks agreed to pay their additional capital contributions in 
10  INTRA-EUROSYSTEM 
LIABILITIES
a  Participating interest
in the ECB
2010 2009 Change
Treasury. Law 3/1983 special account 976.26 1,171.51 -195.25
Treasury. Law 4/1990 special account 2,779.19 3,126.59 -347.40
Treasury. Credits arising from subscription for 
participating interests, contributions and quotas in 
international agencies 
326.53 367.35 -40.82
TOTAL  4,081.98 4,665.45 -583.47
EUR m 
Type of asset 2010 2009 Change
Participating interest in the ECB  801.70 663.30 138.40
Claims equivalent to the transfer of foreign reserve 
assets to the ECB 
4,783.65 4,783.65 —
Net claims related to the allocation of euro 
banknotes within the Eurosystem  
15,360.48 7,674.24 7,686.23
Other claims within the Eurosystem (net) — — —
TOTAL  20,945.82 13,121.19 7,824.63
EUR m 
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three equal annual instalments. The first of these payments took place on 29 December 
2010 and the other two instalments will be paid at the end of 2011 and 2012, respectively.
As a result of this increase, the subscribed capital and paid-up capital of the national cen-
tral banks is as follows:
As regards the Banco de España, the above table shows that its subscribed capital increased 
from €478.36 million to €893.56 million, equivalent to 8.3040% of the ECB’s capital stock. As 
stated above, the first instalment of €138.40 million of this increase was paid on 29 December 
2010. As a result, the capital disbursed by the Banco de España reached €616.76 million.
This item also includes the participating interest in ECB equity. Its balance of €184.94 mil-
lion at 31 December 2010 is the amount paid in previous years for the Banco de España’s 
participating interest in ECB reserves due to the increase in the Banco de España’s share 
of the ECB capital key
Subscribed capital as at 
28 December 2010
Paid-up capital as at 
28 December 2010
Subscribed capital as at 
29 December 2010
Paid-up capital as at 29 
December 2010
Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale
de Belgique
139,730,384.68 139,730,384.68 261,010,384.68 180,157,051.35
Deutsche Bundesbank 1,090,912,027.43 1,090,912,027.43 2,037,777,027.43 1,406,533,694.10
Central Bank and Financial Services Authority
of Ireland
63,983,566.24 63,983,566.24 119,518,566.24 82,495,232.91
Bank of Greece 113,191,059.06 113,191,059.06 211,436,059.06 145,939,392.39
Banco de España 478,364,575.51 478,364,575.51 893,564,575.51 616,764,575.51
Banque de France 819,233,899.48 819,233,899.48 1,530,293,899.48 1,056,253,899.48
Banca d’Italia 719,885,688.14 719,885,688.14 1,344,715,688.14 928,162,354.81
Central Bank of Cyprus 7,886,333.14 7,886,333.14 14,731,333.14 10,167,999.81
Banque centrale du Luxembourg 10,063,859.75 10,063,859.75 18,798,859.75 12,975,526.42
Central Bank of Malta 3,640,732.32 3,640,732.32 6,800,732.32 4,694,065.65
De Nederlandsche Bank 229,746,339.12 229,746,339.12 429,156,339.12 296,216,339.12
Oesterreichische Nationalbank 111,854,587.70 111,854,587.70 208,939,587.70 144,216,254.37
Banco de Portugal 100,834,459.65 100,834,459.65 188,354,459.65 130,007,792.98
Banka Slovenije 18,941,025.10 18,941,025.10 35,381,025.10 24,421,025.10
Národná banka Slovenska 39,944,363.76 39,944,363.76 74,614,363.76 51,501,030.43
Suomen Pankki – Finlands Bank 72,232,820.48 72,232,820.48 134,927,820.48 93,131,153.81
Subtotal for euro area NCBs 4,020,445,721.55 4,020,445,721.55 7,510,020,721.55 5,183,637,388.22
Българска  народна  банка  (Bulgarian National Bank) 50,037,026.77 3,502,591.87 93,467,026.77 3,505,013.50
Èeská Národní banka 83,368,161.57 5,835,771.31 155,728,161.57 5,839,806.06
Danmarks Nationalbank 85,459,278.39 5,982,149.49 159,634,278.39 5,986,285.44
Eesti Pank 10,311,567.80 721,809.75 19,261,567.80 722,308.79
Latvijas Banka 16,342,970.87 1,144,007.96 30,527,970.87 1,144,798.91
Lietuvos bankas 24,517,336.63 1,716,213.56 45,797,336.63 1,717,400.12
Magyar Nemzeti Bank 79,819,599.69 5,587,371.98 149,099,599.69 5,591,234.99
Narodowy Bank Polski 282,006,977.72 19,740,488.44 526,776,977.72 19,754,136.66
Banca NaŒionalĖ a României 141,971,278.46 9,937,989.49 265,196,278.46 9,944,860.44
Sveriges Riksbank 130,087,052.56 9,106,093.68 242,997,052.56 9,112,389.47
Bank of England 836,285,430.59 58,539,980.14 1,562,145,430.59 58,580,453.65
Subtotal for non-euro area NCBs 1,740,206,681.03 121,814,467.67 3,250,631,681.03 121,898,688.04
TOTAL (a) 5,760,652,402.58 4,142,260,189.22 10,760,652,402.58 5,305,536,076.26
 
 
EUR 
a Due to rounding, the subtotals and totals may not equal the sum of the individual jgures in the table.
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These represent the ECB’s debt to the Banco de España arising from the transfer of for-
eign reserve assets to the ECB. The claims equivalent to the transferred reserves are de-
nominated in euro at a value fixed from the time of their transfer. They are remunerated at 
the marginal rate for the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations, reduced by 15% to 
reflect a zero return on the gold component. Their year-end balance of €4,783.65 million is 
unchanged from the previous year.
This item, the balance of which amounted to €15,360.48 million at end-2010, consists of 
the claims and liabilities of the Banco de España vis-à-vis the Eurosystem in relation to the 
allocation of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem when there is an overall debit balance 
(see “Banknotes in circulation” and “Intra-Eurosystem balances” in the section on ac-
counting policies).
The increase with respect to 2009 (€7,686.23 million) was due to the decrease in bank-
notes put into circulation by the Banco de España in 2010 (-5.0%) and the contrasting rise 
in the Eurosystem as a whole (growth of 4.1%), which resulted in the aforementioned in-
crease in the balance of these accounts.
In accordance with Eurosystem rules, since the accounts making up this item have a net 
credit balance, this information is presented on the liabilities side of the balance sheet (see 
Note 23 on the balance sheet).
The balance of this item amounted to €254.61 million at end-2010, of which €593.17 mil-
lion related to cost and €338.56 a million to accumulated depreciation.
The breakdown of this item into its components, together with their accumulated depre-
ciation, is as follows:
b  Claims equivalent to the 
transfer of foreign reserve 
assets to the ECB
c  Net claims related to the 
allocation of euro banknotes 
within the Eurosystem
d  Other claims within the 
Eurosystem (net)
11  TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE 
FIXED ASSETS
2010 2009 Change
TANGIBLE FIXED ASSETS 485.85 470.11 15.74
    Land and unbuilt plots 5.35 5.35 —        
    Buildings, structures and renovation work 107.45 106.41 1.04
    Plant in buildings 171.72 162.67 9.05
    Furniture and jttings 37.19 36.42 0.77
    OEjce machines other than computer 
    equipment 
48.20 47.59 0.61
    Computer equipment 58.59 55.56 3.03
    Transport equipment 8.52 8.67 -0.15
    Library collection 5.59 5.01 0.57
    Other tangible jxed assets 4.31 3.90 0.41
    Art collection 38.93 38.54 0.39
INTANGIBLE FIXED ASSETS 60.42 53.03 7.39
    Computer applications 60.36 52.97 7.39
    Industrial property 0.06 0.06 —        
FIXED ASSETS IN PROGRESS 46.90 30.35 16.55
    Buildings, plant in buildings and other 
    structures under construction 
24.45 20.28 4.17
    Computer applications under development 19.24 9.20 10.05
    Other jxed assets in progress 3.21 0.87 2.34
TOTAL  593.17 553.49 39.68
  
EUR m 
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The increase in fixed assets in 2010 basically arose from increased investment in develop-
ment of certain computer applications, from the refurbishment of the mezzanine floor of 
the historic Cibeles building, from the completion of upgrades of electrical and air condi-
tioning fixtures in the Madrid buildings and in several branches, and from diverse improve-
ments to these buildings.12
This item includes €47.18 million of financial investments relating basically to the Banco de 
España’s participating interests in the Bank for International Settlements and Bolsas y 
Mercados Españoles, Sociedad Holding de Mercados y Sistemas Financieros, S.A. The 
decrease of €3.26 million in these financial assets was due to the lower underlying book 
value of this firm.
This item includes the amount of the net debtor position arising from foreign-exchange 
forward and swap transactions valued at the exchange rates prevailing at the end of the 
year. When the position is a creditor one, as in 2010, it is recorded under the same heading 
in liability item 12.1 (see Note 25 on the balance sheet).
The main components of this item, the balance of which amounts to €1,891.39 million, are 
as follows:
12  OTHER FINANCIAL ASSETS
13  OFF-BALANCE-SHEET 
INSTRUMENTS 
REVALUATION DIFFERENCES
14  ACCRUALS AND PREPAID 
EXPENSES
Accumulated depreciation or amortisation 2010 2009 Change
TANGIBLE FIXED ASSETS -294.35 -274.75 -19.61
    Buildings, structures and renovation work -35.25 -32.92 -2.34
    Plant in buildings -130.42 -121.86 -8.56
    Furniture and jttings -25.41 -23.36 -2.05
    OEjce machines other than computer equipment 
i
-40.28 -39.44 -0.83
    Computer equipment -49.59 -45.14 -4.44
    Transport equipment -6.84 -6.27 -0.56
    Library collection -2.89 -2.39 -0.50
    Other tangible jxed assets -3.67 -3.36 -0.31
INTANGIBLE FIXED ASSETS -44.21 -38.30 -5.91
    Computer applications -44.15 -38.24 -5.91
    Industrial property -0.06 -0.06 —
TOTAL   -338.56 -313.04 -25.52
EUR m 
12  The refurbishment of buildings is accounted for as an addition to fixed assets if it meets the criteria set out in 
Section 3.1 “Accounting policies” in regard to tangible and intangible fixed assets.
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As can be seen from the foregoing table, the most significant accounts are accrued interest 
arising from securities acquisitions and accrued coupon interest receivable denominated in 
euro arising from the trading portfolio (€574.23 million), from the held-to maturity portfolio 
(€814.88 million) and from monetary policy operations (€332.22 million). In total, this interest 
increased by €55.72 million with respect to 2009. Furthermore, accrued interest receivable on 
monetary policy operations decreased significantly (by €297.59 million) due to the lower vol-
ume of outstanding transactions at year-end. There was also a decrease in interest receivable 
on claims equivalent to the transfer of foreign reserve assets to the ECB due to the lower 
average rate of return, while the interest accrued on intra-Eurosystem banknote adjustment 
and offsetting accounts increased as a result of the larger balance to be remunerated.
The most significant components of this item, which totals €1,515.55 million, are the transfer to 
the Treasury on 1 December 2010 of €1,316.49 million, equivalent to 70% of the Bank’s distrib-
utable profits earned to 30 September 2010, adjusted in line with the projected performance of 
profits up to year-end (see Note 15 on the profit and loss account), which was €390.18 million 
lower than in the previous year, and the home loans and repayable advances granted to Bank 
employees, the balance of which, at €187.26 million, was down by €2.14 million from 2009.
The balance of banknotes in circulation (€91,917.98 million) represents the Banco de Es-
paña’s share in the total euro banknotes in circulation (see “Banknotes in circulation” in 
Section 3.1 Accounting policies) according to the Eurosystem euro banknote allocation 
key (10.9465% of the total issue by all the central banks) after deducting those corre-
sponding to the Eurosystem (8% of the ECB total). This balance was €3,644.20 million 
higher than in the previous year because of the greater volume of euro banknotes in circu-
lation in the Eurosystem.
15  OTHER ASSETS. SUNDRY
16  BANKNOTES
IN CIRCULATION
2010 2009 Change
ACCRUED INTEREST ARISING FROM 
SECURITIES ACQUISITIONS AND ACCRUED 
COUPON INTEREST RECEIVABLE
1,775.91 1,720.19 55.72
    Trading portfolio 584.13 813.46 -229.33
        Denominated in foreign currency 9.89 8.89 1.00
        Denominated in euro 574.23 804.56 -230.33
    Held-to-maturity portfolio 859.56 848.17 11.39
        Denominated in foreign currency 44.68 34.30 10.38
        Denominated in euro 814.88 813.87 1.01
    Held for monetary policy purposes 332.22 58.56 273.66
OTHER ACCRUED INTEREST RECEIVABLE 112.01 402.72 -290.72
    Claims on the IMF 3.75 2.72 1.04
    Swap transacctions 0.95 — 0.95
    On claims equivalent to the transfer 
    of foreign reserves to the ECB 
41.23 52.72 -11.49
    On intra-Eurosystem claims arising from 
    banknote adjustments
38.86 19.66 19.20
    On monetary policy operations 27.14 324.73 -297.59
    On liquidity-providing loans — 2.02 -2.02
    Other 0.08 0.88 -0.80
ACCRUED COMMISSIONS RECEIVABLE AND 
PREPAID EXPENSES
3.47 3.21 0.26
TOTAL  1,891.39 2,126.12 -234.73
EUR m 
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The overall balance of the different types of deposit held by credit institutions with the 
Banco de España amounted to €26,964.03 million at end-2010, €8,124.99 million less than 
in the previous year. This decline was due to the fall in the balance of credit institution cur-
rent accounts (including minimum reserves) and to the decrease in the deposit facility.
The breakdown and the amounts in both reporting years are as follows:
The first component, which includes the total current accounts held by credit institutions at the 
Banco de España, in which they maintain the minimum reserves required for monetary policy 
implementation purposes, underwent a decrease of €4,786.02 million. Its average balance also 
decreased during the year, falling from €26,052.70 million in 2009 to €25,383.94 million in 2010.
The item “Deposit facility”, which includes overnight deposits remunerated at a fixed inter-
est rate (appreciably lower than the interest rate on main refinancing operations), also de-
creased, from €10,352.00 million in 2009 to €6,997.50 million in 2010. However, the average 
balance increased (€9,393.71 million in 2010 compared with €7,535.94 million in 2009).
With regard to fixed-term deposits, as in 2009, there was no balance as at 31 December 
2010. They are fine-tuning operations (liquidity withdrawals) that take the form of deposits. 
During 2010 the Eurosystem carried out 45 operations of this type.
The other captions in this item relate to fine tuning reverse operations and deposits related to 
margin calls. As at 31 December 2010, fine tuning reverse operations had a zero balance, while 
institutions’ deposits related to margin calls amounted to €16.53 million (€1.00 million in 2009).
This item includes the deposits held by general government with the Banco de España. The 
outstanding balance at year-end was €9,336.63 million, which breaks down as follows:
17  LIABILITIES TO EURO AREA 
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
RELATED TO MONETARY 
POLICY OPERATIONS 
DENOMINATED IN EURO
18  LIABILITIES TO OTHER EURO 
AREA RESIDENTS 
DENOMINATED IN EURO.—
GENERAL GOVERNMENT
2010 2009 Change
Central government (State) 3,633.00 14,429.06 -10,796.06
    Treasury current account 300.01 305.25
    Other central government agencies and 
    similar bodies 
3,332.98 14,123.81
Territorial government 355.48 960.17 -604.69
    Regional (autonomous) governments, 
    administrative agencies and similar bodies 
351.16 954.85
    Local government 4.32 5.32
Social security funds 5,348.15 15,843.81 -10,495.66
    Social Security System 5,347.19 14,773.28
    Other 0.96 1,070.54
TOTAL 9,336.63 31,233.05 -21,896.42
EUR m 
Type of liability 2010 2009 Change
Current accounts (covering the minimum 
reserve system)
19,950.00 24,736.02 -4,786.02
Deposit facility
EUR m
6,997.50 10,352.00 -3,354.50
Fixed-term deposits — — —
Fine-tuning reverse operations — — —
Deposits related to margin calls 16.53 1.00 15.53
TOTAL 26,964.03 35,089.02 -8,124.99
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The substantial decrease in this item (€21,896.42 million) was basically due to the smaller 
balances held by Social Security Funds (€10,495.66 million) and by the Fund for the Or-
derly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB) under “Other central government agen-
cies and similar bodies” (€8,718.93 million) and, to a lesser extent, to the decrease in the 
balances held by the Treasury and territorial (regional and local) government.
Included here are the current accounts of financial institutions other than credit institu-
tions, such as the Deposit Guarantee Funds, other financial intermediaries associated with 
securities markets settlement, other intermediaries in the debt book-entry market, etc., as 
well as the current accounts of non-administrative public and autonomous agencies of the 
State, the current accounts of employees and pensioners and other accounts of legal enti-
ties classified in “Other resident non-financial sectors”.
The balance at end-2010 was €152.11 million, and its decrease of €1,340.41 million with 
respect to end-2009 was basically due to the decrease in the balances of the current ac-
counts of State agencies (€1,231.26 million).
This item includes basically the euro-denominated accounts held by international organi-
sations, non-Eurosystem monetary authorities and central banks to which reserve man-
agement services are provided. The balance of €400.15 million was €135.67 million higher 
than a year earlier, mainly due to an increase in deposits of the central banks to which re-
serve management services are provided.
This item basically includes the foreign-currency balances of non-euro area central banks 
and collateralised inward deposits recorded in respect of reverse transactions conducted 
under repurchase agreements. The end-2010 balance of €0.76 million was €0.06 million 
more than at the end of 2009 as a result of the significant increase in US$-denominated 
deposits placed by these institutions.
This item of €3,272.05 million shows the amount of the special drawing rights allocated to 
Spain by the IMF in proportion to its quota. The total amount of this item increased by 
€193.97 million with respect to the previous year, due to the variation in the exchange rate.
This item, which as at 31 December 2010 had a balance of €50,864.34 million, comprises 
the following two sub-items:
In accordance with Eurosystem rules, since the accounts making up this item have a net 
debit balance, this information is presented on the assets side of the balance sheet.
The balance of €50,864.34 million as at 31 December 2010 represents the sum of three 
components: 1) the position of the Banco de España vis-à-vis the ECB in respect of the 
transfers issued and received through TARGET2 by the ESCB national central banks, in-
cluding the ECB, plus the balances held with Eurosystem central banks through corre-
spondent accounts; 2) the position vis-à-vis the ECB in respect of the pooling and alloca-
tion of monetary income within the Eurosystem pending settlement; and 3) the Banco de 
España’s position vis-à-vis the ECB in respect of any amounts receivable or refundable, 
basically in respect of the seigniorage income relating to euro banknotes issued by the 
ECB and of the securities acquired by the ECB under the securities markets programme.
Regarding the first component, the year-end net transfers via TARGET2 had a credit bal-
ance of €50,922.53 million, while the correspondent accounts showed a debit balance of 
19  LIABILITIES TO OTHER EURO 
AREA RESIDENTS 
DENOMINATED IN EURO.—
OTHER LIABILITIES
20  LIABILITIES TO NON-EURO 
AREA RESIDENTS 
DENOMINATED IN EURO
21  LIABILITIES TO NON-EURO 
AREA RESIDENTS 
DENOMINATED IN FOREIGN 
CURRENCY.—DEPOSITS, 
BALANCES AND OTHER 
LIABILITIES
22  COUNTERPART OF SPECIAL 
DRAWING RIGHTS 
ALLOCATED BY THE IMF
23  INTRA-EUROSYSTEM 
LIABILITIES
a.  Net liabilities related to the 
allocation of euro banknotes 
within the Eurosystem
b  Other liabilities within the 
Eurosystem (net)
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€0.15 million. The remuneration of this position is calculated daily at the marginal interest 
rate of Eurosystem main refinancing operations.
The second component, i.e. the position vis-à-vis the ECB in respect of the annual pooling 
and allocation of monetary income within the Eurosystem national central banks, had a 
debit balance of €58.05 million at year-end (see “Net result of pooling of monetary income” 
in Note 8 on the profit and loss account).
Finally, in regard to the position vis-à-vis the ECB relating to the distribution of income 
arising from the seigniorage of euro banknotes issued on its behalf by the NCBs and to the 
securities purchased under the securities markets programme, pursuant to the Decision of 
the European Central Bank of 25 November 2010 (ECB/2010/24), the ECB Governing 
Council may decide before the end of the financial year not to distribute part or all of this 
income (see “Banknotes in circulation” in Section 3.1 Accounting Policies). In 2010 the 
Governing Council decided not to distribute this income.
Included here are various accounts which as at 31 December 2010 were in the course of 
settlement, such as transfer instructions pending execution and transfers sent to deposit 
institutions yet to be reimbursed.
The balance of this item amounted to €138.39 million at end-2010, of which €125.69 re-
lated to transfers to accounts with other institutions, with payment of those transfers yet 
to be made.
This item includes the amount of the net creditor position arising from foreign-exchange 
forward and swap transactions valued at the exchange rates prevailing at the end of the 
year. When the position is a debtor one, it is recorded under the same heading in asset 
item 11.4. Its credit balance of €30.43 million as at end-2010 is the net value of the forward 
and swap transactions outstanding at that date that are listed below:
The only unmatured transactions at year-end were swaps of euro against US dollars.
Regarding exceptional liquidity-providing transactions in the form of swaps, which reached 
a considerable volume in previous years, it should be noted that in January 2010 the ECB 
Governing Council decided, in agreement with the central banks involved, to cease these 
transactions in view of the lower demand and of the improvements in the functioning of the 
financial markets. However, in mid-2010 the ECB decided to continue the liquidity provid-
ing arrangements (swap line) with the Federal Reserve until 1 August 2011 in response to 
24  ITEMS IN COURSE
OF SETTLEMENT
25  OFF-BALANCE-SHEET 
INSTRUMENTS 
REVALUATION DIFFERENCES
2009
Operation Position Currency
Currency 
amount 
(million)
Market 
exchange rate
Equivalent 
(million €)
Equivalent 
(million €)
EUR 2,888.29 1.0000 2,888.29 170.00
CHF — 1.2504 — 157.34
EUR — 1.0000 — 170.00
CHF — 1.2504 — 157.34
USD 3,900.00 1.3362 2,918.72 —
DEBTOR EUR — 1.0000 — 2,627.54
CREDITOR USD — 1.3362 — 2,707.21
NET POSITION 30.43 79.67
CREDITOR
SWAP
FORWARD
2010
DEBTOR
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the resurgence of tensions in US dollar denominated short-term funding on the European 
markets. However, Spanish institutions did not participate in transactions of this kind.
This item includes interest accrued but not yet paid, expenses accrued but not yet paid 
and income collected in advance.
As at 31 December 2010, its balance amounted to €80.96 million, the main component 
being interest accrued but not yet paid (€74.24 million). The increase in this item in 2010 
(€12.30 million) basically resulted from the larger amount of interest incurred on intra-Eu-
rosystem accounts relating to TARGET2 transactions (€13.84 million) and from the interest 
incurred on the minimum reserves held by credit institutions (€2.02 million) which were 
payable at year-end. These increases were partly offset by the decrease in the interest 
payable to remunerate the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector 
(FROB) accounts (€2.28 million) and the Social Security accounts (€1.22 milion).
This includes other liabilities not classifiable above.
As at 31 December 2010 the balance of this item amounted to €188.84 million (€38.35 mil-
lion less than in 2009) and its main component was the “Banco de España employee social 
welfare scheme (Mutualidad de empleados).- Contributions payable” (€72.51 million). The 
most significant change relates to the decrease of €46.96 million in this debt to the em-
ployee social welfare scheme.
With the exception of country-risk provisions, which are presented in the balance sheet as 
reductions of the value of the assets concerned, provisions are recorded under this item, 
with the following breakdown:
This is the most important provision. It was created by a resolution of the Executive Com-
mission of 26 January 1999 to cover exchange rate risks affecting the external reserves of 
the Banco de España. Subsequently, on 14 April 2004 the Executive Commission resolved 
to extend the purpose of this provision to include the coverage of interest rate risk. The 
balance of this provision as at 31 December 2010 amounted to €3,957.27 million, which 
was €148.57 more than in 2009 (see Note 5 on the profit and loss account).
The balance of this provision is revised annually based on the Banco de España’s valua-
tion of its exposure to the aforementioned risks by value-at-risk methodology. This review 
takes into account, in addition to that valuation, a number of factors, including the esti-
26  LIABILITY ACCRUAL 
ACCOUNTS AND INCOME 
COLLECTED IN ADVANCE
27  OTHER LIABILITIES.—
SUNDRY
28  PROVISIONS
Provision for exchange rate
and interest rate risks
2010 2009 Change
For exchange rate and interest rate risks 3,957.27 3,808.71 148.57
For early repayment of special loans 786.25 734.01 52.23
For counterparty risks in Eurosystem monetary 
policy operations
239.07 434.49 -195.42
For credit risk 336.20 168.91 167.29
For operational risk 22.86 22.86 —
For exchange of withdrawn peseta banknotes 50.46 17.70 32.76
For early and regular retirement 25.85 33.05 -7.20
For death and retirement assistance 59.70 72.47 -12.77
For sundry liabilities and charges 1.15 19.84 -18.69
TOTAL 5,478.81 5,312.04 166.77
EUR m 
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mated profit for the coming year and the envisaged behaviour of risk assets and any oth-
ers deemed to be worthy of consideration under the circumstances. In this respect, on 30 
December 2009 and 2 February 2011 the Executive Commission adjusted to market con-
ditions the methodology used to calculate the provision for exchange rate and interest rate 
risks. To do so, it set, inter alia, the calculation basis and the percentages of coverage to 
be applied for exchange rate and interest rate risks in each portfolio.
The agreement in 2007 with the Spanish State government whereby the Treasury can ask 
to repay a portion or all of these loans early, paying a cash amount equal to their market 
value instead of their nominal amount, led the Banco de España to set up in that year a 
provision for losses due to early repayment of special loans, so as to cover the possible 
losses that may arise from early repayment of these loans (recorded in asset item 8; see 
Note 9 on the balance sheet). The balance of this provision was set at the difference be-
tween the nominal amount and the current market value of the loans. Its balance of €786.25 
million as at 31 December 2010 was €52.23 million more than in the previous year.
In accordance with the general accounting principle of prudence, the ECB Governing 
Council considered it appropriate in 2008 to establish a buffer totalling €5,736.00 million 
against counterparty risks in monetary policy operations (see these operations in Note 6 on 
the balance sheet). In accordance to Article 32.4 of the ESCB/ECB Statute, this buffer will 
be funded among all Eurosystem national central banks in proportion to their subscribed 
capital key shares in the ECB prevailing at the time. As a result, the Banco de España re-
corded a provision of €621.35 million, equivalent to 10.8324% of the total provision, which 
decreased to €434.49 at the end of 2009. On 4 February 2011 the ECB Governing Council 
reviewed the adequacy of the amount of this provision with effect as at 31 December 2010 
and decided to reduce it from €4,011 million to €2,207 million. As a result, the Banco de 
España provision was set at €239.07 million and, accordingly, a portion of it amounting to 
€195.42 million was released (see Note 8 on the profit and loss account).
In 2009 the Executive Commission approved a methodology for calculating the credit risk 
on Banco de España investment portfolios, as a basis for setting up a provision for credit 
risk, as well as the percentage of coverage to be applied to the value of the risk exposure. 
This provision is reviewed yearly in accordance with the valuation made by the Banco de 
España of its risk exposure. This methodology was used in 2010 to record a provision of 
€167.29 million, the balance of which reached €336.20 at the end of the year.
Also, the Executive Commission approved in 2009 a methodology for calculating opera-
tional risk, to be reviewed yearly. It will be used to set aside a provision for any losses 
arising from operational risk. Once this exercise had been completed, an analysis of the 
appropriate amount for this provision concluded that it should have a balance of €22.86 
million, the same as in the previous year.
This provision was recorded initially in 2005 to cater for the exchange of any peseta bank-
notes withdrawn from circulation due to the introduction of the euro that may be tendered 
at the Banco de España. At the same time, the Council of Ministers decided that if the 
amount of banknotes tendered for exchange exceeded the amount of the provision at that 
time, the Banco de España would meet the excess with a charge to its reserves.
In November 2010 the balance of the provision fell to zero. Accordingly, pursuant to a 
resolution of the Executive Commission, an additional €50 million were provisioned (provi-
sion for a period of approximately five years), using the Banco de España reserves arising 
Provision for losses arising from 
early repayment of special loans
Provision for counterparty risk
in Eurosystem monetary policy 
operations
Provision for credit and 
operational risks
Provision for exchange of peseta 
banknotes withdrawn from 
circulation due to the 
introduction of the euro
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from the retention of 2005 earnings. At the end of the reporting year this provision had a 
balance of €48.31 million.
In the reporting year there were decreases in the provision for payments to early and regu-
lar retirees as a result of the use thereof for its intended purpose (€7.20 million) and in the 
provision for sundry risks and expenses (€18.69 million).
This item includes the revaluations arising from unrealised gains on financial assets and 
liabilities valued at market prices and exchange rates at year-end. It may be broken down 
as follows:
The balance of revaluation accounts at end-2010 was €9,274.59, up €2,254.43 on 2009. 
The main change was in gold, the unrealised gains on which were €2,617.18 million higher 
as a result of the increase in its market price (up from €766.35 per ounce at 31 December 
2009 to €1,055.42 per ounce at 31 December 2010). Its balance at 31 December 2010 was 
€8,705.06 million.
With regard to fixed-income securities in the trading portfolio, there was a decrease in 
unrealised gains arising basically on securities issued in euro by euro area residents 
(€830.85 million), as a result of security price movements driven by interest rates. This 
decrease was minimally offset by the increase in foreign currency denominated securities 
issued by non-euro area residents (€6.12 million)
As regards the foreign exchange revaluation accounts, the unrealised gains on foreign cur-
rencies increased by €468.09 million, basically due to the appreciation of the US dollar and 
the SDR against the euro (€405.78 million and €62.19 million, respectively).
As at 31 December 2010 the capital of the Banco de España amounted to €1,000 million, 
with no change in the year. Of this amount, €1.37 million were constituted pursuant to 
Decree-Law 18/1962 of 7 June 1962 and €998.63 million as a capital increase carried out 
in 2006 through the retention of 2005 earnings.
As at 31 December 2010 the reserves of the Banco de España amounted to €950 million. This 
balance is €50 million lower than in the previous year as a result of the recording, with a 
charge to reserves, of a provision of this amount for exchange of peseta banknotes with-
drawn from circulation due to the introduction of the euro (see Note 28 on the balance sheet).
Included in this item is, first, the amount of capital, reserves and profits that arose in 1973 
when the now-defunct Spanish Foreign Currency Institute was included in the Banco de 
Other provisions
29  REVALUATION ACCOUNTS
30  CAPITAL
31  RESERVES
Type of account 2010 2009 Change
Gold 8,705.06 6,087.88 2,617.18
Foreign currency 468.33 0.25 468.09
Securities (trading portfolio) 83.73 911.31 -827.58
    Issued in foreign currency by non-euro area residents 40.79 34.67 6.12
    Issued in euro by non-euro area residents — 2.85 -2.85
    Issued in euro by euro area residents 42.94 873.79 -830.85
Other 17.47 20.72 -3.25
TOTAL 9,274.59 7,020.16 2,254.43
 EUR m 
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España (€3.17 million) and, second, the portion of 2005 and 2006 profit taken to reserves, 
authorised by the Council of Ministers, respectively, on 28 July 2006 and 29 June 2007 in 
application of the legal provisions cited in the previous note.
The net profit for 2010, after deducting the transfer to the Beneficent Social Fund (€25.96 mil-
lion), amounted to €2,570.00 million, down 3.9% on 2009. Of this amount, €1,316.49 million 
was paid to the Treasury on 1 December 2010, in accordance with Royal Decree 2059/2008 
of 12 December 2008 (see Note 15 on the profit and loss account “Profit for the year”).
During the year, the following amounts were also paid to the Treasury out of 2009 profits:
a) On 1 March 2010, €699.19 million, which, together with the payment in De-
cember 2009, amounted to 90% of the €2,673.18 million of distributable prof-
it for that year.
b) On 13 August 2010, once the balance sheet and profit and loss account for 
the year 2009 had been approved by the Council of Ministers, €267.32 mil-
lion, representing the rest of the distributable profit for that year.
The details of the various components of the profit for 2010 and the reasons for the 
changes in them with respect to 2009 are given in Section 3.3 below on the profit and loss 
account.
This item includes income from interest accrued on the main assets of the  Banco de Es-
paña. The breakdown in 2010 and 2009 is as follows:
Interest income decreased by €219.28 million in 2010 with respect to 2009. This decrease 
was a result of a fall of €198.80 million in the return on euro-denominated investments and, to 
a lesser extent, of a decline in income from foreign-currency investments (€20.48 million).
32  PROFIT FOR THE YEAR
3.3  Notes on the profit 
and loss account
1  INTEREST INCOME
Interest income
2010 2009 Change
FOREIGN CURRENCY 285.15 305.63 -20.48 12,702.47 2.2
    Securities 266.38 255.82 10.56 8,096.64 3.2
Deposits and other assets 18.74 18.33 0.42 4,605.83 0.4
Exceptional liquidity providing 
operations
0.02 31.48 -31.45
EURO 4,165.42 4,364.23 -198.80 202,799.46 2.0
Securities 2,978.79 2,945.21 33.58 86,990.00 3.4
Monetary policy operations 1,006.76 1,280.53 -273.77 99,291.50 1.0
Intra-Eurosystem accounts 160.19 104.18 56.00 16,517.95 1.0
    Claims equivalent to the transfer
    of foreign reserves to the ECB  
41.23 52.72 -11.49 4,783.65 0.9
Claims related to allocation  
of eurobanknotes within 
the Eurosystem 
118.96 51.46 67.50 11,732.79 1.0
Other claims within  
the Eurosystem (net)
— — — 1.51
Other assets 19.68 34.30 -14.62 —
TOTAL 4,450.57 4,669.85 -219.28 215,501.93 2.0
Average 
yield in 2010
Average 
investment in 
2010
  
EUR m and % 
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Of the €285.15 million of interest on foreign-currency investments, €266.38 million arose 
from investments in fixed-income securities denominated in US dollars, €18.74 million from 
deposits and other assets, and €0.02 million from exceptional liquidity providing operations 
which generated expenses for the same amount. Interest on this dollar-denominated port-
folio increased by €10.56 million and that on deposits and other assets was up by €0.42 
million; by contrast, interest on exceptional liquidity providing operations dropped signifi-
cantly (€31.45 million) due to the small amount of these operations in 2010. Overall, the 
average return on foreign-currency investments was 2.2%, compared with 3.0% in 2009.
Euro-denominated interest income (€4,165.42 million) arose basically from the securities 
portfolios (€2,978.79 million, an increase of €33.58 million), monetary policy operations 
(€1,006.76 million, down €273.77 million) and intra-Eurosystem balances (€160.19 million, 
up €56.00 million).
The main reason for the decrease of €198.80 million in euro-denominated income with 
respect to the previous year was the lower average return in the reporting year (down from 
2.5% in 2009 to 2.0% in 2010), partly offset by an increase in the average balance of the 
aforementioned assets (up from €171,070.37 in 2009 to €202,799.46 in 2010).
Specifically, analysis of the average investment made discloses the significant increase in 
monetary policy operations (€99,291.50 million in 2010 against €80,937.90 million in 2009), 
derived from the higher funding requested by Spanish financial institutions from the ECB. 
There was also an increase in claims related to the allocation of euro banknotes, which 
rose from €4,533.66 million in 2009 to €11,732.79 million in 2010 as a result of changes in 
banknotes put into circulation (-5.0% in Spain, compared with 4.1% in the Eurosystem as 
a whole). Investment in securities increased by €6,174.84 million (7.6%), basically in the 
monetary policy portfolio. It should be noted with regard to this portfolio that in May 2010 
purchases began under the securities markets programme, while the covered bond pur-
chase programme was declared to have concluded in June 2010.
This item includes interest expenditure on the liabilities listed below, as follows:2  INTEREST EXPENSE
Interest expense
2010 2009 Change
FOREIGN CURRENCY 10.02 35.19 -25.17 3,115.88 0.3
    Swap and forward 0.51 — 0.51
Exceptional liquidity providing 
operations
0.02 31.48 -31.45
Other liabilities 9.48 3.72 5.77 3,115.88 0.3
EURO 1,030.37 970.10 60.27 119,475.45 0.9
Remuneration of minimum 
reserves 
256.30 333.08 -76.79 25,383.94 1.0
Deposit facility 23.81 59.06 -35.25 9,393.71 0.2
Fixed-term deposits 8.64 5.32 3.32 1,659.37 0.5
General government deposits 122.86 147.96 -25.10 22,135.39 0.6
Other liabilities within the 
Eurosystem (net)
617.49 422.02 195.47 60,903.05 1.0
Other liabilities denominated
in euro 
1.28 2.65 -1.37
TOTAL 1,040.39 1,005.29 35.10 122,591.33 0.8
Average cost
in 2010
Average 
jnancing in 
2010
  
EUR m and % 
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Interest expenses increased by €35.10 million in 2010 as a result of a rise in expenses on 
euro-denominated liabilities (€60.27 million) and a fall in interest expenses on liabilities 
denominated in foreign currencies (€25.17 million).
Of the euro-denominated interest expenses (€1,030.37 million), €617.49 million relate to 
the remuneration of other intra-Eurosystem balances (TARGET2), €256.30 million to remu-
neration of minimum reserves, €122.86 million to remuneration of general government 
deposits and the remainder to remuneration of the deposit facility, fixed-term deposits 
(fine-tuning operations) and other euro-denominated liabilities.
The increase in euro-denominated expenses (€60.27 million) basically resulted from the 
higher average balance of the aforementioned liabilities, which rose from €87,617.81 mil-
lion in 2009 to €119,475.45 million in 2010, partly offset by the lower average cost at which 
they were remunerated, which dropped from 1.1% in 2009 to 0.9% in 2010.
Regarding the net credit balance of intra-Eurosystem balances arising from TARGET2 
transactions, interest expenses rose by €195.47 million because of the considerable in-
crease in its average balance with respect to 2009 from €33,514.58 million to €60,903.05 
million in 2010, partly offset by the decrease in the average cost (1.0% in 2010 versus 1.2% 
in 2009).
Interest expenses denominated in foreign currencies (€10.02 million) related almost solely to 
allocated SDRs (€9.48 million), since in 2010 the volume of exceptional liquidity providing op-
erations was very small and generated expenses of only €0.02 million (€31.48 million in 2009).
This item includes the profits and losses arising from dealing in financial assets. In 2010 the 
net gains in this connection amounted to €366.04 million, arising from the following sources:
Compared with the prior year, the total amount recorded in 2010 increased by €257.50 
million due to the gains on the sale of foreign currencies in contrast to the losses in 2009, 
basically in US dollars (€185.74 million) and SDRs (€14.51 million) and to the higher gains 
on the sale of euro-denominated fixed-income securities (€89.78 million). These two in-
creases were partly offset by the smaller gains on the sale of US dollar-denominated se-
curities (€34.68 million).
This item includes the loss arising in the currency position derived from the exchange rate 
depreciation, as well as that arising from depreciation of securities prices, for that portion 
that cannot be offset by unrealised gains from previous years. The breakdown in 2010 and 
2009 is as follows:
3  REALISED GAINS/LOSSES 
ARISING FROM FINANCIAL 
OPERATIONS
4  UNREALISED LOSSES ON 
FINANCIAL ASSETS AND 
POSITIONS
2010 2009 Change
FOREIGN CURRENCY 47.45 -120.27 167.71
    Sale of gold — — —
Sale of foreign currency (exchange gains/losses  31.39 -169.57 200.96
Sale of securities (price gains/losses) 14.85 49.53 -34.68
Other gains/losses  1.20 -0.23 1.43
EURO 318.59 228.81 89.78
Sale of securities (price gains/losses) 318.59 228.81 89.78
TOTAL 366.04 108.54 257.50
  
EUR m 
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Unrealised losses in 2010 amounted to €793.89 million, most of which related to euro-
denominated fixed-income securities from the trading portfolio (€790.92 million) as a result 
of the adverse performance of the price of some securities in this portfolio. Comparison 
with 2009 shows that these high unrealised losses were responsible for the increase, since 
in 2009 they amounted to €14.11 million. Also notable was the decrease in unrealised ex-
change losses denominated in foreign currency (€175.52 million), since there were no 
losses at end-2010 on either US dollars or SDRs.
This includes, first, the transfer of €793.89 million from the provision for foreign exchange 
rate and interest rate risks to cover the losses recorded at end-2010 and, second, the 
transfer of €942.46 million to this provision to cover the estimated foreign exchange rate 
and price risks associated with the financial positions subject to such risks, in accordance 
with the Executive Commission resolution of 10 February 2011.
This item also includes the transfer to the provision for credit risk in accordance with an 
Executive Commission resolution, amounting to €167.29 million in 2010.
Lastly, regarding the provision for losses arising from early repayment of special loans 
derived from the adjustment of changes in the market value of these assets, in 2010 the 
provisioning expense underwent a negative change of €277.66 with respect to 2009, due 
to the charge of €92.10 million in 2010 as against the recovery of €185.56 million in 2009.
This basically includes income and expenses arising from fees and commissions for bank-
ing services and the like (TARGET2, transfers, handling of cheques, custody and adminis-
tration of securities, etc.). It may be broken down as follows:
5  TRANSFERS FROM/TO 
PROVISIONS FOR FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE RATE, PRICE AND 
CREDIT RISKS
6  NET INCOME FROM FEES 
AND COMMISSIONS
2010 2009 Change
FOREIGN CURRENCY 2.97 179.01 -176.04
Foreign currency (exchange rate losses) 0.05 175.57 -175.52
Securities (price losses) 2.92 3.44 -0.52
EURO 790.92 14.11 776.81
Securities (price losses) 790.92 14.11 776.81
TOTAL 793.89 193.12 600.77
  
EUR m 
2010 2009 Change
Transfers to provisions -1,109.75 -1,066.82 -42.93
Foreign exchange rate and interest rate risk -942.46 -897.91 -44.55
Credit risk -167.29 -168.91 1.62
Transfer from exchange rate and interest rate 
provision
793.89 193.12 600.77
Transfer/reversal from provision for losses arising from 
early repayment of special loans
-92.10 185.56 -277.66
TOTAL -407.96 -688.14 280.19
EUR m 
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Net fee and commission income in 2010 (€8.95 million) was €1.62 million less than in 2009. 
This variation relates basically to the lower fee income from securities transactions and the 
smaller amount of fees and commissions received by the Banco de España from the hold-
ers of direct accounts. This lower income was partially offset by the lower expense of fees 
and commissions paid on security transactions carried out through the Sistema Nacional 
de Compensación Electrónica (National Electronic Clearing System).
This item includes the participating interest of the Banco de España in the profit of the ECB 
from ordinary operations, seignorage income, income generated by the ECB portfolio de-
rived from the security market programme and the dividends on other shares and partici-
pating interests.
Of the total amount of €191.04 million recorded, €174.43 million relate to the ECB ordi-
nary dividend, €8.80 million to dividends on the participating interest in Bolsas y Merca-
dos Españoles, Sociedad Holding de Mercados y Sistemas Financieros, SA (BME) and 
€7.81 million to participating interests in international agencies (Bank for International 
Settlements).
In 2010 the ECB Governing Council decided not to distribute among the Eurosystem cen-
tral banks the banknote seigniorage income or that generated by its securities portfolio 
purchased under the security market programme, but rather to retain that income to re-
cord a provision for foreign exchange rate, interest rate, credit and gold price risks.
Compared with 2009, the amount recorded in 2010 was €73.10 million higher, basically 
due to the larger ordinary dividend distributed by the ECB in the reporting year (paid out of 
2009 profit), partly offset by the aforementioned absence of an ECB dividend from sei-
gniorage income (€93.66 million were allocated to the Banco de España in 2009).
The amount of each Eurosystem NCB’s monetary income is determined by calculating the 
annual income generated by the earmarkable assets held against the liability base. The 
liability base consists of the following items: banknotes in circulation; liabilities to credit 
institutions related to monetary policy operations denominated in euro; net intra-Eurosys-
tem liabilities resulting from TARGET2 transactions whenever they have a credit balance; 
and net intra-Eurosystem liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes within the 
Eurosystem whenever they have a credit balance. Any interest paid on liabilities included 
within the liability base is to be deducted from the monetary income to be pooled. The 
earmarkable assets include the following items: lending to euro area credit institutions re-
lated to monetary policy operations; monetary policy portfolio securities; intra-Eurosystem 
claims equivalent to the transfer of foreign reserve assets to the ECB; net intra-Eurosystem 
claims resulting from TARGET2 transactions, whenever they have a debit balance; net in-
tra-Eurosystem claims related to the allocation of euro banknotes in the Eurosystem, 
7  INCOME FROM EQUITY 
SHARES AND PARTICIPATING 
INTERESTS
8  NET RESULT OF POOLING
OF MONETARY INCOME
2010 2009 Change
1   Income from fees and commissions 20.07 23.77 -3.70
Foreign operations 0.03 0.02 0.01
Domestic operations 20.05 23.76 -3.71
2   Expenses from fees and commissions 11.12 13.20 -2.08
Foreign operations 3.06 2.96 0.09
Domestic operations 8.06 10.24 -2.17
NET INCOME FROM FEES AND COMMISSIONS (1-2) 8.95 10.57 -1.62
EUR m 
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whenever they have a debit balance; and a limited amount of each NCB’s gold holdings, 
in proportion to its capital key. Gold is considered to generate no income and the securi-
ties acquired under the covered bond purchase programme are deemed to generate in-
come at the interest rate on main refinancing operations. If the value of a NCB’s earmark-
able assets exceeds or is less than the value of its liability base, the difference will be offset 
by applying to it the most recent marginal interest rate on main refinancing operations.
The breakdown of this item in 2009 and 2010 is as follows:
The monetary income pooled by the Eurosystem is to be allocated among NCBs accord-
ing to the ECB subscribed capital key. The difference between the monetary income 
pooled by the Banco de España in 2010, amounting to €1,177.53 million, and that reallo-
cated to it, amounting to €1,236.86 million, is equivalent to a net allocation of €59.34 mil-
lion. From this net allocation should be deducted €1.29 million for the Banco de España’s 
share of the losses on Eurosystem monetary policy operations (the expense of the profes-
sional consulting and audit services of independent experts and the settlement of the final 
loss from the insolvency of Indover Bank). Compared with 2009, there was a positive net 
change of €50.92 million in these results.
Also, with regard to the provision for counterparty risk in Eurosystem monetary policy op-
erations, on 4 February 2011 the ECB Governing Council approved the amounts relating 
to each NCB. Accordingly, the Banco de España reversed a portion of the provision re-
corded (€195.42 million out of a total of €434.49 million), resulting in a change of €8.56 
million in profit (in 2009 €186.86 million were released).
This includes the income and losses that cannot be included in other items, along with 
other diverse income of an exceptional nature. It may be broken down as follows:
As can be seen, this item shows a net loss of €11.56 million, which is €1.36 million less 
than in 2009, basically due to the decrease in the principal of the debt to the employee 
social welfare scheme (Mutualidad de Empleados), which generated lower expenses of 
€4.65 million.
This item includes the headings “Wages and salaries”, “Contributions to pension scheme” 
and “Social security contributions and employee benefits”.
9  OTHER INCOME AND LOSSES
10  STAFF COSTS
2010 2009 Change
Monetary income pooled -1,177.53 -1,349.81 172.28
Monetary income allocated 1,235.58 1,356.94 -121.36
Provision for counterparty risk in monetary policy 
operations and for ECB losses
195.42 186.86 8.56
TOTAL 253.47 193.99 59.48
EUR m 
2010 2009 Change
Extraordinary prNjt 0.35 2.36 -2.01
Employee social welfare scheme -13.14 -17.80 4.65
Sundry 1.23 2.51 -1.28
TOTAL -11.56 -12.93 1.36
EUR m 
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The breakdown of changes by component is as follows:
It balance decreased from €230.96 million in 2009 to €228.40 million in 2010, a fall of €2.56 
million (1.1%). The main reason for this decrease was the wage reduction derived from the 
application from June of Royal Decree-Law 8/2010 on extraordinary measures to reduce 
the budget deficit, partly offset by the higher expense of temporary hires (€2.55 million), 
due basically to Eurosystem projects, and a number of factors of varying nature (wage drift 
due to promotions, increased social security contributions, medical and pharmaceutical 
assistance, pension scheme, etc.).
The following table sets out the changes in permanent and temporary staff, in terms of 
average number of employees:
As at 31 December 2010, the Bank’s total staff numbered 2,709 employees, 18 fewer than 
at the same date of the previous year, as a result of the smaller number of permanent em-
ployees (down from 2,545 at 31 December 2009 to 2,432 at 31 December 2010, partly 
offset by a significant rise in temporary hires (95 workers) for the aforementioned reasons. 
Most noteworthy as regards staff composition by gender was the increase of 47 in the 
number of women, which, together with the decrease of 65 in the number of men, meant 
that women now account for 40% of the Bank’s total staff.
This item includes expenses arising from the purchase of current assets and of diverse 
services received during the year, as follows:
11  ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
2010 2009 Change (%)
Gross staff costs 230.86 233.04 -2.17 -0.9
    Wages and salaries 174.12 177.84 -3.71 -2.1
    Social Security 32.27 32.09 0.18 0.5
    Staff welfare expenses 18.01 17.05 0.96 5.6
    Contributions to Pension Scheme 6.46 6.05 0.41 6.7
Reversal of staff costs due to 
capitalisation of computer applications
-2.47 -2.07 -0.39 18.9
TOTAL 228.40 230.96 -2.56 -1.1
EUR m and % 
2010 2009 Change %
AVERAGE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 2,733.2 2,745.8 -12.6 -0.5
1   Permanent staff 2,488.7 2,570.9 -82.2 -3.2
Managerial staff 1,485.9 1,476.2 9.7 0.7
Administrative staff 816.5 886.3 -69.8 -7.9
Other 186.3 208.4 -22.2 -10.6
2   Temporary staff 244.5 174.9 69.6 39.8
Managerial staff 131.2 107.8 23.4 21.7
Administrative staff 101.1 59.8 41.3 69.0
Other 12.3 7.4 4.9 65.5
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The above table shows that in 2010 the most significant administrative expenses were 
external services (€62.76 million), mainly IT services (€38.11 million) and rental and main-
tenance (€33.03 million), composed mainly of hardware and software rental and mainte-
nance (€15.12 million) and property rental and maintenance (€12.05 million).
Goods and services expenses decreased in 2010 (€3.68 million). The reasons for this de-
crease were basically the higher recovery of expenses due to capitalisation of computer 
applications (€3.31 million) and the fall in external services expenses (€1.32 million) due 
mainly to the lower expense of computer services procurement (€1.07 million).
“External services” include €139,164.25 (including VAT) relating to the fees of the external 
auditors Deloitte, S.L. for the audits in 2010 of the Bank’s annual accounts and of certain 
aspects of the Bank’s management of European Central Bank reserves, the latter being the 
only service provided by the auditor to the Bank. In 2010 no services were received from 
or amounts paid to other firms related to the auditor.
Included here is the expense of the estimated depreciation of the Bank’s fixed assets, 
which breaks down as follows:
This amount (€61.71 million) corresponds to payments made by the Banco de España to 
purchase banknotes from the National Mint. The decrease with respect to the previous 
year (€9.74 million) was because in 2010, despite the higher costs due to the rise in VAT, 
the volume of purchases of €50 and €20 banknotes, with a higher unit cost, decreased, 
12  DEPRECIATION OF FIXED 
ASSETS
13  BANKNOTE PRODUCTION 
SERVICES
2010 2009 Change %
Gross administrative expenses 123.44 123.81 -0.37 -0.3
Renting and maintenance 33.03 32.32 0.71 2.2
Material and supply 11.10 10.97 0.13 1.2
External services 62.76 64.08 -1.32 -2.1
Training. promotion and selection 4.02 3.20 0.81 25.4
Sundry operating expenses 12.53 13.23 -0.70 -5.3
Reversal of administrative expenses due 
to capitalisation of computer applications
-5.61 -2.30 -3.31 143.9
TOTAL 117.83 121.51 -3.68 -3.0
EUR m and % 
2010 2009 Change %
Depreciation of buildings. structures and renovation 
work 
2.33 2.27 0.06 2.4
Depreciation of plant in buildings 8.32 7.25 1.07 14.8
Depreciation of furniture and jttings 2.07 1.94 0.12 6.2
Depreciation of NEjce machines other than 
computer equipment 
i
1.98 1.79 0.19 10.7
Depreciation of computer equipment 5.18 5.31 -0.13 -2.4
Depreciation of transport equipment 0.71 0.83 -0.12 -13.9
Depreciation of other tangible jxed assets 0.30 0.26 0.05 18.3
Depreciation of library collection 0.54 0.51 0.03 5.0
Amortisation of computer applications 5.90 5.42 0.49 9.0
TOTAL  27.34 25.58 1.76 6.9
EUR m and % 
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and, at the same time, a significant volume of €5 banknotes, with a lower unit cost, was 
purchased (in 2009 no banknotes of this denomination were purchased).
The net balance of transfers and applications to other funds and provisions in 2010 
amounted to €7.73 million, compared with €75.89 million in 2009. This decrease (€68.16 
million) derived basically from the decline of €17.74 million in the provision for sundry risks 
and expenses relating mainly to litigation finalised in 2010 in favour of the Bank (in 2009 
€17.61 million were transferred to this provision) and from the updating of the provision for 
death and retirement assistance referred to in Article 190 of the Banco de España Condi-
tions of Employment, which entailed a credit of €5.33 million to the profit and loss account. 
This item also includes transfers to and releases from the provision for operational risks, 
which in 2010 was used to cover losses arising from operational risk (€0.03 million) and 
was replenished so as to raise its balance to the agreed level of €22.86 million. The trans-
fer to the Beneficent Social Fund amounted to €25.96 million (€27.00 million in 2009).
The Banco de España, because of the nature of its activity, is not an institution with a high 
environmental risk. Accordingly, in 2010 it was not considered necessary to record any 
provision for environmental liabilities and charges.
Pursuant to Article 1.1.b) of Royal Decree 2059/2008 of 12 December 2008, the Banco de 
España must pay into the Treasury, on the first working day of March 2011, 90% of the 
profits earned and recorded up to 31 December of the previous year, less the amount paid 
on 1 December of the previous year.
On 1 December 2010 the Banco de España paid into the Treasury €1,316.49 million, equal 
to 70% of the profit recorded as at 30 September 2010.13
Once the year had ended, and taking into account that the provisional profits amounted to 
€2,570.00 million and that 90% of the profits was €2,313.00 million, a payment of €996.51 
million was made to the Treasury on 1 March 2011.
The payments to the Treasury of 2010 profit are as follows:
The following table shows the changes in the reporting year, which, in addition to the ac-
counting profit, include the net gains not recognised as income in the profit and loss ac-
count, the change in provisions and the effect on the balance sheet of the appropriation of 
profit for the year.
14  TRANSFERS AND ADDITIONS 
TO OTHER FUNDS AND 
PROVISIONS
15  PROFIT FOR THE YEAR
3.4  Changes in capital, 
reserves, provisions 
and revaluation 
accounts
1   Total projt for 2010 2,570.00
2   Payments to the Treasury 2,313.00
On 1.12.2010 1,316.49
On 1.3.2011. Difference between the above amount and 90% of prNjt 
as at 31.12.2010
996.51
3   PrNjt payable to the Treasury 257.00
At date of approval of the 2010 accounts 257.00
EUR m 
13  Pursuant to the aforementioned Royal Decree, the payment resolution must take into consideration the foresee-
able performance of profits up to the end of the year. For this reason, account was taken of a number of factors 
which entailed a risk of lower profit estimated at €802.77 million. Accordingly, this amount was subtracted from 
the Banco de España profit of €2,683.47 million as at 30 September, resulting in a profit of €1,880.70 million, 70 
% of which was paid into the Treasury.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 245 ANNUAL REPORT, 2010 ANNUAL ACCOUNTS OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA
The changes reflected in this table have been explained above in the explanatory notes on 
the balance sheet and profit and loss account that refer to provisions (Note 28 on the bal-
ance sheet), revaluation accounts (Note 29 on the balance sheet), capital (Note 30 on the 
balance sheet), reserves (Note 31 on the balance sheet) and profit for the year (Note 32 on 
the balance sheet and Note 15 on the profit and loss account).
Capital Reserves
Revaluation
accounts
Undistibuted
prNjt
Provisions Total  
A) 2010 OPENING BALANCE 1,000.00 1,000.00 7,020.16 966.51 5,312.04 15,298.72
1   UNRECOGNISED NET GAINS IN PROFIT 
AND LOSS
2,254.43 2,254.43
In gold 2,617.18 2,617.18
In foreign currency 468.09 468.09
In securities -827.58 -827.58
Other -3.25 -3.25
2   2010 PROFIT 2,570.00 2,570.00
3   CHANGE IN PROVISIONS -50.00 166.77 116.77
4   APPROPRIATION OF PROFIT -2,283.00 -2,283.00
Payment to the Treasury of 2009 prNjt -966.51 -966.51
Payment to the Treasury of 2010 prNjt -1,316.49 -1,316.49
B) CHANGES IN THE YEAR.
B = 1+2+3+4
— -50.00 2,254.43 287.00 166.77 2,658.19
C) 2010 CLOSING BALANCE.
C = A + B
1,000.00 950.00 9,274.59 1,253.51 5,478.81 17,956.91
  
EUR m 
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The contribution of the Banco de España to the Deposit Guarantee Funds is regulated by 
Article 3 of Royal Decree 18/1982, according to the wording established by additional 
provision seven of Royal Legislative Decree 12/1995 of 28 December 1995 and Royal De-
cree 2606/1996 of 20 December 1996, which implemented the legal regime for such funds.
The aforementioned Royal Decree-Law established that the Deposit Guarantee Funds 
may only exceptionally “be supplemented by contributions from the Banco de España, the 
amount of which shall be fixed by Law”. In 2010 the Banco de España made no contribu-
tions whatsoever to these Funds.
The table below shows the loans outstanding in 2010 with interest rates below the refer-
ence rates used, in order to estimate the loss of profit for the year pursuant to the provi-
sions of Article 4.2 of Law 13/1994 of 1 June 1994 of Autonomy of the Banco de España.
Included under “Net State debt” is the average balance during the year, on a daily basis, 
of the special loans granted to the State before 1994 less the deposits held by the Treasury 
with the Banco de España, when there is a net balance in favour of the latter.
The reference rate used to estimate the loss of profit in all the loans is the daily average of 
the marginal interest rate on main refinancing operations conducted during the year.
On 26 March 2007 an agreement was entered into with the State government to bring 
forward the repayment schedule of the loans granted to the State prior to the entry into 
force of Law 21/1993 of 29 December 1993 on the State Budget for 1994 (Law 3/1983 
loan, Law 4/1990 loan and credits arising from subscription for participating interests, 
contributions and quotas in international agencies), such that they all reach final maturity 
by 2015 at the latest and the Treasury can request early repayment of part or all of these 
facilities, paying on the due date the effective market price instead of the nominal amount. 
Under this agreement, in 2010 payment was received of two instalments of the first of the 
aforementioned facilities (that for the reporting year and the last outstanding instalment of 
the original repayment schedule), along with the reporting year instalments of the other 
two facilities, the repayment date of all of them being brought forward from 31 December 
to 30 April. In accordance with the foregoing, on 30 April 2010 the Treasury paid to the 
Banco de España the amount of €543.60 million, the effective market price of the debt 
repaid on that date.
4.1  Contributions made 
by the Bank to the 
Deposit Guarantee 
Funds
4.2  Loss of profit
4.3  Other transactions
4  SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 4.2 OF THE LAW OF AUTONOMY
OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA OF 1 JUNE 1994
Type of credit/loan
Average balance 
in 2010
Interest rate 
received
    (%)
Reference 
interest rate
       (%)
Estimated loss 
of prNjt
Net State debt 3,937.24 — 1.00 39.37
Housing loans and repayable 
advances to employees 
41.70 0.13 1.00 0.36
Housing loans 7.46 0.75 1.00 0.02
Repayable advances 34.24 — 1.00 0.34
TOTAL 3,978.95 0.00 1.00 39.73
EUR m and % 
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1 REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITORS
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We the undersigned, Ángel Luis López Roa, Ana María Sánchez Trujillo and Carmen Alon-
so Ledesma, are members of the Governing Council of the Banco de España and of the 
Audit Committee appointed by the Governing Council. In accordance with Article 29 of the 
Internal Rules of the Banco de España, we were given the task of reviewing the accounts 
of the Institution for the year 2010.
As required by the aforementioned precept, the Audit Committee has analysed the opera-
tions of the Banco de España. This examination basically involved: 1) studying the annual 
accounts of the Banco de España for the year 2010, prepared by the Directorate General 
Services of the Banco de España; 2) studying the audit of the balance sheet and profit and 
loss account of the Banco de España for 2010, conducted by the Internal Audit Depart-
ment; 3) studying the documentation requested by the members of this Committee from 
the independent external auditors; 4) interviewing the persons responsible for the inde-
pendent external audit, for the Internal Audit Department and for the Control, Budget and 
Accounting Department; and 5) making proposals for the modification, correction or clari-
fication of various matters, all of which have been satisfactorily incorporated in the annual 
accounts by the Control, Budget and Accounting Department.
The basic conclusion of our report is that from the analysis carried out of the examination 
and accounting procedures, of the accounting records and of the internal controls in place, 
it can be inferred that the annual accounts for the year 2010 give a true and fair view of the 
net worth and financial position of the Banco de España.
Madrid, 5 May 2011.
2  REPORT OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE
CARMEN ALONSO LEDESMAANA MARÍA SÁNCHEZ TRUJILLOÁNGEL LUIS LÓPEZ ROA
INDEXES
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